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PRECIS.
1 The Akan Law of Property” endeavours to describe the 
present position of land-tenure in a homeonomic group of Gold 
Coast peoples. It attempts neither to expound the ancient 
customary lav/, nor to give a definitive restatement of the 
modern law - and that for a very good reason. The law of 
the Gold Coast today is a law in transition, from an entirely 
unwritten body of rules fortified by long-established usage, 
but subject as customary lav/ so often is in its unwritten 
stages to local exceptions and shifting emphases, and designed 
for the simple needs of a people without commerce or permanent 
agriculture, to a twentieth-century legal system suitable for 
the requirements of a modern economy based on cash-crops and 
trade. The crystallization of valuable rights in land, 
claimed concurrently by a hierarchy of holders from the para­
mount stool to the individual cultivator, is illustrative of 
this change in purpose.
The complex and fluid nature of land-rights in the South­
ern Gold Coast at the present time, due to this transition and 
the partial reception of English law, has for long led respon­
sible persons to call for a statement of the modern law, and 
at the same time has deterred anyone from making the attempt.
The existing authorities are brief or out-of-date. No-one 
would minimise the valuable contributions of Sarbah, Danquah 
and Rattray to our knowledge of Akan law; but there has been 
up till now no book solely or even largely devoted to the Akan 
law of property, nor one which has set out to synthesize the 
developing customary law with the many decisions of the super­
ior courts on that law. Nor has much attention been paid to 
the decisions of native courts, which often reflect changing 
attitudes in advance of official recognition.
"The Akan Law of PropertytT is divided into three Parts:
Part I deals with the Persons of Akan Law - the Stool, 
the Family, and the Individual.
Part II covers the Institutions of Akan Law - sale, 
pledge, tenancy, gift, caretakership, 
succession.
Part III deals with Miscellaneous Topics; the use of 
writing, the function of long possession, and 
the application of registration to Akan tenure.
Part I: the land-rights of stools are set out, the vague
term wstool land” is analysed into its component parts, the 
modern separation (formerly inconceivable) between the chief 
and his stool is shown. The complicated and varied problems 
(both of fact and law in each particular case) whether a 
stool has rights of ownership, or only of jurisdiction, or 
both, are considered in a separate chapter. In the sphere 
of the family, the term family property" is also divided, so 
as to show the exact interrelation between a family and its 
members, and especially the weakening control now exercised 
by a family over its members. The rights of citizens and 
"strangers’ (the latter of increasing importance today) are 
also examined.
Part II: dealings with rights in land are considered in
the complexity induced by concurrent separation of interests, 
and the diversity of possible subject-matter. The more inter­
esting features here include:-
(1) the virtual disappearance of the ancient pledge;
(2) the growth of new forms of tenancy;
(3) the institution of " c are taker ship" ;
(4) developments in the customary law of testate
and intestate succession, particularly through the demand
that widows and children of males should be provided for.
Part III: the efforts of the superior courts to fill the
gap caused by the absence of rules of prescription or limita­
tion in Akan law are examined; whilst the chapter on WRITING 
reveals the consequences of the not always happy marriage bet­
ween English and African law. In Chapter XIII present legis­
lation and experiments relevant to registration of title, and 
a tentative scheme for recording titles, are set out, with an 
eye to the future development of Gold Coast land-law, in which 
it is expected that registration will play a large part.
Apart from the mass of new material presented here, the 
method used in collecting this material is largely novel. The 
Akan law being mainly unwritten, reliance had to be placed on 
the personal receipt of oral information on the spot: the methoc 
thus differs widely from that customary in legal research (ex­
cept for the investigations into customary law in the Punjab 
and Indonesia). In Africa up to now most of the collection of 
information on customary laws has been made by anthropologists, 
and not by lawyers. "The Akan Law of Property" thus represents 
a new venture in the techniques of legal research.
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GLOSSARY.
I. NATIVE WORDS.
(Note: The spelling of the Twi, Pante and Asante words adopted 
here is the author's own. The orthography of these 
languages has varied very widely in the past hundred 
years, and is not yet stabilized. Spellings given 
f below are generally in conformity with accepted modern 
’ ; practice; but the reader may care to refer to J.G.
Christaller: Dictionary of the Asante and Fante Language.)
Diacritics have been omitted.
Abus a
Abusua
Abusuahene
Abusuapanin
(also - ebusah, bu'sa) - lit, “division into three 
parts”; used here principally of abusa tenancies, 
where a tenant contracts to pay one-third of the 
yield (usu. cocoa) from the land which he holds.
“Clan”; or “family” (matrilineal).
“Head of the Chief's family group” - Warrington.
Head of an abusua or family; lit. “Elder of the 
Family”.
Abusuatirl Head of an abusua.
Adonten The main body of the army.
Adonterihene The chief of the Adonten wing of the army.
Ahenfie “House of the chief” or palace.
Aseda
/Bu'sa
Ebusah
Fie
Fie-nipa
“Thank-offering"; a token of money, drink, etc., 
given by the recipient of a benefit to the donor 
in thanksgiving, and to seal the arrangement.
See abusa.
See abusa.
“House”, both literally and figuratively.
“People of the house”; often a euphemism for 
sieves, “domestics" (q.v.) or servants.
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Fie-wura
Guaha
Kwae
Mailo
Mbusua
Mfuwa
Mpaninfo
Nua
Ntome
Ntoro
Obaapanin
Odikro
Ohemaa
Ohene
Okyeame
“Master of a house”; head of a household.
"Etymology uncertain; guaha is “cut" in order to 
complete a conveyance of land, especially by sale.
Virgin forest, not yet brought under cultivation; 
in distinction to mfflwa (q.v.), land cultivated, 
and then allowed to revert to secondary bush.
UGANDA. A native modification of the English word 
“miles*4, and referring to land allocated by the 
British Government to chiefs and others, in dis­
tinction to land held there by native tenure.
Plural of abusua, q.v.
"Fallow-landu; cultivated land now uncultivated, 
resting, or lying fallow, in accordance with the 
native practice of shifting cultivation.
Plural of panin, q.v.
Brother, real or classlficatory.
A boundary tree, planted at the corner of a piece 
of land when it is sold or otherwise transferred.
(Ashanti Nton) Patrilineal, totemic(?) groupings, 
cutting across the Akan matrilineal system. Now 
apparently in decline.
(Also obaapenin) lit, “the old woman”; the senior 
female member, or “female head”, of a family.
(Also odekro) “one who eats a village”; the polit­
ical head of a village, often distinguished from 
a mere headman, usually on the ground that the odik 
ro has a stool.
The “Queen-Mother”, or senior female relative of 
a chief.
Chief. Freely used in compounds as ”-hene” - 
e.g. Asantehene, Omanhene, meaning the chief of 
Ashanti, the chief of the oman or state (paramount 
chief).
The spokesman of a chief; in Gold Coast usage 
invariably called the "linguist” of a chief.
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Oman
Omanhene
Panin
Panyin 
Peyin
Safohene
Samanfo
Samansew
Sanaheno
Tramma
II.
Arbitration
Authoriza­
tion
A community, the people of a particular area, 
the state.
Head of the state; in Ashanti used for the divi­
sional chiefs (e.g., Adansihene, Mamponghene) 
serving the Asantehene directly; a Paramount Chief.
An "elder”; used of the elders of a chief, or of 
a family.
See Panin.
(Also: Safohin) a chief serving a Paramount Chief; 
a senior or wing chief.
The departed ancestors.
(Also: samansiw, samanse, nsamansie, saman-nse) 
customary oral will or declaration by a person on 
his death-bed. Lit, "what the ghost said" or 
"what the ghost set aside".
The official in charge of the Royal treasury.
(Also: trimma, ntrimma, ntrama); lit, "cowries"; 
a token given to seal a sale; see SALE, pp. 353 
et seq. "ton no ntrama” is used to mean "sell 
outright".
ENGLISH WORDS USED IN SPECIALIZED MEANINGS.
The customary mode of settling disputes out of 
court by reference to an "arbitrator", who may be 
the head of the family, a chief, or a private in­
dividual. His award is binding only when accept­
ed by the parties; hence customary arbitration is 
not to be confused with the English institution of 
the same name.
Permission given by A to B to deal with property, 
where title is with A and. not with B; e.g., per­
mission given by a family to one of its members 
to sell the inherited .property which he holds, 
including the family's interest. Used in 
opposition to "consent", q.v.
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Caretaker
Citizen
Class I Area
Class II 
Area
Company
Dash
Domestic
Drink
Elder
Fallow-land 
Family
Family-head
One who looks after property for its owner, 
usually on customary terms (see Ch. VIII, post).
A subject of a stool or state, bound thereto by 
birth into one of the families owing allegiance 
to that stool or state; used In opposition to 
"stranger" - one not so bound.
Areas or states where claim to the absolute title 
in the land is laid by the stools, and not by 
families or individuals; e.g., Ashanti.
Areas or states where claim to the absolute title 
in the land is laid by families or Individuals, 
and not by stools (which claim at most jurisdict­
ional rights); e.g., Fante.
Groups of "young men" or ordinary citizens (per­
haps originally for military purposes), especially 
in the coastalareas (e.g., Cape Coa3t, Elmina). 
Their main purpose now is social and religious. 
Although outside the customary legal framework, 
they claim at times special rights in regard to 
land as companies. There is no connexion with 
joint-stock companies.
A gift; often used of presents customarily given 
to seal a bargain, introduce an applicant, etc.
An emancipated slave, or a descendant thereof; 
the status of domestic entails In customary law 
special privileges and special liabilities in the 
family of which he is an adoptive member.
Often used of customary presents or "dashes", 
especially In the giving of aseda (q.v.). Is 
either drink, or its value in money (calculated 
on a standard customary scale in "bottles").
A panin (q.v.), of a chief or a family.
Twi mfuwa. q.v.
The Akan matrilineal family or abusua, a legal 
person in Akan law. See Ch. IV, passim.
The abusuapanln, or head of a whole family. He is 
appointed to this position by election by the 
other members of the family. See Ch. IV.
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Family-
house
Family-
member
Family-
property
Family-stool
Farm-stead
Foodstuffs
Gong-gong
Inherited 
property
Knocking-fee
A house which is family property; used especially 
of the principal family house, where the head of 
the family resides.
One qualified by relationship strictly through 
the female line to share in the life of the fam­
ily, to succeed to the property of other members, 
etc. See Oh. IX.
In general, all property to which the family as a 
whole lays claim (apart from the interests of any 
political superior). The antithesis is with 
"self-acquired'1 property" or "individual property".
Although "inherited property" (q.v.) is family 
property In the wide sense, a distinction Is made 
in this work between family property in the narrow 
sense (where the family as a whole has the title 
and the use); and inherited property (where the 
family has the title, the individual successor 
the use for the time being).
One of the two types of stool, the other being 
"town-stools". Primarily a stool to which the
members of a family exclusively elect and depose; 
typically the stool of the head of a family 
(abusua-panln); but a family may have more than 
one stool.
A synonym for fallow-land.
Subsistence, as opposed to cash or commercial, 
crops. The antithesis is usually made between 
"foodstuffs farms" (e.g., cassava, maize, etc.) 
and cocoa farms. Often different rules apply 
to each type of farm.
An instrument used by the messengers or "town- 
criers" of chiefs to summon the inhabitants and 
give them information or instructions.
A species of the genus family property, q.v. 
Property to which an individual member of a fam­
ily has succeeded on the death intestate of another 
member of that family. The antithesis Is often 
made with "self-acquired property".
A present of drink or money often used to Initiate 
bargaining, e.g., on sale of land or marriage.
Linguist The okyeame or spokesman of a chief.
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Oath A customary method of commencing a case.
Queen-Mother The ohemaa or senior female relative of a chief.
Rope A customary measure of land, usually equalling
24 fathoms.
Section A major segment, "branch", or "house", of a family. 
Senior member of a family, a panin.
Sheep-money A customary mode of reckoning money, originally 
tied to the price of sheep. Now used in refer­
ence to the mode of calculating money-rent s.
That which binds or confirms a transfer, or 
arrangement. Usually consists of something given 
by the person benefited to the person conferring 
the benefit. It may be drink, sheep, etc. Its 
effect is usually to make the transaction Irrev­
ocable.
(1) a native chair.
(2) the blackened or consecrated stool(s) of the 
ancestors of a chief or head of a family.
(3) a legal person (-"crown" or "throne"), the 
chief and his elders and councillors acting 
on behalf of his subjects. ; , ' ; ; ; „  ^ :
One who voluntarily or by custom renders customary 
services to a stool, of a domestic or ritual 
nature,
The wives of a chief, who are stool property; 
they are enjoyed by the chief for the time being 
and passed on to his successor on the stool.
Wing One of the major divisions of an Akan army, hence
of an Akan state.
Young man (1) Ordinary citizen of a state, not being of
royal or chiefly blood.
(2) Ordinary member of a family, not being its 
head or an elder.
Stamp
Stool
Stool-
servant
Stool-wife
INTRODUCTION,
The subject of this book is the Akan law of property.
In order not to mislead the reader, it is, I think, essential 
to indicate its scope, the problems that it considers, and how 
far it can be said to provide answers for them.
First, it is necessary to say something about the word 
nAkann. This word is linguistic rather than ethnographic,
but serves conveniently to delimit the Fante- and Twi-speaking 
peoples of the Colony of the Gold Coast and Ashanti. This 
group stands out, not merely on linguistic grounds, but by 
reason of institutions also, from its neighbours: the Akan
peoples are matrilineal, they share a similar clan-system, 
they all have a political system based on the Institution of 
the chieftaincy and in particular of the Stool. Some of the 
Akan peoples may have borrowed certain features of their org­
anization from their more successful neighbours (the division, 
for instance, into "wings" (Nifa, Benkum, Adonten, etc., orig­
inally for military purposes); their non-Akan neighbours may 
have borrowed some of these typical institutions (for instance, 
among the Ga people); but the isolation appears to be justi­
fied. There are borderline cases: both In language, and
perhaps in institutions, there is a certain shading off to the 
West - the Ahanta and Nzlma peoples, and to the East - some of 
the Guang fragments; but 1 have not hesitated from mere con-
2sideratlons of language to quote cases originating in Sekondi 
and Takoradi as evidence of general principles of Akan law*
Prom the personal point of view, it was impossible to 
investigate every aspect of the customary law in every tribe, 
state, or community within the Akan group* I hope that by 
taking representative samples from amongst the different peoples, 
of the Gold Coast a sufficiently definite body of custom has 
been accumulated, and especially that certain principles and 
points of practice have been established: these principles are,
I feel, of fairly general acceptance among the Akans; where it 
is alleged that there is a local difference, one^s approach 
should be cautious though not entirely sceptical* Local dif­
ferences undoubtedly exist. Some of these differences are 
brought out in the text; some are due to the varying ways in
which local authorities have emended or supplemented the exist- j
■ s
ing customary law to cope with modern difficulties and modern
i
developments. Again, there is a radical difference between 
the relation of the stools to land in Ashanti on the one hand, 
and in Fante land on the other. Further, in many cases differ­
ences are not so much between one locality and another, as bet­
ween one family and another; this makes extremely difficult a 
detailed statement of certain aspects of the family law in re­
gard to such matters as the appointment of the head of the
family, the rights of a successor, and so on.
We are concerned with the "law of property”. In case the
3critical reader objects that the major portion of the text 
concerns the law of real property, that is, the law of land 
tenure, one may plead in extenuation the classic real property 
legislation of 1925, the principal statute of which was simply 
entitled "The kaw of Property Act, 1925". And, secondly, 
customary rules do not seem to have reached such a stage of 
elaboration in regard to movable as to immovable property; 
where there are such rules, they frequently follow the general 
pattern of property law. Economic development brings its own 
difficulties: new classes of chattels, comparable in value to
houses and farms, are now the subject of ownership - for in-, 
stance, lorries and motor-cars. The English law of torts has 
found a similar difficulty with such chattels (in regard to 
the liability of the owner for injury suffered therein): in
the African, as in the English, law there is a tendency to 
create a third class of property, intermediate between the 
time-honoured categories. The law for each class of property 
has been separately indicated wherever possible.
What is the law which is described here? It is not the 
ancient customary law; nor is it the modern customary law by 
Itself. It is rather the modern customary law as established 
in practice and recognized by the native courts, together with 
modifications due to the Influence of English legal ideas, and 
to the Judgements of the superior courts. If the law which 
is as a result set out in the following pages appears a melange
4of rules and principles derived from more than one system, and 
not always wedded in a happy union, then the description does 
no more than picture forth the present state of Gold Coast law, 
which calls urgently for revision and codification*
A new Bentham, one who wished to codify the customary and 
other law of the Gold Coast, could not he expected to perform 
such an heroic task - whether he Intended merely to record in 
Indisputable form the law now existing, or to produce from 
existing elements adapted to new principles a workable law for 
this age of cocoa,timber and gold concessions, and town- 
planning, unless he had first beside him a statement of the 
law as it is now administered, even if that statement revehled 
serious gaps and uncertainties - for, after all, it is to 
settle such uncertainties and fill such gaps that he will be 
called on to draw up a uniform code. This treatise, by 
revealing the present state of Gold Coast law, may perhaps 
impel and encourage the demand for codification; and it is 
hoped that it may also assist the codlfler in his task*
A few words must be said about the sources of the law 
described below* nSources” in this context refers rather to
the places to which one can go for Information, than to the 
law-making power, or to the justification for treating custom 
as a source of law* Such jurisprudential questions are best 
left uhbroached here, although it is important to note that 
modern legislation recognises custom as a source of law (vide
5tli© Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance, 1944), provided it is
fortified by established usage.^ The Gold Coast is fortunate
in comparison with most other British African possessions, in
having a considerable literature on the subject of customary
2
law. The works of Sarbah, so long treated as an authority 
in the courts and elsewhere, (even for non-Pante custom), 
Rattray.® the distinguished anthropologist who also had a 
legal training (which sometimes led him into error^), and
R
Danquah. fortunately still with us, are a sufficient indica­
tion of the richness available in the field. Going more
widely we find the valuable works of Hayes Redwar and Casely 
7Hayford - two authorities frequently quoted in the courts.
It is no coincidence that so many of these authors have been 
indigenous, a fact which may be considered to give them added 
insight into the background of the customary law In the Gold 
Coast. Various sociologists have also delved Into the way of 
life of Africans in the Gold Coast,® but they naturally tend
1. Such points are considered in J.N. Mat son Js work on 
Native Custom in the Courts, unfortunately not yet 
published; though not generally available, it Is a 
most valuable critique of the courts* attitude.
2. His Fanti Customary Laws. Fantl Law Reports. Fanti 
National Constitution, etc.
5. In his series of books on Ashanti custom and institutions.
4. For example in his search for feudal parallels to Akan law.
5. In Akan Laws and Customs, and Cases in Akan Law.
6. Comments on the Gold Coast Ordinances.
• 7. Gold Coast Native institutions.
8. E.g., Field and Fortes.
to approach the problems we are to consider from a different 
point of view: the sociologist treats the law as only one of
the factors which go to make up the life of the community - he 
will look at law as “social engineering11, in Pound*s phrase.
To the lawyer, evaluating law only as a body of rules enforce­
able in the courts, a narrower approach is essential.
Nor have the Judicial personages of the Gold Coast been 
backward in making plain the rules of customary law as they 
see them; from Governor Maclean through the great Brandford 
Griffith to the present day, the country has not lacked those 
who have examined customary law with critical sympathy in their 
decisions. The series of reports of cases decided in the 
Supreme Court, the Full Court, and later in the West African 
Court of Appeal, are impressive by their volume; no-one exam­
ining the customary law dare ignore them. It Is to be reg­
retted that It was decided to cease reporting the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast in 1937, since much of value 
subsequent to that date may thus have been lost. Fortunately, I
one may still find unpublished copies of some decisions of the 
for
court/after this date, which In some cases give Important 
evidence of changes of mind in the attitude to certain customs, 
and an indication of the approach to new problems which have 
arisen (e.g., in connexion with swollen-shoot disease in cocoa). 
One must also note with regret that certain decisions in the 
superior courts have not dealt adequately with customary law,
whether by Ignoring established custom, by putting on a custom
a complexion which it does not bear, or by failing to make a
sufficient distinction between the different customary laws of
9
the Gold Coast. One therefore approaches decided cases with 
respect, but sometimes with caution; and I must apologize to 
readers who may feel put out to find that I have not hesitated 
to Indicate those cases where the courts have, in my opinion, 
gone wrong* In some Instances, since the decision of the 
court is conclusive of the law, it is now too late to restore 
the right custom; in other, however, superior courts may be 
able to override previous decisions, even whenhallowed by 
antiquity; and certainly the most profitable method of doing 
so is by recognition of the mutable nature of custom, espec­
ially at the present time.
Besides, then, text-books and court decisions, there are 
other written sources of information* The files of the 
Administration often reveal a problem, or answer one. The 
reports of commissions of enquiry (of which the Gold Coast has,
9. The most flagrant example of this is in connexion with 
the customary law of succession in Accra, which although 
not strictly within the present terms of reference, Is 
too obvious to let pass. Ga succession is patrilineal, 
not matrilineal; and yet not only have the works of 
Sarbah, writing about Fante custom, been cited as decis­
ively against patrilineal succession, but evidence from 
the Gas themselves has been rejected when in favour of 
succession through the father.
See my A Note on the Ga Law of Succession* B.S.O.A.S. 
(1953) Vol. XV, 1, p. 164.
8through the years, had a considerable number) are also in some
cases worth consultation?’^ Lastly, there Is a rich field of
material available in the shape of native court records, a
field up till now largely untouched?^ The records of the
native courts vary greatly in quality as from one court to
another (those from certain of the “A” Courts are excellent),
and they may even be illegible or unintelligible; even when
the judgements have been perverted for extra-judicial reasons,
the customary law is often correctly stated: for this purpose,
the examination of witnesses as recorded is often more valuable
than the judgement itself, which may, for various reasons, omit
almost all statement of principle or practice* Investigation
of native court records - which in the Gold Coast are kept in
English - is thus something which should be initiated on a
larger seale: I cannot claim to have done more than touch the
12fringe of the subject in my investigations*
There are also the unwritten sources of information. As 
is common practice throughout Africa, there are certain persons 
who by custom have been trained to a greater knowledge of the 
time-honoured principles of the customary law than other 
members of the tribe; and a large part of my information has 
been gathered by oral inquiry from these persons. I refer to
10. E.g. of the Belfleld Commission*
11. But not in Tanganyika, where Cory and Hartnoll derived 
most of their information for their Customary kaw of the 
Haya Tribe from court records.
12. I should warn potential Investigators that the examination 
and sifting of native court records is a most
laborious business*
9the elders and "linguists" of the chiefs, who traditionally 
fora the advisers of the Chief in legal matters, and the panel 
of native tribunals or courts. As in other parts of Africa, 
and in other fields of research, this is our last chance to tap 
this rich source of information - much of the ancient custom in 
which the elders are skilled is now being superseded in modern 
practice, and the membership of the native courts is being 
"democratized” by the inclusion of non-traditional members, so 
that a cleavage is developing between those who are experts in 
customary law, and those who try cases involving that law.
Besides these African experts, I did not hesitate to 
examine for myself the actual practice of the people, nor to 
question at length persons of all walks and ranks in life. 
Customary law is, after all, authenticated by its observation; 
a custom which is no longer followed has to that extent ceased 
to be a custom recognizable by the courts. This personal in­
vestigation and Inquiry was also essential for fixing the 
sociological background in which the customary law operates, 
and to explain the reasons underlying its rules. It emphasized 
how customary law is the law of the possible, rather than a 
science for settling disputes; that the African (though often 
stigmatized as litigious) is more at home in a customary 
arbitration, and that the arbitrator will try, within the
13, A term how exclusively used in the Gold Coast for the 
"okyeame" or "spokesman" of a chief.
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framework of commonly-accepted principles, to produce a solu­
tion which will restore peace between the contending parties*
The solution is one which will "be acceptable to the parties,
rather than one justified by strict adherence to legal rules,
14or even by an appeal to the doctrine of fair play.
It would not be out of place to say a few words about the 
nature of the evidence upon which the account that follows is 
based. The statements of substantive law which are put for­
ward here rest largely on oral information gathered by myself 
as the result of a process of question-and-answer. This may 
be a treacherous method if certain points are not kept clearly 
in mind:
(1) It is much better to ask informants for a statement of 
the customary law applicable to a particular set of facts, 
rather than for an enunciation of some general principle un­
related to actual instances. My experience was that questions 
of a general nature - "what is the customary law relating to 
the disposal of self-acquired property?", and the like - were 
most likely to mislead the informant, or cause him to give 
answers at variance with present practice. I therefore en­
deavoured to limit questions to concrete cases which could 
arise, or had arisen, and to elicit an answer restricted to 
such cases. By varying the details of a hypothetical case,
14. Cf. my Customary Law of the Akan Peoples. African Studies.
March 1955, &6.
J
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more general rules of law gradually emerged. This method was 
more tedious than that of generalized questioning; but It was 
rewarding, since it could more easily be verified by court- 
cases and personal observation. After a sufficient multiplica­
tion of instances a general conclusion may form in the invest­
igator's mind; and there is at this stage no objection to 
testing the conclusion by putting it to the informants.
It is for such reasons that I am suspicious of the 
Questionnaire” method of investigating customary law, since 
the questions which can be asked are usually general in nature 
(though such a questic&iaire can usefully be drawn up, and kept 
by the investigator as a reminder of the main points he wishes 
to examine).
(2) Answers from informants may be coloured in either of 
two ways: (1) they give an idealised picture of customary law, 
either as it was, or as they would like it to be;
(11) they ignore established custom in giving an 
account of actual practice, even where this runs counter to the 
accepted principles of customary law.
Evaluation of statements of customary law, if one bears 
these tendencies in mind, is nevertheless rendered difficult 
by the fact that sufficiently numerous infractions of ancient 
customary law over a period of years establish a new custom; 
and it is not easy to specify the exact point of change, to 
decide whether the information from our second type of inform­
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ant represents an Infraction (though a frequent one) of the 
customary law, or an acceptable change in usage.
(5) Besides unconscious prejudice, one finds also active 
bias, under which informants may tend to pervert the customary 
law deliberately in order to deceive the questioner. This may 
occur whenever the subject of enquiry is in actual dispute in 
the courts, or is likely to be brought there. Such bias was 
often detectable by looking through recent native court records, 
through “complaint files" held by the Administration, and so on.
(4) Where possible theoretical answers must be verified,
not merely by repetition of questions to different groups of
informants, but by observation of actual usage and scrutiny of
15court records. This was done wherever feasible.
(5) Much of the information given here was received by way 
of interpreters, a notorious source of error. This was yet 
another reason why general questions on rules of custom were 
avoided, since the use of Twi words (such as - "own") is as 
lax as that of the corresponding English terms in ordinary 
speech.
The impression which one derives from this investigation 
is of a fairly static basis of customary law, with a constantly 
changing surface, the result of adaptations by custom of ancient 
rules to new problems. I hope that in this aecount of the
15. But a large part of the time of native courts is taken up 
with criminal work; and one cannot expect to find con­
firmation of every point made in oral questioning.
J
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Akan law of property the basis of generally-accepted principles
16
emerges through the surface of shifting material♦
It remains only to requite some debts of gratitudes the 
first duty of acknowledgement is owed to those who provided 
the finance without which the investigation would have been
17impossible* For financing my first visit to the Gold Coast
I have to thank the School of Oriental and African Studies, of
18
the University of London. For the second visit, I am in­
debted to assistance from the Colonial Social Science and Res­
earch Council, who provided the funds. On each visit, my work 
would have been impossible without the kind interest and aid 
provided by the Gold Coast Government in general, and its 
servants in particular, from whom I received all the co-opera­
tion possible.
Some personal debts of gratitude remain: to Mr. A.J.
Loveridge, O.B.E., formerly Senior Judicial Adviser, and
presently Chief Commissioner of the Colony, (who was in a 
sense the fons et orlgo of this inquiry); to his successors 
in the former post, Mr. A.C. Russell and Mr. J.N, Matson, who 
have not only provided assistance, but stimulation and comment; 
to Professor Vesey-FitzGerald, ft.C., LL.D., lately of the
16. It is hoped to produce a brief manual of the principles 
of Akan law; but such a work must clearly rest on a 
previous expanded treatment such as is given here.
17. October 1949 - April 1950.
18. October 1950 - April 1951.
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School of Oriental and African Studies, who as my supervisor 
has guided and watched over me; to the officers of the Polit­
ical Administration in the Colony and Ashanti, and to a host 
of other government servants, whom I have found at all times 
willing, not merely to facilitate my investigations, hut to 
devote some of their time to aiding me, in and out of office 
hours, and in many different ways; and finally, (and most 
important), to the Paramount Chiefs, Chiefs, Elders and Lingolsbs, 
and to the employees of the Native Administrations - regis­
trars, state secretaries - of the many states which I visited 
both in the Colony and Ashanti. It is impossible to over­
emphasize the importance of their willingness to discuss 
points of customary law, often at length, and to make available 
to me their resources.
P A R T  I.
THE PERSONS OF AKAN LAW.
^  < ur* vn 3
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CHAPTER I
THE STOOL AND PROPERTY
A, WHAT IS A STOOL? *
No examination of the Akan laws of property can fail to 
take into account the three major personae capable of enjoying 
interests in property; and it is the interplay between these 
three which makes such a fascinating study now and for the
vidual. Besides asking which of these three will eventually 
emerge as triumphant in the sphere of land-rights (a problem 
also much in evidence elsewhere in Africa), it is necessary to 
study their interrelations at the present day, and the histor­
ical process by which they have come into existence as personae.
The question of which of these three came first in point 
of time is an emotional rather than a logical or historical 
one. Today an answer to such a question will usually only be 
given to support the prejudices of the questioner; if he is 
opposed to the institution of the chief as the mark of an out- 
of-date political system, naturally the family or the individ­
ual will be placed first. If he is an individualist, he will 
play down the role of the family.
future. The three are the Stool,1 the Family, and the Indi
1. The Twi for nstool” is agua, whether one is referring to 
the ordinary article of furniture or to the wider concept.
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It Is perhaps true that the family preceded the stool: 
the stool emerged from the family. The stool exercising 
political authority has developed from the family stool with 
npatriarchalw authority. Again, between family and individual, 
no family can take its roots or be composed from anything but 
the conjunction of individuals; equally, no individual does 
not belong to a family - in fact, it is the hen-and-egg prob­
lem all over again.
lfi/hatever the truth of the matter, one has to deal with 
present-day problems. In this age all three are significant 
forces in the ordering and development of the Akan peoples; 
to ignore one of them would be fatal to an understanding of 
property and other customary law in the Gold Coast. The nature 
of the individual's interest in property as against political 
authority on the one hand (i.e., the Stool), and against the 
family on the other, must be considered: it is not sufficient
to lay down - by a sweeping and inaccurate generalization - 
that all land belongs to the stool, or to families, or to 
individuals.
The position of the Stool in Akan law has been chosen for 
examination first, because it Is the most striking feature of 
the customary law - the one most evident to outsiders - and the 
one most subject to misconceptions. It is nothing new in the 
field of African customary law to find that the Chief is 
considered to hold the lands of the tribe In trust for his
17
people; but the Stool as such (bearing some analogies to the 
position of the Crown In English law) Is an advanced juridical 
concept, one which one would not expect to find In a customary 
law which not so long ago would have been miscalled a ”prim- 
ltlve legal system”* What Is more, It Is Indigenous and not 
exotio, which speaks much for the capacity of the customary 
law for evolution, by a combination of native genius and the 
logic of events.
So much has already been written by those well-qualified
by reason of birth or understanding on the subject of the
2
stool as such, that It would seem as Impertinent as it Is 
unnecessary to say more of this here. Constitutional quest­
ions - who may elect to a stool, who may depose, etc. - are 
outside the scope of this work, except insofar as they have 
something to tell us about the legal results in relation to 
property of the modes of election and destoolment, and the 
rights which the electors may be presumed to delegate or retain 
over the property and people entrusted to the stool.
Family and Town Stools:
Stools are of two kinds, the ”famlly stool”, and the 
”town stool”. It would seem to an observer that this divi­
sion, though patent in theory, is more difficult to elaborate 
in practice. The mark of the distinction appears to lie in
2. See, for instance, Rattray, A.L.C., esp. at pp. 81 et seq; 
Danquah, A.B.C., esp. pp.109 et seq. and pp. 200 et seq: 
Busia, esp. Chapter II.
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tiie class of electors to the stool - where the stool-occupant 
is appointed by the family of which he is a member, such a 
stool is called a family-stool. Originally, nothing was 
known except family-stools: the head of a family who had 
distinguished himself and brought honour on the family during 
life, was himself honoured after death by having his stool 
consecrated and placed as a family relic in the family shrine 
or stool-house# As the family grew in size and importance, 
the number of stools thus consecrated grew with it, even 
though the occupant from time to time would still be described 
as occupying the stool of that distinguished ancestor. The 
notion of "stool*1 was thus generalized from the actual stools 
of the family-heads to an abstract conception, just as the see 
of a bishop is a generalization. But one must not make the 
mistake of taking the stool for a mere symbol: the analogy
with the Crown is close, and therefore doubly likely to mislead*
3. Ghambra v, Swea. (1892) F.L.R* 64, (See also: Ren, 92).
Warrington says (p.4) that: "Practically all
Stools in Ashanti may be regarded as Family 
Stools, since only members of a particular 
branch of a particular family are eligible 
for election to any Stool; but the term is 
properly applicable to the Stools of the 
Abusuatiri. ♦
Also see: Amissah v. Krabah (1936) P.O., 2 W.A.C.A. 30,
where it was found that the lands in dispute were attached 
to the town-3tool of the 0hen6 of Dutch Sekondi, and not to 
the family-stool in his stool-family; and Wurapah v. 
Commonwealth Trust, (1922) F. Ct. *22, 80.
And Danquah, A.L.C. 114-5, maintains that "there is no 
town-stool in theory. Family stools are the 
real things". This is perfectly true if 
one bears in mind Warrington's explanation above.
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It Is true that both from the point of view of prestige and 
continuity the Crown is something larger than the actual 
crowns of the kings, or the heads on which they have rested. 
Nevertheless, it remains a symbol or a way of speech. But 
the ancestor's stool is something more than a symbol. Besides 
representing the family, it also enshrines the spirit of the 
family, and is thus a spiritual and social reality. (One's 
thoughts turn to those Jurists who describe the state or other 
body corporate as an organism different from the persons who 
oompose it, having a life of its own, and yet subsistent in 
its component parts).
The stool, then, began as a religious institution founded 
on the system of ancestor-worship dear to African and other 
peoples; but it grew to acquire other purposes and other 
meanings.
It has already been noted that the distinction between 
family and town stools is not always clear in practice. If 
a family acquired subjects who were not of the same blood, as 
might happen peacefully - through intermarriage and the founda­
tion of new villages with the co-operation of other families - 
or by war, through the subjugation of the defeated, at first 
the family stool or stools (for there might be more than one) 
would be enjoying authority over persons of different blood, 
which would be in the nature of a political and not a family 
relationship. Pamily-heads have always had power of a patri­
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archal kind over persons not of the blood - slaves, spouses 
of family-members, children of unions made by male members, 
who according to the matrilineal system of the Akans would 
follow their mother's, and not their father's, line, and so 
on* Such power was of a family nature, since the subjects 
were at least semi-dependents, or quasi-members, of the family* 
Where, however, the family - or a member thereof - ac­
quired political power, then it seems to have been recognized 
after a time that those governed should have some say in their 
mode of government; and the historical process is preserved 
by the present method of electing an occupant to a town-stool. 
It is for the family to make the suggestions or nominations, 
speaking through the Queen-Mother where there is one; for the 
citizens, through their representatives, to accept and confirm, 
or alternatively to reject, such nominations. So that which 
today is a polite fiction or matter of form represents the 
method by which the governed acquired an increasing voice in 
the government in accordance with the best democratic prin­
ciples, If the distinction is still obscured in the method 
of enstoolment, the same cannot be said for the mode of de-
stoolment. Here, where there is a town-stool, the people
4
have complete control and the family little or none* The 
“young men”, having perhaps first acquired the right by
4. Cf. Danquah, A.L.C., 121s “The Stool Family have no 
visible power in the matter of destoolment.
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revolution against lawful but detested authority, (as a matter 
of expediency), now maintain it jealously as an inalienable 
right* Destoolment, and the question of who can destool, is 
thus a characteristic of a stool, and is useful to determine 
whether the stool is a town stool, or a family stool (some­
times with some political authority). Frequently, however, 
the question is whether a destoolment has been constitutional; 
and then one must know whether the stool is family or town.
Such a mode of proof is therefore liable to become an unbreak­
able circle.
Family stools are those occupied by the head of the family 
(in the first place); but how is one to explain the transition 
from this type of stool to the town stool, of which the occup­
ant is, as feu? as one can see, not - even perhaps never - the 
head of the 3tool family? A link is missing from the chain, 
and can be supplied only by surmise. Families today may have 
several stools, which will be described as family stools; 
obviously, only one of them can be occupied by the head of the 
family at any one time. It is worth while noting that the 
right to hold a stool appears to be sometimes conferred by 
political authority from above, as in the case of the clan- 
elders who advise a town-chief. This is a change from the 
original procedure; but helps to explain how more than one 
stool may be found in one family.
Again, in the field of property, there is no doubt that
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a town-stool represents and contains the spirit of the people 
who serve that stool (who are In fact described as members of 
the stool); the best example is the Golden Stool of Ashanti, 
enshrining the spirit of the Ashanti nation. By virtue of 
this, one may conclude - as will be demonstrated later that 
in the field of property the stool speaks for, and is, its 
people; so that a stool (or the stool-holder and his advisers 
for the time being) must administer the stool-property in the 
Interests of its subjects. Family-stools representing only 
the family should represent also only the family-interest in 
property; and yet the family-stool of the founder of a village 
may come to represent members of other families who come to 
settle in that village, as the stool acquires political author­
ity, and the village grows into a "town”.
The relation of the family-3tool properly so-called to 
the ownership and use of property will be examined in the sub­
sequent chapter on THE FAMILY (Ch.IV). It Is necessary only 
to add that It would be wrong to term such property, which is 
here called family-property, “stool property”s the latter term
5
is reserved for the property of the town-stool. Here, one 
must discuss the stool in its political aspects, its relations 
with its subjects, the vexed question of the stool’s claim to
5. For cases which raise the difference between town and 
family stools, see: Tawlah v. Mensah: (1934) D. Ct ’31- 
’37, 65; and Mensah v. Toku: (1887T F.L.R. 42.
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the ultimate title to laud in its dominion, and whether the 
interest that the stool claims is one of ownership, expressed 
through the payment of rent, or jurisdiction, paramountcy or 
the right to allegiance, expressed through payment of tributes
6
and tolls, and through control of the use and disposal of land.
The institution of the stool is not primordial in the 
history of the Akan peoples, although now a typical feature 
of their society* As a certain African versed in the custom­
ary law once remarked to the author, giving the aphorism as
7
his parting shots ‘’Remember, the family came first*” This 
is no doubt true* The family existed when the stool was not; 
and it was the families, or their members, who cleared the 
bush and made the first farms in the transition from a hunting 
to an agricultural community. Throughout the history of the 
stool jurisdiction over persons has been confused with control 
over the land which they occupied* At the time when the Akans 
were hunters, it was the personal relationship which counted* 
The people, if they served anyone (and were not merely small 
family groups) served a chief in a personal capacity even where 
the allegiance was devolved* The machinery was one of govern­
ment and organization in peace (partly for ritual functions)
6 . Discussion of JURISDICTION AND OWNERSHIP is generally 
relegated to the chapter of that name below*
7* And compare Ratt* Ash, 219-220: WI am convinced that
stool lands had their origin in family lands and not 
vice versa.” (at p*2 2 0 )*
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and leadership in war or migration (much the same thing at 
that time)* Land-rights did not enter the picture, because 
they were negligible. As the land filled up and society be­
came more stabilized, stools tended to assert rudimentary 
boundaries for themselves and their peoples as between one 
hunting-tract and another, even though the boundaries at this 
time may well have been vague. At that time, for strangers 
to cross such boundaries was an act of aggression, but it was 
Invasion, and not trespass.
The relation of the Stool to the Chief occupying it:
The salient fact which must be grasped at the start is 
that the stool is not equivalent to, or co-emtensive with, the 
person occupying it for the time being, or even to a success-
Q
ion of such persons. The stool is more than the chief who 
holds it; and where we find in the customary law that the 
"Stool11 can do such-and-such, this by no means implies that 
the chief has similar powers. This truth is not always kept 
clearly in sight, even by the Africans themselves; so that it 
will be found that chiefs claim payments or powers for them-
8 . "The occupant of a stool is hot regarded as the owner of 
the lands attached to  It, but as being in some sense a 
trustee for the clan, tribe or family subject to the 
stool." - Am/i s a ah v. Krabahs £1936) P.O. 2 W.A.C.A. 30.
One regrets the use of the term "trustee", If this is
held to connote any of the rights or duties prescribed by 
technical Equity in England, A better word is "manager • 
For a further consideration of the relation between a 
stool and the chief who occupies it, see Danquah, A.L.C.
2 0 0 et seq.
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selves, when it is for their stools that such claims should 
be made# An act affecting stool property performed by.the
Y wC-
/ chief in his own capacity is therefore unconstitutional.
Grants or sales of land by chiefs alone are thus of no valid­
ity; but here again confusion is possible. To begin with, 
in former times chiefs may have been despotic, and exacted for 
themselves what should have come to the stool. There was not 
the same temptation then, however, for a chief to attempt to 
enrich himself by use of his official position, since every­
thing which he possessed was adjudged to be stool property; 
and at first a chief had no private property.
Again, a chief may be the instrument by which the stool
acts, so that a stool may sue in the name of its occupant, or
9
land may be granted in the same way. In such cases one must 
pay attention both to the form and the causa of the transaction 
to decide whether it is the stool acting, though in the name 
of the chief. Even where a chief has acted in an unauthor­
ized manner in selling or granting land, such a transaction, 
though prima facie void, may be recognized by the subjects of 
the stool, who, instead of trying to restore the status quo, 
often express their disapproval against the chief personally, 
by destoolment or otherwise.
9. A stool may further delegate specific powers to indi­
viduals, to act as agents in buying or selling interests, 
or to manage some part of the stool properties (as 
Caretakers").
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Juristic distinctions between stool and stool-holder 
were not elaborated formerly; as has been noted above, all 
a chief9s property belonged to the stool. Nowadays, of 
course, a chief is allowed to keep his own property separate 
from the stool-property - but more of this below.
Stool. Elders, and Councillors;
Other personalities enter the picture as agents of the 
stool, viz., the elders and councillors of that stool. These 
are a most important class of persons, representative of those 
who serve that stool, whose consent is essential for dealings 
with the stool property.10 If one may attempt an analogy (not 
to be carried too far) they are the Board of Directors of the 
stool, in which the subjects are "share-holders"; and to the 
chief falls the task of chairman of the Board. It is not 
suggested for a moment that a stool is a limited liability 
company; but at least the comparison serves to underline the 
facts that:
(a) the chief, with his elders and councillors, are the 
managers of the stool and its property;
(b) this power of management is to be presumed to be
10. See: Amiss ah v. Krabah; (1936) P.O. 2 W.A.C.A. 30, at 
p. 31. Sales and leases of stool lands "take place in 
the case of a state or town stool with the consent of 
the Ohene, the elders and the councillors".
And U.A.C. v. Apaw; (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 114: a chief
cannot bind the stool by an agreement (In this case a 
written lease), "unless the elders, or at all events 
the linguist had been a party thereto".
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delegated to them by the members or subjects of that stool;
(c) the members of the stool have the power (in the 
correct constitutional procedure) to change any of the members 
of the nBoard” (by destoolment) if they are dissatisfied with 
the administration of their affairs*
The Stool and its subjects;
In African society, a stool without subjects is an empty 
thing, unless the holder has assumed the rank for personal 
ostentation and display only. The interesting fact is that 
persons can be both members of a stool and its subjects at the 
same time# This is explained by the stool's being a corpora­
tion, but an organic one, in which it resembles another great 
organism, the Christian Church. Paradoxically, it lives 
alone, but it lives in its members.
If one takes a Paramount Stool, its proximate subjects 
may again be stools which are subordinate to it, and one may 
proceed down the chain of allegiance until we come to the 
human beings who form the broad base of the pyramid. The 
hierarchy of lordship might seem to imply a divided allegiance 
in the minds of the citizens. No such divided allegiance 
exists in their minds; they clearly recognize the natural
condition of hierarchical organisation - no-one but has a lord,
11
until we come to the Lord himself. But Akan structure is
1 1 . A notion which one might compare with the medieval 
feudal theory.
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not feudal; it is rather hierarchical* In practice divisions 
occur; but this does not affect the underlying theory.
The citizens are the base of the pyramid of power which is 
an Akan tribe or state. kike so many bases they tend to be 
taken for granted or ignored; but on them rests the whole 
structure, and it is right that more prominence should be given 
to them. They are the wealth of the stool; their labours 
and services have built it up: and where the stool's wealth
is converted into property, this represents the economic en­
deavour of its citizens. Their right to share in the owner­
ship and control of such property, the resources of the stool, 
should not be lightly alienated or passed over.
B. THE STOOL AMD PROPERTY.
In the forthcoming discussion of the relationship between 
a stool and property, it should be understood that we refer to 
town or political stools; the rights of a family stool over 
its "stool" property are the rights of the family over family 
property in the general sense, and they therefore do not fall 
for consideration here.
The terminology of African customary law - vague though 
it is - transcends itself in the matter of "stool property", 
since it is possible to extract several meanings from this 
expression, and in addition distinguish other forms of property
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which should not he called •stool” property.
First, we have what are called ”tribal lands”: this may
mean either the whole extent of the land occupied by a tribe;
or only those parts - virgin forest and waste land - not under 
cultivation. Whichever sense is given to the term, nstool 
lands11 is also frequently used as a synonym.
Then comes stool property in a narrow sense: farms,
houses, chattels, definitely acquired by the stool by use, gift, 
purchase or escheat.
After that there is stool-family property, or the property 
which belongs to the family from which stool-holders are 
chosen.
Finally there is the chief*s property.
The claim of the relevant stool to the reversion in tri­
bal lands, whether unoccupied, or occupied by subordinate 
stools, families and Individuals, is a claim to ultimate 
title; whereas the claim to stool property in the narrow 
sense is a claim to an interest in property such as is cap­
able of being possessed by ordinary individuals.
1. UNOCCUPIED TRIBAL LAMPS:
By ntribal lands” is meant the territory in the sphere 
of effective occupation of a tribe: of such lands part will
t
have been occupied and put to use by the members of the tribe; 
and part will remain unused, though this will diminish in 
time. The term * tribal lands” is thus sometimes used to mean
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the whole of the land occupied by members of the tribe, or 
under their control; and sometimes only that part which has 
not been brought under cultivation* The term ”stool lands11 
Is often used to signify the same thing (also in a dual sense) 
Perhaps ”tribal lands” is better, since it avoids confusion 
with other categories of stool land; and also underlines the 
point that such land is a reservoir on which any citizen may 
draw for fresh plots to cultivate.
It is well-known that stools lay claim to possess the 
reversion to unoccupied tribal lands; and it is also obvious 
that the claim is to a right which differs in nature from that 
of members of a tribe, actually farming lands, to their farms* 
The claim of the stool is to the absolute title in such tribal 
lands; whereas the individual farmer or family creates no 
more than a limited interest* (One must not be misled by 
terminology: because the stool's title is called an ”absolute
one, it must not be presumed that it may do as it pleases with 
such lands, unfettered by any obligation or restriction* The 
control of the stool over such lands is exercised for the bene 
fit of and in the Interests of the members of the tribe who 
serve that stool*)
It must also be noted that there are areas where stools 
do not lay proprietary claim to the title in all the tribal 
lands (or have only recently begun to do so); or at most 
claim only a Jurisdictional right over such lands* This is
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especially so In some of the coastal regions of the Colony 
and the only property known there appears to he stool-family 
property* In this work such areas are distinguished by call­
ing them "Class II Areas? whereas areas where stools do make 
such a claim to title are here termed "Class I Areas” *
It Is a commonly-stated principle of Akan law that there 
is no land In the Southern Cold Coast without an owner. So, 
for instance, in the Belfield Report it was said at p. 39:
”157. Section 2: ‘Unoccupied land*, The people 
take exception to the use of this term, contend­
ing that it implies the existence of land over 
which no right of ownership or occupancy is 
practised or claimed, and that the expression 
is inconsistent with the fact that all land is 
the property of some tribe or individual. The 
objection is probably not of much value...”
The discussion was in regard to s. 2 of the Forest Ordinance.
1912; it was suggested that the term “undeveloped land” might
be substituted.
The then Attorney-General, Arthur Hudson, K.C., in the
same report said at p. 45:
” ...1 acquiesce in the opinion that all land in 
/ the Colony is owned by someone. Ordinarily the 
land belongs to a chiefdom. Usually in every 
chlefdom so much land belongs to the stool.
This land is not actually rented by the stool 
but is let out to families, who live upon it.”
(The last statement is peculiar, to say the least.)
And, at p. 46 of the Report, Mr. T# Hutton-Mills said:
“There is no land in the Colony without an owner; 
it is all the property of some tribe, family or 
individual."
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In such a position Mr. C.J. Bannerman concurred at p. 51, Mr.
Crowther, S.N.A., at p. 55, Mr, Grimshaw at p. 61, the
Omarihene of Akmnfi at p. 78, the Omanhene of Yamuransa (near
12
Cape Coast) at p. 79. But in Aradzle v. Adlankah, whilst 
the Court were prepared to admit the truth of the rule at 
present, they doubted whether it had always been so, Smyly,
C.J., saying at p. 58 that "it was certainly not so 200 years 
ago".
Where there is unoccupied land, it is maintained that 
the land belongs to the adjacent or paramount stool, depend­
ing on the local custom. This was stated by Brandford
13
Griff 1 ths, C. J., in Wiapa v, Solomon:
"Though the principle obtains that all unowned 
lairi. under the authority of a paramount stool 
belongs to such stool, in practice this is 
much modified, at any rate In the Eastern parts 
of the Colony, In these parts each subordinate 
stool has attached to it large portions of land,.”
which he wrongly - as it is submitted - thought had been
"carved out of the territory originally belong­
ing to the Paramount Stool...
Any unoccupied land within the recognized 
boundaries of the subordinate stool land or 
the family land or private land would, of 
course, belong to the subordinate stool, or 
the family, or the private individual, as the 
case might be; but any unoccupied land not 
being part of the land of a subordinate stool 
or family, or a private individual, would be 
attached to the paramount stool.11
12. (1923) P.Ct *23-'25, 52; and see Sarbah, F.C.L#, 6 6 .
13. (1905) P.Ct Ren. 405.
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The proposition raises certain points:
(a) "Unoccupied” or "uninhabited" land is not the same as
14"unowned" or "unclaimed" land: Atta v. Fua held that the
lands in dispute had been "uninhabited"; the Court laid down
the rule that
"these lands being uninhabited lands situated 
between two paramount stools would according 
to native law and custom^ accrete to the 
paramount stools*..15
(b) Atta v. Fua ruled that the paramount stools (of 
Eastern and Western Akim) had, though claiming through sub­
chiefs, sufficient interest in the land to bring them under 
the Concessions Ordinance; the question of the interests of 
the sub-chiefs was specifically reserved. To whom does the 
absolute interest in the unoccupied adjacent land accrete?
(The right claimed in Atta v. Fua seems to be no more than one
16
) Deane, C.J., in Ababio v. Kanga suggests
1*7
"the nearest stool". (Hammond v. Ababio was a Ga case, but 
it was a contest between the right of the Ga Mantse, as
14. (1913) D. & P. *11-'16, 65.
15. In opposition to the finding in Akuamankra v. Paul & Ajare: 
(1912) D. & P. '11-'16, 26, that as regards a contest bet- 
ween the Akwaplm Paramount Stool and the Tutu subordinate 
stool, the Akwaplm stool had no claim to the land in dis­
pute, and that the land was "up to 1899 unowned land, ad­
jacent to the Tutu Nyago stool". (This case was disting­
uished by Brandford Griffith in his Digest from Wlapa v . 
Solomon on the ground that in the latter case the contest 
was between the Akwaplm Paramount Stool and one of jits 
subjects.) ""
16. Tl932)1 W.A.C.A. 253.
17. (1913) D. Sc P. '11-'16, 23.
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paramount chief, and the Asere Mantse, a subordinate chief.
The case Id of little assistance, although decided on the 
ground of want of sufficient evidence of title in plaintiff.)
Whatever the position in the past, at least in Class I 
areas today the claim of stools to unoccupied lands within 
their boundaries or immediately adjacent thereto must be re­
cognised.
Is the claim of the stool to title in tribal lands anal­
ogous to the fee simple vested in an English landlord? Are 
the relations between stool and subjects similar to those bet­
ween landlord and tenant? The answer is emphatically in the 
negative. The stool has various rights and duties in regard 
to such unoccupied tribal lands.
DUTIES:
Its first duty is that of conservation of the tribal 
lands. In the past this conservation was principally against 
alien invaders. Today, as regards interference with the 
rights of a tribe by strangers, the legal system is used in­
stead of warfare. Such contests are both against alien 
stools, claiming absolute title for themselves; and against 
individual strangers, who may infiltrate and squat on the 
lands. Part of the stool#s duties today is therefore the 
orderly allocation of limited farming interests to strangers, 
and the prevention of unauthorized alienations. The stool 
must also prevent waste of the tribal resources. This implies
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both prevention of negative waste, and abstention from positive 
waste* The latter is one of the main sources of diminution 
of the tribe's interests* It includes the reckless alienation 
of the timber and minerals of the land, or the wholesale 
alienation of parts of the land to strangers. No-one can 
deny today that a stool has authority to put the tribal land 
to the best use; but this should be done in such a way as not 
to impair to any serious extent the tribe's interest. This 
cannot be said to have been observed, especially in the Colony, 
where some stools have denuded themselves of all reserves of 
land. This might be considered a betrayal of trust to the 
subjects of the stool; it could not have occurred before land-
sales came into general use, except, in a comparable way,
through the loss of tribal land by warfare. In several areas 
the inconsistency of such sales with the duty of the stool to 
conserve the property of the tribe has been recognized.
The stool has a duty to control the tribal lands, which 
was formerly exercised through its powers of jurisdiction; and 
by regulation of the occupation and use of the land by its 
subjects and others.
The stool also has the duty to protect the individual 
interests of its subjects. This does not imply that in every 
case where a citizen is liable to forfeit his land because he 
has fallen into debt, the stool must step in to prevent his
losing this interest. But it extends to such matters as
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assistance of subordinate stools In litigation against neigh- 
bouring states, etc., wherein the interests of the superior 
stool may incidentally be jeopardised.
RIGHTS:
Correlative with its duties, the stool also has rights.
It has the right and the power to take action to conserve the
tribal lands, and to control their use. This finds expression
today in such matters as control of alienations, regulation of
18farming practice, forest reserves by-laws. It also has a 
right to exploit the tribal lands in the best interests of its 
subjects. Such exploitation includes the right to sell, 
lease, mortgage, or grant farming or other rights on the tribal 
land, to permit the exploitation of timber, minerals, to permit 
fishing or hunting, and so on. These rights are definitely 
proprietary. A stool requires no day-to-day authority to 
exercise these powers; but its actions are subject to control. 
The citizens have at their disposal the weapon of destoolment, 
and a chief who abuses his position on the stool to the detri­
ment of the interests of the citizens may be forced to quit. 
Such action affects only the power of the chief to misbehave 
for the future; past alienations, if unauthorized, Informal, 
or fraudulent, may be disclaimed by the stool subjects; but
18. Stools are losing, or have lost, practically all their 
jurisdictional rights to native or local authorities; 
they retain their proprietary rights (except, appar­
ently, powers of management).
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it seems obvious that this right should be exercised in a 
reasonable time, otherwise the subjects of the stool must be 
taken to have acquiesced in the dealings of the chief* It 
appears to be frequently the practice to allow past alienations 
to stand, in order to avoid disturbance of rights which may 
have come into existence since the alienations* Where a pur­
chaser at such an unauthorized sale is evicted, it is customary 
to give him an alternative portion of land. This is not ob­
ligatory, but it is preferable to the legal (but not always 
fair) eviction of the purchaser coupled with refund of the pur- 
chase-price. Exactly what authority a stool possesses in 
connexion with stool lands is not certain; it varies from 
state to state, and in accordance with practice for the time 
being* Oases do not really help us on this subject.
Concurrently with its right to exploit the tribal lands
there is the correlative right to receive the revenues from the
land. It is the stool in the first place which receives the
revenue, and not the stool-holder; though ancient custom
provides for the distribution of revenues from land and other
sources between the various parties concerned. It is most
important to note that formerly a good deal of revenues from
stool lands, although receivable by the stools themselves, were
in practice paid into local stool or Native Authority treasuries. 
_____________________________________   19
19. Though this was by no means invariably the case for
revenues from stool property in the narrow sense (farms, 
e tc•) *
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The new Local Government Ordinance, 1951, provides by s* 74(1) 
that
” The revenues from Stool lands within 
the area of authority of an Urban or 
Local Council shall be collected by 
such council and deposited In such 
special fundor funds in the custody of 
the Accountant-General as the Minister 
may direct. w
The division of the revenues between the Local Council and 
the Stool concerned is left to be decided by agreement from 
time to time between the two parties; until a proportion has 
been agreed, it will be governed by any laid down in the In­
strument relating to the council concerned (s* 74 (2) ). If 
there is at any time disagreement as to the proportion, the 
matter may be referred to the Minister (s. 74 (3) )♦ Provision 
is made for lawful payments out of the fund; but nothing is 
said about who may give a valid receipt (from the point of 
view of the payer) for payments into the fund* Is it the 
council, the authorized representative of the stool, or the 
Accountant-General?
The most important parts of the stool's powers and rights 
in regard to tribal lands are those relating to the grant of 
concessions, and other Interests in the land* It is to the 
stool that applications are made by strangers for permission 
to farm on unoccupied tribal land. The stool is represented 
by the chief, so that Africans may say that one must ask the 
chief for permission to farm; it is, of course, the stool
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which gives permission and receives the revenues* Strangers 
come under the head of persons who are "not entitled by cus­
tomary law to the free use of land" in s. 74 il) of the Local 
Government Ordinance* Permission to farm or build houses 
granted to strangers appears to be caught by the Ordinance 
whether any valuable consideration is paid or not. Therefore 
today such transactions need the "concurrence" of the Local 
Council.
Power to grant concessions: this term is used here more
widely than it is in the Concessions Ordinance, and refers to 
the grant of a licence to take minerals, prospect, cut timber, 
or otherwise obtain something of value from the land, without 
permanent interference with the potentialities of the land for 
farming. Such transactions may or may not be caught by the 
Ordinance; but in the nature of things such grants are of 
fairly recent origin, although gold-mining has been practised 
in Ashanti before the advent of the British. All these grants 
are similar to the grants of profits a prendre in English law. 
The stool is the proper agent of the citizen body for the 
granting of concessions. Where the right is of little value, 
form is not of much importance. But where conveyances are 
drawn up in proper form, then the stool must be the granting 
body. In former times the consideration for the grant of such 
rights to strangers was a percentage of the kill, catch or 
yield. Today, valuable consideration is exacted. If citizens
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occupy soma of the tribal lard for farming purposes, then the 
land becomes of a different character, and ceases to be un­
occupied tribal land, so that the grant of concessions over 
such land is Impeded or altogether lost. Where the land is 
made the subject of concession to get minerals, or fell timber, 
to fish or to hunt, etc., then it still retains its character 
of unoccupied tribal land.
2. OCCUPIED TRIBAL LANDS:
It is evident that the majority of the land within the 
confines of any state is no longer in the category of unoccup­
ied land, having been taken up by the citizens for farming and 
other purposes. Such land comes within the area of land 
occupied by the tribe as a whole, and so merits the designation 
11 tribal land11; but since interests of limited extent in the 
usufruct not previously in existence have been created in fav­
our of families and individuals, from the point of view of 
these last the land would be described as wfamily land" or 
^individual property”. As such, they are considered in their 
proper placef0 here we wish to examine only the interests in 
such land of the stool, as representing the tribe.
It may be objected that it is needlessly confusing to term 
such lands occupied by families or individuals ”tribal lands”. 
(They are often termed by a stool its 11 stool lands”). Such a
20. See: THE INDIVIDUAL, pp. 126 et seq.. 174 et seq; 
and THE FAMILY, pp; 211 et seq.
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terminology underlines the fact that the lands are part of the 
whole tribal area, out of which the farmer-citizens have 
carved their individual Interests, and that the tribe or stool 
retains some interest in such lands* It also serves to show 
that not all family or individual holdings can be considered 
as also tribal lands, since
(a) acquisitions by members of the tribe outside the 
tribal territory are not subject to tribal interests;
(b) it is possible for families or individuals to acquire 
the absolute Interest in Class I areas;
(c) in those states which do not recognize the paramount
interest or reversion of the stool in land occupied by families
or individuals it would be incorrect to call their lands tribal
lands: the tribal interest has dwindled or has never existed
as a right; in its place there is at best a shadowy sentiment*
21
These are the Class IIareas*
The nature of the stool's claim to reversion in 
family land:
In Class I areas (e.g. Ashanti, Akim) it is generally
recognized that stools have an interest in all the land in the
22
state, even if occupied by the farms or houses of the citizens.
81* Especially Fante, Ahanta, and other coastal areas.
Cf. Ami a s ah v. Krabahs (1936) P.C. 2 W.A.C.A. 30 at p. 31:
11 ..it is common ground that it is part of the Fante customary 
law that lands may be attached to the Stool of an Ohene, or 
to the stool of a family, and no doubt (as appears from 
other cases) there may be privately owned lands”. This is 
an understatement, it is respectfully submitted, of the 
actual situation.
22. (See next page)
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In such a case, not only cannot the citizen dispose of the 
absolute title to the land which he occupies, since that ab­
solute title is within the custody of the stool; but he may 
be subject to the control of the stool even when he attempts 
to deal with his own limited interest in his farm or house*
This fact is frequently described by the African as follows: 
“the farmer owns his farm, but the stool owns the land; and 
so the farmer cannot sell the land - only the stool can do 
that”* Expressed in other words, the farmer can create for 
himself only a limited interest of usufruct; he is without 
capacity to sell the land itself* Originally, too, the stool 
could not sell the land, even though it had an Interest, which 
was a mixture, as we see, of jurisdictional and proprietary 
rights* The stool performs one of its duties in recognizing 
the individual interest of the citizen who makes a farm out of 
the forest, namely, to preserve it free for the citizens, and 
permit them to farm it freely* Once citizens have begun to 
farm, the stool ceases to exercise such a close control over 
the land; and there is no interference with the farmer*
Occupied tribal land Illustrates perfectly the typical 
Akan structure of concurrent interests; it perhaps over­
simplifies too much to talk of the “stool's reversion11 without 
more* One may have a given piece of land, in which a family
22* I From previous page)
Which stool is the landowner depends on the area and the 
actual circumstances: vide JURISDICTION AND OWNERSHIP post*
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has a family interest, with one member holding an inherited 
interest over part of it; this forms part of a village, again 
subordinate to a wing chief's stool, and thence under the para­
mount stool* Rattray pictured these Interests as a series of 
circles; some of these circles are concentric, but of differ­
ing radii; others are eccentric, but a portion of their circ­
umferences overlaps* Each such circle represents a viable 
group in Akan structure, with an external unity and an Internal 
diversity. My own picture is that of a pyramid; to the Eng­
lish lawyer it is difficult to analyse them without bringing in 
such terms as freehold and leasehold, legal and equitable es­
tates* They are in fact sul generis* without exact parallel 
in English law* It cannot be truly said that there is an 
upward limit to such a pyramid, since no group or institution 
can be characterised as possessing the ultimate of rights*
One sees this where formerly Independent chiefs are placed 
under another as paramount. There is no lower limit to the 
creation of subordinate Interests.
Which came first - the stool or the family?: It so
happens that in the Fante states (and others) of the coastal 
regions the rights of the stools in land are vestigial, and 
the families claim absolute title in their own lands* In 
Ashanti and the states of the interior, the reverse is the 
case, the stools claiming absolute title* There is no doubt 
that the family as a social element antedates the stool-
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conception; but probably when the first claims to rights in 
land were asserted stools were already in existence* The 
argument is now academic*
Powers of the stool over family (and individual) lands:
(a) Control of occupation: the relevant stool may in
certain cases exercise a control over taking into use by its 
subjects of unoccupied land. But this is probably the ex­
ception. One finds that a farmer may Inform his Odikro where 
he is going to farm, or where he has made a farm; the purpose 
of this is to prevent rival claims, and ensure planned use of 
the village resources. It is possible that one would be 
required to see the chief before farming on land which is al­
ready being put to some use - for mining, or timber.
It is possible that one should make a distinction between 
holdings of land by citizens, which have been occupied by their 
families since wtime immemorial11, and those which are newly 
acquired today. It is at least customary that where a person 
from one village goes to farm in another, or where he moves 
from the area of his own chief to that of another in the same 
state, he should ask permission for farming the virgin forest 
there. Drink will customarily be given as a token acknow­
ledgement.
Occupation by strangers is of course more rigidly con­
trolled.
(b) Control of use: there is little attempt to control
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the use or misuse of citizens* holdings; and there seems to 
be no general rule - as there is in some other African com­
munities - that a man forfeits his usufructuary right to land 
if he does not employ it profitably. Any apparent interfer­
ence with this right is traceable to other causes: e.g.,
where a man declares his intention of farming in a particular 
area, and then abandons his farms, the courts today are pre­
pared to hold that he has forfeited his right to the land, if 
it can be shown that he has displayed this intention, either 
by open act, or by tacit implication (as where he has not en­
deavoured to evict another who adversely takes possession). 
Control of farming practices is really a matter of jurisdict­
ion, and is exercised sometimes by Native Authorities through 
the making of rules.
(c) Control of disposal: the most frequent interference
with the right of the farmer to undisturbed enjoyment of his 
holding lies in the stool's control of alienation. Where the 
stool claims title to the land, then it can demand that no 
transaction should take place which would impair this right. 
Hence the rule that sales to strangers must be registered with 
the stool, which must give its consent. In certain states it 
is declared to be the custom for all sales of land to be ref­
erred to the stool, whether the purchaser is a stranger or not - 
but this may be doubted, and is certainly not always observed 
in practice. And the general rule is that only alienations to 
strangers are controlled.
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There is a lack of logical rale for lesser forms of 
alienation: mortgages, for instance, may be disguised methods
of passing an interest to another; and in any case may result 
in judicial sale of the holding if the debt for which the sec­
urity is given is not satisfied in the specified period. Yet 
in many places it seems that there is no control over the 
giving of real security by citizens to strangers, and what 
control there is is limited to notification by the stranger- 
mortgagee to the stool if he sells or forecloses. Especially 
where writs of fi. fa. are concerned, the present law needs 
clarification; the conflict caused by it with customary law 
is left in obscurity. No control seems to be exercised 
either by the stool, or by the native or other courts, over 
the seizure of the property of citizens in execution, espec­
ially where the eventual purchaser is a stranger. To take one 
example, does the provision of s. 75 of the Local Government 
Ordinance. 1951, relating to the disposal of interests in land, 
apply to a judicial sale of property seized in execution?
Such a sale is not made either by a stool, or Hby any person*1 
(i.e., the citizen judgement-debtor).
In urban areas especially some control is exercised by 
stools (and now by local authorities?) over dealings in houses 
and plots, building on plots acquired, and so on.
(d) The stool’s right to a share: stools possess rights
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to a share in certain cases In the land and its fruits.
These include the traditional claims to share in gold nuggets, 
percentage of snail-catches, portions of game, portions of 
fish caught; and all claims to a share of extraordinary re­
venue arising from land, which includes the right to a share 
from proceeds of the sale of land held by subordinates. Some 
of these customs have fallen into desuetude, owing to the im­
mensely more valuable rights (royalties from timber and gold) 
which a stool may now enjoy.
(e) The stool*s right to take land for national purposes: 
this right is limited, and stools cannot as a rule take land 
occupied by their subjects without the letter's consent, or 
without tendering compensation. Such a right must be exer­
cised, for instance, in determining the plans for extension 
of towns (laying out streets, drains, and so on); where farm­
ing land is taken, agreed compensation (in at least one case a 
fixed amount per cocoa tree) is paid.
3. STOOL PROPERTY IN THE HARROW SENSE:
So far the type of stool property which has been dis­
cussed is that which involves the possession of absolute in­
terests, or at least of a dependent interest such as only a 
stool may enjoy (e.g., that of a wing stool from its para­
mount), which is distinct in kind from the limited interests
23. Cf. Sarbah, P.O.L. 73-4; and also s.v. INDIVIDUAL, 
at pp. 158-160.
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of the citizens farming on that land* Now we turn to a con­
sideration of property enjoyed by a stool, whose interest in 
this case is a limited one, similar in kind to that which may 
be possessed by its subjects* Between the claim by a stool 
to the reversion in tribal land, and the claim by a stool to 
own certain coeoa-fanns or houses, there is obviously a wide 
distinction. Although the stool owns certain limited inter­
ests of this kind in common with its subjects, the rules deal­
ing with this kind of property may vary widely owing to the 
special position of the stool* The distinction exists 
theoretically in English law, between the title of the Crown 
as lord of all tenants in fee simple, and the title of the 
King to his royal estates.
• ' , 
This type of stool property is perhaps the most repres­
entative, since it is the property of the stool (and not of 
the chief), combining its general claim to the ultimate title 
to the land, and its specific claim of a limited Interest in 
the res, be it farms, houses, or chattels. It would have 
been better if one could reserve the term nstool property” 
for this type alone; but usage unfortunately allows a wider 
meaning for the term*
(a) Derivation of such stool property: The juridical
distinction between this kind of stool property and the wider 
kind of stool property is clearly illustrated if one considers 
its possible derivation, i.e., whence the stool may have
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acquired it. It ia possible, aud indeed probable, that most 
of the property is acquired from subjects of the stool, and 
from the stool family, which would not be possible if the 
interest were an absolute one, which a subject would not be 
capable of possessing or transferring.
(i) Prom the Stool Family; it will presently be 
shown that the property of the stool family, which is just 
like any other family property, is kept quite separate from 
the stool property; in fact, a frequent source of argument 
betweeqthe members of a stool family is whether a certain prop­
erty is stool-, or stool-family-, property. Since the stool 
family is an ordinary Akan family which has risen to greatness, 
its possessions have been used to provide for the needs of the 
stool* With some stool families it is the custom for each 
incoming stool-occupant to present one of his properties to 
the stool, thus ensuring that the stool gets ever wealthier.
The stool family may assign some of its properties, by a family 
act, to the stool; usually this dedication will be Irrevocable,
on the principle that ”once stool property, always stool
« 24 property .
It seems possible that the ^ahenfle11 or palace of the 
chief, now occupied by the stool-occupant as his official
24. Perhaps it will be thought of little importance whether 
property belongs to the stool or the stool family. The 
difference is in fact vital: control of the property is
in different hands, alienation is made by different per­
sons, the revenues go to different destinations.
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residence, was originally one of the family-houses (perhaps 
that of the original head)* Many of these palaces are now 
built specially for their chief by the oman or people of the 
state*
(li) From the individual chiefs* property: in former
times when all the property which a chief brought on to the 
stool with him became stool property, and any subsequent ac­
quisitions by him became stool property, this was an important 
source of Increase of the stool properties* Today, as is 
noted below, the rule has changed, and chiefs9 properties do 
not merge in general stool property.
(iii) From the subjects of the state; in the past 
subjects were called on to make certain contributions to the 
stool on special occasions, which Rattray compared (rather
oc
wildly) to feudal incidents* Besides these forced or semi- 
voluntary contributions, it has always been customary for 
individuals to show their appreciation of the stool by pre­
senting gifts in return for favours received, and one can find 
many instances of farms being "dashed" to the stool by a 
subject at his death* It is sometimes a difficult task for 
a court to decide whether the gift was made to the chief per­
sonally, or to the stool* Previously, this would have been 
immaterial; but one cannot say that there is any presumption 
today in favour of the stool.
25* In Ashanti.
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The stool has always been accustomed to call on Its citi­
zens to pay for the expenses of warfare, litigation, admini­
stration, and so on. Today a distinction has been made: 
there are regular annual levies, payable by all adult citizens; 
these go to the Native Administration, are exacted under ord­
inance, and are applied to all residents. There are also 
special levies designed to cover any unusual expense - often 
today to cover the cost of litigation. These are still pay­
able to the stool by its subjects. If the stool receives 
such payments, they are wealth in its hands, which may be 
turned into real property by the next mode of acquisition of 
stool property.
(iv) By purchase: part of the purchases made by a
stool are financed from the general revenue - from the taxation 
of strangers, profits from land transactions, and so on. Part 
are derived from the contributions of citizens ad hoc: this
may especially apply to such things as regalia and ornaments. 
Although in general limited interests are purchased, it seems 
likely that where large tracts of land are bought, these are 
assimilated to the other tracts of tribal land, and similar 
rules apply.26
Purchases made by a chief from his own money belong to
26. Of. the disputed ^purchase" from the Kukurantumi Stool 
of land for the benefit of the Juaben settlers at 
Koforidua.
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him now, even where they are made from the allowances paid 
to chiefs In substitution for the customary dues and tithes 
which they were entitled to receive. Formerly (if it could 
be said that a chief had any private funds to dispose of) pur-* 
chases accrued to the stool. Properties purchased out of 
the proceeds of stool properties are themselves stool prop­
erties.
(v) By succession to strangers: it is most unusual,
and I do not think that instances could be given (except in 
the case of subjects banished from the state in former times) 
for any escheat to operate in the case of citizens9 property. 
But many of the stool properties (especially cocoa farms) in 
certain states have come to the stool from succession to
strangers, who have made (with permission) farms on stool
lands, and then died or departed without leaving a successor.
27As pointed out elsewhere, . this rule no longer operates to
such an extent as formerly.
(vi) By succession to stool servants; this covers 
cases where grants of land were made by chiefs to servants of 
the stool, conditioned on the rendering of certain services by 
them and their successors. Such grants may be forfeited by, 
for example, failure to continue to render such services.
27. Cf. INDIVIDUAL, pp. 186, 187.
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(b) Types of such stool property: Stool property in the
narrow sense falls under various heads: even within the head­
ings, rules may vary as to control and disposal.
(i) Real property:
Farms, usually cocoa farms, palm trees 
and the like.
Ferry- and other water-rights.
Fisheries.
Certain other commercial enterprises.
Houses: the'ahenfie is the royal palace; there
may be more than one royal residence. The ahenfie. together 
with the stool house, is considered inalienable. Whole vill­
ages have been set aside in the past as estates for certain 
members of royal families; in Ashanti the Queen-Mothers have 
been provided with villages of their own. In the old days, 
there were slave-villages, occupied by slaves and their des­
cendants, regrettably kept to provide a reservoir of human 
life for the purpose of sacrifices at the death of royal per­
sonages.
Where the stool owns farms, these are usually administered 
by caretakers on behalf of the stool. Such a caretakership 
is of course quite different from that where a subordinate 
stool is said to be caretaker for the paramount stool.
(ii) Chattels: The stool regalia - umbrellas, orna­
ments, and the like, which are presumably inalienable; although
I was told that there was a case of a stool which purported to 
sell the whole of its regalia! Modern chiefs now have a great
i
number of chattels placed at their disposal, which are stool ! 
properties* Such are motor-cars, and other appurtenances of 
modern living*
(ill) Stool wives: The stool wives are part of the
28appurtenances of the stool. By this is meant that there are 
wives who on the death or destoolment of the chief pass to the 
next occupant of the stool, and do not go with the ex-chief.
The latter is usually allowed to take one or more of his wives 
with him by grace of the elders of the stool. It Is to be 
expected, and hoped, that this custom, although not ruled by 
the Courts as contrary to natural justice and morality, will 
tend to disappear with the growth of monogamous Christianity. 
Difficulties already appear where a chief who is a Christian 
finds himself on enstoolment with twenty or thirty stool wives.
(iv) State enterprises: There is no real conflict
between the stool, with its councillors, and the modern Native 
Authority, In law the creation of statute. Although the per­
sonalities of the members of both may be the same (which they 
need not be) juridically they are distinct, since the authority 
of the stool rests on due observance of custom, and the author­
ity of N.A.*s rests on the ordinances. Nevertheless, there is 
no cause for worry if stool revenues (or what would have been
28. Cf. Danquah, A.L.C., 203.
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stool revenues in the old days) are paid into the N.A. Treasury, 
and are used to finance what may be termed State enterprises, 
such as the building of schools and clinics, the making of 
roads, the digging of wells, and so on, since such enterprises 
are to the benefit of the subjects of the stool. Where 
buildings are erected from N.A. funds, such transactions are 
subject to audit and control; the speculations of the stool 
from its own funds, untouched by the Native Authority Ordin­
ances, are not so subject. But the stool is obliged by custom 
not to enrich itself at the expense of its subjects. No-one 
has much worried whether the land was provided by the stool, 
and the money for a school by the N.A. At the present time 
there is not much need for clarification; but the demand for 
it will be insistent when the personnel of the local author­
ities begins to differ substantially from that of the stools 
and their customary councillors. Under the present system, 
money goes hand-in-hand with responsibilities for its proper
use for the benefit of the people. Such may not be the case 
29in the future. No-one wishes to see the traditional author-
29, The above was written before the provisions of the Local 
Government Ordinance. 1951, became law. Under this Ord­
inance, only one-third of the members of the new Local 
Councils will be ”traditional” (an unhappy word). The 
revenues from stool lands are to be collected by the Local 
Council, and- after deposit in a special fund - to be 
divided in unspecified proportions between the Council 
and the stool concerned (s. 74 (1) ). The disposal of 
any interest in land by stools (or citizens) is subject 
to the concurrence of the Council (s. 75). It appears
/over
56
ities dwindle from their responsible positions to become mere 
hereditary landlords, stripped of all administrative power.
Often the business enterprises of the stool will be 
carried out through the agency of the chief* Warrington3^ 
says that the old custom was that
nIf a Chief engages in any business under­
taking he must obtain the consent of the 
Elders before doing so: any profit he makes
is then a gain to the Stool and any loss 
a Stool debt.n
This, insofar as it is true today, applies not to a Chief's 
private dealings with his own property, but to the necessity 
for the approval of the elders in any activity he undertakes 
on behalf of the stool.
Stool debts: Warrington gives three rules with
regard to stool debts:
"A Chief has no right to become security 
for any person without the consent of his 
elders, and if by so doing he involves the 
Stool in debt, this would be sufficient 
ground for destoolment." 31
It is doubtful today whether a chief could involve his stool
in debt by this method, even if a chief is permitted by custom
to act as a surety.
29. (cont. from previous page) -
that the rights of the stool in regard to land will tend 
to become empty ones; and that the former position by 
which N.A. *s made use of stool land free will perhaps 
not apply in the future.
30. p. 32.
31. p. 32*
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"If a candidate /Tot the stool/ ••• declares 
his /private/ debts /before Sis election/ and 
is nevertheless elected to the stool his pri­
vate debts are thereby accepted by the stool 
and become stool debts*" If he fails to do 
so, they become debts of his family. 32
This i3 the corollary of the former rule that all the private
property of a chief became stool property when he came to the
stool. As this rule no longer applies, it is dubious whether
the rule in regard to private debts applies either.
"A Chief is not entitled to incur any debt on 
behalf of the Stool without the consent and 
approval of his Elders; and if money is
borrowed by the Stool at least two of the
Elders must be actual parties to the loan;
if this is not done the Elders may deny any 
liability on behalf of the Stool."
This rule (apart from the specification of the exact number
of elder3 who must be present) applies in substance today.
Stool debts, however incurred, are a charge on the members 
of that stool; and the stool can call on its subjects (citi­
zens only, and not strangers) for special contributions to 
defray them.
The incurring of stool debts has been much limited by 
legislation, notably the Stool Property Protection Ordinance. 
No. 22 of 1940, for Ashanti, and s. 27A of the Native Authority 
(Colony) Ordinance. 1944^ for the Colony.
32. loc. clt.
33. loc. cit.
34. As amended by the Native Authority (Colony) (Amendment) 
Ordinance. No. 13 of 19W, s7 6 .
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Whereas the Ashanti Ordinance applies to stool land, the def­
inition in the Colony Ordinance of stool property limits its 
effect only to stool insignia ”and such other property as may 
he attached for customary, traditional and ceremonial purposes 
to the Stool of any Chief”, and so presumably does not include 
stool land, or stool property in the narrow sense.
(c) Control of such stool property:
The control of the stool properties is in the hands of
the chief, together with his elders and councillors, as is the
35case with stool property in the broader sense. The sharp 
distinction between such stool property and stool family prop­
erty is therefore evident, since the latter is under the con­
trol of the stool family, and especially as represented by the
36
head of the family. In Enoo v. Anessi II: a stool family
claimed to be entitled to l/3 share in the proceeds of sale by 
a chief of stool lands. The claim was rejected. The Royal 
Treasurer, in Ashanti the Sanahene. was formerly responsible to 
the stool for keeping the accounts of the stool; and he pre­
sumably still has functions in the more private aspects of stool 
affairs today. Where control of State property and funds is 
not in the hands of the N.A., and more particularly in the 
cases of stool farms and the like, the Elders and Councillors
35. E.G., a lease, signed by the chief alone, without refer­
ence to his elders or councillors, does not bind the 
stool: U.A.O. v. Apaw: (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 114.
36. (1910) Ren. 576.
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retain all their power. It is the duty of the stool to pre­
serve the stool properties as far as possible; unilateral 
action by either the chief alone, or some of the elders alone, 
is not sufficient to dispose of it.
(d) Disposal of stool property:
Disposal of stool property is open to the same parties 
who are competent to control the use of stool property. Cer­
tain forms of stool property cannot be disposed of. It is 
customary, if a chief is destooled, to provide for him by 
allowing him to take one or two farms, or other property, with 
him. Except for this, disposal of stool property to individ­
uals without consideration is not encouraged*
Here we must consider the effect of the Local Government 
Ordinance. 1951, with regard to the disposal of stool property. 
S. 75 regulates the disposal of "any interest or right in land” 
for a consideration or "which could, by reason of its being to 
a person not entitled by customary law to the free use of land, 
involve the payment of any such consideration", and prescribes 
that in such cases the concurrence of the Local Council is 
required. The Ordinance covers disposals both by a stool, and 
by "any person who, by reason of his being so entitled under 
customary law, has acquired possession of such land either with 
out payment of any consideration or in exchange for a nominal 
consideration” (i.e. citizens). (One may note in passing 
here the unhappy side-note "Disposal of Stool Lands”, since we
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find that disposals by a citizen of "any interest or right in 
land” are included - and such is certainly not disposal of 
stool land.)
Our first question iss "What is 'Stool land*?” This is 
in a sense a supererogatory task, since s. 75 in its body does 
not speak anywhere of "stool land”, but only of "any interest 
or right in land”; and whilst it is true that the side-note 
specifies the subject of the section as the disposal of stool 
lands, one does not legislate by slde-notes. In S. 2 of the 
Ordinance it is defined as follows:
"'Stool land' includes any land or interest in 
land controlled by a Stool, head of a tribe or 
company captain for the benefit of the subjects
of the Stool, tribe or company, as the case may
be, and 'Stool9 means the person or body of 
persons having such control.”
This definition iq&nfortunate in many respects: although it
appears to define "stool”, its definition is circular. It
fails to make any distinction between ”town” and "family”
stools, so that presumably interests in land controlled by the
head of a family with a stool fall within the definition of
stool land. One must also regret the perversion of the term
"stool land” to include land controlled by a company captain
("presumably inserted in the first place to take account of the
special conditions which exist, for example, in some of the
coastal towns). Our next concern is the phrase "any land or
interest in land controlled by...". The word "controlled"
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Is most ambiguous: does one read the phrase as "any land con­
trolled by; and any Interest in land, the land being con­
trolled by.."; or does it mean rt... any interest in land, the 
interest being controlled by”? In the former case interests 
enjoyed by citizens and others in land the absolute title (or 
a dependent title) in which is owned by a stool are presumably 
caught within the definition of stool land. In the latter 
case, they are not.
What Is the meaning of the word "control” itself? It will 
be remarked that such words as "owned”, "enjoyed", "possessed”, 
etc., have been passed over in favour of the colourless word 
"controlled”. Control refers to management rather than owner­
ship, one would have thought. The question whether land over 
which a stool possesses a jurisdictional right only, as well 
as land over which a stool has proprietary rights, is included 
in the definition, remains in the dark.
It will be noted further that the definition says that 
"'Stool land* Includes", not that it "means", "any land...etc." 
The choice of the word "Includes" implies that the definition 
Is the minimal content of the words "Stool land"; but that 
further meanings of the words are not excluded by the defini­
tion. What such further meanings are could be the subject of 
wild speculation, lamentable in a context where the greatest 
precision is surely required.
Our next regret is the phrase "land or interest in land".
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This form of words Is inelegant, since the former is the sub­
ject-matter of rights and interests, and the latter is the 
interest in that subject-matter. But what is meant by "land”, 
or by "interest in land"? It is notorious, as should be ap­
parent through our treatment of the interests which stools, 
families and individuals may possess in Akan Law, that the 
customary law does not share the English legal definition of 
"land"; and specifically, that the customary law permits a 
separation - not possible in English Law - between the land 
itself and the things in or on It, such as trees and houses.
Is "land* to be taken in the normal English sense, applying the 
maxim qulcquld plantatur solo, solo cedlt? One presumes that 
it must be so taken. Such an assumption can lead to diffi­
culties.
The definition of "stool land" from section 2 of the Ord­
inance is operative for s. 74 - Revenues of Stool lands, pre­
sumably for s. 73 (side-note - Declaration of Stool lands), 
and not for s. 75 - despite the side-note - Disposal of Stool 
lands.
Now we turn to section 75, and a consideration of its 
meaning and effect. It affects all disposals of_any_Interest 
or_rig£it_in land by certain persons, and to certain persons. 
Our first question is the meaning of the word "disposal". Its 
primary and commonsense connotation is "getting rid of", and, 
if for a consideration, "sale". Does it mean (since the
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section covers certain transfers for no consideration) "any 
outright alienation or transfer”? Or does it cover also ar­
rangements which are not outright, since only part of an inter­
est passes, or because the transfer is only temporary? This, 
it is submitted, must be its intended effect, when read in con­
junction with the words ”of any interest or right in land”, 
since a grantor transferring only a portion of the bundle of 
rights which makes up his interest can be said to be trans­
ferring a right or rights. The phrase may therefore be taken 
to include, not only sales and absolute gifts, but also leases, 
tenancies, mortgages and pledges, and perhaps even caretaker- 
ships and offers of lodging.
The section comprehends disposals by two classes of per­
sons: ”a stool”, and ”any person who, by reason of his being
so entitled under customary law, has acquired possession of 
such land (it would have been better to have said: 'of any 
interest or right in land') either without payment of any con­
sideration or in exchange for a nominal consideration".
"Stool” (following s. 2 of the Ordinance) means a person or 
body of persons controlling land or an interest in land con­
trolled by a Stool, head of a tribe or company captain for the 
benefit of the subjects of the Stool, tribe or company! The 
second class of persons - "any person...” - includes citizens 
who have either inherited interests in land from their family, 
or received them as the result of a bequest under a samansew(?).
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or cleared a portion of the virgin forest for their own use, 
or built a house on a plot which they are entitled to take by 
custom; but does not presumably include citizens who have 
taken possession of land by pledge or mortgage, or by means of 
a gift inter vivos, or by purchase from a citizen, since a 
citizen in such a ease has not acquired possession without 
consideration or in return for a nominal consideration by 
reasonjof being £0_entitled under customary law. This class 
of persons also does not include strangers who have acquired 
land by purchase, or lease, tenancy, gift, pledge, succession, 
etc*, since in no case are they persons entitled to the free 
use of land*
The class of persons to whom the interest or right in 
land Is transferred includes:
(a) all those to whom it is transferred for a 
valuable consideration;
(b) those to whom it is transferred, if "by reason 
of its being to a person not entitled by customary law to the 
free use of land" it could involve the payment of such consid­
eration, even if no such consideration is in fact paid*
The anomalous position results that transfers between 
citizens for a valuable consideration of an interest or right 
in land are caught by the section; whilst a transfer by a 
stranger to a citizen would not be caught* This is an exact 
reversal of the principles of Akan Law* Such transactions as
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those by which a temporary tenancy of land is granted by a man 
(who is a citizen) to his wife, or children, or servants (who 
might well not be citizens) might therefore technically fall 
under the section. In those states where stools claim a gen­
eral proprietary interest in the land, the previous practice 
has been that transactions between citizens are not normally 
the subject of control. Only where strangers are parties (and 
not always then) has the stool stepped in* Y/here stools claim 
no more than a right of paramountcy (e.g., in the coastal 
areas), no transactions have been the subject of scrutiny.
One may respectfully doubt whether this section was drafted 
with these points in mind.
S. 75 provides that disposals caught by the section shall
be subject to the concurrence of the Local Council; and that
they nshall be of no effect unless and until such concurrence
has been obtained and certified in writing under the hand of
the chairman or clerk of the councilw. One wonders whether
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in fact such disposals will be of no effect. Does the pur­
chaser, before such concurrence has been obtained, obtain any 
kind of equitable interest in the subject-matter? Is he en­
titled to possession as against the grantor? Is he entitled
37. Remembering the fate in English Law of such provisions 
as that of the Infants* Relief Act. 1874, providing that 
certain contracts with infants shall be "absolutely void". 
In fact, even where transactions are declared "void", 
the innocent party may acquire equities in the subject- 
matter, third parties may acquire rights, etc.
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to mesne profits, and if so, from the time of the transfer, or
from that of the concurrence? If he re-transfers, or charges
38
the property, does the third party acquire any rights?
4. STOOL FAMILY PROPERTY:
The property of the stool family, and the rules which 
relate to it, are considered here (even though the stool fam­
ily property is family property like any other), because cer­
tain questions relating to its use and control, and more es­
pecially the relation existing between the chief and the prop­
erty of his family, are bound to arise#
(a) The relations of the stool family, the stool# and 
the chief in regard to stool family property:
Each stool family has family property, and in general the 
rules covering this form of property are fully dealt with in 
the chapter on family property# But in addition there is 
the problem of the membership of the chief in that family.
The family have a considerable say in the nomination of a can­
didate for the stool, and may exercise some influence on the 
chief indirectly. But the whole conduct of the stool's 
affairs rests with the chief, his elders and councillors; 
and the stool family are not meant to interfere. Similarly, 
the stool family is left alone by the stool in the conduct of 
its business, and in particular the chief is not expected to
38. The words ”of no effect” may mean no more than that the 
transaction is valid but unenforceable.
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interfere in the management of the family property, which it 
is for the head of the stool family, together with the elders 
of the family (the family council) to administer.
Prom the property of the stool family one must trace the 
origins of the property (or some of it) now in the possession 
of the stool. Each chief will have added more to the stool's 
property - this being an entirely praiseworthy tradition with­
in the family; and he will perhaps have obtained the means to 
do so from the family.
Conflicts between the stool and the stool family as to 
the ownership of lands controlled by the stool or family are
of relatively frequent occurrence: for example, in Amiss ah
39v. Krabah the contest was between the town-stool of Dutch
Sekondi and the stool-family. The latter's claim to the
property in question was rejected. And in Paramount Stool
40
of Breman Eslam v. law Akyirefl the paramount stool won be­
fore Quist, J., on the ground that E., a member of the stool 
family, was pledgee of the land in dispute from a section of 
the family. E. ascended the stool; and therefore the land 
became attached to the stool, and remained so on his death.
The ground of decision, it is respectfully submitted, is now 
suspect, since it was based on the rule, at present out-of- 
date, that a chief's private property not declared at the time
39. (1936) P.O. 2 W.A.C.A. 30.
40. (1948) Unreported: Land Ct. Cape Coast, 1,10,48.
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of his accession becomes stool property. In any case, as E. 
was only a pledgee of the land, it is difficult to see how the 
land could become attached to the stool for longer than the 
duration of the pledge. One may also refer to Aglnfram v. 
Broquassie. ^
In these cases the findings were reached on the basis of 
the evidence presented in favour of the property being stool, 
and not stool family, property. The Privy Council, for in­
stance, found obiter in Amissah v. Krabah that "the evidence 
as to the consents necessary in the case of a family stool 
^selling stool (family) property/ was left in some uncertainty". 
There is no presumption in favour of either party. (If a stool 
Is a family stool, there can obviously be no such conflict.)
It has sometimes been maintained in disputes between the 
stool family and the stool that certain property was given to 
the chief for his own use while he was on the stool; so that, 
if he was subsequently destooled, the property should revert 
to the stool family. In many cases disputes regarding stool 
family property have to do with what may be termed unwarranted 
Interference by the chief with the affairs of the family. It 
is difficult at times to decide whether a chief has received 
a gift as chief, or as a member of the family, or whether it 
was intended to give the property to the stool In perpetuity.
41. (1878) Ren. 40.
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It cannot be stressed too emphatically that the stool 
family has a head, whose duty - as with any ordinary head of 
a family - it is to supervise the family and the family prop­
erty. And further that in the family councils the chief for 
the time being does not rate much more consideration than any 
other member of the family. In one dispute in a native court 
plaintiff said in evidence that:
nI sued defendant being the head of the family. 
Defendant is a young-man in the family but he 
is the head of the family regardless the 
stool-holder.w
Frequently, too, the stool family is divided into sections, 
which further complicates disputes over the ownership of prop­
erty within the family. The organisation of their family is 
a subject which chiefs and others are sometimes reluctant to 
disuoss; but the isolation of the chief from the ordinary 
affairs of the family seems clear. It should not be forgotten 
that it is possible for royal houses to possess more than one 
stool, and in particular that the Queen-Mother will have a 
stool of her own, which will behave, for these purposes, like 
a political stool - that is, the affairs of the stool are kept 
separate from the ordinary family business.
(b) Control, use and disposal of stool family property:
The family control of stool family property lies with the 
head and elders of the family, as is the case with any other 
family. The use of the property is divided up between the
70
sections and members, again in accordance with, the normal rules* 
Tfi/here a chief has, before his election as chief, possessed 
family property, this will be kept separate from the stool 
property on his enstoolment; or else the family may decide 
to give the property to the stool. It appears good law that 
a chief could not, by a unilateral act, give such property 
permanently to the stool without the approval of the stool 
family; otherwise, one would be forced to attribute to him 
wider powers over the family interest than a member of an 
ordinary family would have.
Disposal of the family property follows the control of 
its use, i.e., it is with the head and elders of the family.
(c) Succession to stool family property:
Succession to family property follows the usual rules; 
but an exception must be made where the personality of the 
chief Is involved. Succession to the private property of 
the chief follows custom; but it is stated that it is unusual 
for a chief on the stool to be appointed successor to a dec­
eased member of the stool family.
5* CHIEF’S PRIVATE PROPERTY:
(a) By a chief’s private property is meant that property 
which is self-acquired by him, and not by virtue of his posi­
tion as occupant of the stool, In which case he would acquire 
for the stool. There has been a definite change of custom In 
regard to such property.
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(i) The former rule In regard to the chief*a 
property: The former rule in regard to property which a chief
might either bring with him to the stool, or which he might 
acquire once he was on the stool, was that all such property 
became stool property, over which he might retain a right of 
temporary enjoyment, but the permanent title to which became 
vested in the stool. If the chief was destooled, he therefore 
stood to lose everything, except such as the grace of the 
elders or the new occupant chose to allow him. Such a rule 
was certainly salutary, since it meant that it was very diff­
icult for a chief to make a personal profit out of M s  posi­
tion; and it made becoming a chief a more hazardous operation 
if a possible outcome was penury.
TMs rule is given by Warrington:
wWhen a Chief is in occupation of the Stool 
he is according to ancient custom incapable
of owning any property apart from the Stool,
he and the Stool are one.
Before he accepts the Stool, he is entitled 
to dispossess himself of M s  private property, 
particularly land3, and any family property 
which he is in possession of will revert to 
the family." 42
And he mentions subsequently that the stool will owe money to
a cMef, if the cMef contracts debts on behalf of the stool
43at the request of the elders. The old custom was found
44proved in Jasi v. Tchum.
42. At p. 31. 43. At p. 32.
44. (1911) D. & P. 'll-’ie, 9.
(ii) Next, the rule underwent some amelioration, and 
self-acquired property which a chief possessed when he was in­
stalled he was allowed to retain as his own - even on destool- 
ment - provided that he had declared his possessions to the
elders and councillors of the stool at the time when he as-
45cended the stool* In the case of Antu v. Buedu the modified 
rule was admitted. Michelin, J. said at p. 477:
WI entirely agree with the learned Judge in 
his enunciation of the principle of native 
law, hoth in this Colony and Ashanti, 4that 
unless a chief's private property is ear­
marked when he ascends the stool it becomes 
mixed up with the stool property and cannot 
be claimed by him on deposition'.’1
45U.A«C. y, Apaw recognized that it is possible for a chief in
47Ashanti to have private property. In iamuah v« Sekyl the 
requirements were further watered down. It is not necessary 
to ’’earmark” the property, or make an inventory; all that is 
required is:
wNow a stool-holder who has kept his self­
acquired property distinct from the Stool 
property, to the knowledge of the senior and 
immediate members of the Stool, can make a 
valid testamentary disposition of such self­
acquired property to a member of his family - 
vide Sarbah's Fanti Customary Laws, page 99..
This wa3 an exception to the rule in Antu v. Buedu. That all
that is required is that the facts should be known to the
45. (1929) F.Ct. '26-'29, 474.
46. (1956) 3 W.A.C.A. 114.
47. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 57.
48. At p. 59, per Yates, J.
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elders of the stool - thus making it an equitable fraud on
their part to act otherwise - was confirmed by the judgement
49of Jackson, J. in Nkansah v. Apau. Counsel pleaded the rule 
in Antu v. Buedu; the learned judge held:
”Provided that the stool holder and his 
councillors are aware of the true facts, 
namely that the farms were self-acquired 
property and acting upon that knowledge 
permitted them to be treated as such, it 
would be a close approach to fraud for the 
Stool to attempt to set up a claim to title 
on the ground that there had been no formal 
pronouncement of such rights, i.e., when 
such rights are so clearly known to the 
other party; and in my judgement it would 
be inequitable to apply this strict prin­
ciple of customary law as to the merger of 
such estates in such circumstances.w
With this judgement I respectfully concur.
(lii) It is possible, however, that the rule in re­
gard to chief’s private property is still weaker today.
50Matson cites a case from the Asantehene’s Court, Padzie v. 
Poku, which lessens the rights of the stool still more:
nThe farm in dispute having been made by K.A. 
before his enstoolment as Dwirahene, the 
Dwira Stool according to custom could not 
inherit the farm, except by the expressed 
wish of K.A. before his death.”
My own information varied in its extent; one informant 
said that when a chief is enstooled, he has to declare, at the
49. (1949) Unreported: Land Ct, Cape Coast, 16/2/49.
50. See Judicial Process in the Gold Coast. (1953) 2 I.L.Q. 47 
(1948) Asantehene's Court, on appeal from Kokofu
Native Court.
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time of his enstoolment, all his private property to the 
elders. If he fails to declare it, it becomes stool property; 
so that, if destooled, the property remaining undeclared would 
remain with the stool. Private property acquired by a chief 
whilst on the stool is his own property, which he keeps if he 
is destooled. If a chief dies on the stool, his self-acquired 
property goes to his line in the stool family. But other 
informants did not indicate the need for actual declaration; 
one said:
”A chief when enstobled keeps his private prop­
erty, such as cocoa farms, etc. The people 
enstooling him will know which is stool prop­
erty, and which the chief's private property, 
so that there is no need for a declaration by 
the chief of his private property on enstool- 
ment. It does not matter whether a declara­
tion is made or not. Chiefs whilst on the 
stool draw an allowance, and anything purchased 
with this money is the chief's private property, 
and not stool property (if anything is purchased 
with stool funds, It is stool property); a 
similar rule applies to.gifts either in money 
or in kind. When destooled, a chief keeps all 
such private properties.”
Another informant was curter:
”A chief's self-acquired property remains his 
when he goes on the stool. And whilst he is 
oh the stool, his self-acquired property 
remains separate.”
And in a case before a native court, evidence was given that
any personal properties other than those expressly given to
the stool by the chief cannot be added to the stool properties.
The general custom at present (though it may vary in the
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case of particular stools) is that there need be no express 
declaration by a chief of his private property when he ascends 
the stool5 that it will be known to the elders which are stool 
properties (through inventories taken when the succession to 
the stool changes and otherwise); that private acquisitions 
by a chief whilst on the stool remain the property of the chief 
(unless given to or acquired by him as representative of the 
stool); but that In many cases chiefs reserve their private 
properties when enstooled in order to prevent later confusion - 
as a precautionary matter only.
(b) The derivation of a chief’s self-acquired property:
A chief may acquire property which Is then his individual 
property in any of the ways open to other men before he becomes 
chief. The portion of the ancestral stool family property 
which is included In his assets does not fall within this 
classification - since the title is with the family, and it is 
for them to preserve it as against the claims of the stool.
Once a chief is on the stool,: gifts are frequently given 
to him. Some of these gifts are for customary purposes; and 
certainly none of them goes through the normal accounting 
procedure laid down for Native Authorities. In any case 
where custom prescribes the gift of drink, this is given to 
the chief (even though one would expect It to be due to the 
stool). The chief by custom, however, shares It among his 
councillors.
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Where gifts are not of a transient character - e.g.,
where a farm is ”dashed” to a chief - one has to ask: Mis it
then his persoijFand private property?” The answer to this 
depends on the circumstances of the case; but although modern 
customary law is far readier to hold that the gift Is Intended 
for the chief in his personal capacity, there nevertheless 
remains a burden of proof, however, slight it has now become, 
that the gift is not intended for the stool.
It Is open to a chief to provide for himself by using
the funds which he may have from allowances, etc., for his own 
benefit. It must be admitted that in practice no fine line 
is always drawn between the private and public life of the 
chief, and that a certain confusion of funds Is quite possible,
(c) Rules regarding its declaration to the elders:
A certain amount has already been said above about this 
question. To put the matter briefly:
The old rule that all the chief's property becomes stool 
property is obsolete; in most places the variation on this 
rule that a chief must declare his private property to the 
elders, otherwise it is forfeit to the stool, also does not 
apply.
(i) Property acquired before enstoolment: the chief
is recommended to declare this before he is installed. The 
penalty of automatic forfeiture no longer holds. In some cases 
It is stated that provided he either declares the property
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within a reasonable time, or not at all where the elders are 
aware of the true facts, he may keep this property. The best 
rule is that which recommends him to declare the property at 
once to the elders, but which does not penalize failure to do 
so, unless the omission is such as to give rise to a belief 
that the property is stool property. In fact, this rule is 
comparable with that for the barring of claims by long possess­
ion adverse to the owner bona fide, where the owner is con­
structively held to have the desire to abandon his property, or 
to permit adverse interests to develop# In many cases a dec­
laration of property i3 part of the formalities of ascending 
the stool, when an Inventory of the stool properties is taken.
(ii) Property acquired by the chief on the stool: 
there is no rule which states that property acquired personally 
by a chief on the stool Is stool property. Today, It is really 
a question of fact: did the chief acquire the property as
stool-holder, or in his personal capacity?
(d) Use, control and disposal of the property:
The rules regarding these are the same as for any self­
acquired property.
(e) Succession to such property:
It has been pointed out that it is not the Incoming chief 
who succeeds to the self-acquired property of his predecessor, 
nor the elders and councillors.^ It is true that in the old
51. Cf. Dadzie v. Poku (mentioned above).
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days a chief was stripped of all his property when he quitted 
the stool: this is not the custom today. When the chief
dies, succession to his self-acquired property goes to his 
line inthe stool family. Disputes sometimes occur between his 
relatives and the stool, the latter maintaining that certain 
property left by the chief is stool property which he cannot 
bequeath.
6 . CUSTODY OP STOOL PROPERTY DURING AN INTERREGNUM:
During an interregnum a Regent is frequently appointed, 
to act in the place of the chief. He will be thereby entitled 
to sign conveyances, etc., in cases where the signature of the
chief would otherwise have been required.
52Warrington gives some rules regarding the custody of 
stool property:
(a) Death of a chief: The Wirempifu (or Gyase subjects) 
take custody of the stool property (sic. stool property in the 
narrow sense). The members of the royal family do not take 
custody.
(b) Destoolment: ”Gyasihene is the proper guardian for
all Stool property during the time that the Stool is vacant.11 
The Queen-Mother has no power.
52. At p. 31.
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CHAPTER II,
JURISDICTION AND OWNERSHIP.
It is necessary to consider the vexed question of juris­
diction and land-owner ship at some length, and in some detail. 
The Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Ordinance^ makes provi­
sion for the delimitation of stool boundaries, both jurisdict­
ional and proprietary. As is observed in the Chapter on 
REGISTRATION (q.v.) certain difficulties are already exper­
ienced with regard to the conflict between the jurisdiction 
of a stool (over both land and peoples), and its proprietary 
rights. These difficulties are aggravated when an attempt is 
made to delimit the boundaries of a stool, since the stool may 
have ownership without jurisdiction, jurisdiction without 
ownership, jurisdiction partly co-extensive with ownership, 
and jurisdiction co-exten3ive with its ownership of lands.
It will be necessary for the Commissioner to declare at the 
time of settlement how far the boundaries settled refer to 
jurisdiction, and how far to ownership.
Questions relating to a stool's ownership of land are at 
present judicial questions, cognisable by the courts.
Questions relating to a stool's jurisdiction over land 
or persons are administrative questions, not cognisable by the
1. No. 49 of 1950.
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courts (except insofar as concerned in or evidencing claims of 
ownership), hut are rather the subject of executive decision 
and action#
The dichotomy above, though clear, is not allowed to 
operate fully; since it is commonly conceded that a judicial 
decision with regard to the ownership of land may have an in­
cidental consequence in determining the extent of a stool's 
jurisdiction* The converse does not apply; a determination 
of jurisdiction cannot as such affect questions of ownership.
It appears that the following questions will have to be 
considered in some detail:
(1) With whom is the ownership of land, with a Paramount 
Stool, or a subordinate stool?
(2) Which is the fundamental right, jurisdiction or owner­
ship?
(3) What powers and rights are attributable to juris­
diction, and what to ownership?
(4) How may a. ownership, b. jurisdiction, be acquired 
or relinquished by a stool?
Before attempting an answer to these questions, one must 
consider the historical process by which both jurisdiction and 
ownership have evolved. Some of the history has already been 
considered, so that it will be sufficient to give it only 
briefly here*
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A. ANCIENT CUSTOM,
Most of the questions above would formerly have been i
meaningless, since there was no juristic separation between 
ownership and jurisdiction. Ownership is a meaningful term 
only when the right owned is capable of disposal, or when it 
is capable of being challenged by others. Before land was the 
subject of sale, and whilst there remained large portions of 
unoccupied land available for talcing up by members of a tribe, 
ownership of the land itself (as opposed to a claim to a farm 
or house made on it) could not develop. Whatever is the posi­
tion now, there can be no doubt that in historical times there 
was land in the Gold Coast without an owner, partly because, 
from the practical aspect, there was an excess of land available 
for occupation, and belts of forest between the tribes in some 
cases; and partly from the legal aspect, because the conception 
of nwnership of land as such had not yet appeared.
The area of land under the control of a stool could be 
divided into the nuclear lands, under the effective occupation 
of the members of the stool; and the peripheral lands, pre­
sently used for hunting and collection of forest-products, and 
potentially a source of land for occupation in the future. The 
boundaries of the tribe or community rested primarily on the 
limits of the nuclear lands, and secondarily stretched to the 
vague limits of the peripheral hunting tracts.
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Jurisdiction was originally exercised as a function of 
the right to allegiance; this right to allegiance was orig­
inally personal, i.e., over persons. It is obvious that 
allegiance could and did exist without reference to land- 
control or land-ownership. A tribe or community on the move - 
whether migratory, or occupying the lands of a defeated enemy - 
owed allegiance to its ruling chief or stool, independent of 
land-control. But conversely, land-control could not exist 
without the right to allegiance* The land controlled by a 
stool was the land within the effective lor potentially effect­
ive) occupation of the persons serving that stool* If the 
land ceased to be occupied, actually or constructively, by the 
stool's subjects (for Instance, if ejected by a neighbouring 
tribe) the stool lost its jurisdiction over that area.
In the olden times, the land thus controlled by a stool 
or tribe was compact, and the persons occupying the land were 
homogeneous (members of the same tribe).
A member of a tribe proceeding Individually to another 
tribe did not acquire land-rights for his former chief or 
tribe; his allegiance to his previous chief might remain.
But the allegiance he owed would not import jurisdiction for 
his previous chief over the land he occupied. Cases could 
arise where the tribe's control or jurisdiction was extended; 
one instance would be where Individual members pushed out their 
effective occupation into their peripheral region, or even into
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the region of a neighbouring tribe.
The primary right, then, was to allegiance, which carried 
with it in genera}.: (a) jurisdiction over the persons owing
allegiance; and (b) jurisdiction over the territory occupied 
by the persons owing allegiance - or land^control*
Jurisdiction and land-control were thus at this stage in­
separable* Transfers of allegiance were possible: such
transfers were either Voluntary or involuntary.
Voluntary: (i) by pledge: - a stool could transfer the alle­
giance of some of its subjects, individually or as a group.
Once money was existent, but before land-rights as such became 
valuable, a stool might pledge one of its villages to a neigh­
bouring stool in satisfaction of a debt. Such a transfer was 
temporary or Indefinite in its duration, and occurred parti­
cularly in Ashanti as a result of expenses incurred in warfare. 
By the transaction passed:
the allegiance of the subjects: 
personal jurisdiction; 
land-control over the territory in actual 
occupation of the persons. The persons and their land passed 
en bloc. The transaction was redeemable, being a form of in­
definite alienation. In more recent times a form of redeemable 
sale appeared, but there was little nice distinction between 
this and the indefinite pledge.
(ii) by submission by a stool and Its people to
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another stool: this occurred in two main ways:
it was one of the methods by which the native 
states were built up, as a confederation of chiefs under a 
paramount leader;
it might involve a transfer of allegiance from 
one superior stool to another.
In neither case does it appear that the land-rights of the 
stool that passed into subjection were affected. The occupa­
tion of the land remained static, and all that happened was 
that either allegiance was directed to a different lord, or 
else that the stool*s jurisdiction became subject to the para- 
mountcy of an overlord.
(iii) by immigration and settlement: individual
strangers or blocks of strangers who settled within the con­
fines of an alien tribe transferred both their occupation and 
their allegiance, becoming, as it were, adoptive members of 
the new community.
Involuntary: (iv) by conquest: where a formerly independent
people were conquered, various consequences are recorded in 
history, into which one cannot go in detail here. Remnants 
of aboriginal tribes are to be found here and there, the Guang 
peoples (Akwapim, Efutu, etc.) and the Etslfo in Fanteland 
being examples; these aborigines were either forced onto the 
periphery, or remained as co-tenants of the lani. Is is poss­
ible that their former control of the land is indicated by the
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asasewura. who is reported from certain areas (cf. Field); 
but - although there may be analogies with the tend ana in the 
Northern Territories, the word of itself means no more than 
TIland-ownern or u owner of the land".
In more modern times the usual plan of the conquerors was 
that either they left the inhabitants as they were, only re­
quiring that they owe allegiance and render tribute to their 
new lords; or else the land was parcelled out by the para­
mount chief amongst his underlings, the conquered being allowed 
to retain a portion, or being entirely expelled.
Since at this date allegiance and jurisdiction were the 
major issues, one cannot say that land-rights (apart from land 
control) were thereby affected.
B. MODERN CUSTOM.
Today there has been a splitting off. Allegiance remains 
personal, but it has bedn separated from jurisdiction over per­
sons (partly as a result of ordinance^, partly as a concomitant 
of modern migrations and economic and political developments).
Jurisdiction over land has also been separated from 
ownership.
Jurisdiction over persons has become separated from 
jurisdiction over land.
2. See: Akim Kotoku. pp. 13, 59-63,
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The rights of land-control of the stool are now partly 
attributable to jurisdiction, and partly to ownership.
Rights over persons are attributable to:
the right to_allegiance, now important only insofar 
as certain customary duties owed by citizens are concerned, 
and as a basis for a claim by a State to extra-territorial 
rights over its citizens; it is also sometimes used to base 
a claim of ownership by a stool;
territorial jurisdiction^ which operates to cover both 
citizens (or subjects of a stool) within the confines of the 
State (or the Stool's jurisdictional area), and strangers, 
within the boundaries of the State. This jurisdiction is a 
product of the Native Administration Ordinances, but whilst 
diverting some of the former powers of the Stool from it to 
the new Native Authorities, and creating fresh statutory duties, 
they otherwise leave the powers of the Stool by custom more or 
less untouched.
1. With whom is the ownership of the land, the Paramount 
Stool/ or a subordinate stool?
The answer to this question depends partially on the area 
in question, since the legal position varies from state to 
state; and partially on recent changes or assertions of 
rights. Let us take some instances:
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ASHANTI:
Who Is the owner of land situate within the stool lands 
of a Wing Chief serving a Divisional Chief in Ashanti? That 
is, with whom, if anyone, is the absolute interest in such 
land?
There are certain theoretical possibilities: (a; that
all the land in Ashanti is ultimately owned by the G-olden 
Stool, i.e., by the Asantehene in his official capacity, in 
trust for the people of Ashanti; (b) that the land is owned 
by the Divisional Chief (equivalent to a Paramount Chief of a
3
state in the Colony), and the Wing Chief has a right as "care­
taker", the rights of the Asantehene being attributable to his 
paramountcy; (c) that the land is owned by the Wing Chief's 
3tool, the Divisional Chief has a jurisdictional right, and the 
Asantehene a further superior jurisdictional right. (There is 
also the possibility that a chief or Odikro serving the Wing 
Chief owns this particular portion of land, so that all super­
ior rights are jurisdictional only.)
First one must consider the rights of the Asantehene.
In practice, the Divisional Chiefs are considered as owMng
3. To avoid confusion, it must be noted that in Ashanti each 
state making up the Confederacy is called a "Division" 
("divisional chief" ■ omanhene or Paramount Chief); each 
Division is divided up between the different "Wing Chiefs" 
(sometimes called "senior divisional chiefs" by informants). 
In the Colony the largest unit is the "State" (with its 
Paramount Chief), each state being composed of "Divisions" 
(which ■ "wings").
88
the absolute title to the land within their Divisions, which 
is reasonable if it is remembered that Ashanti is a confeder­
acy* The evidence of Ashanti witnesses in the Belfield Re­
port must be carefully considered in the light of the absence
of the Asantehene in exile at the time of the Commission.
4
Hence Chief Frimpon could say:
“When the King of Ashanti was in the country 
he claimed the land as paramount chief, but it 
actually belonged to the CHefs and tribes.”
It is difficult to get an exact answer from African in­
formants with regard to the Asantehene #s position in regard to 
the land within the divisions. His right of supervision over 
land-use is traceable to his overlordship, and is now exer­
cised, if at all, in a markedly moderate and constitutional 
manner. One informant put it that title to all the land in 
Ashanti was theoretically with the Asantehene, but that he did 
not press the claim in practice, rather allowing his divisional 
chiefs to behave as though ultimate title was with them. The
5
Ashanti Confederacy Council, in discussing the subject, re­
solved that all the land in Ashanti is the property of the 
stools of various chiefs. One of the chiefs endeavoured to 
lay down that all the land belonged to the Asantehene; the 
latter, however, demurred. Several informants held that there 
was a difference between former times and today: perhaps the
4. At p. 94 of the Report.
5. See Matson, Digest, paras. 81 and 82, p. 18.
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interregnum, and the absence of an Asantehene, led the divi­
sional chiefs to assert an absolute title not dependent on any 
other* This attitude has been retained since the restoration 
of the confederacy, with the change that they now owe allegi­
ance to the Asantehene, and this qualifies their holding of 
land*
It thus appears that the Asantehene*s right (where he does 
not operate as Kumasihone) is one of paramountcy; claims to 
land-control and tribute or share of extraordinary wealth are 
attributable to allegiance and not to title to land. This 
finding does not ansv/er the next problem: within the Division,
who owns the land?
It is commonly observable that the lands of a division 
have been divided up bet ween the different wing-chief s, leav­
ing only a minor portion - sometimes only scattered villages - 
reserved for the Omanhene, In line with this the KOKOFUHENE 
could say before the Belfield Commission?
”A11 the land in my country belongs to my 
stool; but it is divided amongst my 
sub-chiefs.9
These sub-chiefs tthave charge” of the land.
Thi3 sub-division may represent an actual event in the 
past, the granting of feuds or fees, as it were; or it may 
be a subsequent rationalisation. Warrington says on this 
subject:6
6. pp. 35 - 36.
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“In former times all land in Ashanti belonged 
to the Asantehene and ownership was vested in 
the Golden Stool; the land belonged to the 
Asantehene by right of conquest and he gave 
the land to the various chiefs. Such at any 
rate was the general principle, but it is diff­
icult now to say what were the legal rights of 
the Asantehene, in respect of the lands of his 
Abrempon or to what extent such rights were 
exercised, if indeed they were ever defined.
There was no land which belonged to the 
Golden Stool as distinct from the land occupied 
by the Chiefs who served the Stool, and in so 
far as the lands of those Chiefs who were the 
Asafohin of the Asantehene were concerned there 
is little doubt that ownership was vested in 
the Golden Stool, and that the Asafohin held 
their land from the Asantehene; but with re­
gard to the lands of the more powerful Abrempon 
it is probably more accurate to say that these 
Chiefs S0rved_the—Asantehene wi th_their__1 ands 
and that the right’s he exercised in respect of 
such lands depended upon the relations exist­
ing at any particular time between the Asante­
hene and the Birempon concerned.
Whether the Divisional Chief was formerly 
the owner or the caretaker of the land in his
possession, in the absence of an Asantehene
he exercises all the rights of ownership and 
his Asafohin hold their lands In trust for his 
Stool."
(The head chief becomes a party if one of his “asafohin" has
a land dispute with the “safohin" of a neighbouring chief.)
Warrington wrote at a time when the Ashanti Confederacy 
had not been restored; his U3e of the word "ownership", dep­
ending as he did on the evidence of informants naturally lax 
in their use of this word, is a little confusing.
However, there seems no doubt that at the present day in 
most Ashanti Divisions the ultimate title is with the Paramount
Stool of each Division, and a dependent title with the Wing
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7
and other chiefs serving the paramount stool direct. The 
wing chiefs are often described as caretakers for the paramount 
chief. The control of the paramount stool is indicated by, 
for instance, the fact that stranger-farmers are admitted by 
the paramount stool, even if they approach the stool by way of 
a subordinate chief. The practice in different divisions 
varies: in BEKWAI the paramount stool has more control, even
though for all matters except the admission of strangers the 
sub-chief in charge of the land is the land-controiler. In 
ESSTJMEGYA it was stated that if a contractor wished to cut down 
timber in a village under a senior chief, then the agreement 
would be made by the senior chief; but it would be sent to the 
Omanhene for confirmation. This is only a change of emphasis, 
since the proceeds are paid to the Omanhene by custom, who 
gives a proportion to the chief in charge of the land. (Since 
N.A. Treasuries have come into being, this practice is natur­
ally no more.)
In certain cases it does not appear that title is with 
the paramount stool. Certainly for instance in ADANSI, there 
are stools owning their own lands, with the Adansi Paramount 
Stool as paramount in authority rather than in title. In Adansi,
7. Cf. Rattray, A.L.C., 351, (quoting an informant):
1 All land whatsoever belongs to the Head-Stool, 
but the ‘use of it* may have all been given 
away to sub-Stools...1
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both Wing Chiefs and certain other stool-holders appears to 
own their own lands.
Again, in KUMASI Division, there is the distinction bet­
ween stools owning their stool lands, and those which are 
merely caretakers.
Q
Warrington, in discussing this question of stools which 
own their lands, fcnd those which do not own their lands, says:
"The ownership of land is in general the 
distinguishing feature of a Safohene as 
distinct from an Odikro, but there are 
numerous exceptions to this rule: a
newly created Safohene might be given 
subjects although no land was available, 
similarly an Odikro might purchase land 
for his stool but did not thereby become 
a Safohene."
It appears, however, as noticed before, that Warrington 
uses "ownership" in a special sense. It is practically im­
possible to find an ownership of land in sub-stools, independ­
ent of the Paramount. Where the sub-stool is a so-called 
owner, it may still be unable to alienate unless the Paramount 
Chief concurs, or confirms; grants of lesser interests (e.g., 
permitting strangers to farm) are made without the knowledge 
of the Paramount Stool, or with subsequent notification to that 
stool.
Can one distinguish between the "Abrempon",^ "serving 
with their lands", and other chiefs? One test which appears
8. p. 10.
9. For a discussion of the word "Birempon", see Ratt. A.L.C.94.
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reasonable to apply among others Is the compactness of the 
stool lands: some Wing Chiefs are to be found with their
villages scattered through the breadth of the state (as in 
Bekwai); others with their lands a single, isolable, whole.
The latter are more probably "owners" of their lands than the 
former, but this is not a perfect test* Taken in conjunction 
with history, however, it seems that where a chief with his 
own compact stool lands commended himself to a superior chief, 
such a one from then on "served with his lands"; and I inter­
pret this phrase to mean that the interest of the superior 
stool was one of paramountcy and not of ownership; even if 
the rights of the subordinate stool were conditioned by the 
political allegiance it owed, this need not imply that its 
proprietary rights were thereby taken away from it. This 
combination of tests certainly seems to work in other parts of 
the Gold Coast; but it must be admitted that the position is 
baffling in the extreme, and that it is difficult to give a 
clear answer one way or the other, owing to the former confus­
ion between jurisdictional and proprietary rights, and the fact 
that land-owning rights have been a recent development.
COLONY:
If we turn to the Colony proper, there is a good deal of 
evidence from the AKIM states. The leading series of cases 
dealing with the position in AKIM ABTTAOTA are to do with the 
Asamangkese Arbitration, and the subsequent law-suits which
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tested the finding of the arbitrator. It was claimed*^ that 
Asamangkese - a stool serving the Paramount Stool of Akim 
Abuakwa - held their lands subject to the following conditions:
(a) They serve the Paramount Stool with their lands.
(b) Gold nuggets found on the land must be submitted 
to the Paramount Stool which is entitled to appropriate one- 
third of the value.
(c) Treasure trove must be submitted in like manner 
and is subject to a like reduction.
(d) There were further conditions of tribute and toll 
as to hunting and snailing.
(e) Alienations of land to persons not subjects of the 
State were contrary to custom, and had to be reported to the 
Omanhene who was then entitled to a proportion of the purchase- 
money.
The arbitrator said that:
"There has not been sufficient evidence 
brought before me as to the meaning of 
the term 'serving with the land*, which 
is not an English expression, to enable 
me to come to a decision on this claim."
He also found that the assent of the Paramount Stool is not
according to custom necessary for the valid alienation of lands
held by the stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia; but also that
the Paramount Stool is entitled to 1/3 of all rents and profits
10. See: (1929) D. Ct, *26-*29, 220, coram Hall, J.
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of land alienated by the stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia or 
either of them.
11
When the arbitrator's award was considered before Yf.A.C.A.,
Deane, C.J., said that, in regard to counsel's contention that
12
the arbitrator had confused abusa and tribute:
"the contention is that the arbitrator has
really made an award which is contrary to
all the principles of the native customary 
law of land on the Gold Coast, since, 
while finding that the Omanhene's ancestor 
granted the land to the ancestors of the 
Ohene and thereby ceased to be the owner, 
he has in effect awarded him ebusa which 
is the one-third share payable to the owner 
of land by an occupier or person having 
charge of the land for the owner; and that 
the conception of a person who is not the 
owner of land being entitled to ebusa which 
is the first and principal right of owner­
ship is a palpable contradiction of ideas, 
a thing so alien to all native ideas of 
land tenure that the arbitrator may be said 
to have fathered a monstrous hybrid notion 
which if allowed to stand will reduce that 
tenure to chaos.”
13
Casely Hayford was quoted in support of these content-
14
ions; but the Chief Justice said:
“from this passage I think it is clear that 
paramountcy is not in all cases merely a 
personal relationship divorced from all 
connection with the land, but that the King, 
even although he may not be the owner, has a 
very real interest in all the lands of his 
state.“
11. In Ofori Atta v. Amoah: ^1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 15.
12. At p. 24.
13. G.C.N.I., 44.
14. Atta v. Amoah, at p. 26.
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And further that:
uthe true test of what is ebusa and what 
is tribute is not to be found in the 
manner of payment but in the nature of 
the payment.1' 15
It was also objected that only 1/9 had been awarded from
i g
Akwatia, and not 1/5. The objection was overruled, Sarbah 
being cited to show that the King is entitled to an abusa of 
the sub-ruler*s abusa.
One can sympathize with counsel's contention that payments 
attributable to ownership have been confused with payments 
attributable to paramountcy; in particular, the true test of 
what is abusa and what is tribute is surely to be found neither 
in the manner of payment nor in the nature of the payment, but 
in the causa of payment. Since the causa is the point which 
in this and other cases is the main question to decide, this 
test is not very helpful.
A point which must be made about the Asamangkese arbitra­
tion is that the full force of the word ” abusa” has probably 
not been appreciated. Of itself the word signifies no more 
than ttdivision into thirds”; and it can be used equally for 
the division into thirds which takes place when a caretaker 
renders accounts, and when a tenant does the same. The vital 
question is: to whom does each of these three parts go? In
15. loc. cit.» p. 27.
16. P.N.C., 17.
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the case of an abusa tenancy, one-third of the produce goes 
to the land-owner; payment of the one-third is evidence of 
his ownership; and it will be used in the courts to rebut the 
statement that the tenant is in fact the owner of the land.
If the caretaker relationship exists, two-thirds are payable 
to the land-owner; and the fact that two and not one of the 
parts are so paid rebuts the presumption of an abusa tenancy.
In the case of the Paramount Stool, and the subordinate stools, 
somewhat similar considerations apply. The "paramountcy" in­
volved, which I term M jurisdiction’1, is not merely personal, 
but territorial. Some rights with regard to the land are 
attributable to territorial jurisdiction, and some to a prop­
rietary interest. Where there is ownership in a sub-stool, 
but that latter serves a superior stool with its lands, it is 
preferable to avoid describing the letter's interest as a prop­
rietary interest. The powers and claims which it possesses 
are jurisdictional; such powers may include the power to pro­
hibit outright alienations of land outside the citizen-body, a 
power sufficient to entitle the superior stool to sign a con-
17
veyance as "confirming party", or even as one of joint-grantors.
17. In Odjldji v. Nuame: (Unreported) Land Ct, Accra, 19.5.1949, 
from Akim Abuakwa, where sub-stools conveyed to plaintiff 
in fee simple, and the Omanhene gave a licence to defendant 
to fell timber on plaintiff's land, Smith, J., held:
1. The Omanhene does not own all the land in Akim Abuak­
wa.
2. Sub-stools own their own land.
3. The Omanhene is entitled to l/3 of timber felled
on the land. _
/over
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Its signature in such a case indicates a withdrawal of certain 
powers and claims for the future, powers which it would other­
wise possess; it thus bars - through the Stool - its subjects *
powers and claims (e.g., to take up land for farming). In
18Ofori Atta v. Atta Fua it was said in regard to the nature 
of this interests
1 As regards the question of ownership, both 
paramount stools claiming through sub­
chiefs, I consider that where the paramount 
stool has the power to grant concessions 
whether alone or jointly, there is suffic­
ient ownership shewn to bring it within 
the purview of the Ordinance.”
The Ordinance was the Concessions Ordinance, and the judgement
must be considered only within the terms of that Ordinance;
but it is sufficient to illustrate the fact that the powers of
paramount stools - even when less than the ownership of which
we speak, but including the right to countersign concessions -
may be taken as an indication of some kind of proprietary title
by the courts of the Gold Coast.
What does the state of Akim Abuakwa itself say in regard 
19to these problems?
”Every Odikro has some land attached to his 
Stool. A Chief would not be an Odikro but 
a headman, unless he had a stool with land
17. (cont. from previous page) -
4. The conveyance to plaintiff was valid.
5. Neither the /Omanhene nor the sub-stool alone had a 
right to grant timber-rights over the land to a 
third party.
18. (1913) D. & P. 'Il-'IO, 65.
19. In answers given by the Okyenhene and some of his 
councillors in 1951 to myself.
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attached, though the converse is not true, 
namely, a headman may have land and be the 
head of a village, and not be an Odikro.
To speak of an Odikro as 'caretaker' of 
his Stool land will be misleading in the 
English sense. As between one Odikro and 
another Odikro each is owner. As between 
an Odikro and the Okyenhene 20 the land is 
held in trust for the people of the Odikro's 
town as also for all citizens, i.e., persons 
of trueAbuakwa birth...
Both the Okyenhene and the Odikro are 
owners in the sense that they are joint 
trustees, one local and the other paramount.
In common parlance, the paramount Chief is 
owner (ne dea) and the Odikro is caretaker 
(ohwe so), but the reality goes deeper than 
than...w
21
And the Akim Abuakwa Declaration says at paragraph 1:
"The ownership of all Stool land in the State 
of Akyem Abuakwa is vested jointly in the 
occupants for the time being of the Paramount 
Stool and the several Subordinate Stools to 
which the respective portions of such Stool 
land are attached. These portions of stool 
land the Paramount Chief and the Subordinate 
Chief concerned administer as trustees on 
behalf of the members of such Subordinate 
Stool. But the occupant of one Subordinate 
Stool has no right of control over the land 
attached to another Subordinate Stool."
At the present day sales and concessions, etc., are made by
the local landowning stool and the Paramount Stool jointly.
There has been a tendency away from the Paramount Stool
20. (This is the term for the Paramount Chief of Akim Abuakwa
21. State of Akyem Abuakwa (Declaration of Native Customary 
Law) Proclamation. 1952, No. 4 of 1932; made under s. 123 
of the old Native Administration Ordinance; rejected and 
re-submitted v/ith certain modifications in 1939. It is 
still not law.
• 
V
.
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merely signing as confirming party, to signing as a joint 
22
grantor. This represents, no doubt, an historical process 
by which the Paramount Stool has tended to assert more concrete 
rights and powers over the land; this has marched in step with 
the development of proprietary rights by the immediate land­
owning stool, and also by the individual. Such a process is
not regrettable, since the "dual trusteeship" brought out in 
23
the citations means, for instance, that a citizen of Akim 
Abuakwa may cultivate any forest-land anywhere within the con­
fines of the State, The Akim Abuakwa Declaration has recog­
nised this right, although differentiating between the case 
where a citizen cultivates the land of his own Stool, and of 
another stool in Akim Abuakwa: in the latter case, he is re­
quired to hotify the land-owning stool first, A similar 
requirement is observed in, for instance, Adansi, where owner­
ship is divided between the stools. The modern rule that a
22. Danquah, A.L.C. 214, deals with the position in Akim 
Abuakwa. He says:
"Therefore, to obtain an unimpeachable title to stool 
land in Akim Abuakwa, it is necessary first to ac­
quire an option over the land from the Chief of the 
town or village owning the stool by which such land 
is mediately held, and then obtain the sanction and 
approval of the Paramount Chief. It is rightly 
becoming the custom now to approach the Paramount 
Chief in the first Instance who will then Introduce 
the sub-stool owner of land to the applicant."
23. But it will be noted that the "beneficiaries" are in 
one case the local inhabitants and all citizens, and 
in the other the former only.
101
citizen of a state may cultivate anywhere within the State 
free is a development to be welcomed as indicating the welding 
of the component parts of a state into a whole. Citizenship 
has triumphed over local allegiance.
The judgement of Brandford Griffith, C.J., in the leading
24
case of Wiapa v. Solomon is also of interest, even though it 
has to deal in this instance with questions arising In Akwaplm 
(which is a neighbour of Akim Abuakwa):
“Though the principle obtains that all unowned 
land under the authority of a paramount stool 
belongs to such stool, in practice this is 
much modified, at any rate in the Eastern parts 
of the Colony. In these parts each subordin­
ate stool has attached to it large portions of 
land apparently carved out of the territory 
originally belonging to the Paramount Stool; 
similarly, families have large tracts of land 
carved out of the subordinate stool lands, and 
finally we get down to individuals with private 
worshi£ (sic: sc. “ownership”) of particular 
parts' of family land; or private individuals 
may have part of stool land not being family 
land. Any unoccupied land within the recog­
nized boundaries of the subordinate stool land 
or the family land or private land would, of 
course, belong to the subordinate stool, or the 
family, or the private individual, as the case 
might be; but any unoccupied land not being a 
part of the land of a subordinate stool or 
family or a private individual would be attached 
to the paramount stool."
This case was concerned with a contest between the Paramount
Stool of Akwaplm and one of its subjects. It was therefore
distinguished by Brandford Griffith in his Digest from a con-
25trary decision in Akuamankra v. Paul and A.jare on the ground
24. (1905) P.Ct Ren. 405.
25. (1912) D. & F. '11-'16, 26.
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that the latter concerned a conflict between a paramount 
stool and one of Its subordinate stools.
The quotation from Wlapa v. Solomon represents an almost 
exact reversal of historical facts. This occurs, doubtless, 
through the importation of English notions (the 1 carving out" 
of estates) into customary law. There is, it is true, one 
method by which land within a state has been divided out in 
this manner; one can, however, distinguish two modes:
(a) in the first family land develops from the acquisi­
tions of its members, stool land from the accretion of fami­
lies, and the lands of the paramount stool from a confederation 
or Joining together of these separate entities;
(b) in the other newly seized lands have been parcelled 
out by the paramount chief among his sub-chiefs, and thence 
down to the subjects.
The first is, I feel, typical of Ashanti, and the second 
of some states in the Colony. But in most cases there has 
been a mixture of the two methods.
In Eastern Akim - Akim Bosome, Akim Kotoku - the subord-
26
inate stools claim title to the land. The position is
26. In Sintim v. Apeatu: (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 197, and (1936) P.O.
2 W.A.C.A. 201, the question was of the right of a subord­
inate stool of Akim Kotoku to sell land; but the debate 
was about the right of an Odikro to sell his land without 
the consent of his overlord, the Stool of Mansu, the latter 
being of a divisional chief. The dictum of Yates, Acting
C.J., (at p. 198) - wit Is recognised customary law that no 
lands which are subservient to the dominant stool can be
/over
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complicated by the fact that in some cases the land itself is
owned by one stool, but the persons occupying the land are
under the jurisdiction of another stool; (this is also found
in Ashanti). Their constitutions appear to be on the confed-
27
erated pattern - Pield says:
"When the oman unions were set up it was 
entirely a matter of military convenience, 
choice, or sentiment which of these any 
one town chose to join. No question of 
land entered into the contract.”
And again,
"...to this day land control is independent 
of oman control." 2°
But the Oman, as represented by the Omanhene, do have certain
rights in regard to land:
"If such a town 3ells any of its land or 
timber, or lets out its land on hire to 
be used for any abnormal - i.e., non- 
agricultural - purpose (for instance, 
mining) the Omanhene is given one-third 
of the proceeds. Ff it lets out its land 
for rent or on the bu*sa system, the 
Omanhene gets nothing so long as the land 
is used in the normal agricultural manner.
That is to say, the Omanhene has nothing 
to do with the land as such, but as soon 
as his subjects acquire any extra-ordinary 
wealth, whether by exchanging their land 
for it or by any other means, then he can 
claim a share in this wealth for the needs
26. (cont. from previous page) -
sold without the consent of the Paramount Chief and his 
elders” must be read subject to this explanation, the 
Paramount Stool of Akim Kotoku not being involved.
27. In Akim Kotoku. p. 4.
28. Ibid., p. 5.
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of the oman of_which the town in question 
is a mem55r." 22
I did not find It possible to check the information given
above on the spot; but the Declaration of Akim Abuakwa custom-
30ary law, already referred to, although not entirely reliable 
in certain points, states definitely that
“27.The Paramount Stool is entitled to one-third 
share of the proceeds from the sale of all 
Stool land and to one-third share of all 
forms of revenue accruing from Stool land.”
and this provision will include payments of abusa and rent by
strangers occupying stool lands,
31
Again, Field quotes the evidence of an Okyeame that 
where a citizen sells his farm or cleared land to a stranger, 
the chief of the town take3 one-third, but no portion of this 
is sent to the Paramount Chief:
’‘It is only when uncleared forest is sold 
by the town that the town sends one-third 
to the Omanhene. “
The Akim Abuakwa Declaration specifies that one-third of the
proceeds from the sale by a citizen to a stranger of the
former's farm is to be paid to the local stool; whether the
paramount stool takes one-third of this or not Is not specified.
In ASSIN, the Paramount Stool has its own land, and other 
stools also have their own land. Before the subordinate
29. Ibid. p. 57.
30. See p. 99 ante.
31. Ibid. p. 6T.
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stools began to serve the Paramount Stool, they enjoyed their 
own lands, being separate and independent. Here, again, then, 
there appears to be a federated constitution.
In ESSIAM the position is similar: the Omanhene and the
Divisional Chiefs each have their own lands; in most cases 
these have been largely taken up by families and individuals, 
and there is little unoccupied stool land* The Divisional 
Chief is expected to inform the Paramount Chief before dispos­
ing of any of his land.
In this and other Fante states ”stool land11 appears to
refer principally to two things
the area of jurisdiction of the stool;
the stool-family lands.
But there is also reference to the portions of stool-family
land earmarked for the ruling chief, which portions are thus
attached to the Stool; and there is also reference to any
unoccupied portions of land within the area of jurisdiction 
32
of the stool.
In MAHKESSIM, for instance, i was told that title to the 
land is not with the Omanhene. The land there is divided up 
between the different clans and families. There is no unused 
forest-land left, so that ttstool land11 in its wide connotation
' Borebori
32. Cf. Danquah, A.L.C. 215: ”In Fanti proper (Bcedbcrii Fanti)
there are but very few Paramount Stools which can claim 
absolute right of ultimate ownership in all the lands in 
their 3tate divisions.”
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is inapplicable.
In AJUMAKO the Paramount Stool family has its own land; 
the families of Odikros have their own lands. The Omanhene 
has no control over any land but his own. The subordinate 
stools similarly have no control over any land except their 
own. Individual families also have their own land which they 
own. In some places there is forest-land which is owned com­
munally by the Oman; and any man may cultivate it without per­
mission. I do not think that there is any appreciable amount 
of such forest-land left in this State, however.
In ASIKUMA the inhabitants claim to have migrated from 
Ashanti, and to have conquered the aboriginal inhabitants. The 
Paramount Ohief sent out his subordinate chiefs to fight the 
aboriginals, conquer them, and take their land, the land being 
acquired for the benefit of the Paramount Chief. The surviv­
ors came indirectly under the Omanhene. Today all the land is 
controlled by the subordinate chiefs, but the Paramount Stool 
has an interest in the land. This interest appears to be a 
jurisdictional one, including:
(1) a right to l/3 of extra-ordinary gains derived from
the land;
(2) a right to approve sales of land by subjects;
(3) as regards timber, it was said that forest-lands are 
attached to different stools. The Paramount Stool has its own 
forest-lands, and the subordinate chiefs have their own forests
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The Omanhene is by custom entitled to a share of the price 
realized from the sale of such timber; he is not, however, the 
owner of such timber, but only controls its use and disposal.
It is to be noted that it was said that:
"there is no stool land, apart from 
stool-family land."
Land for churches, missions, and stranger-farmers, is acquired 
from the head of a family which owns land. It Is possible for 
a stranger to ask for land from a Chief, who would allow him to 
farm on unoccupied land. Vi/here land is acquired for a church 
no payment need be made to the local chief. Where a store is 
erected on family land, title to the soil remains in the grant­
ing family.
In AKWAPIM a divisional chief has his own land but "he 
owns it for his Paramount Chief". A Wing Chief needs no per­
mission from the Paramount Chief before selling his land. A 
finder of treasure trove reports it to his Wing Chief, who re­
ports the finding to the Paramount Chief. The find is custom­
arily divided as follows:-
l/3 to the Omanhene;
33. Information from Akropong (sed quaere). Cf. Danquah,
A.L.C. 214-5: "...it is apparent that... there Is no
recognition of the Paramount Stool of Akuapem* s inherent 
right of ultimate ownership in all the Akuapem lands, 
although his absolute and indisputable jurisdiction over 
all the lands of Akuapem and the inhabitants thereof, 
has never been denied."
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l/3 to the Divisional Chief;
1/3 to the finder.^
Akwapim is a confederacy of divisions of different racial 
origins: Larteh, Obosomasi, are Guang;
Adukrom and Awukugua are described as Cherep yong; 
Akropong and Amanokrom are Akan, related to the Akims; 
Aburi is Akwamu.
At Aburi it was stated that Akwapim is not like Ashanti, 
where the stools own all the land. In Aburi the land is all
divided up between the seven clans who own the town. The
35 ^Adontenhene had some stool land (quaere stool family land?),
but has public-spiritedly given it away for public purposes,
e.g., as sites for schools, missions, and for the Botanical
Gardens.
Transfers of land by land-owning families are not con­
trolled by the chief; his consent is not necessary, although 
his signature is sometimes sought as a witness or In confirma­
tion in order to ensure greater security of title (a kind of 
registration, as It were) for the purchaser. It should be 
noted that the Akwapim divisions are geographical, thus indic­
ating the federated nature of the constitution.
34. Cf. the Akim Abuakwa Declaration (already referred to at 
p.99), where a similar distribution is observed, except 
where the stool of which the finder is a member does not 
own the land on which the find is made, in which case the 
l/3 share Is divided equally (so it Is said) between that 
stool and the stool which owns the land.
35. That Is, the chief of the Adonten Division of Akwapim, 
centred on Aburi.
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In SEKONDI land is owned by the Stools, the citizens orig­
inally owning not the land, but the things thereon. Before 
selling land, a citizen must therefore have the Stool's consent
Individuals owning land are found, usually as the result of
36sale or deed of gift from a stool.
Paramount and subordinate stools each have their own 
lands, and are entitled to l/3 of what comes out of the land.
There has been much competition between the Stools and the 
stool-f ami lies in this area, the latter claiming that the so- 
called wstool lands" were really "stool-family lands". What­
ever the truth of the matter, it has now been decided that in
37Takoradi the stool owns the lands as against the stool-family;
38and that in Butch Sekondi the like rule holds.
CAPE OOAST:
In Cape Coast any rights which the Stool may possess 
appear to be in abeyance, and tenure is on the typical Fante 
model, although with a tendency to absolute ownership, and a 
corresponding diminution of stool rights, even of a jurisdict­
ional nature. This is explicable by reference to Western 
Influences, and to the existence of a Town Council. Cape Coast 
and other Fante towns are notable for the claim by the
36. Personal information given.at Sekondi.
37. See: Aginfram y, Broquassie: (1878) Ren. 40; (also spelt 
"Broguassi^ in the report).
38. See: Wurapah v. Commonwealth Trust: (1922) F.Ct, '22, 80;
Ami S3 ah v. Krabah; (1956) P.O. 2 W.A.C.A, 30.
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"companies1 to title in certain land, usually that on which 
they have for long held their meetings, or where their head­
quarters are situated. Such a claim is not made elsewhere;
and even here doubt has been cast on the interest which they
40possess, if any. They can, of course, own land acquired in 
a manner similar to that by which individuals may become 
seised of an absolute interest. The Local Government Ordin­
ance. 1951, includes land or interests in land controlled by a
41
company captain in the definition of "stool land”. This may,
it is submitted, be inappropriate*
WESTERN PROVINCE:
It seems that in the states of the Western Province (e.g.,
Wassaw Amenfi) the position is similar to that in Assin, and
Akim; but, as I have no personal experience of them, this
42supposition must await verification.
39. These "companies” are purely indigenous institutions, into 
which the asafo or "young men" of a particular state or 
town are organised. They seem in origin to run counter
to the typical Akan military organisation (being "democrat­
ic", without chiefly members, etc.). They have assumed 
most importance in the towns of the coast (.e.g., in Cape 
Coast, Elmina). In Cape Coast I was Informed that member­
ship of a company goes in the male line. At Elmina, com­
panies seem even to have taken some part Ii>judiclal work, 
the Dutch (when Elmina was within their territories) having 
apparently established a tribunal of the heads of the ten 
companies in the town.
40. See: Inkoom Company of Cape Coast (No.4> v. Attorney- 
General : (1910 J Ren. 56*7. where Earnshaw. J.. doubted 
greatly if a company can own land according to batlve 
law and custom.
41. S. 2.
42. And see Danquah, A.L.C., 215.
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2* It ©merges from the above that In some eases para­
mount stools own the land, the subordinate stools enjoying only 
a dependent interest in their own lands carved out from this; 
that in others subordinate stools own their land, but subject 
to the jurisdictional Interest of the superior stool, concrete­
ly evidenced by signature on conveyances, rights to a one-third 
share, etc; and in other, finally, that neither grade of stool 
truly owns the land, families and individuals owning their own 
lands, subject to a jurisdictional power of varying importance 
in the stools controlling them, and the stool-lands so-called 
are in reality stool-family lands, or are carved out therefrom 
(sometimes together with pieces of forest-land not yet taken 
into effective occupation),
A series of propositions may be attempted:
(i) The jurisdictional boundaries of a Stool or state are not 
coincident with it3 land-owner ship:
- nthe mere fact that certain lands are within 
the administrative boundaries of a certain 
division could not raise the presumption 
that they belonged to the Stool of the Para­
mount Chief of that division.”
(ii) Jurisdiction over persons does not now extend over the
43. Per the trial judge in Kwasi Safo v. Chief Kofi Yensu: 
Tl941) 7 W.A.C.A. 167, quoted with approval by the 
appeal court. This case concerned a dispute between 
Techiman and Offuman in Ashanti, occasioned by the 
British Government's placing Offuman under Techiman 
from the date when Prempeh was exiled until 1935, 
when the Confederacy, and the previously-existing 
position, was restored.
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boundaries of a state:
- in Odonkor v, Ayeh^ the question arose of which
native tribunal had Jurisdiction in land cases, the land in
question in this case being Begoro (Akim) land which had been
settled by Krobos. Crampton Smyly, C.J., dissented from the
45
judgement of Brandford Griffith, C.J., in Angbo v. Del, in 
which the latter judge decided that the land should be deemed 
to be Krobo land having been settled by Krobos. Crampton 
Smyly, C.J., said:
ttThis is a statement I find very great diffi­
culty in following, if it is to be extended 
to the case of the purchase of land by members 
of one tribe from another tribe - it would do 
away with the territorial limits of the parti­
cular jurisdiction of the tribunal and change 
it into a jurisdiction over the persons of the 
tribe.11
This new principle is consolidated by, for instance, the
46
Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance. 1944, which requires 
annual rate or tax to be paid now on a residential, and not 
an allegiance, basis. The idea that tax or levy is due by 
reason of allegiance, is by no means extinct, a3 is shown by 
disputes between states recorded in the files of the admini­
stration. The residence requirement does not in any case 
provide a pat answer where ownership is disputed, e.g., where 
it is claimed that settlement in the territory of a neighbour-
44. (1915) D. & P. ,11-,16, 50, in the Supreme Court.
45. (1908) S. Ct, 15.6.1908.
46. No. 21: of 1944,
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ing state coupled with the allegiance of the settlers produces 
ownership, or at least jurisdiction, in the settlers* stool,
(iii) Allegiance extends over political boundaries:
this may be of importance when questions of meeting extra­
ordinary stool expenses, etc., are raised. These were former­
ly met by special stool levies, applicable only to subjects of 
the stool. It is noticeable, however, that permanently 
settled strangers are now becoming liable to contribute 
equally with citizens.
( iv )  A lleg iance cannot now be bought and so ld :
it might have been transferred in the past by the act of
the Individual, or by a chief transferring his own, or the
allegiance of some of his subjects, to requite a debt.
(v) Jurisdiction over persons can now be altered only by
change of political boundaries:
Jurisdiction cannot be sold, it can only be ceded. As 
will be seen when the question of the effect of sales is dis­
cussed, it was considered formerly that an outright sale es­
pecially to a stool, or to a group of individuals serving the 
same chief, might also pass jurisdiction.
(vi) Ownership of land does not now confer jurisdiction.
(vii) Absence of ownership does not imply absence of juris­
diction.
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3. There are also the complications caused by the dicho­
tomy between the Stool - or the Chief and his elders and coun­
cillors - on the one hand, and the Native Authority, even 
though constituted by the same persons, on the other. As 
regards this, it must be noted that the stool is a customary 
entity, whilst the Native Authority is a statutory authority. 
The Stool and the Native Authority are not the same body, nor 
interchangeable, even where they are composed of the same per­
sons. The land-owning rights of the stool are not affected 
by the creation of a Native Authority, even though in some 
cases the revenue from stool lands (for instance, payments for 
concessions, for sales of land, for rent from strangers, etc.) 
are now paid into a Native Authority treasury. The chiefs 
have generally taken a salary from Native Authority funds in 
commutation for their previous incomes from customary payments.
Rights attributable to allegiance are still exercised by 
the Stool, since it would be patently absurd to expect citizens 
to owe any duty of allegiance to a completely non-customary 
body. The rights of jurisdiction exercised by a Native Auth­
ority consist partly of rights formerly exercised by the Stool, 
and partly of powers directly conferred on the Native Authority 
by legislation. The rights of land-control, where now exer­
cised by the Native Authority, are partially attributable to a 
delegation of powers of management of stool lands to the Native 
Authority, either by the Stool, or by statute. No doubt,
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when the local government reforma are put Into effect, the 
distinction between the customary and the statutory body will 
become more patent, since they will no longer consist of large­
ly identical personnel# Any juridical difficulties which now 
exist are to some extent glossed over by the failure to make
the distinction in practice at present, but will become more
47obvious in future# What duties are attributable to alle­
giance at the present day, what duties to jurisdiction, and 
what to ownership?
4# Duties attributable to allegiance:
These duties are owed to the Stool, or to the Chief - the 
Native Authority does not come into the picture#
(i) Certain customary services rendered to the Chief, 
and (ii) Liability to contribute to extraordinary stool levies, 
e#g#, in defence of the stool lands#
It was formerly the custom that only real subjects of the Stool 
must contribute, even if outside the confines of the State# 
Strangers need not contribute to Stool debts# But today It 
is Increasingly evident that those who are permanently-settled 
strangers are now being rendered liable to contribute to stool 
levies: this may be done on the practical basis that they are
fictionally assimilated to membership of the stool or tribe.
47# Much of the above will require to be radically revised 
in the light of the new Local Government Ordinance.
1951, under which "traditional' members11 constitute only 
1/3 of the new Local Authorities# Such revision must 
await the application of the Ordinance#
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(iii) Liability to contribute a portion of certain 
extraordinary gains:
e.g. a portion of game killed;
the tusk of an elephant killed; 
large gold nuggets;
(1/3 of extraordinary gains from the land, as 
for instance from concessions, sales, snails gathered, 
especially between stool and superior stool)*
But some of these duties may be attributable to land-ownership 
in the stool; it was stated by one informant that the gift of 
a portion of snails served nto show the real owner of the 
land”; and the destination of portions (hind legs) of game 
killed may vary according as the game was killed by a subject 
of the stool owning the land or not. If one may take the 
Asamangkese Arbitration as an authority, it seems that the pay­
ment of 1/3 between subordinate and paramount stool of various 
amounts, including money gained from exploitation of diamond 
deposits, is attributable to allegiance, and not to ownership. 
5# Rights attributable to jurisdiction:
(a) Persons.
(i) Right to exact a levy or tax.
(li) Right to tax strangers*
The position is complicated because levies were originally 
extraordinary and irregular, and did not apply to strangers.
The right to impose a general rate or tax is of course now
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confined to the Native Authority, which is so empowered by 
statute. The modern rate is payable by all residents, and 
also by persons owning immovable property within the area of 
the Native Authority, even though ordinarily resident outside 
that area*
(iii) Right to political control over the actions of 
residents, to judge their cases, and execute the judgements. 
This power of control was definitely attributable to jurisdict­
ion; and the judicial power - now exercised by native courts 
under the respective ordinances - is not exercisable outside 
the jurisdictional boundaries of the authority concerned. To
seek for a proprietary basis for the exercise of this juris-
48
diction is fallacious, as was shown in Odonkor v. Ay eh: it
must be remarked, however, that there are two points: does
the settlement of subjects of a State, S, on land outside S*s 
boundaries give rise to a power in the authority of S to decide 
personal claims between them, or cases concerning land which 
they occupy (i.e., is there an extension of jurisdiction?); 
and does the settlement give rise to proprietary rights in the 
stool of the settlers, which rights then carry along with them 
the right to judge cases concerning the land (i.e., an exten­
sion of ownership)? The answer to the first question is a 
decided negative; the answer to the second question is 
considered later. ^
48. See ante at p. 112.
49. See below at pp. 123-5.
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(iv) Certain services (e.g., of communal labour) are
now owed to the Native Authority under the N.A.C.O. Are these
only owed by real subjects of the stool, being a transference
of previous customary services? Or are they owed by all,
strangers and citizens, being attributable to residence? As
50to the latter, Warrington says that a stranger paying cocoa- 
tribute in Ashanti is not liable to perform communal labour for 
the Chief on whose land he resides, nor does he contribute to 
levies. But a stranger growing food, (i.e., probably a per­
manent resident) is not usually called on to contribute to 
levies, but he is expected to assist in any communal work.
This might serve to indicate that the choice is between the 
duty being attributable to membership of the land-owning stool, 
or to allegiance owed to the stool calling for the communal 
service. I feel, however, that in the old days the duty of 
communal service in the village-eontext was owed by reason of 
permanent residence in the village, and was therefore attrib- 
\ utable not so much to ownership, or to allegiance, as to terri-lt
torial jurisdiction over land. The matter is uncertain.
(b) Land.
(v) The right to control occupation.
(vi) The right to control use (e.g., by forbidding 
certain kinds of use).
In the context of the village, the Odikro may control occupatior
50. at p. 55.
119
within the village, for instance, in the matter of where to 
build houses and so on* He also in certain cases controls 
the use, by, for instance, permitting the taking of fish, or 
the damming of a stream, at a certain time of year* These 
rights are exercised independently of ownership* But where 
the ownership is with a superior stool, it might be said that 
the Odikro (commonly called “caretaker for the Stool” in such 
circumstances) is only exercising powers delegated by the sup­
erior stool, powers attributable to the Stool's ownership. 
Certainly, the most important of the rights in regard to the 
control of occupation and use are those which concern the ad­
mission of strangers to farm or reside in the village or forest. 
And, quite certainly, an Odikro who does not (througjh his 
Stool) own the land in the village concerned, does not on his 
own initiative admit strangers, but rather refers them to the 
superior land-owning stool. The admission of strangers thus 
appears to be a right relative to ownership; and I do not 
think that a stool with only jurisdictional powers could claim 
to exercise such rights a3 flow from ownership of stool lands.
(vi) The right to take land for public purposes, 
e.g., for sanitary reasons, roads, buildings, etc.
The present powers of a Native Authority in this respect rest 
on Ordinance; but before that time the Chiefs could undoubt­
edly regulate these matters (even, perhaps, if not owning the 
land?). Land required today for public purposes, e.g., for
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the building of State amenities, slun-clearance, layouts, etc., 
is taken and used by the Native Authority (obviously not exer­
cising rights of ownership in Itself), but by virtue of the 
fact that the Stool which it represents is owning the land 
required. A Stool is not permitted to take land within the 
beneficial occupation of its subjects without the payment of 
compensation for the loss by the citizens of their interests in 
the land. Such might happen if their farms are destroyed so 
that roads might be made, or buildings erected; or if their 
houses are demolished for any reason. There are certain quest­
ions to which I feel unable to give a definite answer without 
further information:
(a) Can a stool which owns the land acquire compulsorily 
stool land in the actual occupation of citizens, or is it nec­
essary for the stool to obtain the consent of the occupiers 
first?51
(b) Can a stool which does not own the land acquire land
52
compulsorily; and must it compensate not only for the citi­
zen^ dependent interest, but his absolute interest, where he 
has one, al30?
6 . Rights attributable to ownership of land:
(i) The right to dispose of the stool lands, e.g., by 
sale or lease, etc.
51. Probably the consent of the occupiers must be obtained
first.
52. Almost certainly not.
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This is quite certain, since a stool which does not ov/n the 
land, even if exercising jurisdiction over it, has no interest 
which it is capable of disposing of at law,
(ii) The power to admit stranger-farmers on abusa, or 
other systems; and the right to l/3 share from non-citizens 
farming the land*
This again is referable to ownership only.
(iii) Power to grant timber and mineral concessions;
It should be noted that if there is an absolute grant of land 
by a stool, including the right to timber and minerals and 
timber, the grantee has no liability to pay l/3 in respect of 
minerals or timber which he wins or disposes of.
If there is an absolute grant, without the right to timber and 
minerals, then the grantee is normally on abusa and will pay 
l/3 of the proceeds derived from the sale of timber or minerals 
from the land granted.
The payments of 1/3 between a subordinate stool owning its 
lands, and a superior stool to which it owes allegiance, are 
not referable to ownership; but may be referable to allegiance.
(iv) The right to the reversion in the land in which 
citizens and strangers enjoy an interest (a farm, or a house). 
The question of the reversion to land occupied by citizens 
does not normally arise today, since it would be most unusual
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for a citizen, to die without leaving any heirs at all. The 
case might have arisen in the past, when a citizen had been 
banished, and his lands were forfeit to the chief. The quest­
ion of the reversion to the land occupied by the stranger, for 
farms or houses, can arise today. It will be appreciated 
that there are two interests involved: the stranger's depend­
ent interest in the land, and his absolute interest in his 
farm or house. When a stranger departs or dies leaving no-one 
to succeed him, the stool which granted him the interest suc­
ceeds to the absolute interest in the farm or house, and the 
dependent interest in the land is extinguished or merged in 
the stool's title.
It may happen that the stranger has acquired the absolute 
interest in the land, by purchase; then presumably the stool 
succeeds to that absolute interest also, and the lard reverts 
to the category of stool or tribal land, having previously been 
land alienated in individual ownership.
The most interesting case is that where the stools do not 
lay claim to the land occupied by individuals or families sub­
ject to them (as in the Fante areas), or to the land occupied 
by strangers claiming title through such subjects. The stool 
has in such a case at best a jurisdictional interest; but it
53. The rule is given theoretically by Battray at Ash, p. 222. 
He says the land would be taken “by the stool under whom 
the now extinct clan or family had held it". (Quaere 
whether he intends “land-owning stool11 )♦
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seems that if a stranger is absolutely entitled to land within 
such a state, and dies or departs leaving no heir, then the 
stool will claim it. The 3tool in such cases also lays claim 
to land added to the state, as for instance by alluvion.
Sales of land: The major problems to do with jurisdiction and
ownership have arisen through the sale of land by stools* 
Similar problems do not arise when strangers have merely occup­
ied land owned by another stool as farmers. If land is sold 
by a stool to an individual stranger, thep, if the sale is out­
fight, the stool forfeits all proprietary rights in the land, 
including the right to timber and minerals, unless these have 
been reserved. At the same time, citizens of the stool may 
forfeit the rights which they customarily enjoy In the land, 
including the right to take up forest-land for farming, to take 
forest-products and fish, etc. But a sale by a stool cannot 
deprive citizens of the enjoyment of farms, etc., which they 
already possess over the subject-matter, without the consent 
of those citizens. The stool retains jurisdictional rights 
over the land, however; and even where the purchaser owes 
allegiance to a different stool, the land is not taken outside 
the jurisdiction of the granting stool; nor can an alien pur­
chaser purport to set up an independent state of his own.
The problem is a little more difficult when land Is sold 
to a group (especially an organized group) of strangers. It 
has been quite customary for a purchaser, and especially a
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group of purchasers, to found their own village on large 
tracts of land which they have bought. In time, the original 
purchaser or one of them becomes the headman of such a village;
such headman may owe allegiance to a stool different from that
from
/which he purchased the land. It is such cases as these which 
have led to the assertion that jurisdiction, together with 
ownership, have passed by the sale, or by the subsequent course 
of events. There was formerly a widespread feeling that a 
sale of land outright by the cutting of guaha or otherwise ex­
tinguished all the rights which the vendor-stool had in the 
subject-matter, including rights of jurisdiction; and that 
the effect of such a sale was to create - If there was a stool 
capable of exercising jurisdiction - jurisdictional rights in 
the stool which the purchasers served. The position was
similar to a first occupation by subjects of a stool. This
54is certainly the cause of difficulty in the Krobo cases.
There has been a gradual recession from the idea that 
sale of land could extinguish rights of jurisdiction; and to­
day jurisdiction could not thus pass except by a definite 
cession. If, however, the sale took place some time ago; 
the land bought was contiguous or near to the tribal land of 
the purchasers; and jurisdiction was allowed to flow as a con­
sequence of the sale and the allegiance owed by the purchaser
54. See: Odonkor v. Ayeh: 11913; D. & P. ’ll-'lG, 50.
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to the purchasers9 stool (as by abandonment of any attempt to 
exercise jurisdiction); then one may say that the sale has had 
the effect of transferring jurisdiction.
The transactions by which land was acquired for the State 
of Hew Juaben in the last century through a purchase (?) of the 
land from an Akim chief are an illustration of this. The facts^ 
taken at their face-value, speak for a sale by the chief to 
Government, and with a subsequent granting of permission to the 
Juabens to settle there and set up a state of their own (the 
Government retaining title to the land until they expressly di­
vested themselves of it); but it has also been suggested that 
the transactions might be represented as a cession of territory 
from Akim to the Juabens, that the sum paid to the chief of 
Kuloirantumi (the grantor) was a compensation-payment, and not a 
purchase-price, ani that Government merely asserted superior 
rights (e.g., to take land for public purposes without payment 
of compensation to the New Juabens) as consideration for their 
instrumentality in bringing about this cession.
Where land is sold by one stool direct to another, there
may or may not have been a cession of jurisdiction as well.
In  former tim es, such a tra n s fe r would almost in e v ita b ly  have
55implied a transfer of jurisdiction as well.
55. For a further discussion of the effect of sales on juris­
diction and ownership, see SALE, pp.587etseq,post.
CHAPTER III.
THE INDIVIDUAL AND PROPERTY.
We turn from a consideration of the position, rights and 
duties of stool3 In Alcan law to the next category of legal 
persons, namely, individuals. It Is proposed here to study 
the position and rights of citizens in respect of their Indi­
vidual property, the common rights which they may enjoy, ani 
the position of “strangers" in the Alcan law of property. It 
must be emphasized:
(1 ) that we study the rights of individuals here as 
against other individuals and political authority (the stools) 
the rights of an individual In the context of his family are 
dealt with in the chapter on THE FAMILY (post):
(2 ) that in their external relations families are in the 
position of individuals to a certain extent, and the descript­
ion of a citizen’s rights as against another Individual, and 
as against the stool, applies In many principles and details 
to families also.
A. THE CITIZEN.
What is a citizen? Our first question is naturally this 
since so often the antithesis is made between citizens and 
strangers in regard to rights over land, liability to levies, 
and so on. In ancient custom it would have been easy to
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answer, since there was little movement between states, and 
warfare gave every subject his place in the military and poli­
tical machine. At the time when jurisdiction was primarily 
over persons, allegiance was the test,'** All those who, owing 
allegiance to the stool in question,were its subjects or 
members, were citizens; perhaps one should say more exactly: 
all those who belonged to families forming the State or com­
munity were citizens. Citizenship was therefore a heritable 
)status, which could not normally bo otherwise acquired (except 
in cases of change of allegiance).
With the development of purchase of land, and immigration 
by strangers, there has come about a greater infiltration of 
non-citizen elements. These strangers are divisible into two 
classes - permanent and temporary residents. There is an in­
creasing tendency for the former to become assimilated (except 
insofar as concerns the mode of their original acquisition of 
land) to the position of citizens.
The body of citizenry is called in Twi the lfomanu. One 
may observe here that this word is applied to every community 
resident together, from the inhabitants of a village, to sub­
jects of one stool, to all the citizen-body of a state. And 
secondly, that oman is used as the description of the state
1. uCitizen" in Twi is akoa, or "subject of a stool”. The 
word akoa may mean “slave", but is commonly used of any 
person who is in a natural state of subjection (by birth) 
to a superior authority.
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itself, which indicates how much in African eyes states are a
personal affair, and the existence and meaning of a state are
2
represented by the persons going to make it up.
The citizen in his context - the village: The individual
subjects of a state do not exist in a formless mass; they 
have a hierarchical context of over-wider communities, a chain 
of allegiance reaching up to the paramount stool itself, A 
typical set-up may be:
Paramount Chief
i------- 1------- 1
Chief Chief Villages
I I 1
Subordinate Chief Villages Families
I I
Villages Families
f
Families
Certain villages serve the Paramount Chief directly; but 
the great majority of the state is divided up between the 
different "Wing" or Senior Divisional Chiefs, who may, besides 
having villages directly under them, have subordinate chiefs 
with their own villages.
The villages serving any particular chief may be one solid 
block, or may be scattered throughout the breadth of the state 
in question. The difference may be due to different modes of 
acquisition.
2 , In the following account, "citizen" is to be taken in its 
widest sense, as a subject of the Paramount Stool of the 
State (or Division, in Ashanti) concerned, unless other­
wise stated.
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In the former case the stool lands of the chief have a
definite boundary: in the latter case the boundaries of a
*
chief are the boundaries of the various villages which serve 
him. The boundaries of the state (i.e., all the land under a 
particular Paramount) are the boundaries of those subordinate 
to him. There may be segments of land broken off from the 
main body: these may be owned by the Paramount Stool - or a
stool serving it; or the inhabitants may only owe allegiance 
to it. In such cases, drawing the boundaries of a given 
state may be a matter of great difficulty.
Depending on the actual area, any given stool may own its 
own stool lands (whatever its rank), or may only be a Care­
taker1* of those lands for its political superior. In some 
cases the paramount stool lays claim to all the land in its 
state or division; in some the land is owned by its subord­
inate stools; in others it is claimed that there is a kind 
of joint ownership.
VILLAGE:
However long the chain of allegiance one comes down In
the end to a village, which appears a functioning unit for
3
many of the purposes of the Akan law of property. The origin
3. Cf. the case of Boadu v. Fosu: (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 187, where 
the judgement of the Native Tribunal, reproducing in almost 
identical terms Sarbah, F.C.L.63-4, is seriously misleading. 
It was said that the lands in question Mare held under the 
system of village community, whereby all the inhabitants of 
Brakwa village, divided into clans or families, have each
/over
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of villages was given by one set of informants as follows:
The building of huts or houses originates first from 
hunting, and later from farming in that order. When a sub­
ject first find3 or found a forest, he should inform his Oman- 
hene. It becomes the property of the family once they start 
to farm it. The Paramount Stool gives permission for a vill­
age, or hamlet, to be built in the first place.
It is possible that many villages have in the past dev­
eloped in this manner, and that this account represents the 
change-over from a hunting, to a settled, existence. Many 
villages in different areas have developed independently, and 
their origin is lost in antiquity (informants say f,they have 
been there since time immemorial"). Even at the present time
In those states with unused forest-land new hamlets or villages
5
continue to grow up. In many cases they develop as offshoots 
from existing villages (hence the nomenclature: "Hemang I, 
Hemang II, etc."). If a village grows sufficiently in import­
ance, its headman may become an Odikro. At one village I 
visited, the Odikro, an old man, said that when he first came 
the village was very small indeed, with only six houses or so. 
At present, I estimated it contained about seventy-five
3, (cont. from previous page) -
of them a proportionate, share In the said lands, as common 
property, without any possession or title to distinct por­
tions of the said lands.” This is far from an exact 
description of the legal position.
4, Essumegya.
5, Of. Hatt. A.L.C. 344.
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compounds. It had also become a market-centre for surrounding 
villages. It was on a main road, with neighbouring villages 
about four miles in each direction along the road, and at six­
teen miles distance into the J&Lrest at right angles to the
_ a
road. This was in an under-populated area of thick forest,
7
and in more settled areas villages are much nearer than this.
(In parenthesis, the word "odikro” needs consideration.
Of itself it means no more than "he who eats (owns) the vill­
age”; but in usage it seems to be extended to cases where it 
is not maintained that the Odikro owns the land of the village;
he may "own” only the village itself and not the land on which 
8it stands.)
With regard to village boundaries, the following is the 
gist of some information vouchsafed. The boundaries of a 
village have never been demarcated on a map; but the Odikro 
of that village will know his boundaries, and take charge with­
in those boundaries. These boundaries have existed from time 
immemorial (meaning that no-one remembers who laid them down?). 
Trees, streams, abandoned huts, dungs-hills, etc., may mark the
6 . Adansi.
7. In the case of New Juaben, it was said that there was no 
ordered migration. Settlers came in groups from Ashanti 
Juaben at different times. It was all forest-land at 
that time (1882). They settled where they wished, and 
farmed where they pleased on the land, which they found 
empty.
8 . The name compares with the Nyanja (My as aland) "mwlnl wa // 
mudzi" (owner of a village).
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boundaries. Another informant said that each village will 
know its boundaries roughly even before all the village area 
has been farmed.
It was said that it is impossible to have village bound­
aries in vacuo; you must have boundaries with some-one. The 
following were impossible cases 
Case 1.
r Village 
v No. 1. >
 ^ /
No
man's
land
1 Village 1 
\ No. 2. t
Case 2.
But the following was a possible case:-
where V^ and V^ serve the same chief, and Vg serves a differ- 
erent chief. This was given me in a state where there is no 
unused forest-land left, and where villages serving, a chief do 
not necessarily form a compact and contiguous group.
Another informant put it that there is a village nucleus, 
surrounded by a portion of virgin forest accessible to the
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fanners of that village
\ F O R E S T  - _
Its boundaries will be in the forest on each side with neigh­
bouring villages. These boundaries often follow natural 
features. If a new village, Vg, is founded to one side of the 
original village in the forest, representatives of both vill­
ages will meet to fix a boundary between them before all the 
intervening forest is farmed. This is one of the first acts 
in the foundation of a village. This probably describes 
fairly accurately how the forest was gradually brought under 
occupation in the first place.
The cultivation of farms by the individuals and families 
making up the village goes on within the village framework as 
described, the forest on each side being available for new 
cultivation. As the forext is used up, cultivators must go 
further afield - in the village already mentioned farmers went 
up to six miles away. The reasons given were that the land 
near the village was too dry, and that the nearest land had 
already been farmed and was now secondary bush.
It should be remarked that there is a sharp differentiation 
in regard to rights between virgin forest and secondary bush.
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The latter is forest-land which has been farmed and then 
allowed to lie fallow. Such fallow-land (mfuwa) is not part 
of the forest, available for new cultivation by villagers, 
since concrete individual rights in favour of individuals and 
families are created therein (even though it may look remark­
ably like virgin forest to the inexpert eye).
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS;
1. RIGHT TO FARM.
The primary right of citizens Is their right to farm 
free, which includes both the taking of virgin forest into 
cultivation, and their continued farming of land howsoever 
acquired. This farming takes place typically within the 
context of the village as already described.
(a) Acquisition of Interests: A citizen may acquire
land for farming In any of the following ways:
by clearing a portion of virgin forest;^ 
by succession from his family, or under will; 
by^egging” land from another family or individual; 
by outright gift (rare);
by leasing, taking under pledge, or purchasing a
farm;
by purchase of the absolute Interest in land
(where this Is permitted).
9. Sacred ('’fetish”) groves, burial grounds (cf. Matson, 
Digest. 43), and perhaps land intended for building, 
cannot be taken into occupation in this way.
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The norm is that of first acquisition. By exercising his 
right to take up unoccupied forest land for farming, the citi­
zen concretizes his potential power or right into an individual 
interest in the land in question. Thi3 interest is dependent 
on the stool's interest in the land itself; but absolute as 
regards the farm as against the claims of other families and 
individuals.
Method of cultivation: all cultivation is off a deter­
minate baseline into the virgin forest. The method, and the 
boundaries that result, was given as follows (a plan being 
appended for greater clarity):
F O  R £  $ T
*  Q--Q---Q--- Q O— ~ — Q---0— &
IL
8 A  5 £ JL / A,
A
if > ^  
/5U
10. Cf. the maxim given by Rattray, A.L.C. 347, Note: dadie 
na pere asase (the iron, i.e., the hoe, is the one to lay 
cTaira to the-land).
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The baseline is AE.
A family start cultivation at AB. A member of the family 
starts individual cultivation at BC. An individual (not a 
member of that family) might start cultivation at CD. Another 
family starts at BE.
All the cultivators have started equal. The first stage 
is to clear the bush, the second to plant cocoa, the third to 
interplant food crops, which provide shade whilst the cocoa- 
trees are small. The fourth stage is when the trees grow up, 
picking starts, and maintenance is restricted to weeding. In 
the last stage a new farm may be started up, perhaps at EP.
The dotted transverse lines indicate each year's clearing- 
the cultivators expand their cultivation progressively into 
the forest.
The portion AB represents several members of a family: 
they will clear the bush vigorously, and advance considerably 
each year on a definite frontage. Eventually, they will reach 
XY, At XY they may find that there are new farms with XY as 
a base, proceeding in the same direction - so AB must stop 
cultivation and start elsewhere. Alternatively, there may be 
other farmers who are starting from a still more distant base, 
and farming towards XY; in which case XY represents the for­
ward edge of their cultivation. In such a case, some time 
before the respective cultivations meet, the two parties will 
have met and agreed on a common boundary (which will be In the
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bush, between them). Such a boundary might be at - O' 0 0* 0» -0-0- . 
When El is reached, either AB will turn round and farm - with 
AB as a baseline - in the opposite direction, or go to an en­
tirely new place some distance away. Hence it can happen 
that a family or.individual may finish up with many farms, 
widely scattered.
BC - a single person - will farm much less vigorously.
It is a principle of customary law that each cultivator should 
stick to his side-boundaries, and not farm across the line of 
cultivation of a neighbour. Nevertheless, it will naturally 
happen that AB, farming more vigorously, will encroach on BC; 
and their right-hand boundary may wander as Indicated by
Two conclusions emerge: the first is that typically Akan
11
cultivation tends to resemble a grid of long, parallel, strips; 
the second that in practice farms may become entangled, and 
the final patchwork may look something like this (drawn for me 
by a cocoa inspector):
9 so as to cut across BC*s front and finish up
at H
11. It will be appreciated that the rectangular symmetry of 
our diagram, though necessary for explanation, is an 
over-simplification.
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If the farms are foodstuffs farms only, then as the cul­
tivation advances, the levels of cultivation in the rear will 
tend to revert to hush, and will in time look like secondary 
forest. The original cultivator (or his family) will still 
lay claim to them; and no-one else may go and farm there with­
out his permission. Additionally, a farmer will lay claim to 
the land in front of him up to the boundary""*)- fo-O-O O -0-- even 
before he reaches it; so that again permission will be re­
quired for farming there.
Permissions and Payments: For farming within the bound­
aries of his village a citizen needs no permission from his 
Odikro, or from the stool owning the absolute interest in that 
land. It appears that portions of virgin forest are not
allocated to villagers; nor is the site where they choose to
12farm notified to the political authority for approval. Citi­
zens will, pay no tribute or percentage of their yield over to 
the stool. At most in some cases there may be a nominal pay­
ment before beginning farming.
If there is no virgin land left In his own village, a 
citizen may go to another village in the same state. All in­
formants agreed that in such a case he should notify the Odikro
12. So: Informants from Ashanti, Adansi, Asikuma, Akim Abuakwa;
Contra: "he notifies the Odikro if he wishes to make a 
cocoa farm and pays customary rum": Bekwai.
Rattray. A.L.C. 350, quotes an Informant as saying:
" A Subject had not any right to go and farm, even 
on unallocated Stool land, without first in­
forming the Stool."
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of that village and pay a nominal amount (usually drink) before 
beginning farming there. He will not pay anything thereafter 
annually. One informant said that in such a case he should 
pay rum at.the initial stage, and rum thereafter annually, to 
the Odikro. The reason given was that otherwise the Odikro 
of the citizen’s native village (if neighbouring) might lay 
claim to the land as part of that of his village. No tribute 
is payable even if cocoa is planted.
If the now village to which the citizen goes serves a 
different chief from his own village (but in the same state), 
similar rules apply; though in some areas it is customary for 
him to notify this chief first. Again, he makes only a nom­
inal payment, and is thereafter on all fours with a native of 
that village. This is a recent development in states where
the title to land is split up between the wing and other chiefs
13the state being basically a confederation of such chiefs.
14The case of Kofi v. Brentuo is somewhat baffling, therefore, 
as the claim appears to run counter to modern custom. It 
concerned land in Adansi, particularly the dispute between 
Adokwai and Abodom. In thi3 case an Adnnsi sub-stool claimed
cocoa-tribute (£19) from the subject of another Adansi sub­
stool. Unfortunately, it was ruled that the dispute was over
13. i.e., some informants said that if cocoa was planted,he 
might have to pay rates of tribute similar to those paid 
by a complete stranger. This probably represents the 
former rule; but it is now questionable.
14. (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 92.
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jurisdiction, and not a land-case, despite the claim for trib­
ute, so that the merits of this claim were not tested in the 
W.A.C.A.
If all the forest-land in his village-area is used up,
the usual remedy of an individual (after turning to his family
for aid) is to ”begn spare land (fallow-land) from another
family in the village* A farm made on such land belongs to
him, even though on another family's land* Usually only a
nominal initial payment is made (with sometimes nominal annual
payments thereafter)* The transaction is thus a species of
15
tenancy* free or for a nominal rental; but although tenant 
of the land, he is not tenant of the farm* It makes some dif­
ference whether the transaction takes place in his own or 
another village; e.g. i n_hi s_own_vy lage: when the farmer
dies, his successor takes the farm automatically, and nothing 
is charged (as a rule) by the land-owning family; the Odikro 
need not be notified; inj_aiioth^rjvyiage: the successor will 
continue the farm, but may have to make some nominal payment to 
the ”land-owning” family; the Odikro may have to be notified 
(but probably not compulsory)*
Such begging of land is by no means rare, and was reported 
everywhere as a customary method of acquiring land* Outright 
gift in such a case was declared to be unusual. In the more 
commercialized areas it Is possible that annual substantial
15. See: TENANCIES AND LEASES, pp. 451 et seq*
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payments (or abusa) might bo charged*
A man may also come into possession of farming land by
pledge* If land is pledged to him by customary pledge, he
enters into possession and takes the fruits of the farm as
inte re s t-payme nt s * A
An individual may also purchase a farm outright (some
informants declared it contrary to custom for an mfuwa or
16 ^
fallow-land to be sold)* The citizen who buys a farm from 
another citizen holds it thenceforth as though it were a farm 
made by himself out of virgin forest (subject to the interest 
of the stool landowner)* Such purchases are not normally 
controlled by the stool* Where outright sale of land is rec­
ognised, an individual may buy, not a farm (i*e., a citizen's 
interest) but the land itself, with or without a farm on it 
(i.e., he buys the absolute interest in the land). This has 
been considerably practised in the past (principally by 
strangers); it applies especially when only part, or none, of 
the absolute interest in all the land is owned by a stool (viz. 
in Class II areas - Pante, etc.).
(b) Security of tenure: A citizen who acquires a farm
is not liable to be divested by the stool for any reason what­
ever* His tenure is described as "indefinite" or "perpetual". 
Formerly, he might have been evicted, or his possessions con­
fiscated, for political offences (where he failed to obey the
16. See s. v* PLEDGE*
16a.See Akim Abuakwa Declaration, 1932.
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order of the chief, or where he was banished). Today, I was 
assured, there is no such remedy. A citizen who failed to 
carry out his customary and other obligations is not liable 
to be evicted. The only remedy is prosecution for the offence 
of which he is guilty.^
His successors continue to hold the land on the same terms 
as he himself held it (qua the stool: qua his family it is now 
inherited property - vide SUCCESSION passim). The successor 
does not, as far as I am aware, make any payment in respect of 
the farm when he succeeds. He may make a nominal payment of 
rum to the Odikro or chief concerned, if he farms outside his 
own village.
Where a farm is made by an individual on land begged from 
another family, the successor may be expected to report his 
succession, and make a nominal payment in token thereof. Nor­
mally the successor in this case also farms on the same terms 
as his predecessor.
It is possible that a citizen purporting to dispose of the 
absolute interest in the land (held by the stool) might thereby 
forfeit his holding, but I am not aware of instances. A personi
farming on begged land would probably forfeit his interest by 
purporting to pass the interest of the HlandownerM also; and 
also in some other cases.^
17. A citizen's farm cannot be taken away from him for any 
reason whatever - Akim Abuakwa.
18. See TENANCIES, pp. 45^ 4-4; 458.
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In some cases the land occupied by the farms of citizens 
may be required for other purposes., If required for public 
purposes (e.g., roads, housing, etc.) today it may be possible
for the land-owning stool to acquire the land compulsorily;
19though even this seems somewhat doubtful. In the case of
soOkyere Darkoh v. S.K. Botwe there was a dispute concerned 
with the acquisition of land iriKoforidua Town, New Juaben.
The land was situated where Elmina Street now is, and was 
under farming. The Omanhene's palace was built there in 1916, 
the cocoa was cut down, and a street made. The land not af­
fected remained for the benefit of the farmer. Apparently, 
some of the land was in fact transferred:
”The defendant's family appealed to the late 
Omanhene, Nana Kwaku Boateng, for land to 
settle on and the Omanhene instructed the 
defendant's family to search round if they 
could discover any land and if they succeed 
they should report to him so that he could 
see the person who had foodstuffs and crops 
on the land and defendant's family would pay 
compensation to the party.
The Native Court, in their judgement, said:
"This Court considered the New Juaben tenure 
of land. When compensation is paid to the 
person who owns foodstuffs and crops on any 
land then he or she has no right over the 
land again, the land automatically reverts
19. Compensation is paid to citizens who are called on to 
forfeit their farms. The Omanhene cannot take them 
without the consent of the owners - New Juaben.
2 0 . Unreported: (1950) New Juaben A Court, 23.9.50.
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to the Stool of New Juaben, and the Oman­
hene has right to grant it to his subject#"21
There seems little doubt that when a stool wishes to pass 
the absolute interest in land to a purchaser, or grant concess­
ions over it, this must be done so as not to affect the rights 
of eitizen-farmers (unless they consent thereto). In the old 
case of Ayim v. Mensah^&.A. planted cocoa on the land of K.E., 
and worked it for eight years. K.E. sold this land to Mensah 
(the defendant). After buying the land, M. discovered the
farms on it. He agreed with K.A. that K.A. should continue
to farm there, and pay l/- per year token rent. It was agreed 
that M. had no right to abusa. Crampton Smyly, C.J., enun­
ciated a wide principle of law;
“...the native custom, as sworn to, is that 
where a chief sells lands which have been 
cultivated by natives as cocoa farms, the 
cultivator is entitled to either continue 
working his farm, or else be compensated by 
the purchaser for the trees he has planted,
the value of each sound tree being estim­
ated at five shillings."
The facts as cited are insufficient to judge the merits of this
dispute; as to the dictum of the learned Chief Justice, a
modern statement of the law is the following:
“Land with farms on it belonging to natives 
of Akim Abuakwa cannot be sold by a Chief 
at all, except under special circumstances, 
and in that case with the express permission
21. It was said that the decision was confirmed by the 
Land Court, Accra.
22. (1911) D. & P. ,ll-,16, 4; In the Supreme Court.
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of the owner of the farm. Once the 
land is sold the native loses his 
right to the farm,*1
(c) Use of land farmed: There is little or no restrict­
ion placed by custom on the use to which a citizen may put his 
land. Where he has ,fbegged” the land from another, or where 
he is required to notify the relevant Odikro, etc., he should 
specify the purpose for which he wants the land - foodstuffs, 
cocoa, building. Where he begs land he may be liable to for­
feit his holding if he specifies one use (e.g., foodstuffs) 
and actually uses it for another (e.g., cocoa).
There is no rule that he must use his land profitably -
24he may choose to leave it fallow and unworked. This is not’
a ground for eviction. There is no wide general rule (as 
perhaps in English law) saying sic utere tuo ut allenum non 
laedas, though trespass as such is recognised (not in English 
terms).
Occasionally special uses are prescribed, or, more likely,
particular uses forbidden or controlled. Examples are the
25
prohibition on unauthorized new cocoa farms in Ashanti, and 
provisions in N.A. Forest Reserves, for which the N.A. makes
23# Information from Akim Abuakwa. See also: Danquah,A.L.C.206
24. Ratt. A.L.C. 349-50, suggests that the individual must in 
fact continue to use the land and that his holding is 
conditional on his rendering all the customary services 
to his stool. Neither proviso seems to apply now.
25. See Matson, Digest, p. 16; and the terms of the order 
at p. 41
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byelaws. To take an example from Bekwai, the Subin Shelter 
Belt Forest Reserve was brought into existence as an N.A. res­
erve, and rules were passed by the Bekwaihene and his Council­
lors. There were no local contracting parties. The area in 
question was as follows:
Reserve itself: 9.93 sq. miles
Farms : .12 sq. miles
Net area : 9.81 sq. miles
Rule 4 of the Reserve Rules provides that no cultivator shall, 
without the permission of the Chief, extend his boundaries 
beyond the area actually occupied at the time the reserve wa3 
made. (These boundaries are delimited in a plan.) It was 
stated that the usual practice is for an inhabitant who wishes 
to extend his cultivation to ask the Chief first; in appro­
priate cases the latter will ask the Forest Officer for per­
mission. It will be observed that it is the Chief who ad­
ministers (with his councillors) the rules, and draws them up. 
It will be interesting to see what is the position under the
new Local Government Ordinance, 1951, and especially to deter­
mine whether delimitation and administration of ^N.A.” Forest 
Reserve is a matter for the Native Authority, or for the 
landowning (? jurisdictional) stool concerned. It appeared 
that in practice there was little difficulty, the N.A. and the
Stool sharing the same (or largely the same) personnel, so
26that one could not tell in which capacity they acted.
26. N.A. Forest Reserves are constituted by ordinance.
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Forbidding extension of cultivation obviously impedes 
normal use of farming land by Africans, since an accessory 
right of the farmer is his right to extend cultivation each 
year on the same line (as emerges from the description above).
There is one day in each week which is a nforbidden farm­
ing day”, when no-one is permitted to farm. Although this 
has a religious significance the native authorities seem ready
to enforce it by action. The day varies in different areas.
27In much of Ashanti it is Thursday.
(d) Ancillary Rights and Miscellaneous: First a few
words must be said about the question of boundaries. From 
the description of the typical method of cultivation it will 
have emerged that there is a rigid baseline, and theoretically 
fixed side-lines; but no further boundary, although the far­
mer’s sphere of influence extends in this direction for an in­
determinate distance. The baseline may well follow a natural 
feature, a stream or path; and the forward boundary may event­
ually be determined in the same manner. Something is said 
28under SALE of the ways in which boundaries may be marked when 
land is sold; and the same remarks apply mutatls mutandis in 
other contexts. In one personal investigation of a farm a
27. See: Matson, Digest, pp. 28-29; Ratt. Ash., pp. 214-5, 
A.L.C. 314 and 343. But in 1941 the A.C.C. made a 
Customary Offences Order (v. Matson, Digest, pp. 42-3) 
the validity of which is uncertain, according to Matson. 
Rule 20 makes it an offence for any native ”to farm on 
Thursdays”.
28. At pp. 365-7 post.
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kola tree was pointed out as a boundary-mark; the boundary -
quite invisible on the ground - was an imaginary line running
between two trees. It was stated that footpaths are also
often boundaries, and especially those cut as boundaries when
29the farm is first made out of the bush. Fencing of farms is 
very rare.
I was also told that in one state when land is sold out­
right, sales are made by means of documents if possible, and 
not by guaha alone; the boundaries of such land are demar­
cated by N.A. surveyors, and are recorded in the (N.A.) Lands 
Office.
The first of the ancillary rights which must be noticed
is the right to continue cultivation in the same direction.
A parallel cultivator should not allow his cultivation to
cross over the lines of his neighbour. Nor can someone begin
cultivation in a completely different sense immediately in
front of the cultivator's farm in progress?^ Cases in Dan- 
31
quah's book refer to infringements of the right, and it is 
well established. I found out no fixed limit to which this 
runs: a suggested criterion was about four years' cultivation
in front of the existing line. The right is to exclude 
others; but the land or the right to cultivate it cannot be
29. In a case before N. Juaben A Court, a farm's boundaries 
were marked by !,Entome and Castor-oil Trees” at the corners
30. Cf. Danquah, A.L.C. 206.
31. E.g., C.A.L.-A. 21.
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32 & 33
independently sold by the man in front of whose farm it lies.
By being a farmer in that village the individual may ac­
quire the right to share in all the advantages enjoyed by the
34inhabitants of the village, e.g., common rights.
The rights of a farmer to exclude others from his farm,
apart from those attempting to farm there, will be considered
below, when the common rights enjoyed by citizens are dis- 
35cussed. There is not a general sense of trespass in the 
36English sense, account being usually taken only of wilful
damage, and attempts to usurp the title of the farmer. Claims
actually involving title may be brought before a native court 
in the guise of actions for trespass,
2. RIGHTS TO HOUSE-PLOTS AND HOUSES.
As a matter of principle citizens are entitled to acquire 
plots for building houses free of all charge; and to build 
houses thereon without payment to political authority. Once 
a citizen has acquired such a plot (unless subject to a higher 
interest in his own family, another family, or individual), he 
is entitled to it exclusively and rent-free. A citizen is not
~0 ,
 ^ ; a tenant from the land-owning stool, although - where he begs
- ! A M a plot from another - he may be in the position of a tenant of 
that other party.
32. Cf. Akim Abuakwa Declaration.
33. i.e., sold apart from the farm to which it is appurtenant.
34. Permanent strangers may acquire common rights similarly 
to citizens. 35. See below, pp. 168-170,
36. In English law trespass to land is actionable per se 
without any proof of damage: Salmond, Torts, p.199.'
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(a) Acquisition of a plot: A citizen may acquire a site
for a house in any of the following ways:
by prime acquisition on unoccupied land;
by succession from his family;
by making use of an unused family plot;
by wbegging" the use of a plot from another
family or individual;
by outright gift;
by lease or outright purchase from a family or
individual of their dependent (vis-a-vis the 
stool’s) interest;
by outright purchase from a stool, or from a family 
or individual possessed of the absolute 
interest*
It was stated that normally families are already in occu­
pation of building plots or sites; and it is to his family 
that an individual turns first* If he wishes to acquire a 
building plot for the first time, he should go to the Odikro, 
who will direct him to a suitable plot (which will in time
become a family plot, of course). But various accounts are
37
given* One Informant said that a citizen may build freely;
y  <•' j , . l ' i, I i. •/ ' -- i -' ' I 1 • \ ; ’ •
but the Odikro approves of the site selected*, There were in
the village of this informant two small chapels which had been
erected by the villagers; It was said that villagers were
quite free to erect such buildings on their own initiative and 
free of charge If they wished* And others said that a citizen
37* Himself an Odikro.
I
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need consult no-one.
If a citizen has not got a plot (and his family has not
got one) then he will beg or buy one from another person or
family in the village. Begging sites is frequently done, 
according to informants, principally in areas where there is
no demand for land for sale, or for houses to let. One inform­
ant (from Kwahu) said that he begged his site from a person in
the town, who put the matter before his abusua-panin and
obaapanln. He gave rum (£2 and a bottle of gin) to "stamp" 
the bargain. No ground-rent was charged; and apart from 
the initial fee no annual rum was payable. Transactions of 
this nature, according to some informants, need not be noti­
fied to the Odikro, the superior chief, or anyone; though 
quite often the Odikro is called in to witness the transaction.
In Class II areas generally such arrangements are espec­
ially common: e.g., it was stated:^®
"If a man wants a plot on which to build a 
house, he will approach a person owning 
land in the town. Such land may be given 
to him, it may be leased to him, or given
to him on condition that he gives a sheep
annually to the landowner."
It should be stated, naturally, that the plot is required for
39a house at the time it is begged.
In certain towns the procedure is somewhat different, as 
there has been some attempt to control occupation and develop-
38. Aburi, Akwapim.
39. See above as to misrepresentation of purpose 
vitiating acquisition (p. 145).
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40ment. The case of Koforidua is mentioned elsewhere/ Kumasl 
is also a special case. The town of Bekwai is an example*
All citizens of Bekwai Division (in Ashanti) are entitled to 
receive land for a house rent-free in the town. The town is 
divided into sections, each of which is under the control of 
a senior divisional chief. If a citizen wishes to build in 
the town, he approaches the relevant senior chief for permiss­
ion to build. The land itself is allocated in plots, and it 
is not necessary to build over the whole plot at once. A cit­
izen pays no kind of rent for such a plot, whatever kind of 
structure he puts up, permanent or otherwise. If his old 
house falls down, he may build a new one without fresh permiss­
ion. The citizen receives, however, a "lease" expressed for 
the plot oh which the house is to be built. All houses in the 
town, whether belonging to citizens or strangers, must have a 
lease of the plot first. The lease (“This Indenture") is 
made between "The Bekwaihene and Elders of Bekwai of the first 
part” (called "the lessors”) and the "lessee” of the other 
part. A plot described and delineated on a rough sketch plan 
annexed is "demised for a term of fifty years". One plot I 
examined was 50 feet by 55 feet 6 inches. The instrument 
goes on: "In consideration of the rent hereinafter reserved";
but no rent is payable by a citizen. It provides for deter­
mination of the lease by the lessor on five years9 notice.
40. In REGISTRATION, at pp. 757-761
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There are covenants In the lease
(a) to pay the rent reserved;
(b) to fence off the plot within twelve months;
(c) to build a house or store thereon within
eighteen months;
(d) to keep in good repair ard fenced;
(e) not to carry on a noxious or offensive business;
(f) “not to assign, underlet or part with possession
of the premises without consent in writing 
of the lessors”.
Practically all these provisions are inapplicable, not 
observed, or contrary to customary law. The term of fifty 
years I wa3 assured to be purely formal, since the lease would 
be renewed automatically (though there is nothing to this 
effect in the “lease”). It is certain that the house built 
on the plot is the citizen’s absolute property, which he deals 
with as he likes (apart from assignment to strangers). A 
citizen is not a lessee or tenant, nor is his plot “demised” 
to him.
(h) Building of a house: its use and occupation:
However the plot is acquired, any house which the acquirer of 
the plot (begged, allocated, held on lease, etc.) erects is his 
own absolute property, in which the holder of a superior inter­
est in the land has no interest whatever. The most that the 
holder of the superior interest in the land may have is a right 
of prohibition, or of being consulted, in regard to dealings
154
41with the house (principally alienations).
Where the site has been begged or held on a tenancy from 
another family or individual, then the house-owner may be res­
tricted in his dealings with the house (though he has a right 
to exclusive occupation as against the land-owner). Informants
did not give exactly corresponding descriptions of the land-
42
lord's privileges. One said that the house-owner must have
permission If he wishes to sell the house from the land-owner,
but not if he wishes merely to let it or part of It* He does
not need permission to pledge it, although he should inform
43
the landowner that he has done so. Another said the house­
owner cannot pledge or mortgage the house without the consent 
of the donor or owner of the land. Some informants contested 
the necessity of informing the landowner at all in the case of 
any alienation.
Powers stated to be possessed by the land-owner included:
telling the house-owner to quit and pull down
the house;
making the owner sell the house;
converting a nominal tenancy to a tenancy for a
money-rent; requiring fresh permission to build 
up an old house If it ha3 collapsed in ruins.
41* Some informants said that the relevant chief or odikro 
must be consulted before a citizen builds a house, even 
on land belonging to himself or his family.
42* Mazikessim.
43. Aburi.
44. Said to be theoretically possible, but I doubt if it is 
ever done.
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The Ashanti Confederacy Native Authority Sanitary Orders, 
45
1944, which apply to all villages within the area of the
A.C.N.A., control the use of houses and house-plots. Rule 5
provides that a chief or headman 11 shall cause a clearing to be
made round the village’1. Rule 4 provides:
"The Chief shall when called upon by the 
Native Authority give instructions to 
demolish any ruined house standing ifi 
his village an! shall have it levelled 
and the site cleared of rubbish."
And Rule 6 states:
"No person shall erect any building or make 
an addition to any existing building in 
any village without the permission of the 
Chief or headman",
and gives minimum requirements which must be met.
(c) Security of tenure: What has been said already with
regard to a citizen’s farms applies to his house and plot.
Generally he has a right of indefinite or perpetual duration,
and cannot be divested without his consent and the payment of
compensation. It is possible that a land-owning stool has
the power to acquire a plot (without a house on It) for public
46purposes compulsorily, but with payment of compensation.
The rights of an individual on land acquired pother than 
outright) from another Individual or family are conditioned 
by the nature of the relationship. A free tenancy is of
45. Reproduced in Matson, Digest. 37.
46. The Akim Abuakwa Declaration maintained that no compensa- 
tion is payableT It is doubtful how far this represents 
the customary law.
1 5 6
indefinite duration; it may have to be made anew if the 
house is ruined, or the holder dies.
(d) Boundaries: Alleys are commonly left between houses
in a town or village. It was stated that this open ground 
is all owned, e.g.:
X
I
House I House II
The area A between House I and house II is owned by I and II
respectively, who will have an unmarked boundary X Y.
, The parties will know their boundaries, however. Encroach­
ment by other parties over these boundaries is trespass (if 
by building), and may be resisted by legal or other action
V
(.e.g., if I builds a new building overlapping Xi). Passers- 
by use such alleys freely for passing and repassing.
Boundary-fences are more frequent in the towns than for 
farms; often these fences are for privacy rather than to de­
limit a boundary; hence they may not be certain evidence of 
where a boundary lies.
3. DISPOSALS OF INTERESTS BY CITIZENS.
; 47This matter is more fully dealt with elsewhere. Apart
47. See: SALE, 335 ; PLEDGE, p, 421 : TENANCIES, pp.
471 et seq.
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from any consents or authorizations required from his family, 
a citizen's powers (in relation to the stool) are briefly as 
follows:
(a) Transactions between citizens are not normally con- 
way
trolled in any/by the stool. Exceptionally in certain towns
it may be necessary to follow a prescribed form, have the
48
transaction "registered”, etc. The local Odikro may be not­
ified, or present as a witness.
. (b) Sales to strangers by citizens are practically always
;; controlled by the stools (but not in Class II areas). In some 
3tates, the theory is that the citizen, on a sale, "surrenders” 
his interest, is compensated by the purchase-price paid by the 
stranger, and a fresh interest in the form of a tenancy is 
granted by the stool to the stranger.
(c) Grants of lesser interests to strangers are seldom 
controlled in practice, though they may be subject to such 
control in theory.
4. SPECIAL LIABILITIES OP CITIZENS.
The special liabilities of citizens are principally:
(a) Duty to pay special levies to the stool.
(b) Duty to render communal services.
(c) Duty to contribute portions of certain exceptional 
gains to the stool.
48. See under REGISTRATION, at pp. 755 et seq.
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(a) Levies: Levies to pay stool debts are exceptional
and irregular. They are payable by all true citizens of the
particular stool. Strangers are not assessed, though- perman-
49ent residents may thereby become liable in some areas. Such 
levies are distinct from annual levy, rate or tax, and from 
tribute charged on stranger-farmers.
(b) Communal Services: This is a theoretical duty of
decreasing importance. Again, permanently-resident strangers 
may be liable*
(c) Tolls and Abus a; A citizen is liable to pay l/3 
share or abusa of extraordinary gains coming out of the land. 
Examples are:
Gold nuggets: large gold nuggets found by an individual must
be reported to the Omanhene. The Omanhene in turn used to
send it to the Asantehene, Asantehene took his share and
returned the value remaining to the Omanhene, who in turn gave
a share to the finder?^ The share of the finder may be 1/3^
52
Treasure-trove is now always reserved for the stool. A large
gold nugget (called nEpon) is sent through the subordinate
stool to the Paramount Stool. The value of the nugget is
divided, l/3 to Paramount Stool, 1/3 to the stool, l/3 to the
53finder. Other rules are given. In other areas it appears
49. E.G., Akim Abuakwa.
50. Essumegya.
51. Asamang, Adansi,
52. Akim Abuakwa.
53. Akim Abuakwa Declaration.
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conditioned by where a nugget is found. If found on family
54
land, it goes to the family. The head of the family takes 
it all, but the finder may get a share; shares would be sent
to the Omahhene and divisional chief by virtue of their para-
55mountcy. There are frequently similar rules for diamonds.
It is possible that where a stool owns the land, the 
finder gets only 1/3. Where a stool has jurisdictional rights 
only, l/3 may be sent to the stool in token of allegiance. 
Natural Produce: there is often a tribute on snails collected
in the forest. This is a much less valuable right today. 
Timber on a farmer's land may be subject to a 1/3 payment to 
the stool if the farmer sells it. Kola trees are not subject 
ahusa, one informant stated. Rubber collected from natural 
rubber trees in the forest may be subject to abusa or other 
share for the stool. The same applies to tolls collected 
from palm-wine tappers.
Game and Fish: it is customary in many areas to send a portion
of large game killed to the chief on whose land the game was
56
killed. One informant stated that one hind-leg was sent to
the Omanhene, one fore-leg to the caretaker-chief in charge of
57
the land on which it was killed. Catches of fish by citizens
58
are not normally subject to tolls; though in certain rivers
54. Ajumako.
55. Essiam: the amount of the shares (or perhaps whether they 
are sent at all) appears to depend on the head of the 
family in this case.
56. Cf. Akim Abuakwa Declaration. 57. Bekwai.
58. Akim Abuakwa declaration. Eekwai, and elsewhere.
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and for commercial fishing tolls of up to l/3 may be charged ?^9 
Treasure-trove: trinkets, cash, etc. They should be reported
to the landowner. One informant (from a Class II area) said 
that the finder keeps all.
Sales of interests in land: stools may charge abusa when por­
tions of stool land with farms, etc., on them are sold by 
citizens, such sale being equally an extraordinary gain coming 
out of the land.
B. COMMON RIGHTS.
We turn now to consider rights which, although enjoyed 
by individuals, are not exclusively individual, other persons 
being commonly and equally entitled to exercise them over a 
subject-matter of indefinite spatial extent.
1. RIGHTS IN FORESTS AND FORE ST-PRODUCE.
Timber: Timber In unoccupied forest-land is the prop­
erty of the landowner (stool), and may not be cut down or sold
by individuals without permission of that stool. This does 
not apply to trees cleared by a farmer when extending cultiva­
tion; nor (it was reported) Is there needed prior notice 
before a citizen - in whose farm timber-trees stand - disposes 
of such trees for cash, though the stool should be notified
59. Bekwai.
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60and is entitled to abusa. In Adansi the Wing Chief or the 
Paramount Stool - the landowner - grants leases and concessions 
to exploit the timber, mainly by way of sales of a certain 
number of trees, specified, or to be ascertained later. 
Timber-leases of the whole area are not used. The conclusion 
of a timber-agreement imports no restriction on the right of 
citizens to farm in the forest, to hunt and exercise other 
customary privileges, except insofar as it is necessary to 
make roads, etc*
b^) Forest-produce: A citizen is entitled to collect
forest-produce of many different kinds. This right in un­
occupied forest does not appear to be delimited by reference 
to membership of the adjacent village. Such collection 
includes:
(i) Snails: may be freely collected without per­
mission. In abundant years It is customary to send some
snails to the stool - nthis shows who is the real owner of
, ,„61, 62, 63.
the land’.
64
(ii) Firewood; may be collected freely in the forest.
60. The Paramount Stool Is entitled to l/3 by virtue of 
its Paramountcy: Ajumako.
61. Bekwai.
62. No share is given to anyone: Asamang, Adansi.
63. In former times a share was sent to the stool, but 
not today: Essiam.
64. Asikuma.
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(ill) Mushrooms: may be collected freely anywhere.
And some of the common rights recognized in forest-reserves by
Reserve Settlement Commissioners include:
Posts and poles*
Brushwood.
Esa saplings for fufu poles.
Split and sawn timber and fufu mortars.
Ampei for tie-tie.
Leaves for roofing.
Collection of deadfall trees for brushwood. 
Collection of bark of certain trees for
medicine.
Common rights in forest-reserves can only be exercised
by permission, i.e., if recognized by the Commissioner.
(°) Hunting; A citizen may hunt in the forest anywhere
66
in his state without permission. Inhabitants of one village
67
can freely hunt the land of another village without permission. 
"Company-hunts" (or battues) were formerly practised; in some 
areas it was stated that they still took place, in others that
they were abolished. In Ashanti they were prohibited in 1936,
68
if without permission, and rules for regulating them published.
(d) Rights of passage: Anyone may freely walk in or
through a forest, drive animals through it, etc. Rights of
69
way are saved if timber-agreements are made; and are pre­
served in Forest Reserves.
65. Bekwai.
6 6 . Cf. the dictum in Wiapa v. Solomon: (1905) F.Ct. Ren.405: 
"Subject to the usual toll, the stool lands can freely 
be hunted over by all the subject of the paramount stool, 
but in our opinion hunting can confer no right of owner­
ship as between stool and subject."
67. Bekwai, Adansi. 6 8. Control of Company Hunting (Confeder- 
acy Area) Rules. 1956~TGazett<rL^ --------
69. Adansi.
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2. RIGHTS IN WATER - RIVERS, STREAMS, ETC,
(si) The Ownership of rivers, streams and other bodies 
of water: Where stools own the land, they naturally lay claim
to ownership of such bodies of water, although their use is 
open to the inhabitants freely. Certain rivers appear to be 
the property of the landowning stool in a different sense.
In Bekwai I was told that citizens fished free of tolls in all 
rivers except the rivers FIna, Sunyan, Darikran and Of in. In 
these last citizens fishing in restricted And defined parts of 
them, within the boundaries of Bekwai, must pay a customary 
proportion of their catch to tho Omanhene. Citizens fishing 
there without informing the Omanhene or sending a proportion 
of their catch to him would be charged in court. Other parts 
of the same rivers are free fisheries. I did not meet this 
distinction elsewhere, though it may well exist.
One finds small ponds, and especially wells, In private
. .  70. 
ownership.
In areas where stools claim only jurisdictional rights, 
rights in rivers are ill-defined, but appear to attach to the 
riparian communities.
(b) Rivers as boundaries; It often occurs that a river 
or stream constitutes the boundary betv/een the lands of two 
stools, two villages, etc. The ownership of such rivers
70. In one case from Akwapim a man who fished in a pool 
without the owner's permission, was fined for fouling 
the water, and stealing fish.
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presents a problem. Three contradictory views emerged:
(i) One stool owns to its near bank; this is the 
boundary, the other stool claiming to this bank (i.e. includ­
ing the whole of the river). This appears to be the case 
with the River Rra, where it is apparently claimed that the 
Ashanti boundary (rather, that of divisions of Ashanti) ex­
tends to the Colony side of the river.
(ii) The boundary between the stools or communities 
is the mid-line of the stream's bed. Hence things found or 
won from the bed belong to one side or the other, depending
71on the part of the river or bed where they are found or won.
(iii) The whole river is the boundary, the river 
itself, and its bed and the things therein, being jointly in 
the ownership or control of the communities on either aide. 
This view was strongly maintained by some informants, who em­
phatically declared that it was not one bank, or the thalweg, 
of the river that was the boundary. Hence minerals, e.g., 
diamonds, found in the bed of the river are divided equally 
between the two landowners or communities, and ferry-tolls are
similarly divided. If there is a concession of any kind over
72the river, it must be made by the two parties jointly.
71. Such a boundary has often been laid down in Validated 
Executive Decisions in Ashanti; (cf. the EngliSsh and 
?Roman doctrine of ad medium filum aquae).
72. E.G. New Juaben. "Anything found in the river would be 
shared by the towns on each side of itn - Essiam.
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If a boundary-river changes course, again various views 
were put forward:
One view was that the bed of the old course would remain the
boundary. It would now cease to be a natural boundary, and
would become an artificial boundary. It will be necessary to
draw an artificial line as the new boundary, following more or
less the centre of the bed, and mark it with ntome trees. B
will not acquire the shaded portion by the change of course.
If there is a joint concession over the river, the concession
would stand, even though parts of the bed will be solely owned
is
by either A or B. But if it/necessary to make a new concess­
ion, after the river has changed course, if over the new bed 
but within the artificial boundary, the landowner in question 
will be sole grantor.
Another view was that where a stream forms a boundary, 
the new course will be the boundary, and not the old bed of
the stream. This means in our example that B acquires the
73
shaded portion.
73. I feel doubtful about this view. Sarbah, P.G.L. 58, 
says: 1 An inundation effects no change of property in 
land.Tl
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If an island appears in the stream, then this belongs 
neither to A nor to B, but to the landowning stool. (This 
makes no provision for eases where the river lies between 
landowning stools, or between two states). The island will 
be treated as virgin forest-land without an owner, which can 
be allocated by the landowning stool. It is uncertain what 
is the position with regard to accretions (where the whole 
river is the boundary). The discussion of this point was 
theoretic only.
Hlght to draw water for domestic purposes: Any per­
son may draw water from rivers and streams, etc., for drinking, 
washing, etc. This right is not limited to riparian inhabit­
ants, and no permission or payments are necessary. Persons 
may freely wash clothes, etc., in rivers and streams. No-one 
can abstract an abnormal amount, or divert the course of rivers, 
without permission.
(d) Canoes and ferries: A citizen may put a canoe for
74
his own purposes on a river without permission. Perries
75
frequently appear to be the perquisite of the landowning stool; 
and where a river lies between two stools, of the two stools 
jointly. In such a case permission Is needed to operate a
74. Only with permission, according to Adansi.
75. “Perries are a state monopoly” - Adansi.
Otoo v. Ellis: (1915) Pull Court, Ren. 711; Aylma v .
Yamike Kwaku: (1913) Pull Court, Ren. 730; were cases 
concerning ferries.
Acquah v. Gaisie; (1896) Ren. 124.
76. Cf. As are v. V/uiu. Danquah, C.A.L., 4 .
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ferry, and/or tolls are collected by the representatives of 
the stool or stools* In the case of one river which forms 
the boundary between Akwapim and New Juaben, I was told that 
tolls are divided equally between the states. Vi/here a river 
is wholly owned by a stool on one side, tolls are collected 
by that stool only* Rights in rivers of this kind are fre­
quently reserved when land is sold outright*
(e) Right to fish: In general any citizen may fish freely
within the rivers of his state, without asking permission, and 
without paying over any proportion of his catch* He need not
be a riparian inhabitant; but no-one of the riparian village
77
can or will object to his fishing there* We have already
noted the exception in Bekwai, where certain waters are subject
to the Omanhene directly*
There is also communal fishing in certain rivers. At the
appropriate time of the year all the inhabitants of a town
(men and women) are summoned by the local chief by gong-gong.
The stream may be dammed. All the fish caught in this way
is divided communally; and it is only in such cases that a
78
proportion of the catch is sent to the stool. According to 
other information dams and the erection of nets are permissible
77. According to one informant. According to another, he 
may have to notify or pay a proportion of his catch to 
the local Odikro if he is a stranger to that village.
78. Akim Abuakwa.
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at certain times of the year; there can he no permanent erect-
79 80
ion, however. In another state informants distinguished
two types of fishing: commercial fishing, and private fishing.
The latter is done, it was said, by the women, who dam streams 
for fish. In such a case no permissions or payments are re­
quired, but the local Odikro has the right to prohibit fishing 
for any reason. The construction of such dams is done only 
at certain times of the year, and, if water is scarce, the 
Odikro of a village may forbid damming, so that water may flow 
to villages lower down the stream. Citizens engaging in com­
mercial fishing on a large scale may be subject to tolls.
(f) Right to dam rivers: Generally, individuals are 
allowed to dam rivers only for the purposes mentioned above.
For any others they will need express permission.
(g) Right to take minerals: Citizens may take clay and
sand freely for their own purposes (unlike strangers). If 
taken in commercial quantities, for e.g., building purposes, 
a citizen may be charged.
To win diamonds from streams and rivers requires the per­
mission of the stool in whom the land is vested.
3. RIGHTS OF WAY. TRESPASS.
A man may in general walk freely where he wishes. It is 
unusual to attempt to exclude bypassers from farms and other
79. Bekwai.
80. Adansi.
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land subject to individual interests. Frequently, well-used 
paths run through individuals' land to the river, market-place, 
etc. It was stated: "A man can walk over another man's land
at will. He can pass to get water without permission. He
q ^
can shoot on the land of another person without permission.
 - - - ~ ' 81
Some farmers could and might stop him going over their land.
Fences are rare, and, if made, are principally to exclude ani­
mals. There is some limitation to the general rule if a man
comes on another's land for a specific purpose: "he cannot
82
collect snails on another's land without permission”; "he
cannot collect firewood on another's land without permission . 
84
It was said:
"Any citizen may walk over, hunt over, etc., 
a farm belonging to another citizen and he 
needs no permission to do so. (85) A man 
collecting fallen branches for firewood on 
some-one else's farm would be stopped by 
the farmer if he were present." (8 6 )
There is a suspicion that if a man is walking aimlessly over
8*7another's land, he has come to steal produce.
81. Essiam.
82. Essiam.
83. Asikuma; contra Essiam.
84. Bekwai.
85. The informants scoffed at the idea of asking permission 
in such cases - there is a general right of way.
8 6 . The idea apparently is to collect the firewood when 
the farmer is absent!
87. A native method of restraining a trespass is by laying 
down palm-fronds on the boundary, according to one 
informant. (See also the Report of the Gold Coast Local 
Committee of the Society of Comparative Legislation, 
December, 1904}.
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Cattle-trespass: sheep and other domestic animals can feed
on the land of another without permission; and animals may 
freely be driven over another's land. If damage is done to 
the farmer's crops, the owner of the trespassing animals is 
still liable to pay compensation, I was told the procedure 
is that if a farmer finds wandering sheep or goats doing dam­
age, he will seize them; then he will find out who is the 
owner. The owner will tender his apologies through an inter­
mediary, and pay for damage done,
0. THE STRANGER.
88
WHAT IS A STRANGER?
It is convenient to divide the class of individuals 
enjoying interests in land into the citizen and the stranger; 
the citizen being a member of the tribe or state by birth, the 
stranger being any person foreign to that particular tribe or 
state who wishes to enjoy an interest in property there. Al­
though it is possible to define "stranger11 by reference to 
groups of various sizes, so that a member of one family is in 
fact a stranger to another family, (though both serve the same 
chief), the member of one village is a stranger to another 
village within the same state, a subject of one stool is a 
stranger to another stool, though both stools serve the same 
paramount, yet it is the usual practice to reserve the term to
8 8 , In Twi ohsha.
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its widest meaning, that is, to a person who is not a subject
89of the state (or division, in Ashanti) in question. The 
foreignness of other categories of stranger does have some 
effect on their legal position, but in writing of the customary 
law the clearest separation is between citizens and strangers.
Since stranger is the antithesis of citizen, it is defin­
able by reference to the latter term, and it might appear easy 
to achieve a satisfactory definition of both terms. Reference 
to the discussion of "citizen” ante (p. 126, 127) will show 
that a reliable distinction is not always easy to achieve.
The categories of "stranger” which thus appear can be arranged 
as follows
(a) Non-resident stranger.
(b) Permanently resident stranger.
(c) Quasi-stranger.
Most customary laws today make a distinction between
strangers who arB resident, and those who are not resident.
The resident stranger may become in time assimilated to the
position of a naturalized citizen, and he is in general treated
90more kindly than one whose residence is temporary in nature.
89. In Ashanti a man from, say, Bekwai Division, is a 
stranger in, say, Kumasi Division.
90.- ”An Assin man who marries an Adansi girl, makes cocoa- 
farms in Adansi, and is permanently resident there, is 
not treated in Adansi as so much of a stranger as an 
Akwapim man, who merely makes a farm there; and the 
iVssin man would not be charged so heavily”. - per the 
Adansihene.
/over
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The additional rights that he thus acquires are usually counter 
balanced by complementary duties, with regard to such matters 
as liability to contribute to stool levies, and to contribute 
communal labour. The effect of the N.A. ordinances, which 
increasingly make residence and not allegiance the test of 
liability to annual rate or tax, also assists in the same 
direction.
I use the term ‘‘quasi-strangers11 in this connexion to 
indicate those who, though fellow-nembors of a larger commun­
ity ie#g., the state), are not members of the smaller commun­
ity within the larger, when rights in this smaller community 
are in issue. Under this head one may collect instances 
where the inhabitant of village A is treated differently in 
regard to property-rights from the inhabitant of village B 
holding land in A; where the subjects of one stool in a given 
state who apply to another stool, within the same state, for 
land are treated differently from the latter stool's own sub­
jects, etc. The increasing development of a common citizen­
ship minimises these difficulties; but they are still found, 
and serve th reveal the way in which citizens5 communal rights 
usually function within the framework of a local community.
90. (cont. from previous page) -
- A distinction is made in Bekwai between a stranger living 
permanently in a Bekwai village, and one who is ordinarily 
resident in another division, of Ashanti.
- Again, in Akim Abuakwa, a distinction is made between 
resident and non-resident strangers, with regard to such 
matters as rent, contributions, and so on.
See also: Ratt. A.L.C. 351-2,
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The concept of "stranger” is largely inapplicable, at 
least as far as land tenure is concerned, where the stool's 
rights over land are negligible or non-existent, or where they 
are largely of a jurisdictional nature, as with the Pante 
states* Even then, the idea may be of relevance where a 
stool, by virtue of its paramountcy, claims a right to be con­
sulted before land is permanently alienated by its subjects 
to a stranger,
“Stranger” is usually taken to refer only to alien Afric­
ans, but it in fact includes non-Africans as well, both indi­
viduals and corporate bodies* Owing to the operation of the 
Concessions Ordinance the permanent transfer of land - except 
in towns - to non-natives is rare; but lesser interests (as 
for instance by 7/ay of demise) have been freely created* The 
most interesting cases are those concerning alienations to 
commercial firms and missionary bodies: in regard to the
latter, relief from the customary onerous terms upon which 
strangers hold land has in the past been given by African 
grantors.
"Strangers” also includes Africans who are not from Akan 
tribes te*g., Africans from other parts of the Gold Coast), 
and even those who are not from the Gold Coast at all (Niger­
ians, Africans from French territory, etc.)* The most fre­
quent instance of possible conflict concerns members of such 
races as Krobo and Ga, who havo settled in Akan states; but
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since the conflict will usually he internal only (in questions 
of succession to the alien acquirer, rights within “companies** 
of Kroho purchasers, etc.), further consideration of this point 
is not required in the present context.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OP STRANGERS.
1. FARMING.
91
(a) Acquisition of an interest: The most common instance
of a stranger acquiring rights in another state concerns farm­
ing. One must notice first of all the rights and powers of 
quasi-strangers, and the conflict that may arise between the 
citizen's right to take up unoccupied stool land for farming, 
and the fact that citizens are members of various communities 
smaller than that of the entire state.
In general, a villager from one village must consult the
92Odikro of another village on whose lands he wishes to farm.
Usually, he will pay customary rum to the Odikro as evidence
93
of the transaction. No tribute is, however, payable.
As regards true strangers, it is the general rule that 
strangers acquiring any interest in land in which the ultimate 
title is with the stool must seek the permission of the stool, 
either before or after.
91. See Sarbah, F.C.L. 66 et seq.
92. So: Essumegya. “If a person from one village in the
State wishes to farm on land in another village 
in the State, he must Inf ora the Odikro, but 
need not pay anything therefor.'1
93. E.G., in Adansi.
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The first type of case is that where a stranger wishes 
to take up unoccupied land for farming purposes* The pro­
cedure is amply testified from many different sources:
(i) He first of all sees the Odikro of the village
94
where he wishes to farm.
(ii) The Odikro sends or takes him before the
Omanhene?^
(iii) The stranger gives customary drink to the
Omanhene?6
(iv) He is then admitted as a tenant, being sent
back with a messenger, who directs him to the part of the
forest which ho may cultivate.
(v) Arrangements with regard to the type of farming,
and the payment of tribute or rent, are concluded before
97 / ^ i ■ ' - -v , - f I ’ 1
cultivation begins.
94. If he has no particular area in mind, then he may 
directly approach the paramount stool.
95. If the Odikro*s stool is the landowner, then the matter 
may go no further, although the arrangement may be 
notified to higher authority.
If the Wing or other senior chief is the land-owner, 
then the stranger .is taken before him, and he makes the 
arrangement with the stranger; but the matter may still 
be referred for counter-signature or confirmation to the 
Paramount Chief.
Sometimes the Odikro passes the stranger to the Para­
mount Chief only through the relevant divisional chief; 
this is the more customary procedure, I feel.
96. In some places the matter is thereafter handled by the 
N.A. Lands Office, or Its equivalent, to which the Oman­
hene will send the applicant.
97. These matters may be settled before the stranger is 
shown the area he is to farm.
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(vi) The stranger clears the ground, and begins 
paying rent or tribute as agreed.
(vii) In some states, he may be required to accept 
98
a written lease.
The second type of case is that where a stranger takes an 
interest from a citizen family or individual in the state.
Vi/hat, then, is the position with regard to the payment of rent 
and obtaining permission from the Stool? This case may arise 
in two different ways: either the stranger tako3 as tenant
from the citizen, or he purchases a citizen’s interest in the 
farm.
Where the former way is adopted, notification to the 
Stool is generally called for?^ the rent payable goes in 
different directions in different areas. In one area, I was 
told that the rent paid by the stranger would go as to 1/3 to 
the family or individual ncontrolling” the land, and 2/3 to 
the Odikro’s treasury;0^ In another, It was stated that the 
Stool only derives revenue from strangers farming on Stool 
lands, and receives nothing if family land Is let to a stranger 
for cocoa-farming^^ In yet another case, it was stated that 
a stranger wishing to make a cocoa-farm on land controlled by 
a family must go through the procedure previously described, 
obtaining permission from the Stool, and paying tribute therefor
98. E.g., in Adansi.
99. E.g., Essumegya.
100. Essumegya. 101. Prom an Ashanti informant.
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The other way in which a stranger may acquire an interest 
is by purchase from a citizen. Sales by citizens of their 
dependent interests in stool lands require the permission of 
the stool if to strangers, and it is customary to charge 1/3 
of the purchase-price paid. This payment, a token of the 
waiver by the stool of its customary rights, is in theory not 
compatible with subsequent abusa payments. The stranger in 
such a case should not become a tenant, any more than the cit­
izen from whom he bought was a tenant. Ho is absolutely en­
titled to the farm, though with only a limited interest in the 
land itself. The one-third is the share which the stool al­
ways receives of any extraordinary wealth or sudden windfall 
(cf. the law relating to gold nuggets).
Sales of this type are usually of cocoa-farms in existence, 
and there is a reluctance (if not a prohibition) to sell a con­
tingent claim by a citizen to forest-land ^e.g,, in front of 
his existing farm), land cleared but not planted, or even 
fallow land. The sale may be either voluntary; or involuntary: 
the latter is today the more frequent. It may occur, for in­
stance, through the operation of foreclosure on a mortgaged 
farm, sales under pledge or mortgage, or fi. fa. Where such 
an Involuntary sale takes place, it is a difficult juridical 
problem to decide what rights the stranger acquires, and how 
he is to be treated, whether as one entitled to a dependent 
interest, or as a mere tenant, Y/here a pledge is not valid
178
without notification to the Chief, then one can maintain that 
the notification operates as an estoppel as against the Stool 
if the pledgee enforces his rights by judicial sale, and a 
stranger purchases the interest. But this does not solve the 
problem where no notice to the stool of a pledge is required, 
or where the pledge is to a citizen (for which notification is 
not required), but the purchaser at public auction by way of 
execution is a stranger. There is no case known to me where 
a purchaser at public auction has been prevented from entering 
into possession by the stool concerned.
The more reasonable rule, and that more frequently found, 
is that the stool remains satisfied with its 1/3 of the pro­
ceeds of sale, and the stranger need not pay any rent, and 
there is no tenancy; but he may be required to pay customary 
drink to the stool before actually entering into possession.
The charging of l/3 on the price appears to be alternative to
102making a stranger-purchaser pay tribute.
The stranger is advised to approach the stool with regard 
to entering into possession, to come to agreement about tribute 
in those states where this is exacted, and to stamp this with 
drink. In the Colony proper, where the stool is land-owner, 
payment of l/3 of the purchase-price appears to be the commoner
102. In Essumegya the stranger pays tribute on the cocoa 
produced, but the stool does not exact one-third of the 
purchase-price. Other evidence from Ashanti indicates 
that a stranger taking possession by purchase at a public 
auction should notify the .land-owning chief, so, that 
arrangements with"”re,gara to tribute may be reached.
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practice; in Ashanti, several divisions stated that no l/3 
was charged, hut the stranger-purchaser was charged cocoa- 
tribute. Cases where a dependent interest-holder is author­
ized to dispose not only of his own interest, but also of the 
absolute interest (by the authority of the holder of the lattei) 
must, of course, be distinguished; as also must cases where a 
stranger purchases land outright from a stool, in which case 
he is never liable to pay thenceforth any rent or tribute with 
regard to his faming.
The third type of acquisition by a stranger is where he
is a squatter on unoccupied stool land. Customarily, he may
either be evicted, or henceforth be charged abusa. He cannot
103acquire absolute title as against the stool. The usual pref­
erence is for a demand of abusa, but the election is with the 
stool, and not v/ith the squatter. If the stool's demand for 
abusa is refused, then he may be evicted; and the same applies 
where the stool's title to the land is altogether denied. It 
is noticeable, however, that squatters who have been there for 
a long time are usually allowed to stay; and a squatter may 
acquire by long possession the right to farm there rent- and 
tribute-free.
(b) Security of tenure: What is the nature of the inter­
est which a stranger acquires (other than by purchase outright 
of the absolute interest in the land)?
103. Cf. LONG- POSSESSION, p . 723
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■ African opinion distinguishes as a rule cases where a 
stranger is a tenant, and where he holds a dependent interest 
other than one of tenancy. If there is no transfer involved, 
then the fanner can only be a tenant.
Where the stranger purchases a citizen's interest, and 
1/3 of the purchase-price is charged, he is not a tenant living 
rent-free on a kind of emphyteutic tenure of indefinite dura­
tion. He has absolute security of tenure, and cannot be 
evicted for any cause whatsoever.
Where the stranger approaches the stool, and receives 
permission from the stool to farm on stool land, he is decid­
edly a tenant, whether on abusa or otherwise. The only diffi­
culty arises where the stranger is charged cocoa-tribute even 
though he purchased an interest, and did not receive a tenancy 
from the stool. This may be explained in two ways: certain
African authorities hold that there is no true purchase in such 
a case - the citizen's interest in his farm is extinguished 
voluntarily or involuntarily, and he receives compensation 
therefor. The arrangement between "purchaser0 and stool thus 
starts unfogged by recollections of the previously existing 
situation - hence quite properly, they say, the arrangement 
may be called a tenancy of the land (though not, of course, of 
the farm).
Alternatively, the nature of cocoa-tribute so-termed must
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be examined. One has become so accustomed to speaking of an 
abusa tenancy that other forms of cocoa-tribute (”sheep-moneyn, 
so much per tree) are considered to be merely a substitution 
for payment of abusa, that tribute is, in fact, a rent. It 
could be argued that the tribute is not rent, but rather a tax 
or levy on strangers who farm on stool lands. At first sight, 
tribute does have an ambivalent appearance, having analogies 
both to rent and tax. It is, however, only payable where the 
stool owns the land, and its payment cannot, therefore, be 
attributed to jurisdictional rights as such. Other forms of 
tribute (of game, of snails) appear similarly to be a coroll­
ary of ownership; and in cases where stool A is on the land 
of stool B, the fact that stool A has the jurisdiction, stool 
B the ownership, yet members of stool A on the land pay tri­
bute to stool B (unless, as is sometimes done, amicable 
arrangements have been worked out) indicates the proprietary 
nature of the claim to cocoa-tribute. Strangers coining on 
this land would pay tribute to stool B.
In general, today, a tenant on abusa receives a tenancy
of indefinite duration: the stranger is assured of perpetual
rights so long as he continues to pay the annual tribute or 
104rent. Some evidence suggests that he cannot be evicted for 
any reason whatever, even including non-payment of rent- which,
104. So, for instance, In Bekwai.
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in arrears, must be sued for as a debt. Reference to the 
chapter on TENANCY will illustrate the usual reasons which 
may be alleged when it is desired to evict a tenant.
Whilst the stranger himself, if a tenant, thus acquires 
an interest of indefinite duration, it appears that the quest­
ion of the transmission of his interest is not so certain. In 
former times there was a suggestion that a stranger's interest, 
whether for farming or for building, did not automatically 
endure beyond the stranger's own lifetime, and that the stool- 
landlord had a right to refuse entry to the stranger's suc­
cessor. Whilst this is in general consonant with the principle 
that strangers may farm on stool lands only with the consent 
of the stool, the rule has perforce been greatly modified In 
practice subsequently. The less heavily populated states look 
on an increase of numbers as an increase of wealth and res­
ources, the development of the country by the influx of stran­
gers is beneficial, and money derived from abusa and rents is 
a considerable item in the revenue. In order to encourage 
stranger-farmers and preserve their revenues various states 
have now modified the former rule. Whereas before the succ­
essor to the stranger-farmer had to make a new arrangement with 
the stool, now, although he should present himself to the stool, 
so that the transmission of the interest may be ratified with 
the gift of drink, the position is that the previous arrange-
105. Sed quaere.
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ment is continued, rather than a fresh one reached. It seems
that where a stool has orally agreed to accept something less
than abusa as a rent (say, "sheep-monay”) it may revise the
rent up to the abusa level when the successor puts in his
appearance. How far this is justifiable in law is uncertain;
where arrangements are recorded in writing (with a lease or
otherwise) the writing may operate to prevent this.
(c) Payments of tribute and rent; Unless otherwise
agreed, a stranger-tenant on stool land pays over l/3 of the
annual produce to the stool if an economic crop (such as cocoa
106
or rubber) is grown. This is the so-called ”abusa system”. 
Formerly only food-crops were grown, and even today it is not 
customary to make any specific charge, except perhaps a nomin­
al one, for use of the land for the growing of foodstuffs only, 
nor is a portion of the crop taken by the stool. The history 
is narrated by Warrington^°^in his notes; he says (in regard 
to Ashanti) that:
"Before the&ays of eocoa-farms tribute was 
collected from all persons farming on a Chief's land 
who were not his subjects. Tribute was then paid 
in kind.” (108)
As for today:
106. In one state I was told that re si dent-strangers pay a 
flat rate of only 10/- per annum per farm; non­
resident strangers pay an economic rent.
107. In his Notes on Ashanti Custom.
108. At p. 34.
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"Cocoa-tribute is similarly collected from all 
non-subjects of a Stool whether they are Ashantis or 
strangers. A person paying tribute to the Chief on 
whose land he lives is not liable to be called upon for 
communal!labour and he is exempt from any levy collected 
by the Chief to whom he pays tribute.
A non-subject growing food for his own use is not 
usually called upon to pay tribute but he will be expected 
to assist in any communal work. His position with regard 
to a levy is then difficult as he may be called upon by 
the Chief on whose land he resides and also by the Chief 
to whom he owes allegiance." (109)
But in general Warrington finds that only strangers who farm
for profit are called upon to pay tribute.
There does not seem much to quibble at in his account; 
but there are certain difficulties to do with estimation of 
the yield (for cocoa), and the collection of the tribute which 
must be mentioned. The practice in one state is for the 
revenue-collectors of the stool to estimate the probable bear­
ing capacity of the cocoa-trees (at so many loads per annum).
and then to make l/3 of this estimated yield the standard
110 
abusa rent.
Difficulties of collection and the exorbitant amounts 
involved, which frighten away prospective tenants, have led 
to the adoption of other systems of rent: one of these is
"sheep-money", expressible in monetary terms. There is no 
standard rent at so much an acre, but there is an approximate 
level, varying in accord with certain factors - the size of 
the farm, the price of cocoa, the acceptability of the stranger
109. At p. 35.
110. In Adansi.
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(and his intention to be a permanent resident, or only a non­
resident exploiter), and so on. Certain stools appear to 
reserve the right to vary the rent in accordance with the
variations of these factors: in one case a farmer paid £2.6*4.,
Illthe next year £11, the next year £10, If the stranger or his 
successor behaves ungratefully to the stool, they may be put on 
a higher rate, or even on abusa.
Certain states do not tax or charge stranger-farmers, or
charge them only a nominal rent in order to preserve the stool*s
112
title.
Where a community is settled on the lands of a stool which
they do not serve, the usual practice is to charge each farmer
113individually, and not to charge them collectively.
Another method of assessment is the "penny per tree” tax,
which is especially popular in Ashanti, The actual charge per
tree has fluctuated in accordance with resolutions of the
Ashanti Confederacy Council from time to time, sometimes against
114 & 115the general move in prices. The general rate in
111. and the Chief said in evidence: ^Tribute bn cocoa
depends upon the fluctuation of the local market. There
Is no flat or specific (rate) which a foreign farmer has 
to pay to the owner of a land on which he farms cocoa.
As pric^6f cocoa goes high it automatically affects the 
tribute.”
112. E.g., in New Juaben.
113. E.g., in the case of the village of Abutennaa farming
on Adankranja stool lands (in Ashanti).
114. See Matson, Digest, p. 17.
115. Rat tray B A.I»7cT 352, mentions three forms of payment: 
a proportion of the crops, so much per tree, or a 
lump sum paid at the time of entry.
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Ashanti at the time of investigation was 8 trees for Id., but 
this rate is departed from by individual divisions in some 
oases.
Some states insist on written documents, others encourage
the use of documents, and in others no documents are made, the
agreement being oral only. The type of rent for which a
stranger holds land, and his terms of tenure, are tied up with
other matters - such as his duty to contribute to stool levies
and to render communal services (which are considered below).
In Akim Abuakwa a distinction (which is a common one) is made
between resident and non-resident strangers, the former paying
a nominal 10/- or so per annum, the latter paying an economic
rent (there being no penny per tree system here, nor sheep-
money; abusa used formerly to be charged, but the system has
now been abandoned in this connexion).
(d) Succession to a stranger; Formerly, the stool was
the successor to a stranger-farmer if he had acquired land
116
from the stool. Gradually it was permitted for the successor 
of the stranger to take over the farm of the deceased; the 
decision whether to permit this or not was dependent on whether 
the stranger was a permanent resident or not, and whether he 
had left potential successors also living within the confines
116. And Rattray (A.L.C. 353) says: "Any plot of land once 
abandoned by a stranger (i.e., someone not a /cTirect^ 
subject of the Stool) immediately reverted to the 
Stool/”
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of tho state. These exceptions seem to be greatly weakened 
today. There are one or two points to make, however. The 
first is that where the stranger acquired the land by purchase 
or gift from a family - although the title to the land was ul­
timately with the stool - then the stool succeeded to the 
stranger's property, and not that family. This rule cannot 
be of any application where the stranger was merely a tenant
of the family, who would in such a case retain the reversion 
117
to the land. It was also suggested in one state that although 
the site of a house in a village occupied by a deceased 
stranger reverted to the use of the village (although ultimate 
title to the land was with the Paramount Stool), the rule was 
different in the' case of farms made out of virgin forest in
I the neighbourhood of the village: the reversion in the latter
(
case would go to the Paramount Chief direct.
It is also important to note that by virtue of its ultim­
ate title to the land the stool, on claiming such a succession, 
will succeed also to the stranger's interest in the farm, and 
this is one of the ways in which stool-property in the narrow 
sense has been built up^^
(e) Rights and powers of a stranger as regards alienations 
and use: There appear to be no unusual restrictions (apart
from those contained in any lease) placed on the use by
117. And so Ratt. A.L.C. 357, n.1.
118. Cf. STOOL, p. 52.
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strangers of farms they have acquired; though as regards 
alienations they are generally at least to inform the stool, 
and usually to obtain the permission of the stool in the case 
of sales outright of their interests. According to one in­
formant, a stool may charge l/3 of the purchase-price if a 
stranger disposes of his interest outright. There is often 
in practice no restriction placed on a stranger's dealings 
with lesser interests (e.g., on his pledging, etc.).
2. HOUSES.
The normal custom is for a stranger who wants a plot for 
a house to approach the local Odikro or chief in charge of the 
land for that village or quarter. The matter may go no fur­
ther; or in many cases he will be taken before the landowning 
stool, with whom negotiations will be conducted. As in the 
grant of permission to farm, drink is customarily offered in 
such cases to "stamp** the permission granted. Often no rent, 
or a nominal rental only (say, 2/- to lo/-), is charged. But 
in the larger towns and in the more civilised areas an econ­
omic rent is payable by the stranger. The case of Koforidua
119
is considered below; mention has been made of leases made with
120citizens for the town of Bekwai; similar leases, but for an 
economic rent, are granted to strangers. The ground-rent is 
payable (for the plot only) whether the stranger erects
119. See REGISTRATION, pp. 757 et seq.
120. Cf. p. 152 ante.
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buildings or not, and does not vary according to the type of
building put up. This does not apply to commercial firms,
121
who will be charged heavily. Kumasi is also a special case,
citizens getting tenancies of plots for a nominal l/- rent,
whilst strangers pay an economic rent.
The rules with regard to dealings with houses are similar
122
to those in force for farms. According to one informant, 
if a stranger wishes to leave the town and his plot perman­
ently, he need not continue to pay rent if he notifies the 
Omanhene; but the building will revert to the stool. If the 
plot is abandoned before it has been built on, then the title 
to it merges in the stool's interest and is available for re­
allocation. In some villages a stranger's house-plot and
house may revert to the Odikro, I was told, instead of passing
123
to the Omanhene's stool.
3. LIABILITY OP STRANGERS FOR LEVIES. ETC.
124
(a) Levies: The former rule is given by Warrington:
f,A levy was only collected for 3ome specific 
purpose such as the funeral expenses of a 
Chief, the expense of litigation or war....
When the amount required had been decided upon 
this was divided amongst the various Asafohin 
and each was required to raise his quota from 
amongst his own subjects no matter where they 
lived."
121. Similarly in Koforidua.
122. Bekwai.
123. Koforidua.
124. 2nd ed. (Matson) 72.
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And further, for today:
ttA person paying tribute to the Chief on whose 
land he lives 16 not liable to be called upon 
for communal labour and he is exempt from any 
.levy collected by the Chief to whom he pays 
tribute
That is, special levies are exacted only from persons who
owe allegiance to the stool in question. Warrington further
says (loc. cit.) that as a general rule strangers who are only
growing food-stuffs are not called on to pay levy to the Chief
on whose land they are farming; and the same goes for petty
125
traders and craftsmen. Rattray say3 the same.
120Busia considers some of the problems that arise in 
Ashanti through the application of this rule that special 
levies are payable on the basi£ of allegiance, and not of 
residence.
(b) Annual Rate or Tax: This is now payable on a resi-
127
dential basis: the different relationships of subject and
stranger do not therefore matter, except in cases where chiefs 
attempt to base claims on allegiance owed rather than on 
residence.
(c) Communal Labour: Vi/arrington (loc. cit.) places
liability to perform services of this nature on strangers who
125. A.L.C. 153, note 2.
126. pp. 128 et_ seq„
127. Under the Local Government Ordinance, replacing the 
Native Authority Ordinances.
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grow food-stuffs, but not on those who pay cocoa-tribute.
It seems likely that the distinction should rather be between 
permanent settlers (who are liable) and temporary residents 
(who are not).
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CHAPTER IV.
THE FAMILY 
and .
ITS POSITION IN THE AKAN LAW OF PROPERTY.
This chapter will deal with the Internal relations of 
the Akan family, types of family property, and so on; where 
the family as a whole is in an equal position with an individ­
ual in external relations (in regard to such matters as the 
interest of the stool which It serves in the property of the 
family, the rights of tenant-strangers on family-land, etc*),
the rules are analogous to those governing the Individual, and
1 2
may be found in the chapters on THE STOOL and THE INDIVIDUAL.
Before we can consider what are the rules and customs 
governing the family and its members in regard to the holding 
of property it is necessary to say something of the internal 
organization of the family, to see what is its construction, 
what is the position of its head, the elders of the family, 
and the ordinary members.
a ; THE FAMILY: ITS ORGANIZATION.
1. NATURE AND BASIS OP THE FAMILY IN AKAN LIFE.
Little need be said of the basis on which the Akan family
1. See pp. 40! et seq«
2. See pp. 126 et seq.
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3
is built; the reader is referred to the works of Sarbah.
4 5
Rattray. and Danguah. where the subject is fully treated.
It suffices to recall that it is matrilineal, that is, related
through the female llnef that it is exogamous, and that the
relationship binding the members of the family is not pre-
6
sumptiye and perhaps fictional, as in the case of the Akan 
clans.
The family Is called in Twi ”abusua11: since the same word 
is used to describe the clan, confusion Is possible. Confusion 
is also possible in English, since the word ”family1n is nor­
mally used by us to describe a much more restricted group.
A certain amount of caution is also necessary in interpreting 
the statements of Africans, since some may describe the sect­
ions of a family (explained below) as "families11.
An Akan family forms part of a clan; but whereas members 
of the same clan cannot as a rule - unless co-members of one 
family - trace their relationship to each other, members of the 
same family should always theoretically be able to demonstrate 
their relationship. With the multiplication of generations 
sections of the family tend to "hive off1*, and the relation 
may be obscured or forgotten.
3. In, for instance, his Panti Customary Laws, pp. 33 et sea.
4. In, for instance, Ash, pp. 21 et seq; A.L.C. 401 et seq.; 
and 1 et seq.
5. In Akan Laws and Customs, at pp. 193 et seq.
6. Cf. Ami as ah v. Krabah: (1956) P.C. 2 W.A.C.A. 30, at p. 31s 
"...a Panti family consists, subject to immaterial excep­
tions, of persons lineally descended through females from
a common ancestress1*.
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(CLAN: Clans as such appear to be Incapable of holding
property; descriptions of their so doing are usually attrib­
utable to their members sharing the same family. Hence the
common statement made by Informants that land in towns is div-
7
ided up between the different clans. But the following facts 
should be noted:
(1) Membership of a clan may determine allegiance.
(2) According to Warrington, the word abusuatirl is used
8
of the local head of a clan in a town or village.
(3) Each clan in a town has a family-stool serving the
9
chief of the town. - -
(4) Members of the same clan still tend to associate for 
farming and residential purposes; and they may share the same 
burial ground.)
Since relationship is matrilineal, it is impossible for 
a line to be continued when it comes to a male: hence a man
is of a different family from that of his son or father. Such 
a rule* exact in theory, admits of exceptions, but these are 
usually of the unspoken kind, where slaves or domestics have 
been adopted into the family.
7. 11 The seven different families (so. clans) have each their 
own land in the town of Aburi.”
8. Warrington, p. 2. - But: cf. W, *s statement at p. 4:
”he is the person elected to a stool by the members of 
a family group in a particular area or community, who 
in general exercises no jurisdiction over persons out­
side that family group,”
9. E.g., in Akropong, Akwapim.
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Membership of the same family is indicated as a rule by:
(1) Common ancestry, as described above.
(2) Having the same head or abusuapanln.
(3) Having the same principal family house.
(4) Mutual contributions towards funeral expenses of 
members.
10
(5) Sharing of the same family burial-ground.
It would be impossible to over-emphaslze the importance
of the family in Akan life: the most terrible fate for an *
Akan is to be without a family, which would occur usually in
the past only where he was a slave or a prisoner of war. Even
slaves were adopted into the family they served as "quasi- 
,.11members . The family performed all the functions which in 
England we associate with the Welfare State - care of the aged, 
the widowed or orphaned; finance for a dozen different enter­
prises; provision of land for houses and farming; payments 
in connexion with marriage and death. It would be regrettable 
if civilisation - and the evolution of a different kind of
10. Sarbah (F.C.L* 36) gives "the ordinary incidents of a 
family" as follows
(1) Common clan;
(ii) A common penin ^ T.e. headT";
(ill) Common liability to pay debts;
(iv) Common funeral rites;
(v) Common residence;
(vi) Common burial place."
A family member is called obusuarl - Danquah, A.L.C. 194.
11. And were called in Twi wfle-nipaq (literally, "people 
of the house").
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family (the ’’European” or "Christian” family of husband, wife, 
and children) were to break up this venerable institution*
2. THE EXTENT OP THE FAMILY*
"Family” is used in speaking of Akan customary law in 
regard to what the anthropologists would call a "maximal 
lineage”. There is no mathematical limit to the extent of 
the family, either in numbers of members, or in the degrees 
to which relationship may be traced, either upwards or down­
wards; but in my experience (though it is a subject on which 
they do not like to speak) there were few Africans who traced 
or could trace their relationship much beyond their great­
grandfathers or great-grandmothers, using this term in a class- 
ificatory sense. This does not apply to chiefly families, 
where it is a matter of pride to be able to trace the descent 
of the family back through many generations.
It mu3t be remembered that an Akan family consists not 
only of the living, but also of departed ancestors and members 
yet to be born; and this in a real sense. This is the ex­
planation of the jealous care with which families endeavour to 
preserve and add to the family possessions.
3. THE ORGANISATION OF THE FAMILY.
(a) Sections, branches, sublineages;
Although the family is a single unit as a term of relation­
ship, for practical purposes one finds that it is split up into
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a number of divisions, which are more or less clearly separ­
ated. The anthropologist would no doubt term them "sub- 
lineages", forming part of that maximal lineage which traces 
its descent to the original female ancestor. Such divisions 
have occurred as soon as the ancestor bore female children, 
the descendants of whom would form separate branches of the 
family. Such a process of division can be continuous and
endless. Some of these divisions remain nothing more than
figments of the fevered brain of certain sociologists. These 
sections or branches do, however, play an important part in 
the control and use of, and succession to, property.
When such divisions occur, the African will refer to them
12
as "sections”, "houses”, or branches of the family; and their 
separateness is especially clear where the members of one sec­
tion are living in a family house by themselves, separate from 
the houses of other sections; and especially where the differ­
ent sections are living in different towns; or branches of 
the family have quarrelled, and there has been separation of 
property, (or, in the past, cutting of the famlly-tie).
Each of the sections is under an elder, or "panin”. who
has immediate control of its members.
12 . Th e most popular word seems to be house an exact 
translation of the Twi "fie" (or "house"). Confusion 
of terminology may arise, because, when talking of 
families and houses, the African may mean:
(i) "Family" - clan in a particular town;
(ii) "House" - family of that clan in that town,
or (i) "Family" - family;
(ii) "House - section of that family.
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(b) The head of the family:
13Each family has a supreme head, who la appointed to that 
position by election; succession to the office is not autom­
atic, although it may be confined to certain lines, and there 
may be a preferential candidate. It Is reported that there is 
always an "heir*1 apparent, officially recognized as such; so
in many cases the appointment of the head Is at least prefer-
14
ential, and practically automatic,
(i) His position; The head of the family is not 
only the business representative of the family; he is orig­
inally the spiritual head of the entire family - so that he
has certain religious duties to perform on behalf of the 
15
family. Where the family acts as a unit in dealings with 
the outside world, the head is the natural representative. 
Within the family, his position is like that of president of
a council, the family council in this case; he is no more
than primus inter pares: and any head who purports or endea­
vours to act by himself in an arbitrary manner is sure to find 
himself in difficulties with the rest of the family. The head 
of a family may or may not occupy a stool. Some families
13. Called ^abusuapanin” - family elder;
n abusuatlri” - family head.
14. The heir-apparent is termed ”abadiakylren.
15. BHe is the elected head of the gross family- spiritual 
and physical representative of the ancestor*; Akim 
Abuakwa.
See also Sar. P.C.L. 37-8.
For a good description of the position of the abusuapanin, 
see Danquah, A.L.C. 804-5.
199
have stools: others have not.
(11) His appointment: the head of the family Is
17
appointed by the family; he does not succeed automatically. 
When the necessity to appoint a new head occurs, on the death 
or deposition of the previous head, the family meets together 
to discuss and elect. Considerable divergencies were shown 
in the information given by different informants on the quest­
ion of which persons were competent to take part in the dis-
18cussion and election. Whilst on the one hand it was said
16. Evidence, inter alia, from Akim Abuakwa.
17. BUT: "Succession to the head of the family is automatic 
and the heir apparent must succeed unless there are 
reasons to disqualify him. such as if he Is Insane, a 
spendthrift, or drunkard. - Akropong. Sed quaere.
18* The head is:
- "appointed by * senior and responsible9 members of
the family": (Cape Coast)
- "appointed by responsible older people”: (another
informant, Cape Coast)
- " appointed by members of the family”: (Aslkuma)
- "appointed by the senior women of the family”: (Aburi.
. Akwaplm)
- "selected by succession: confirmed by the Obaapanin,
supported by the senior members of the family": (Aburi)
- "selected by succession: confirmed by the Obaapanin
supported by the elders of the family”: (Akropong)
- "appointed by Obaapanin in consultation
(i) with the elders of the family; and then
(ii) with all the family, who put forward 
nominations which may be rejected by 
the Obaapanin as unsuitable. The 
Obaapanin can herself nominate." (New Juaben)
- "the head of the family is appointed by the family 
.council, which consists of the Obaapanin supported
by the elders of the family. (The elders must be 
appointed so; elders are not the same as ‘senior 
members', the latter, as such, not being entitled 
to sit in the family council. )n 
And Sarbah, F.C.L. 38.
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that the entire family met together, and all had a voice 
equally, the proponents of this view weakened when it was 
shown that this implied that the young members of the family, 
perhaps still children, would thus be entitled to take part* 
Another view was that it was the "senior and responsible mem­
bers" of the family who conduct such business; but in this 
case no firm test either of seniority or responsibility was 
given; and the qualification did not seem to depend on the 
attainment of any particular age, status or condition, such 
as reaching manhood, being married, being head of a household 
or section*
One may conclude that, whilst custom varies in different 
families, in general there are two stages* In the first, in 
the African equivalent of a "smoke-filled room11, (cf* the Amer­
ican method of selecting Presidential candidates) the elders 
of the family meet together in private, and agree on their nom­
ination, which is then presented to the family as a whole* The 
Obaapanin, as the authority on family relationships, naturally 
has a large say in the deliberations* At the second meeting, 
whieh is informal, all members of the family, young and old, 
are entitled to attend and speak if they wish - though the 
weight attached to what they say will naturally vary according
to their status* Women are entitled to take part in family
19deliberations equally with men* ________ _
19. The "appointment of the head" is" gone into at some length, 
because similar considerations apply in other dealings of 
the family as a whole; and there are obvious analogies 
with the election of a chief.
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As to the sex of the head, it is customary for him to be
a male. One meets Instances, both in history and in the re-
20ports, of female heads of families, especially on the Coast, 
Certain informants stated the same thing too as referring to 
their own families; further investigation usually disclosed 
that they were speaking of their Obaapanin, and that there was 
in fact a male head of the family (usually a brother or other 
close relation of the Obaapanin),
The fact that the head Is a male was explained by one ex­
pert informant on the ground that "it is merely a natural in-
„ 21
cidence of the male potest as - ntoro",
I consider, then, that the usual state of affairs is for 
there to be an Obaapanin, or woman-head of the family; and 
the natural candidate for the position of male head of the fam­
ily is one of her brothers from the same mother; failing such
brothers, recourse is had to other relatives of the same gener-
22 & 23
atlon; and only then to members of a later generation.
20. And in conveyances. There may be confusion because fam­
ilies have both male and female heads; or the woman is 
the senior female of one "house”.
21, Information from Akim Abuakwa,
22, The Abusuapanin's"suece3Sor must be a close relative,
say his brother, or his sister's or his aunt's daughter's 
son, if such is desirable and fit. Otherwise there is 
nothing to prevent the family appointing a successor from 
the gross family at large", - Akim Abuakwa,
23. But where a family is divided into sections or "houses”, 
members of each section are equally candidates for appoint­
ment (unless there is a private family understanding that 
appointments should alternate from each house In order;
or that one house is the senior).
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(iil) General Powers of the head: The powers of the
24
head in regard to property will be fully considered below.
Here it is enough to say that the head originates and directs 
many of the family operations; and controls,the Internal dis­
cipline of the family, besides sitting to arbitrate on disputes 
within the family (a power of great importance). Quarrels 
within the family should be settled within the house; so that
it is only when one of the participants feels that he has not
25
got justice that he will take his quarrel into open court,
(iv) Duties of_ the head: the duties of the head are
a corollary of his powers (or vice versa). He is accountable 
to the family for his actions; and is under a duty to consult 
the family - particularly in connexion with family property - 
whenever custom lays down that he should do so. If he mis­
behaves, he may be deposed, and another appointed in his place. 
In general, the duty of the head of the family is to preserve 
the family and its property as far as possible, and to enhance 
its position and prestige,
(c) Sectlon-heads: elders.
Besides the head of the whole family, one also finds that 
the branches of the family, if they are of sufficient import­
ance, have heads as well; that is, the latter are heads of
24. See pp. 218-221.
25. “Matters of Importance or difficulty must go before the 
Abusuapanin; “Rites of Passage” - birth, marriage and 
death and the funeral obsequies - must be carried out 
with the knowledge and often the supervision of the 
Abusuapanin”: Akim Abuakwa.
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26sub-lineages within the family. Their appointment, if they
are appointed at all, is more informal; but their position
27may be of importance. The section-elder will carry to the
head of the family the opinions and wishes of his branch of 
28the family. And if the section is occupying a separate
house, and has separate lands, then he will have the duty of
29immediate control of such property.
The usual case is that, where there is a sub-lineage, 
then the senior member thereof will be its head, and will rep­
resent its opinions before the family.
(d) The Obaapanin.
Each family has, as well as a male head, a senior female
30
member, who is termed the ffobaapanin”, or "old lady" of the
family, a position of some importance. Besides supervising
the women of the family, she becomes - if the family is a royal
31one - the Queen Mother, with very definite duties in such 
things as the election of one of the family as Chief, and 
advice to the ruler. Hence one is led to conclude that in
26. Such a head is termed a "panin" or elder.
27."Families are divided into sections. Each section has a 
head or panin. r--elders must be appointed so: the word 
‘elder* does not equal 'senior member*": Akropong.
28. The elder settles all normal disputes between Immediate 
members of his sub-lineage: Akim Abuakwa.
29. The powers of section-heads over property vary widely, 
both from district to district, and family to family.
30. She is usually a close relative of the abusuapanin - 
"often mother or sister of the reigning abusuapanin, 
or may be his aunt" - Akim Abuakwa.
31. Called in Twi: "ohemaa".
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ordinary families the obaapanin will have some say not only in 
the choice of the abusuapanin. but in the conduct of affairs. 
Such, in fact, is the case:
(1) She is the "mother” of the family, and looks after it 
if there is no male head.
(2) She takes a prominent part in the appointment of 
heads of the family (and also of other successors too?).
(3) Her signature to a document as witness may be essen­
tial as proof of family approval, and at least carries great 
weight.
(4) Her voice has great weight in the conduct of family 
business generally.
(5) She supervises the women of the family, and settles 
their disputes?**
(6) She takes a close interest in the marriage and div-
32orce of members of the family.
32
(7) She may settle divorce cases by consent.
32(8) She is the authority on the family-pedigree.
(9) She may, according to two decisions, represent the
33
family in the courts; though there is some doubt whether she
32. Information from, inter alia. Akim Abuakwa.
33. See: Mahmudu v. Zenuah: (19%4) 2 W.A.C.A. 172.
Koran v. feafour“lC o fl D okyi: (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 78:
The Court upheld the Native tribunal which: "after stat­
ing that it was satisfied that the plaintiff, an elderly 
woman of the family, had a direct material interest in 
the properties belonging to that line of the family, 
held that according to native custom plaintiff could 
properly bring the action”.
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may do so only when there is no male head; or even when 
there is a male head^
There is a certain amount of confusion, especially in 
cases originating in the coastal areas (particularly Fante) 
about whether there are families with only female heads. Per­
sonal informants frequently mentioned the female head of their 
family only (especially in Cape Coast). Further questions
always disclosed that there was a male head of the family as
. 56well, perhaps brother to the obaapanin.
34. Tsetsewa v. Acquah: (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 216, (following 
Hagan v. Adum: (1959) P.C. 5 W.A.C.A. 35):-
'... the Courts of this country have always recognized 
the right of the leading female member of the family to 
sue ani be sued in respect of family property in the 
absence of any male head”, (at p. 217)
35. In Mahmudu v. Zenuah (see n.33), the rule that only the 
head of a family can sue as representative of the family 
for the recovery of family land was considered. The 
plaintiff, described as ”an elderly woman of the family”, 
was, however, permitted to sue; this decision was based 
partly on the evidence of a former family-stoolholder 
that each member of our family has a legitimate right 
to dispute for the properties in dispute ; and partly 
on the grounds that the rule was in this ^ particular case:
a. repugnant to Justice, etc.. under the Supreme"" 
Court Ordinance, s. 19;
b. incompatible with Supreme Court Ordinance. 
Schedule II, Order 45, rule 25, (IT.
36. In Cape Coast, too, it should not be forgotten that there 
has been a greater tendency for families to fragmentate, 
and form discrete units of matrilineal sub-lineages, each 
occupying its own house. Some of the ”old ladies” from 
Cape Coast who appear in the reports are therefore only 
the old ladies of sections or "houses”.
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(e) Stools In the family:
There may or may not he stools In the family:
(i) Family Stools: in the simplest instance the
57head of the family has a stool. Gut there are complications.
38
Usually the head of the clan in a town will have a stool; 
and there may be additional stools created for heads of fam­
ilies within that clan, as elders to the chief. According
to information, each house of a family - especially a Royal
39
family - may have a stool.
But not every family has a stools It depends on their
status and history. The subject of stools has been fully
40treated in the leading sociological works; but there does 
not appear any sufficient guiding principle on why there 
should be this divergence.
(ii) Town Stools: the distinction between town- and
family-stools is explained in the chapter on THE STOOL (q.v.), 
and also in the writings of many authors of works on Akan cus­
toms. A family may hold one or more town stools, the most 
frequent case being where the family supplies the Chief of a 
town. Besides the Chief's stool, there may also be other 
stools in the family for subordinate positions.
(iii) Other Stools: this category is created,
37. wEvery head of a family occupies a stool11: Akropong.
38. See, for Instance, Akwaplm.
39. Evidence from Akwapim.
40. See references given under STOOL, ante p. 17.
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because Instances were encountered where the Incidents of each 
type of stool occur for one stool* Such a stool one would 
categorize as a town-stool, since the holder exercises poli­
tical authority, but it was stated to be still a family-stool, 
to which the family alone could elect, and from which the fam­
ily alone could depose* The Queen-Mother*s stool, although 
typically a family stool, also has political power; and the 
wyoung-menw may claim the right to depose her. It is to be 
hoped that this matter will be clarified by further investi­
gation*
(f) The fle-wura*
In the works of Rattray in particular, much is made of
41the fle-wura* or master of a household* The fle-wura with 
his household cuts across the family arrangement, since his 
household Includes wives and children, and formerly Included 
slaves, who are none of them members of his family* I consider 
that the position of fie-wura is probably one of more import­
ance in Ashanti than it is on the Ooast; since in the latter, 
especially in the towns, one is likely to find large family- 
houses, controlled directly by the head of the family, or 
section-head* Nevertheless, the position of head of a house-
i
hold is one of importance, increasingly so today when there is 
a tendency for successful members of a family to acquire or j 
build their own houses. The fle-wura*s position is of greater
41* See especially: Ratt. A.L.O* 1, et seq*
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Interest to sociologists than to lawyers (since there is much 
room for study of the conflicting authorities of fle-wura and 
family over his dependents, a conflict typified by the father- 
maternal uncle relation).
As regards the property relations of the fie-wura, the 
matter is adequately covered by consideration of the position 
of the individual holder of an absolute interest in a self­
acquired house; and of the holder of a limited inherited 
Interest in a family-house*
The householder's rights of control over members are of 
particular importance as the converse of the duty of members 
(or wives and children) enjoying rights of residence in an in­
herited house subject to good behaviour.
Where the position of a house-holder is not that of an 
ordinary individual member of a family, and especially in his 
relations with his wife and children, and the wives and child­
ren of other members, it is discussed in the appropriate por-
42tions of this work.
(g) Quasi-member a of the famllyf^
By this term are included three main groups of persons: 
(1) Wives of members; husbands of members.
(ii) Children of male members.
42. See, for instance, GIFT, pp. 523 ff.j TENANCIES, pp. 455 ff.
43, Of which the best Twi equivalent is "fiefo" (house-folk).
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(ill) Slaves ani domestics.
Although one may stoutly maintain the principle that 
account can only he taken of full members by blood of the fam­
ily, as a matter of fact these groups of persons, who share 
the life of the family, or members of it, do acquire definite 
rights against the family and family-property by virtue of 
their dependence or relation with members of the family; and 
it would be unreal to omit consideration of them because of
some abstract theory. Their status is recognized in many ways 
45
by the family: they enjoy privileges and immunities as com­
pared with total strangers - that is, they are not subject to 
the same "no-rights*, disabilities and liabilities (in 
Hohfeld*s classification). Whilst a total stranger would be 
prevented from working on family land, or living in a family 
house, such actions are permitted in certain circumstances for 
these quasi-dependent s. Even if the relationship means no
more than that at a family meeting the presence of, say, the 
husband of a female member of the family is permitted, then 
the distinction is a real one*
44* Stool-servants are not domestics, or slaves; they are 
in a position of dependence on the stool, and their 
property is subject to special rules*
See GIFT, pp. 528-9.
45* As instances:- husbands take part in their wives* funerals;
and wives in their husbands*;
children: pay for deceased father*s coffin;
may take part in, or at least be 
present at, appointment of the 
successor to their father*
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Their relationship with the family may have effects out­
side the family; for instance, if a member of a family marries 
outside the tribe, the spouse, who would otherwise be liable 
to pay tribute for occupying the tribal land, will probably 
go scot-free*
Nor should the rights of former slaves be forgotten*
For them the effect of the Slaves Emancipation Ordinance. 1874,
and the Re-affirmatlon of the Ab^olltion of Slavery Ordinance*
1930, has not been entirely beneficial. Whilst on the one
hand, it has been maintained that the former right of a slave
to succeed to his master's property was based on slavery, and
46
thus cannot be enforced today, on the other it has been en­
deavoured to waive the customary rider to this rule, that per­
sons of slave-blood must be postponed to persons of the free 
47 
blood.
Both of these constructions it is submitted, are false* 
Former slaves, and the descendants of slaves still living with 
the family which they serve, are now termed "domestics”; and 
their position is that of adopted but inferior members of the 
family. They are thus capable of succeeding to family-prop- 
erty (usually only in default of successors of the blood);
46. But see: Sant eng; v. Darkwa: (1940) 6 W.A.C.A* 52, (follow­
ing Blmba v. Mansah: (185*1) F.C.L. 1157) where the right 
of the son of a slave-woman to succeed was upheld.
47. By, for example, Hooper, J., in Ambradu v. Mansah: (1947) 
(Sekondi: Land Appeal No. 1/47).
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and in particular they may occupy a tutelary position in
relation to the young members of the family, whose interests
48they may represent in famlly-councils.
It is admitted by the Africans that such domestics are 
now theoretically free to leave the family if they wish; most 
do not choose to do so,
Bl FAMILY PROPERTO.
The term "family property”, which is so frequently used 
in reference to African Law, needs clarification. How often 
do we find It said: "Such-and-such is family property"? Prom
this statement, ill-understood, a whole set of false conclus­
ions may be drawn. The common picture of family property is 
that it is. property within the direct control of the head of 
the family. On the contrary, more often the use and control 
of family property is divided up between the members of the 
family.
And again, one is told that self-acquired property passing 
on intestacy to the successor thereby becomes family property. 
What is the true interpretation of such statements?
The fact is that no-one could tell by a rapid examination 
of the condition and methods of a farmer whether the farm
48, And they may have a tutelary position in regard to 
property - servants of a stool are often appointed 
as caretakers of stool property. (Their status is 
Inherited,)
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which he possesses Is family property or no; such a distinct-* 
Ion only comes In point when he wishes to sell or give away 
the property; or when he dies* Between an inherited farm 
and the family house which is commonly met with on the Coast 
and hinterland, there would seem to he a world of difference*
If the term "family property" is divided up in the succeeding 
sections, It is only so as to make plain the differences in 
practice between such varying forms of property.
(The presumption that property 1s family property: According 
to Sarbal^ and a multitude of decisions of the Gold Coast 
courts, the presumption in the past has always been that prop­
erty is family property. If this was meant to imply that the 
use of the property was by the family as a unit, such a state­
ment was never true. More recently, it has been accepted that
50
the presumption is not so strong today; it is respectfully 
submitted that the presumption might with advantage be aban­
doned altogether.)
(There.Is no presumption of family ownership of lands in 
&umasi.
49. In his Fantl Customary Laws,
50* See: Cod joe 7, Kwatchey: 11935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371;
Tsetsewa v. Acquah: (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 216;
Acquah v. Aoquah & Tsetsewa: (1941) 7 W.A.C.A* 222.
51. Acc. to Smith. Ag.C.J.', in Korkuah v* Yamoah: W.A.C.A.
Civil Appeal No.8/49.
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1. FAMILY PROPERTY IN THE WIDE SENSE,
The widest sense in which it is possible to use the term 
"family property” is when not only the ownership, but the use, 
of the thing owned is common to the whole family. In such a 
wide sense, we can include only such things as the principal 
family house52(especially among the Fantis), and other prop­
erties which are perhaps bought (as investments) by the head of 
the family on behalf of the whole family. This takes the form
these days of house-property in the towns; but family-farms 
are also encountered, which are worked by caretakers.
(a) The derivation of family property:
Before considering the ownership, use and control of family 
property, It is necessary to indioate briefly what properties 
are family property, and how they may come to be so considered: -
(I) From ancestress: property acquired or owned by
the original ancestress of the family forms the basis of the 
family property, Just as the acquisitions of her daughters form 
the basis of the property of the sections composing the family.
(ii) Head of family: property acquired by the head
of the family acting for the family is family property.
(iii) Act of the family: where the family as a whole 
has either built a house or made a farm with their own communal 
efforts.
52. All families have a principal family house; it is parti­
cularly in coastal towns that large houses are found.
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(iv) Suceeaalon: the family as a whole has acquired
title to property through the decease intestate of a member of
the family, and their consequent succession to his self-
55acquired property.
(v) Actions of members: several members of the fam­
ily have co-operated in the building of a house, or making of 
a farm (although in such cases either: it may become their 
joint self-acquired property; or: they vest the immediate 
interest in their own sub-lineage only).
(vi) Member building or farming on family land: a 
member who builds a house on a family site, or makes a farm on 
family fallow-land, may find that the house or farm is a ”tied 
property”, i.e., it belongs to the family. Even though dur­
ing his lifetime he may have the right to deal freely with such 
a house or farm as though it were his separate property, he may
be prohibited from disposing of the property outside the family 
54
at will.
(vli) Loans to members: a member who builds a house
or acquires a farm through a loan from the family may find that 
the house or farm is treated as family property.
55. The family as a whole acquire title; their title is, 
however, restricted by the dependent Interests of the 
sub-lineage of deceased, and of the successor. See 
Chapter X, SUCCESSION.
54. But see: Kofi v. Manu: (N. Juaben A. Ct. Suit 57/49); 
"According to custom, cocoa trees planted on a family 
fallow land by a member of the family cannot be claimed 
by a(-nother) member of the same family.”
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(viii) In addition, a member of the family who pledges 
his self-acquired property, may have it redeemed by the family 
(case A), or by a member of his family (case B). In case A, 
his farm becomes family property: (sed quaere whether if he
repays the debt to the family, the property becomes his indi­
vidual property again?). In case B, the member redeeming will 
have a right to the use of the property (sed quaere whether he 
will use it as his self-acquired property - the likelier - or 
as a member using family property?); (and quaere etlam whether 
the debtor-member can redeem his property, and either make it
his self-acquired property, or use it as if it were property
55 & 56 
which he had inherited?).
(b) The ownership of family property in the wide sense.
Such family property is vested In the family as a whole 
by a single, Indivisible, title. It seems almost unnecessary 
to add that the head of the family does not own the family 
property, nor has he any larger title, share or interest in the 
property than other members. No member has a separable inter­
est in the title to family property, nor is his right in the
55. The manner in which family property comes into existence, 
and the law and cases concerning this, are more fully 
examined below, at pp. 248-250, 256-278.
56. It should be noted that for the sake of completeness 
various derivations of family property have been given 
above: not all are of the same juristic effect. In 
some, ownership, control and use vest in the whole 
family; In others, ownership vests in the family, and 
use in a limited portion of the family.
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property attachable at law* It is Incorrect to describe the
members of the family as joint tenants, partners, or tenants-
58in-common of the family property* The subject-matter of the 
family's title may be sold or otherwise disposed of (as where 
the family sells a portion of its property, or authorizes a
member to do so); but It Is impossible for the title itself
59to be divided. There was a former custom called by Sarbah
60
"cutting Ekar” by which the tie of kinship binding the family 
could be severed, either between sections or against an indi­
vidual member; and partition of property between the remaining 
and the seceding elements was possible: today ” cutting ekar”
is obsolete; partition of property - if all the family agree -
61
is sometimes allowed to be possible, but rarely occurs.
It was held in Mahmudu v. Zenuah: (1934) 2 W.A.C.A* 172, 
(vide p, 174) that the head of the family (and a fortiori 
an ordinary member) has no attachable interest in family" 
property* Where a.member’s interest is attached and sold 
^7 fl«fa* * nothing is attached, and the sale is a nullity* 
Cases like Lawani v, Tadeyo: (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 37 - which 
was a NIGERIAN case - cannot be extended to the Gold Coast* 
Hence Villars v* Bafoe: (1909) Ren. 549, is misleading 
rather than helpiful; see p. 235 post*
Hence how can a member’s right, if attached, give any 
right to the transferee? V
Kahir or kahire - literally a ”head-pad”; for fuller des­
criptions see Sarbah, F.C.L* 33, and Danquah, A.L.C. 193 
et seq*
In complete distinction from the law in Lagos, where 
partition of family property Is frequently reported*
In the Gold Coast most partition occurs involuntarily 
through the gradual separation of branches of the family 
geographically* In Tawiah v* Addo (New Juabeh A Court,
No. 272/46) plaintiffs claimed, as Immediate sub-lineage 
of deceased, partition of deceased’s property* The Native 
Court refused, holding: "Customarily, family properties
/over
57.
58.
59*
60.
61.
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(c) Ita control.
Family property in the wide sense is controlled by the 
head of the family, acting as manager and representative on 
behalf of all the members of the family. To the head of the 
family falls the duty of regulating the use of the property by 
the members of the family (in the case of the family house, by 
allocating rooms, etc; in the case of investment property, by 
letting out the rooms, collecting of rents, keeping the ac­
counts, etc.).
The control of the family property may be expressly or 
impliedly delegated, either to a member of the family, or to 
a ’caretaker”. The delegate acquires no interest in the prop­
erty, although he may have claims against the family, or the 
head, of a personal nature.
(d) Its use.
The use of such family property (e.g., the family house) 
is open to all the members of the family. No distinction is 
ikade between section and section, Individual and Individual,
61. (cont. from previous page) -
of such nature could, not be divided among the members 
of the family.”
See also Sappor v. Amartey; F.Ct.(1913) D. & F, *11-
*16, 53 (a Ga case), where It was said:
”It has been suggested that partition ^ of 
family property/ by the Court Is unknown 
in this country...”; but the ChiefJo&stice 
went on to say that "subject to any pecul­
iarity of the customary local law unknown 
to me I think that partition is also a 
possible form of relief".
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except Insofar as such Individuals are refused permission to 
use the property, because of disloyalty, indiscipline, or sim­
ilar reasons* Each member is entitled to a room in the prln-
AO ft*
cipal family house, if there is room.
(e) The head of the family and family property:
It has been noted above that it is the duty of the head of
the family to control the use of the family property. It is
necessary to examine his duties, powers and rights a little 
64
more closely.
First, as to his position; he is not a trustee of the 
property, if this is held to imply that he therefore holds the 
freehold or absolute interest for the use and benefit of the 
family, who would thus have only an equitable Interest in the 
property as beneficiaries. Nor is his position that of an 
English tenant-for-life of property the subject of a strict 
settlement. These views would be a gross misrepresentation 
of the customary law, for the whole family owns the property, 
and whilst the head as manager acts with regard to the property 
subject to some of the same disabilities as English trustees, 
we find that his position has not been so clearly defined, and 
he is left a considerable margin of freedom.
62. E.g., “where a family possesses several houses, any member 
of the family may live in any of these houses, provided 
there is room” - Aslkuma.
63. The use of family property is fully considered in a sub­
sequent section: see below at pp. 238-240.
64. It will be appreciated that some of the following remarks 
apply, mutatls mutandis, to the head's dealings with other 
family property.
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(The head enjoys a similar position in some respects to 
the manager of Hindu joint-family property; but the analogy 
should not be pressed too far.) There are also analogies 
with the English law relating to unincorporated associations, 
especially as regards the right of individual members to the 
association's property: the English rules are instructive,
but they can be no more than an amusing comparison.
The head is the manager of the family property. In lesser
day-to-day affairs he is free from the strict scrutiny of the
65family. In all major dealings with the property, (for ex­
ample, if he wishes to sell it), he must consult the family
66
since it is the family which alone can sell, and not he.
The head has the power to undertake repairs to family
67 68property, to furnish family houses, to collect rents, and
perform other necessary actions in connexion with the property*
65. Sarbah suggests, undoubtedly correctly, that the head 
. has greater freedom when dealing with movable, than
with immovable, family property.
66. So: e.g., in evidence from: Cape Coast, Ashanti, Assin, 
Akwapim, New Juaben, etc. Cf. SALE, at pp. 317 ff.E2St. 
A sale made by the head without the consent of the 
family is voidable. not void, acc. to Mahko v. Bonso: 
(1936) 3 W’.A.C.A. 62.
Dealings with the family property without the consent 
of the family do not bind the family: cf. Bassey v.
Eteta: (1938; 4 W.A.C.A. 153 (Nigerian caseTI
67. And may use the rents from family property for this 
purpose.
68. Which are generally paid to the head.
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69The head may let out rooms In family houses to tenants,
70
or give family farm3 out on tenancy.
He has no power to pledge the property for debt without 
the knowledge of the family, since it is his duty, if there is 
a family debt, to call upon the other members of the family to 
contribute In order to satisfy it; it is only if they fail to
71
do so that the property would be pledged.
The head is not entitled to any remuneration at all for
his services as manager and controller; nor is he allowed to
make any personal profit out of the family property.
If the head grossly mismanages the family property, deals
with the family property without the family's authorization,
wastes or converts the money of the family to his own use, he
is liable to be brought before a family meeting and deposed.
72
The family would not take him to court for restitution unless 
he had refused to heed a previous warning, or had converted a 
considerable sum.
May the head be sued for an account? it is neither customary 
nor seemly for families to take their quarrels into open court. 
One member cannot sue the head for an account, unless the
69. Only with.the consent of the family, acc. to some;
(e.g., Akropong).
70. See n. 69.
71. The consent of the family is needed for a pledge (cf.
. evidence from, e.g., Ajumako, Akwapim, New Juaben);
probably even if they fail to contribute when required.
72. So: for example, Akropong, Akwapim.
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remainder of the family have consented. In an unreported
case, It was held that a member of a family cannot sue the
74head of his family for an account at all.
Who can sue for the family? The head is the normal person
75to sue and he sued in respect of family property. But any
member may be expressly authorized by the family to defend the
family-interest in the courts. The obaapanln has a right to
76sue for the family, recognized by the courts; and it seems
probable that any member may now sue in defence of the family,
if the family's interests are in jeopardy (an authority by 
77
implication).
73. Akropong..
74. By Quist, J., in Etuah v. Richardson: (Land Court, Cape 
Coast, 25.10.48); B u tthis-was a case where one section 
of a family sued the-head for apportionment of compensa­
tion paid by the Government to the family In, respect of 
family land acquired.
, Following: Sappor v. Amarteys (1913) D. & F. 'H-'lSjSS,
Ren. 787; Pappoe v. Kweku: (1924) F.Ct. '23-'25, 158.
75. "The head should Inform the family before going to court 
over family property. As soon as he sees that an action 
is necessary to defend the title to the property he should 
call an immediate meeting of the whole family and then 
Inform them, so that they can assist him by raising funds, 
and take the decision whether action is necessary or poss­
ible. If the elders are absent, and it is urgent, the 
head can Inform the people next in rank in the family 
before taking action." - Akropong.
76. See ante, pp. 204, 205.
77. Mahmudu v. Zenuah (already cited), and oral Information, 
tn Busumafle v.~Milbah: (1948) Unreported: Land Court,
Cape Coast, 18.10.48, coram Quist, J., It was said that 
"the right of members of a family to sue In protection of 
the family property is well recognised by the Courts, and 
cannot be disputed."
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Pan a man sue In defence of his inherited farm? It Is pref­
erable that he should be authorized by the family, or at least 
inform them of what he is doing. A victorious suitor against 
such a member may find himself with an empty victory if the 
family interest has not been put in question by joinder of the 
family. In Eccuah Abbah v. Smith: (1910) Ren. -i 21^ Earnshaw, 
J., permitted a person holding a portion of family land to sue 
in trespass a defendant for removing crops planted on the land 
by the plaintiff.
When a person sues as representative of the family his
personal property is not liable to be taken In execution of
78any judgement given against the family.
(f) Liability of family property for family and member's 
Sebtss
Family property may be seized in execution for a debt of 
the family. Such family debts include debts contracted by 
the head (or other representative of the family) when expressly 
authorized to do so; debts contracted by the head on behalf of 
the family, and subsequently ratified or accepted by the fam­
ily; debts contracted by members on their own behalf, and
79
guaranteed at the time or later accepted as a family debt. 
Private debts of members: the former rule that the family was
unconditionally liable both for the torts and for the debts of
78. But, acc. to Hammond v. U.A.C.: (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 60, a 
head of a family^is personally liable for costs awarded 
against him when he is suing in a representative character.
79. See immediately below, and Chapter on SUCCESSION.
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its members Is now generally accepted no longer to apply,
both by the Africans, in their courts and dealings, and by
80
the Supreme Court.
A family is not now liable to have its property attached 
for a member's private debt. But an attachment is an obvious 
nullity in so far as It attempts to seize the family-interest 
in the property. In so far as it attempts to attach the mem­
ber's interest in family property, this is also a nullity, 
since Mahmudu v. Zenuah rightly held that a member of a family 
has no attachable interest in the family property. A sale of 
such an attached "interest” is therefore also a nullity; the 
family need not interplead; and can only lose their right by 
long acquiescence?*’
Where there is a document given in connexion with a loan 
(as there usually is today), then members of the family may 
sign as witnesses. Such signature may be variously inter­
preted:
80. Asiedu v. Oforl: (1932) Suit No. 97/32, coram Deane, C.J.
81. See LONG POSSESSION, esp. at pp. 721-2 ; and cf. Stephens 
v. Blay: (1910) Ren. 578; but see Basel Mission Factory 
v. Suaplm: (1911) D. & P. '11- '16, 15. corwm brampton 
Smyly, J., in the Supreme Court: -
"In my opinion where one member of a family holds 
himself but to the public as the owner of real 
property, it is essential that the family should 
have some Independent corroboration if they wish 
to set up some private arrangement between them­
selves for the purpose of defeating his creditors."
22 4
(1) the existence of the debt is witnessed; liabi­
lity to pay it is restricted to the debtor, his successor, and 
the property of the deceaseddebtor;
(2) the members have signed as individual sureties: 
they are alternatively liable with the debtor or his successor;
(3) the family have signed, not merely as witnesses, 
but as guarantors - they have accepted, on behalf of the fam­
ily, family liability for the debt# The family are then 
liable, and family property may be taken in execution if the 
principal debtor fails to pay# But there must be express
words or acts at the time to indicate that the member's debt
82is accepted as a debt of the family# Only one or two members 
need have signed as guarantors on behalf of the family, but 
the transaction should be at least notified to the abusuapanin 
or obaapanln#
If the family allow a member to hold himself out as owner
of family property, ”very satisfactory evidence is required to
prove that the land or house is not his sole property” -
83
Russell v, Martin#
2# FAMILY PROPERTY WITHIN STO-LIKSAOES#
It is the exception rather than the rule for family prop­
erty to be not merely owned, but also used and controlled, by
82# Information from, inter alia# Hew Juaben.
83. (1900) Ren# 193. Cf# Basel Mission Factory v. Suaplm
above.
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the whole family. It is rather the custom for family prop­
erty to he restricted within sub-lineages, which are divisions 
of the maximal lineage, the family* This is an aspect of the 
separation of the family into sections or branches; and is
illustrated by the normal process of devolution on Intestacy
84
of self-acquired property. When a man dies seised of self- 
acquired property, It is true that this property then becomes 
I family property, but the right to use and control the property
j
is confined immediately within his own sub-lineage.
Apart from this, we find that where a family is divided 
into two or more main sections, these sections enjoy a certain 
amount of autonomy in their dealings with property - the powers 
they may possess vary widely from the case where the section 
maintains its sole right to succeed to the property, to the 
use of the property, to the disposal of the property (perhaps 
even without the concurrence of the rest of the family), to the 
case where members of the section in fact use the property, 
have a prior claim to succeed to the property, and may dispose 
of interests In the property only with the consent of the whole 
family.
It therefore appears reasonable to make a distinction 
between family property in the wide sense, and family property 
within sections; whilst so doing, it must be emphasized that 
the root-title to the property is in the family as a whole;
84. See the Chapter on SUCCESSION, post.
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and the distinction is not mado in order to whittle down or 
negative the family-interest in such section-property.
(a) Its derivation:
Section-property is typically derived from the acquisi­
tions of the daughters of the original family ancestress, and 
their lineages* The subsequent acquisitions of individual 
members of a family go, on their death intestate, to their im­
mediate (minimal) sub-lineage ascertained matrilineally. In 
the case of a male member, this means that the immediate inter­
est is aoquired by the descendants of his mother in the female 
line - including his uterine brothers, sisters, and sisters1 
children. This small sub-lineage is the one within which the 
use of inherited property is normally confined: one out of its
number may be selected &9 the successor of the deceased. The 
Interest of the sub-lineage is a limited interest, inasmuch as 
it does not cover the ultimate title (which is with the whole 
family), and it is a dependent interest, in that it depends on 
the title of the family of which it is a member. On this in­
terest of the section or sub-lineage depends the limited inter-
85est of the individual successor.
(b) Its ownership:
The ownership of section-property is not restricted to 
the members of that section. Title to it is in the family as
85. The individual interest in inherited property is 
examined at 3. below.
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a whole# (Such title may he absolute, where the property is 
capable of absolute ownership free of stool-interests; or it­
self dependent, where it depends on the absolute interest of a
.86
stool,)
The fact that ownership is with the family explains cer­
tain features of the customary law, namely, that the family 
has a say in the appointment of a successor to such property, 
that the family can oversee the manner in which the property 
is maintained by the successor, that the authorization of the 
family is required before there are any major dealings with the 
property, and so on#
(c) Its control:
The control of section property appears to be divided.
It seems fair to say that in minor and day-to-day matters the 
section, through its head, controls the use of the property.
But in any major matter, permanently affecting the interests 
of the family as a whole - such as sale - the whole family, and 
more especially the head thereof, must be consulted# Contrari­
wise, the head of the family must consult the section - through 
its head - before he. attempts to dispose of the property, or to
Interfere with its use* The other sections, as such, have no
88say in the use and control of the property#
fi&TCf.' THE STOOL AHD PROPERTY, p# 4l.
87# So, for instance, evidence from Akropong, Mankessim, Akim
Abuakwa; none section cannot sell by itself; but if all
three sections concur together, they can sell the land
(sc# section^ land)" - Essiam#
88# Cf#: "each branch of the stool family hasttits own land,with 
which the other branches cannot interfere"# - Essiam#
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Several factors appear to affect the rules which have to
be formulated: (1) The size_pf the section: where the family
as a whole is divided into nprimordial” sections, say, two or
three in number (as is frequently found), the section has a
much larger say in the control of its section-property, and
would, for instance, vigorously oppose the appointment of a
89successor from another section to it.
(2) Physical_separatlon: where the section or 
sub-lineage is physically separated from the rest of the family 
- e.g., where it has its own house, or it lives in a different 
quarter or town - the control of the section over its property 
is correspondingly enhanced. In many cases it was stated that,
i
if the position was of this kind, then the section itself 
could initiate such acts of control as pledging and sale, but 
would refer the matter to the abusuapanin for information or 
approval?0
89. The appointment of a successor from another section, whilst 
there remain persons within the section entitled to 
succeed, is a theoretical possibility only.
90. Many such cases have occurred in New Juaben, where a seg­
ment of a family has emigrated, leaving the major portion 
in Ashanti. An illustration was the case of Fordjuor v . 
Ayakwa: (1950) Unrep. Nat. Ct A, New Juaben, Suit 75/50), 
where a segment of the family from Ashanti Juaben settled 
in New Juaben. Plaintiff was the present head of this seg­
ment, as matrllineal descendant of Wlabo, the original 
immigrant. He maintained that the property of this New 
Juaben nfamily” was the property of the section alone;
and that he could deal with the property confined within 
the section in any way he pleased without consultation 
with defendant, who was the Abeslmhene of Old Juaben, and 
a member of the old extended family.
/over
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(5) The naturejDf the £roperty: where a section
is a compact group inhabiting a house, the use of which is 
primarily confined within their section, the head of the house­
hold - in this case probably the section-head - controls the 
details of use: allocation of rooms, repairs, receipt of rents,
etc.; and he may have wider powers of granting interests in 
the property, as by grant of temporary tenancy, letting of 
rooms, pledging, etc. Similarly, with farming land, the sub­
lineage will apportion out the use of this, and may conclude 
temporary tenancy agreements, provided members of other sect­
ions are not deprived of farming land when required, and pro­
vided the title of the family is not permanently affected.
(4) Variance^ injsustom: custom appears to vary,
not only as between district and district, but as between fam­
ily and family. Conditions for a separation of sections1 
powers are more favourable in Fante and Akwapim areas; and 
investigation shows that in those districts sections are tend­
ing to acquire increased powers over their property. Differ­
ences are rarely brought into the limelight of the open court, 
since disputes will be settled as a rule by arbitration within 
the family.
90. (cont. from previous page) -
The contention was upheld by the Native Court, 
which ruled that plaintiff and his *family” were 
absolutely entitled to a C.R. grant received in 
respect of the section-property devastated by swollen 
shoot, and situate in New Juaben.
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The question of whether a section or the whole family
should manage certain property was brought to the foreground
in two oases from Cape Coast Land Court,
91
In Appeal Suit 55/1946 the issue was whether the head 
of a branch of the "Twidan family11 should manage and control 
the land in dispute, or the Abusuapanln, "head of the extended
family, known as the Twidan family".
Jackson, J*, found that:
"The Tribunal decided that £S£.E. (head of the 
section)/ the person entitled to manage 
and control the land as being the Head of that 
particular branch in whom the land was rested 
as family property.1*
But note: (Family property is not rested in any one person,
if this is taken to imply resting as we understand it in Eng­
lish law,) He went on:
"Customary law is quite clear that if children
of a common ancestor acquire land by their
own act, each child who acquires land in this 
manner and who dies intestate sets up ances­
tral land, and the right to control and manage 
that land becomes rested from generation to 
generation in the descendants of the person 
who first acquired the laxxl, and that this 
right cannot be traced through any person abore 
the children of that ancestor who first acquired 
the land.”
The second paragraph can be understood only to refer 
either to the female children of a female ancestor, or else to 
a patrilineal (i.e., non-Akan) custom such as that of Wlnneba. 
In any case, the right in dispute here appears to be one of
91. TJnreported: judgement given 28.6.47.
management and control; presumably, there was agreement that 
ultimate title was In the family as a whole.
The other case was Paramount Stool of Breman Eslam v .
92
Akyiref1. before QuiSt, J. The dispute concerned the Para­
mount Stool Family of Breman Eslam.
It was found that:
"the Paramount Stool family, known as the 
Hsona family, consists of three branches, 
each of which owns land reserved for the 
use of its members and controlled by such 
branch, apart from what are regarded as 
general stool lands attached to the Para­
mount Stool.”
(A candidate for the paramount stool might be chosen from any 
one of the three branches.)
The defendant-respondent claimed that the land was the 
property of the section of which he was a member, and
"alleged the exercise of certain acts of 
ownership by the heads or principal mem­
bers of his branch, which establish his 
section's right to the land.”
These Included:
(1) A pledge of the land by one member of the
section to another.
(ii) Redemption by himself of the land.
(ill) Grant of a tenancy by himself to a member of
the Stool family, who paid rent therefor.
(iv) Sale of a portion of the land, without protest
from the paramount stool.
SS7 (1948) - unreported: Land Ct, c7c7, 1.10.48.
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These grounds were not adequately considered, the land 
being adjudged to attach to the paramount stool on the ground 
that the pledgee under (i) above had ascended the stool, and 
hence the land became permanently attached to the Paramount
93Stool. This part of the judgement is considered elsewhere 
(and, with due respect, dissented from); but one may note 
that of the grounds alleged, three are transactions within the 
family, and two within the section, so that they would not, in 
any case, be strong evidence for absolute separation of owner­
ship.
(d) Its use:
The use of a section or sub-lineage's property is in gen­
eral restricted to the members of that section. Title is in­
divisible, but use is divided. The restriction is not an ab­
solute one; it is customary for members of a family desiring 
land on which to farm, or a room in which to reside, to ap­
proach members or sections of the family who have land or room 
to spare. Refusal to provide this, where it was available, 
would be taken to a family arbitration.
Apart from this exception, only members of the section 
are entitled to the use of a family-house belonging to that 
section (unlike the principal family house, the use of which 
is in theory open to all members of the family). Family mem­
bers from other sections asking for room would - if they
93. See THE STOOL AND PROPERTY*, p. 67.
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asserted their right to live in the house - he told to try 
elsewhere* There must not be forgotten the traditional moral 
duties of hospitality and the offer of a helping hand to family 
members, and it is unlikely that a member would in fact be 
refused shelter, except for good reason*
The use of fanning land that is section-property is immed­
iately limited to the members of that section, and the use of 
portions of it is in practice further limited to individuals 
within that section* A member of the family (even within the 
section, and thus more strongly if a member of another section) 
cannot use an individual's or section's land for fanning with­
out permission from the individual or section first; but as 
already noted, an unreasonable refusal to allow the use of 
spare farming land to such a member would be brought before 
an arbitration*
3. ISHERIBED PROPERTY.
The terms “inherited property11, ”ancestral property”, and 
nfamily property” are commonly U3ed as if they were inter­
changeable. As pointed out when dealing with family property
in the wide sense, ”family property” need not be either
95
ancestral or Inherited; hence it appears dangerous to use
the term ”family property” so loosely as to include the wide
Interest of the family, the interest of a section, and the
94* See also the Chapter on jsUCCESSIONi^at pp* 5^6 et seq*
95. At pp. 213, 214.
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interest of an individual in inherited property. The term 
“ancestral" may be used to indicate the nature of the property- 
right; the term ’inherited11 to indicate by what means this 
right has come.
It is therefore proposed that the term “inherited prop­
erty” should be reserved for describing the interest of an 
individual taking property by way of intestate succession.
The ultimate title to such property is with the family as a 
whole; one may call this title “family property”, and the 
limited interest of tho individual holder “inherited property”.
The term “inherited property” includes both self-acquired 
property of a deceased member passing on intestacy to the suc­
cessor appointed by the family; and property already ancestral 
similarly passing by way of succession. Once the chain of 
devolution as ancestral property has thus commenced* there is 
no difference whatsoever between the rules affecting each kind 
of property?6
The dependent Interest of the sub-lineage in inherited 
property is itself inherited; it will be seen that all forms 
of family property, whether in the wide sense, as section- 
property, or in a narrow sense, are united by the common fact 
of ownership of the absolute interests the whole family.
96. See: Larkal v. Amorkors (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 323.
97. Absolute as regards the family; it may be dependent 
as regards stool Interests.
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(a) Who owns it;
It Is necessary here to make a distinction: the family
owns the absolute interest in the property; the individual 
holder owns a qualified interest, derivative from that absol­
ute interest. Prom the absolute interest of the family as a 
whole derives a whole series of qualified Interests - through 
the decreasing sub-lineages - until we arrive at the most con­
crete and restricted right of the individual holder. This is 
the true explanation of the Akan law of succession: the right
of the successor to succeed, and thereafter to enjoy the prop­
erty, is derived from his membership of his sub-lineage, and 
from his sharing of their general Interest in the property, 
which in turn is derived from the family-interest in the prop­
erty,
In Villars v. Baffoe: (1909) Ren. 549, the Pull Court 
attempted a description of the process: (in referring to the 
succession to e deceased head of a family):-
’‘...the property in and possession of the 
chattels claimed in this case regarded as 
’’family property” do pass to the ’’family”, 
i.e., in the first instance to the persons 
who represent the family on the decease of 
the head of the family, and later to the 
properly constituted head of the family 
when appointed in place of the deceased 
head”.
The Court had no need to Invoke English law, but decided, 
obiter, that a description by English law would mean that
”the deceased must be held to have been a 
joint owner of the chattels with the rest
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of the fondly and not a trustee of the 
same for the family”.
The result would he, as in native customary law, that they 
would pass "to the rest of the family as surviving joint
owners".
It is not clear whether the "head” was a true head of the 
family, and the subject of discussion "Family property in the 
wide sense”; or a successor or mediate head, and the property 
"inherited". The judgement, necessarily inexact insofar as 
it attempts to describe a purely African phenomenon in English 
legal terms, does however serve to negative some common ass- 
umptions, e*g., that a head is a "trustee" for the family.
The case is misleading if it gives rise to the impression 
that the property (or ultimate title) in inherited goods passes 
either to the head, or to a successor.
Nor is it clear from the report (assuming a true head is 
under discussion), whether the succession is to the family
Q O
property which he controls, or to his private property.
(b) Who controls it:
Where an individual succeeds to property - inherited 
property - he enjoys, during his lifetime, a large measure of 
control over it. If it is a farm, he it is who decides when 
and where to farm, and what to grow; he makes what arrange­
ments he wishes for carrying out such farming, by the employ-
98. This may be a Ga case.
t
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ment of labour - that of hi a wife, children, and strangers 
(whether as caretakers or labourers), and so on* He can raise 
money to finance his farming, or because of debt, on the secur­
ity of his farm; advance sales of his crops do not need the 
permission of his family; but before he pledges or mortgages 
his farm it is at least wise to consult his family, and custom
strictly lays down in many cases that the pledge or mortgage
99is not valid unless the family have consented to it first#
In practice, the individual holder often fails to obtain family* 
consent, which leads to trouble if the farm is attached for the 
debt# It is customary for a member of a family to approach 
the family first, if he is in need of money; if they cannot 
provide it, then they will more readily permit his giving of 
his inherited farm as security*
The holder of Inherited property lacks the ultimate power 
of sale: he cannot sell the whole interest in the property -
which would include the family-interest therein, without the 
consent of the family (or rather, without the authorization of 
the family)#
He cannot give away the whole interest in the property
unless the family authorizes him to do so - but to this rule
there are apparent exceptions# The exceptions are not real,
since, for Instance, if he gives the farm to a fellow-member
of the family, he passes only his own limited Interest, and the
99* Members of the family (including the Obaapanin, for 
instance) should have signed as witnesses*
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interest of the family remains unaffected: he can therefore
do this on his own initiative?’00
The holder of an Inherited farm is also permitted to grant
a temporary interest hy way of gift over an inherited farm to
his wife - especially if she has assisted him in the farming
101
of the land; and to his children* Such an arrangement does 
not normally endure after his death, unless the family confirm 
the grant, which is frequently done in the case of children, 
less often in the case of wives.
Ic) Use of such property:
The use of inherited property is confined to the individ­
ual holder in the first place, at least till his death or till 
he is deposed from his position by the family; it is contrary 
to custom for others to use the inherited property without his
permission. This applies even to fellow-members of the 
102
family; similarly, his wife and children receive permission 
to use the property from the individual. (Such permission is, 
of course, almost inevitably tacit.) The use of inherited
100. He should consult the probable successor, who might 
otherwise object to the arrangement.
101. But as a rule, only over part of the farm: the family 
would object if he gave away the use of the whole farm 
in this manner, even as a temporary gift.
102. So: Akwapim. He may go before the family if he unreas­
onably refuses. And in Abbah v. Smith: (1910) Earn. 21, 
one member sued another for trespass on the former^s in­
herited farm. It was said, obiter, that even if the 
head or the family authorized the defendant, such action 
would be illegal and repugnant. Sed quaere.
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property Is part of the holder's qualified interest, and the 
most important part. It is as individual in its effect, as 
the interest of the family - their absolute Interest - is com­
munal.
To the casual eye there is little difference between the 
use which an individual may make of his self-acquired and in­
herited property.
There Is no absolute duty for the individual to make 
proper, or any, use of his Inherited property; but if he fails 
to use it, it is likely that the family will suggest either 
that other members should use it, or else that the property 
should be put to commercial use - for example, by the letting 
of rooms in an inherited house.
Fruits: enjoyment of the fruits is part of the usufructuary
interest which the holder of inherited property possesses.
Such enjoyment Is confined to him, and those claiming under
him, e.g., his wife. The fruits of his property belong to
103
him absolutely, and he may dispose of them as he pleases.
If the property inherited is a house, in which there will pro­
bably be living members of his sub-lineage, and dependents both 
of deceased and himself, then he may be required to devote a 
portion of the receipts from the property to its maintenance.
Owing to a certain looseness of terminology, one may 
falsely conclude that an individual may sell his Inherited
103. Gf. Danquah, A.L.C. 205.
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farm: this confusion steins from the fact that he is entitled
to sell the fruits of the farm as he pleases, e,g,, the cocoa- 
crop, even when still on the tree; and such a sale is loosely 
called 11 sale of the farm" by the Africans, when all that is im­
plied is sale of the fruits, (A farmer may dispose of the 
product either by (1) an advance-sale of the crop, coupled 
with an advance of part of the cocoa-price; (2) a loan; on 
the security of the crops. Under (1) the creditor already 
has right to the crop. His rights are therefore limited to 
coming on the farm and plucking the oocoa if the farmer ref­
uses to hand over the crop. He acquires no Interest in the 
land. Under (2) the creditor is in theory limited to pluck­
ing the crop under order of the Court in satisfaction of the 
debt, if the farmer fails to repay. But in practice the 
creditor may sometimes fi.fa# the farm itself; and the farmer's 
interest in the land, which may be qualified both by the in­
terests of the family and land-owning stool, is taken in ex­
ecution, Strictly this is illegitimate. One cannot evade 
this conclusion by holding that the creditor acquires an inter­
est npour autre vie”, since the farmer himself has not got an 
estate for life. The farmer might also pledge or mortgage 
the farm, and the theoretical position is as in (2).).
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4. SELF-MADE PROPERTY ON FAMILY LAND.
The land-tenure position is complicated where individual 
members of a family make farms on family land, where they re­
plant inherited farms, or extend the limits of inherited farms. 
Members also build their own houses on a family site.
Where a farm or house is the product of an individual's 
own effort or money, then theory lays down that it is his self­
acquired property. It has been suggested that such self-made 
property, if on family land, itself becomes family property,
i.e., in the same position as inherited property. This is 
partially correct. It was difficult to elucidate clear rules 
for such a position; it seems clear that such property falls 
between self-acquired property, and inherited property. Whilst 
on the one hand the maker has exclusive right to such property, 
and cannot be dispossessed like an ordinary successor, yet he 
cannot dispose of the property outright without the consent of 
the family. The family interest in the land thus pervades, as 
it were, the things placed thereon. (One may compare the 
restrictions placed by custom on the right of an individual to
alienate a house or farm made on land ,,beggedli from another
104
individual or family.7
lo4. In Kofi v. Manu: (1949) tfiireported: New Juaben A Court. 
Suit No. 5^/49, the Native Court affirmed the exclusive 
rigjit of a member who plants cocoa on family land, as ag­
ainst any other member of the family.
” According to custom, cocoa trees planted on a 
family fallow land by a member of the family 
cannot be claimed by a /sc. another/ member of 
the same family.”
/over
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Mere replacement of trees in an Inherited farm does not 
destroy its character as inherited.
The right to a farm includes the right to continue cul­
tivation in the direction of cultivation, so that a farmer may 
rigjhtly object if his neighbour cultivates so as to cross this 
line. I am uncertain whether such an extension of cultivation 
of an inherited farm would itself rank as inherited; but I 
feel that it would probably not, since African terminology
separates each year's clearing, and will call each a separate
„ 105
farm.
5. POWERS OF THE FAMILY OVER TUB SELF-ACQUIRED PROPERTY,
(a) Of the head;
Formerly the position with regard to a head's self­
acquired property was similar to that in regard to a Chief, 
namely, that all his self-acquired property became on his ap­
pointment attached to the Stool and part of the Stool property
/ 106
vln this case, family property). The head was thus incapable 
of enjoying private property.
Later, he was permitted to enjoy private property in his 
possession if he declared it as such at the time.
104. (cont. from previous page) -
And Danquah, A.L.C. 198, says: ”...the farm or house 
on ancestral land becomes automatically ancestral prop­
erty on the owner's death.”
105. Reference should be made to Chapter V, SALE, pp.306, 307, 
for a further analysis.
106. See STOOL, p. 71; and Danquah, A.L.C. 204-5, 210.
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At the present day he may freely own and enjoy his own 
private property, whether acquired before or after his appoint­
ment; and the family have thus lost their special power over 
the head's private property,
(b) Of a member:
Besides the family5s interest in the ownership of family 
or inherited property, they also have an Interest in futuro In 
a member's self-acquired property, since this will naturally 
pass, unless left otherwise by will, or disposed of inter vivos 
by the owner, to the family, and thereunier to the successor, 
on the death of the member.
It is questionable how far the family can claim to exer­
cise control over the use by the member of his self-acquired 
property. On the one hand, I was told that they can exercise 
no control whatsoever; and the individual is free to do what 
he likes with his own property, e.g., sell,it, pledge it, give 
it away, without any necessity for asking permission from the
family, or even of Informing them of the transaction before or
107after It takes place.
On the other hand, I was also told that no man can deal 
freely with his self acquired property, but must always tell 
the family before selling or otherwise disposing of it out- 
right*08
107. Cf. Ratt. A.L.C. 338-9.
108. (Sea next page).
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108, (Prom previous page)-
To summarise some information received:
SALE:
Informants from:
PLEDGE:
GIFTS AMD WILLS:
(oral)
(oral)
Family Consent No consent
Bekwai
Adansi
Asikuma
Adukrom
New Juaben 
Adansi
Akim Abuakwa
Jumapo
Adukrom
New Juaben
Akwapim
Bekwai
Adansi
Essumegya
Asamang
Cape Coast
Ajumako
Ashanti
Aburi
Kumasi (notice only)
Ashanti
Jumapo
Koforidua
Aburi
Akim Abuakwa
Kumasi (notice only) 
Bekwai
Ashanti (notice only) 
Jumapo
Akim Abuakwa 
Akropong
Essumegya (if written)
Akropong ( ” )
Aburi (” 11 )
Akim Abuakwa
( u n )
And Danquah, A.L.C. 197-8, says that if a man wished to 
make a valid conveyance of his self-acquired land, or a 
"gift or transfer of any particle of his wealth he could 
only do so with the knowledge of members of his family 
so that on his death the recipients could enjoy the 
property conveyed to them without any question from the 
surviving members of his family”,
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There was also a middle view, which held that he should 
inform the family; or at least that It would he a wise pre­
caution*
The view that the family's consent Is required probably 
represents the earlier position, for a time when there was 
little self-acquired property, and even that had a destined 
succession attached to It. This may be the position among 
less sophisticated Africans today. The view that an Individ­
ual may freely dispose of his self-acquired property represents 
the growth of individualism, due to the increasing importance 
of commercial enterprise and individual effort In the creation 
of wealth. The truth, as usual in such cases, must be con­
sidered to lie somewhere between the two views. In some 
cases, the custom given by expert informants Is not borne out 
by the praotice of the native courts or individuals in the 
area, and the tendency is undoubtedly towards a decrease of the 
family's control. Whilst, then, it is today probably not 
essential that the family give their permission before a member 
disposes of his self-acquired property inter vivos, nor is it 
mandatory to inform them of the intention to alienate in ad­
vance, it is both wisdom and fairness to inform the family, so 
as to avoid disputes after the death of the member, when the
family are otherwise almost certain to contest the dispositions,
109or indeed that the property was self-acquired. In addition,
109. This was an explanation given by many African
informants.
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it seems that no member of a family could by custom strip 
himself of all his property, so that there would be nothing 
to pass to his successor on his death; and it is certain that 
the family would today strongly protest if he attempted to do 
so*
Such a limitation on the power of an individual to alien­
ate all his property, whether recognized by the superior courts 
or not, deserves, in my opinion, to be recognized (if, indeed, 
it has not already the force of law)*
It will be observed that disposal of self-acquired prop­
erty by means of an absolute gift or an oral customary will is 
more strictly controlled. Ehis custom is being eaten away in 
various ways* Many Africans hold that the use of writing en­
ables the requirement of family consent to be evaded; the view 
that a samansew does not operate unless the family consent is 
gradually being overcome by a change in praotice, and particu­
larly by a changed attitude on the part of Native Authorities 
and Native Courts, some of which now hold that the consent of
the family is not required, and it is only necessary that there
110
should be independent witnesses and aseda given. Where in 
any one place the rules regarding gifts inter vivos are laser 
than those regarding death-bed dispositions, the requirement 
of family consent can be evaded by an individual's disposing
110* Cf* the decisions of the Akim Abuakwa State Council, and 
of the Ashanti Confederacy Council; and also information 
given in SUCCESSION, at pp. 611 et seq*
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of his property daring his lifetime, vesting immediate possess­
ion in the donee.
Whilst the family cannot attempt to control the use by a 
member of his self-acquired property, and he may use it or 
abandon it, waste it, let it, pledge it, etc., yet there are 
certain customs which do not appear to have the force of law, 
but deserve mention. , They arise from the strong sense of 
family obligation; e.g., although a member of the family has 
no right to reside in the self-acquired house of another mem­
ber, yet in my experience they have a strong moral claim found­
ed on custom, which is usually met where possible - so that one 
finds that even educated Africans may have many of their poorer 
relations living with them free. The reason given by educated 
informants was that it would cause great dissension with the 
family if accommodation were refused when available.
Again, although there is no legal claim upon the earnings 
of an individual to meet the school-fees of junior family mem­
bers (except in the case of a child's guardian, father or mater 
nal uncle), yet one regularly finds that members of the family 
who earn higher wages in a regular Job contribute part of those 
wages to the support of other of their relatives. Members are 
also conscious of their duty to make contributions to family 
funds, especially for such purposes as meeting family debts.
And similarly, a man with a self-acquired farm will oblige, if
possible, members of his family who have no land to farm, and 
wish to farm on his land.
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6. LIABILITY OF MEMBER FOR FAMILY DEBTS.
The old rule regarding the liability of individual members 
in regard to family debts is put forward in Sarbah^11 where he 
says:
"Not only does the Customary Law render the 
person or persons who defray the burial ex­
penses of any person prlma facie liable and 
responsible for the debts of the deceased, 
but, as Bosman states, the members of a fault­
ily and the head thereof are jointly and sev­
erally liable for any family liability. If 
a member of a family contract debt which 
benefits the family or commit a wrong for 
which he is liable to pay damages or give 
satisfaction, the other members of his family 
are bound to pay, or such members must be 
given up by the family to the person making 
the claim. (112)
This rule is in desuetude: it is obviously now contrary
not only to justice and equity, but also to express legislation
113
v : SlaVes’-' ’Emancipation; Ordinance), by which the position of
114
debt-slaves was abolished.
115
It was, however, applied in one guise in Hammond v. U.A.C.
116
where the W.A.C.A. held that:
111. F.C.L., pp.38-9.
112. See also: Sarbah. F.C.L.. 96; 115-116;
Lokko v. Konklofl: (1907) Ren. 450, at p. 451, on the
su¥Jec^ fc any ar r i ng M.
And see Ratt. A.L.C., 370.
113. Cap. 92 1874; and the Re-affirmation of the Abolition
• of Slavery Ordinance. No. ""6 of 1930.
114. feee also: Chapter on PLEDGE - the position of pawns,p.399.
115. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 60.
116. At p. 61.
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"where a person sues as head of a family he 
thereby renders himself personally liable, 
according to native law and custom, for any 
costs that may be awarded against him".
Accordingly, in this case, personal attachment of the plaintiff
117
by writ of Ca.Sa. was permissible. Cases where a stool- 
holder was held not personally liable if he sued in a repres­
entative capacity were distinguished, on the ground that stool
118
property is on a different footing from family property.
It is submitted with great respect that the decision can­
not stand, as being in conformity neither with present custom-
119
ary law, nor with the trend of decisions in Gold Coast cases.
The present law is, it is submitted, that members of the 
family are not liable individually or with their private prop­
erty for debts of the family; and this rule holds equally for
117. But what can traditional customary law know of liability
for costs in the Supreme Court?
118. See: Angwah Bennleh v. Akaba Kangah: ) referred to at
Oluyemo v. Ohene Agyemfra IV : ) 3 W.A.C.A. 60.
119. E.g.,"in Lokko v. Konklofi (cited above) Brandford 
Griffith, C.J., said that family land can only except­
ionally be seized in execution, and not for the private 
debt of a member.
The family and its members now get the best of both 
worlds, African and English, since their former customary 
liability no longer applies; and under English (Gold 
Coast) law they are not liable individually. The learned 
Chief Justice said in the same case (at p.451):
"The decisions as to family land, which reach 
far back, show that the English Courts will not, 
other than in exceptional cases, permit family 
property to be seized in execution. In this way, 
the family reaps the advantage both of the native 
ani English law, without the disabilities of 
either system."
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the head of the family, when suing as representative of the 
family, and not in his personal capacity, since - as mentioned 
above - the head ranks only as any other member, albeit one 
with special managerial functions.
C. THE USE OF FAMILY PROPERTY.
Title to the property being with the family, what rights 
of use and control do the members exercise over that property?
1* AGRICULTURE.
As regards agricultural property the general rule is that 
each member is entitled to farm the land farmed by his ancestors 
unless for good reason. This implies in particular that sub­
lineages or sections of the family are entitled to use of the 
land confined within their sections.
On the other hand, the family as a whole have a right by 
virtue of their title to the property to control the allocation 
of family land to members, and their use of It. Certain con­
tests or strains are thus set up, between the individual mem­
ber and his section or house and between one section and the 
rest of the family.
(a) Family Farms:
Family farms, where the family owns not only the root- 
title to the land, but the immediate Interest in the farms as 
well, and where the land is farmed as a co-operative Enterprise
251
of the family, are extremely rare* Farms which pass to the
family by purchase, gift, or succession may be worked by a
caretaker appointed by the family (who may be either a member
or employee); the profits then go direct to the family.
Is a farm made by the joint labour of several members of
the family a family farm? Such cases arise where brothers
clear and farm one piece of ground, and co-operation is also
found between close cousins. The superior courts tend to hold
that the effect of this is to vest the title in the family as a 
120
whole. The Native Courts, and African informants, take a 
different view.
Such cases are fairly common, the effort of clearing the 
forest for the cultivation of cocoa being a sufficient explana­
tion. Usually only close relatives will thus combine, brothers 
and sisters, first cousins, uncle and nephew; and it was stated 
to be very rare (if it occurred at all) for distant relations to 
cultivate in common. There are thus no complications due to 
membership of different sections within the family.
The general view was that if two brothers jointly cleared 
and made a farm, the effect would be to make them joint-owners
absolutely entitled;, during their lifetime the family would
121
have no claim at all. Cases occur in the Native Courts of up
120. Cf. Tsetsewa v. Acquah: (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 216.
121. Unless the parties agree at the time that it should 
be treated as a family property.
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to four brothers cultivating in common; the number of persons
does not appear to affect the rules, providing the labour is
12?for their individual benefit, and not a joint family effort.
The customary practice is for the farm, whilst it remains 
undivided, to be held on a joint tenancy (not severable at the 
will of one party); but if there is any danger of dispute, 
either in the parties9 lifetimes, or as to succession to the 
farm (as where the parties are not close relatives), the farm 
is customarily divided physically between the parties, each 
then being absolutely entitled to his portion as self-acquired
122. A most striking case was that of Kofi v. Manu: (1949) 
Unreported: New Juaben A Court, Suit So• 517/49. In this 
case Y.K. (deceased) had self-acquired land. He gave the 
land to hi8 maternal nephews (the two defendants and two 
others), who were all brothers, to plant cocoa thereon. 
Y.K. died, his property being inherited by plaintiff.
The brothers continued to work their cocoa farm. The two 
other brothers died, their interest being taken by 1st 
defendant.
The plaintiff, as successor to Y.K., claimed the prop­
erty as family property (being stimulated to do so by 
payment of a cocoa-rehabilitation grant to defendants in 
respect of the land). The matter was referred to the 
arbitration of the local chief, the Nifahene, who rejected 
the claim, and declared the two surviving brothers solely 
entitled as joint owners.
The Native Court sturdily upheld this decision, de­
claring that: "the action therefore by the plaintiff 
bears no substance according to custom". One of the 
deciding facts was that "the cocoa trees on the land 
were planted by the defendants", and so the plaintiff 
"has no right to claim ownership of it".
And in Acquah v, Ac#quah & Tsetsewa: (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 
222, a man was assisted by his brothers and family-domes­
tic s in making and working a farm; but it was held that 
this did not make the farm family property, and it could 
be devised by English will.
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property* In the case of close relatives, this la not neces­
sary, since the survivor(s) will be potential or preferential 
successors to the deceased co-tenant, and will succeed seml- 
automatically to his holding on his death*
A similar result to that achieved by the English law of 
joint tenancy - the survivor in possession - is thus achieved, 
though for a different reason.
Where A and B, two brothers, thus cultivate in common, and 
A dies, B is appointed his successor, both generally, and with 
reference to A Js Interest in the joint farm* Attempts to elicit 
elaborate juristic distinctions from informants met with no 
success; in theory B holds his own share as self-acquired 
property, and A*s share as inherited property; but the Africans 
do not look at the matter in this light* It seems certain 
that:
(1) B cannot be disturbed from his holding, since his 
labour has gone into the making of the farm; .
(2) he probably cannot dispose of the farm without the 
consent of his family: so the position is intermediate between
self-acquired and inherited property.
(b) Individual Farms:
It is much commoner to find.farms owned ani worked by 
individual members of the family* The unit of labour in such 
a case is usually the individual holder himself, together with 
his family in the European sense - he is customarily assisted
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by his wife and children.
If the farm is made by the individual on land not belong­
ing to his family, then the family have practically no control 
over it during his lifetime (see above, p. 243). Neither his 
use, control nor disposal of such a farm is controlled by the 
family (with exceptions already noticed).
If the farm is made by the individual by his own efforts 
on family fallow-land he has exclusive right to the farm during 
his lifetime, and the family cannot dispossess him in favour 
of another member; but (1) he cannot alienate the farm except 
subject to restrictions similar to those applying to inherited 
farms; and the family may supervise the use of the land more 
closely than is the case with self-acquired farms; and (2) 
where the member 1s assisted in cultivation by other members 
of the family, the presumption in favour of Its being a family 
property, I.e., the family having title to the farm, is much 
stronger than with a farm made on land not belonging to the 
family.
If the farm is inherited, then the farmer's right against 
the family is weaker. Africans sometimes describe the suc­
cessor as a "caretaker” of the Inherited farm; but the holder's
123interest is greater than that of an ordinary caretaker. The 
statement contains an element of truth in that it reminds us 
that the holder of Inherited property is a sort of "trustee”
123. Of. Chapter VIII, CARETAKERS.
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towards the property, which he must neither dissipate nor 
waste. It is unusual for a man to he dispossessed of his in­
herited farm merely for making insufficient use of it; the 
main reasons for dispossession are in addition that he is caus­
ing permanent damage to the value of the farm, or that whilst 
he is not using the farm, other members of the family are land­
less. It is Incorrect in one sense to say that the right of 
the holder of inherited property Is not exclusive, since - 
whilst he is holding It - he has a right to the use of the farm 
to the exclusion both of other members, and of strangers; but 
he cannot set himself up as an individual owner*
It Is unusual for the holder of an inherited farm to be 
told what to grow thereon; usually there will already be cocoa 
planted there, or it may be a foodstuffs farm. In any case, 
the farmer - unless he is expressly told to the contrary at the 
time the property is handed over to him - may use the land in 
any way that he pleases (the exceptions include cases where he 
is given a cocoa farm specifically to use the proceeds for the 
maintenance of dependents, paying off of family debts, etc*).
The farmer’s wife and children assist him in the cultiva­
tion of his inherited property; and they can thus acquire tem­
porary rights in the land, such as the right to Interplant 
foodstuffs, or even to temporary use of an earmarked portion of 
the farm; but they do not acquire permanent rights without the 
family’s consent. Grant of temporary rights is more readily
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made, and more readily* accepted by the family, where the farm 
is for foodstuffs, than where It Is cocoa.
Permanent cultivation in an Inherited farm - as opposed to 
the crops picked, or the foodstuffs reaped - belongs to the 
family. This usually means different types of economic trees, 
both timber, palm, and cocoa. Hence as a general rule the 
Individual holder has no right to:
cut down timber trees, and pocket the proceeds, with­
out the concurrence of the family;
receive rehabilitation grants for a devastated cocoa 
farm, and convert them to his own use * in such a case, he is 
trustee of the money for the family;
(especially in coastal areas) cut down palm trees 
without the knowledge of the family; etc,, etc.
Treasure-trove found on family land by a member must be 
reported to the head of the family; the family take a portion 
(not specified) and the finder will be given a portion - apart 
from the Stool’s possible rights in the matter.
2. HOUSES.
(a) What is meant by a family house?
The expression nfamily house” is so frequently used in the 
reports and elsewhere that it is as well to have a clear idea 
of what is meant by the term.
Nothing more should be implied by the phrase than that it
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is a house which is family-property, that is, one the absolute 
title to which is held by the family as a whole. There is 
therefore no truth in the statement that there can be only one 
family house, an argument which might be used for holding that 
another house claimed as family property cannot be such. There 
is a distinction - perhaps implied in the reports - but cer­
tainly encountered in practice - between the ^principal family
n 124house and other family houses. Each family may own several
houses, the limited interest of use of which may well be vested
in a member, sublineage, or section, of the family. Where
each section has a family house, each house will prima facie
rank equally. But in other cases, especially in the towns
125
and the coastal areas generally, there is a principal family 
house, clearly distinguishable as such, and other houses - title 
to which is in the family as a whole - occupied by a sub­
lineage of the family (usually descendants of a deceased member 
who originally enjoyed the house as self-acquired property, and 
passed the absolute interest to the family, the limited Inter­
est to his sub-lineage, on his decease intestate). There is a 
distinction between the rights enjoyed by members and quasi-
124. "There is always a principal family house ”- Akim Abuakwa. 
"It is where the head of the family resides, or did 
reside, even if a hovel; and is called in Twi 'abusuafie9
(family house)/or 'mpanlnfie* (ancestral house)11 - id. 
Where the abusuapanin resides, where ancestral rites are 
performed, the history of its acquisition, are criteria.
125. Especially in evidence from the Cape Coast area.
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members of the family in regard to each type of house: these
will be brought out In the course of the discussion*
(b) How does a family-house come into existence?
The reports are full of cases concerning the question of 
whether a certain house is a family house or not: most are be­
devilled by the failure to make the distinction between the 
acquisition of the absolute interest, and the limited Interest; 
and in certain cases there is a failure to separate title to 
the land from title to the things thereon* There has also 
been over-appllcatlon of the maxim that "the slightest contri­
bution of labour or materials by members of the family makes
126
the house a family house : .this sweeping generalization cannot 
stand on oloser examination*
(i) By euooesslon: This is the primordial mode by
which a family house can come into existence* As soon as a 
man or woman dies intestate, the title to his self-acquired 
property vests in the family as a whole, whether the property 
was made or bought or otherwise acquired by the deceased. The 
limited interest of use devolves to his immediate sub-lineage, 
and further to an individual member thereof (i*e., the successor 
appointed to him).
When remote ancestors and ancestresses have thus passed on 
property, the house may have become a principal family house, 
especially, of course, where the original acquirer is the
126* Cf.K&dwar, Comments, pp. 79-81*
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original female ancestress of the whole family.
(ii) By act of the family a3 a whole: The family as
a whole acts especially through its,head - acting on the advice, 
and with the consent, of the family. If the family thus act­
ing, or the head acting alone on their behalf (the agency may 
be implied) buy or otherwise acquire, or build, a house, such 
a house becomes a family house, and is family property in the 
wide sense.
If the head of the family acts on behalf of the family, It
will not matter whether he uses his own or the family's or
some other person's money to buy such a house; or whether the
127
house is built by the family's labour or not.
Where certain members of the family act jointly thus to 
acquire a house, it is a question of fact whether they are act­
ing for the family as a whole. Decision of such a question is 
aided by looking to the surrounding circumstances: Was the
abusuapanin or the obaapanln consulted about the transaction? 
Was it the declared Intention of the members at the time to act 
for the family? Were the acquiring members authorised so to 
act? Were there contributions of money, labour or materials 
from the family? Were the members drawn from one sub-lineage 
or section of the family? What is the number of members con­
cerned?
127. The house becomes family-property, but the debt remains 
a personal one.
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One cannot say that the mere question of numbers Is dec­
isive of Itself; informants tended to hold that Joint acquisi­
tions would usually he the self-acquired joint property of the 
acquirers; hut where the number of members concerned is large 
(six was given as an example in one instance) then there will 
he a presumption, taken in conjunction with other evidence as 
above, that the acquisition becomes family property.
It is possible in those families where the sections are 
clearly defined, and largely autonomous in property matters, 
for an acquisition, even by a large number of members, to be 
section-property, and not family property in the wide sense.
(ili) By labour of the family:
Labour of the whole family: If the whole family , or a major
portion thereof, contribute labour to the erection of a house, 
then - unless there is express agreement to the contrary - the 
house will be a family house.
The mere fact that members of the family contribute labour 
to the erection of a house is not, however, decisive of the 
question whether a house is family property or not. There are 
several possibilities which must be considered.
Joint labour of certain members: This is a more difficult
problem of interpretation. The case envisaged is one where a 
certain, limited, number of members contribute labour to the 
building of a house* Whatever may have been the presumption
in the past, there is now no presumption in favour of the house 
thus becoming family property. It happens quite often that
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two or more members of the same sub-line age join together to 
build a house: the normal legal consequence of this, as
accepted by the Africans in their customary practice, is that 
there will arise a Joint-tenancy in favour of the actual build­
ers, but rarely an immediate title in the whole family. (The 
position is the same with the making of joint farms.)
If the court is forced, either by the evidence, or by res­
pect for certain dicta, to hold that the house is family prop­
erty, it is family property in the sense that during the life­
time of the builders, the members concerned (perhaps together 
with their immediate sub-lineages) will enjoy the exclusive
right to use the property, which cannot be taken from them for 
128any reason. The ultimate title of the family to the prop­
erty acquires meaning only when the builders have died.
I am aware that the statement of the law above is express­
ly contradicted by the judgement of the W.A.C.A. in Araba
129
Tsetaewa v. J.P. Acquah & anor, where the Court said:
nIn the present case, Charles, John and Joseph, 
were brothers, and the Fanti law and custom 
applicable to joint acquisition of property 
by more than one member of the family is 
undoubted, namely that such property becomes 
family property...
It has never, so far as we are aware, been 
suggested before this case that where two or 
more members of a family combine to acquire prop­
erty, the property so acquired becomes the private 
joint property of the two or more and not family 
property.tt
128and one of the joint owners cannot alienate without 
the consent of the other.
129.(1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 216.
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Fawcett v, Odamtteii^ was distinguished* Redwar^^ and 
132Sarbah were cited in favour of this proposition*
133It must be noted that Redwar in another place says
something rather different:
"...even the slightest contribution of labour 
or materials in building a house by members 
of the deceased person*s family gives these 
relatives a vested Joint interest in the house 
as family property *
This statement is partially correct, being in line with one of
the principles of customary law, that contribution of labour
134
gives rise to a certain interest in the product; but the
trial judge in Codjoe v* Kwatchey* considering this statement,
wished to amend it by substituting "substantial contribution”
for "even the slightest contribution"* Klngdon. C.J., in the
W*A«C*A* re-affirmed the old "rule" in all its rigour, and
135
rejected the trial judge's amendment as a ratio decidendi 
in the present ease* Webber, C.J., another member of the 
Court, gave judgement on other grounds*
130. (1929) F. Ct *26-*29, 339.
131* Comments, pp* 79-81.
132. F.C.L., pp* 88, et seq*
133* Comments, p. 35*
134. Cf. the interest which a wife or son acquires by 
assistance in the clearing of a farm for the husband 
or parent;
and also a Sekondi case: Aberewa v* Smith (discussed 
below) - the creation of a citizen's interest by 
clearing the virgin forest*
135. See: (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371, at p. 377-8.
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It is also worthwhile to consider in some detail the ease 
of Busumafle v# Milbaht an unreported case decided by Quist, J.
The undisputed facts were that two brothers, K.K. aid K.W., 
jointly built a house on land purchased by them jointly; and 
that they jointly occupied the house whilst both alive. K.K. 
died; K.W., before his own decease, purported to dispose of 
his interest in the property by will as self-acquired property. 
He then died.
Plaintiffs, representing the family of K.K* and K.W., con­
tended that the house was family property, of which K.W. could 
not dispose by will.
Defendant, widow of K.W., claimed that the house and land 
were the individual property of her deceased husband, which he 
could leave to her by will.
Quist, J., further found as a fact plaintiffs9 allegation 
that K.K. made an open declaration of his intention to hold 
the property as family property. (That this was considered 
irrelevant by the Native Court will emerge from consideration 
of their judgement below; it is hard to understand how the 
declaration of one of the joint acquirers could affect the 
issue anyhow.) He also found that the family contributed 
labour during the erection of the house; (but this does not 
appear to be a ratio decidendi).
136. (1948): Unreported: Land Court, C.C., 18.10.48.
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The Natlve_Court held:
"that both brothers had common 
interest in the property and 
therefore one cannot alienate it.”
It ordered :
"that plaintiffs* family and the 
defendant are to own the property 
Jointly by occupying the two 
apartments (rooms) of K.K. and K.W.”
It is perfectly clear that the native court correctly
found (ignoring the declaration and contribution of labour in
favour of the family) that K.K. and K.W. took an absolute 30int-
137
interest in the property in their Joint lifetimes. The 
effect of this - during the Joint lifetimes of the tenants - is 
that one cannot alienate without the other's consent, since the 
title is Indivisible. This Is the proper interpretation of 
the native court's finding above.
On the decease of one Joint tenant, the deceased's inter­
est - if he dies intestate - vests in the family, the remaining 
share in the title continuing to be held as self-acquired prop­
erty by the surviving Joint tenant (in this case K.W,). K.W. 
may by will dispose of his Interest - to his widow in this case: 
the native court's order (above) was therefore a perfectly 
logical recognition of this state of affairs.
The claim of plaintiffs that the whole property was family 
property cannot therefore stand. The claim of defendant that
137. Conformably with the statement of principle at 
p. 261 ante.
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the property was the self-acquired property of K.W. alone is 
also not maintainable.
Quist, J., did not, however, take the finding of the 
native court in this light; he said:
“This in effect is a finding that the prop­
erty is family property of which neither 
of the two brothers can make a valid testa­
mentary disposition...”
It is submitted with respect that the finding of the 
native court can NOT be taken in this sense: it makes nonsense
of the native court's logical order for the division of occupa­
tion of the property.
It was against this order that plaintiffs appealed. Once 
the appeal judge had classified the property as family prop­
erty, it is obvious that the order of the native court must be 
rejected. As the learned judge said:
”It has been urged on behalf of the appellant 
that the above stated pronouncement is cone 
trary to well-established native law and custom 
in regard to family property, for the reason 
that the defendant-respondent being not re­
garded as a member of her husband's family by 
the customary law cannot inherit family property 
jointly with the members of the family. To 
this argument 1 accede...”
133
Sarbah was quoted in support. This passage deals,
V
however, with the right of a widow or children of deceased to 
reside in deceased's house; and it is entirely Irrelevant to 
the present case, where the widow's claim is based, not on this
138. F.C.L. 50.
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right* but on the far stronger right of an individual joint
title transmitted by one of the original acquirers ♦
One must therefore reject the apparent misapprehension of
the law relating to joint acquisition* the reversal of the
native court's findings* and the following dictum:
uThe house in the present case was not built
by K,W, alone, and even if so the widow may
only reside therein subject ‘to good behaviour*1
- a statement which, inter alia, patently fails to cover a case
where a deceased devises his self-acquired property by will to
his widow,
(It should be noted that native courts are not slow to
decree divided ownership of houses, and the Supreme Court not
, 139
slow to reject such divided ownership or occupation; there is 
nothing foreign to African ideas in such a separation of owner­
ship and occupation. It Is, in fact* a logical course In such 
cases as the above, and Aberewa v. Smith - considered below,) 
Assistance of labour: The argument against the old rule Is
even stronger where the position is, not that the members of 
the family concerned have acted jointly in making or acquiring 
the property, but that there has been assistance given to one 
member of the family building or acquiring a house by certain 
other Individual members, either with money or labour, (The 
question of monetary assistance is considered below,)
159, Cf. Asamoah v, Mprenguo: (1949) (Unreported: W«A.C,A,
Civil Appeal No, 72/487#
where there was division of ownership of rooms in a 
house in Kumasl,
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If the assistance by labour given to the acquiring member 
is substantial, then the case is assimilated to the immediately 
preceding one, and the assisting member(s) may acquire a share 
in the interest in the property. If the assistance is not sub 
stantial, then I believe that the customary-law answer is to 
raise an equity in favour of the person assisting, which will 
permit him to enjoy free residence in the house when complete, 
or at least, to receive preferential treatment. He does not 
share In the title to the house* If the contribution Is neg­
ligible (as it was in one reported case), then the contributor 
feceives nothing for his pains. It would be absurd to suggest 
that If he gave his labour for, say, one afternoon, the result 
would be to make the house property of the family as a whole, 
with the contributor immediately acquiring a joint share in the 
title to the house.
(iv) By an act of a member(a). done on behalf of, or 
in the name of, the family:
Is it possible for a member of a family who builds or ac­
quires a house to make such a house family property, If at the 
time of his acquisition, he declares that he acquires it as 
family property?
There is evidence in the cases against such a proposition, 
one judge holding it absurd that anyone could merely by a dec­
laration to that effect convert what would otherwise be self­
acquired property into family property. There is, howdver,
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evidence the other way; and in particular, if a member, at
the time that he acquires a house, declares that he does so in
141the name of the family, or makes a subsequent declaration 
that he intends to hold the house as family property, the effect 
in customary law would be that that house would thenceforward 
be family property.
A self-acquired house can also become family property
by tacit acquiescence, as where the owner has permitted members
of the family - otherwise not entitled to residence - to reside
142there for many years, where he has consulted or obtained the
140. See /lkempon v. Snyan: (1912) Ren. 629, whi ch 1 sT however. 
a misleading case; the account of the judgement in Brand- 
ford Griffiths's Digest is also misleading. It was not 
the alleged declaration at the time the brothers Hockman 
bought the land as family property that the Pull Court 
found significant; it was the presumption of the Court 
that the brothers must have purchased the land with family 
moneys held on a joint account.
In any case, the house was in issue, and this was 
assuredly a family house, as it was built by the family, as 
far as one can gather, and was certainly occupied by them.
141. As was alleged to have been done by one of two joint- 
acquirers in Busumafie v. Milbah (discussed at p. 263 ante); 
but it does not appear from the report that this fact was 
one of the rationes decidendi.
An agreement to this effect was alleged in Codjoe v. 
Kwatchey: (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371; its effect was not 
tested, since the agreement was held not to have been 
proved.
See also Halm v. Hughes: (1869) P.C.L. 165, where it was 
held that a person who has not inherited cannot constitute 
his house a family house.
142. But in Codjoe v. Kwatchey (already cited), at p. 375, 
Webber, C.J., approved a dictum of Deane, C.J., in Okal v. 
Asare: (Unreported: Suit No. 11/35), in which he said:
.. self-acquired land is not turned into family land 
by the owner of the land being kind enough to allow some 
of his family to live on the land and enjoy the use of it.1 
(This was a Ga case; even though Sarbah and Redwar appear 
to have been profusely cited, it is not binding for 
Akan cases.)
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permission of the family for dealings with the house, where he 
has permitted the assumption that the property is family prop­
erty to continue for a lapse of years without demur* This 
follows from rules of estoppel, laches, etc.
A family is not liable for the debts of its individual 
143
members. Where a member has incurred a debt, and his prop­
erty is liable to attachment in satisfaction therefor, if the 
family accepts the debt to preserve the property, thenceforth 
the property concerned may rank as family property.
(v) By contribution of money; on the principle of 
conversion - considered below - there is a presumption that 
anything bought with family funds is family-property. (It is 
important to emphasize that this is a rebuttable presumption.) 
The two commonest cases are those where
(a) a member receives a loan from family funds in order 
to build a house: or
(b) a member receives contributions of money from members 
individually.
(a) Pamily^loan: formerly a house built with the aid of
such a loan would almost always have been a family property, in 
which the builder enjoyed only an exclusive right of use for 
his own life. Today it is not so*
A member short of money may apply to the head of his 
family for a loan: it is a question of construction whether
145. Cf. Ashon v. Snyper; (1869V P.O.L. 156;
Ijokko v. Konklofl: (1907) Ren. 450 at p. 451
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this is interpreted as "Here is the money; go and build your 
house"; or - "Here is the money; you may huild a house to 
live in; but I am giving you somewhere to live, and not a 
house outrigtit". If the latter construction applies, the 
house isfamily property. But today the likelier situation is 
the former, in which the house belongs to the member absolutely, 
and the loan is treated as a debt owed by him to the family.
The debt is usually impliedly secured on the house, in that the 
member may not dispose of the house - without family consent - 
until he has repaid the loan; and further, the loan of money 
appears to raise equities in favour of the lender, which in 
this case (where the family is lender) would mean that the bor­
rower would have to reciprocate by giving accanmodation to
144other members of the family if necessary.
(b) Contributions from other members individually: Just
as Redwar and Sarbah's dicta, and the principles on which 
judges have acted, do not correctly represent the present cus­
tomary law in regard to joint acquisitions by members, and con­
tributions by other members of materials and labour, so also in 
the case of money contributions made by other members of a fam­
ily to a member who wishes to build his own house.
Such money may be given for either of two purposes: either
144. It has to be remembered that it is very frequently the
case that contributions of labour, materials, money, etc., 
ridse equities in favour of the donor or lender, which are 
not shares In the title, but rather claims to preferential 
treatment.
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to purchaser a building plot, when the family has no land to 
spare; or to finance the building of the house, when a plot 
is available.
Even if the contribution of money by individual members 
for the purchase of a site is held to create a family interest 
in that site (which Is doubtful), it has been decided that the
mere fact that a family site is used does not of itself make
145 146
the house a family house. 9
as
The general rule today is,/with contributions of labour, 
against a presumption of family ownership, and for immediate 
individual ownership. As before, if the contributions are 
substantial, the contributors acquire a joint-interest in the 
house. Ho informant could give a minimum number of contribu­
tors, which if exceeded would make the house family-property.
147The case of Aberewa v. Smith will serve as a general 
illustration of the law relating to contributions. This case 
was interesting from many aspects, since it involved a conflict 
between the customary successor and the widow of deceased, and 
involved questions of contribution of money by the family and 
by the widow; and contributions of labour by the widow. The 
case was complicated by the parties having been married under 
the Marriage Ordinance.
145. Santeng v. Darkwa: (1940) 6 W'.A.b.A. 52. at p. 54.
146. The law was^not clarified by Laryea v. U.T.C.: (1931)
D.Ct. ,29-,31, 122.
147. Ahanta Conf. A Ct: 14.11.47 - at Sekondi.
Land Ct, Sek., Land Appeal Suit No. 11/47, coram 
Hooper, J.
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The case came to the Native Court A on appeal from Sekondi 
Native Court B. Plaintiff-respondent Aberewa was the success­
or of one Aidoo, deceased. Defendant-appellant Smith was the 
widow of Aidoo.
The A Court found as facts:
(1) S. was married to Aidoo under the Marriage Ordinance.
(2) Aidoo built a house on land he acquired from one 
Ansah.
(3) S. assisted her husband to acquire this land.
(4) The family of Aidoo assisted him by the loan of £120 
for the building of the house*
(5) S. claimed she also assisted Aidoo financially.
(6) - per Court: "This Court is convinced that
Respondent helped the late Aidoo in putting 
up the building and the Appellant also 
assisted, in one way or the other if even 
she did not advance money towards the 
building."
The Court ruled:
(7) "There is no sufficient evidence to disprove
the late Aidoo* s ownership of the house in 
dispute."
(8) Respondent admitted in court that -
"The house is the sole property of Mr. Aidoo."
(9) The family had an interest in the house 
"according to the custom of this State."
(10) The appellant had an Interest in the house 
"according to the nature of the marriage."
The Court ordered:
(11) "That the Respondent is entitled to the
fossession of the house and the Appellant s also entitled to occupation of the house."
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(12) "The number of rooms in the disputed house 
is to be divided into three parts: one- 
third for the Respondent, one-third for 
the Appellant and the remaining one-third 
for the children of the late Aidoo."
(13) "That in case the Appellant marries to any 
person other than the successor (Respt*) 
or dies, her share of the house reverts to 
the Plaintiff-Respondent.1
(14) "That in case all the children of the late 
Aidoo die their share of the house also 
reverts to the Plaintiff -Respondent.1
(15) "Appellant is to account for all house
rents collected and to be divided into 
three parts:" (and distributed in acc. 
with the division of occupation above.)
The B Court had found that the property was family property.
When the case came before Hooper, J., he confessed himself
unable to understand how the B Court could have so found.
The judgement of the A Court makes clear that in modern 
custom aid, financial and otherwise, as found as (3), (4) (5) 
and (6) above, is not enough to make the property other than 
the individual property of the builder or acquirer. That this 
aid is of some legal import is shown, however, by the Native
Court's order, which endeavoured, in an equitable manner, to
recognize the claims which this aid implied on behalf of the 
family, the successor, and the widow respectively.
This judgement was appealed against by Smith, who asked 
the Land Court to delete points (13) and (14) from the Native 
Court's order, which should otherwise stand. Hooper, J., 
rejected respondent's claim that the house was family property:
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”1 can find no conclusive evidence that 
the house was in any way family property.”
The learned judge confessed himself baffled as to how the A
Court could find the family loan of £120 as proved, and yet
hold that the house was the self-acquired property of Aidoo.
He did, however, reject the evidence of the loan's ever having
been made; and on the absence of this evidence, and . the clear
admission of respondent (see point (8) above) that the house
was the sole property of Aidoo, held that the house was the
self-acquired property of Aidoo.
The further point was raised of the effect of the Marriage
Ordinance, s. 48: under this the widow is entitled to two-
third's of her deceased husband's self-acquired property. The
point was accepted, the judgement of the Native Court set
aside and the appellant was awarded two-thirds of the property,
the remaining one-third going to those entitled thereto under
native law and custom.
How this order was operated in practice (i.e., whether
there was a physical division, as the Native Court had attempted
to decree, of the house; and which were the parties entitled
to one-third under native law and custom) is left unanswered 
148by the report. Owing to the intrusion of marriage under the 
Ordinance, the testing of the Native Court's order never, un­
fortunately, occurred.
148. The problem does not arise today, owing to the amendment
to s. 48, by which the properties are held on trust for 
sale, and only the proceeds are divided. SUCCESSION, p.
635.
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149Cod.1oe v, Kwatchey Is another case where contributions 
of money from the family were alleged. It must be emphasized 
that this was a Qa case, and is therefore suspect authority for 
any proposition concerning Akan law. In this case it was 
originally alleged that deceased had bought the house in. dis­
pute with moneys provided for that purpose by the family. The 
family later shifted their ground, and alleged that it was 
bought with the proceeds from trading with a sum of £100 given 
as loan by the family to deceased for trading in cocoa. Counsel 
endeavoured to put forward the proposition that
ttif property is bought with proceeds resulting 
from the use of the money actually given /sc. 
by the family/ and it is agreed that it is 
bought as familv property then it is family 
property.” (150)
This proposition was unfortunately not tested, since the Court 
were not satisfied as to the existence of any agreement desig­
nating the property family property. As a proposition of Akan 
customary law it is In any case far too wide, since there is 
today no idea that a lender is entitled to follow his money - 
and the increase from his money - into whatever property it is 
used to purchase. There is a law of conversion (which will 
(be considered presently) but It does not cover cases like this.
(vi) By replacement: where a family-house is merely
repaired, it remains family property. Even where the repairs
149. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371.
150. At p. 375.
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are very substantial, and even where a new house is substituted
for an old one (the old one having perhaps fallen down) the
161
character of family-house attaches to the replacement. Sim­
ilarly with a house bought expressly to replace another, which
162
was a family house. It does not matter by whom the replace­
ment is made; but a rule similar to that applying to farms 
operates in certain cases - a member redeeming family-property 
from a pledge with his own money acquires a right to use, but 
not to dispose of, the property, until the family repays him 
the money - in that a member replacing a family house with his 
own money acquires a right of use over the property.
(vii) By conversion; The principle of conversion 
operates in African law also, in that money realized from 
family-property (by its sale or otherwise) has itself the same 
character imprinted on it; so that if subsequently it is used
in the purchase of property, that property Itself becomes fam- 
153
ily property. So, for example, if money paid by way of Cocoa
Rehabilitation Grant in respect of a devastated cocoa farm the
property of the family is used to purchase a house, that house 
becomes family-property.
151. See: Barnes v. Mayan: (1871) P.C.L. 180;
Halmond v. Daniel: (1871) P.C.L. 182..
152. Cf. Quablna Mans ah v. Hamilton: (1878) Ren. 43.
153. See: Tsetsewa v. Acquah: (1941) 7. W.A.C.A. 216;
and Sarbah, P.C.L. 59.
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(viil) By use of family land: So far consideration of
family houses has extended only to the houses themselves and
the rules are not altered where the house stands or is built
on a site belonging to a stranger to the family* One has to
consider the Instance where a family-site is used. Whilst
154
agreeing with the dictum in Santeng v. Darkwa that the use 
of a family site does not by itself make a house a family 
house, one must concede that (a) a special character is lent by 
the use of such a site to a house built thereon by one of the 
family. The position is analogous to a self-made farm on a 
family fallow land. The builder cannot dispose of the house 
outright during his lifetime, although during his lifetime he 
will enjoy an exclusive right to the house. And (b), taken 
together with other evidence, use of a family-site may serve 
to prove that a house is a family house.
A somewhat similar principle operates in regard to the use
of family materials, as where the materials from a derelict
family house sire used by a member to build a new house. It is
a question of law whether the materials so used form such a
154. (1940) 6 W.A.G.A. 52, at p. 54. The trial judge had held 
that ,fthe house described as a store seems to have been 
built on the site of the.ruins.of a family house, 
and is therefore family property.n 
Strother-Stewart, J., in the W.A.O.A., said (at p. 54): 
nI cannot agree with this reasoning. No custom 
was proved that when a house is built on the site 
of the ruins of a family house it becomes family 
property, and I know of no such custom."
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substantial part of the new house as to stamp it with a family
character; but it is incorrect to hold that the slightest use
155
of family-materials serves to make a house a family house*
156 H
The dictum in Sant eng v* Darkwa. that "if it had been proved 
that a single brick from the ruins of the former family house 
had been used by the deceased in building the store, the store 
would be family property" - is, it is submitted with respect, 
too wide*
(c) Rights of residence in a family-houses
(i) Individual member: An Individual member of a
family has in general a right to reside in a principal family 
house - or, if a house is section-property within his section - 
in a section's house* This is only a right to be accommodated 
if possible, and not a vested Interest entitling to take 
possession of a room without prior permission*
Customarily, with the enjoyment of so-called family 
houses being divided up between sub-lineages of the family, 
the member of one sub-lineage neither does in fact, nor claims 
to be able to, reside in a house other than that of his own 
sub-lineage* There is a variation in custom as between the 
town and village, and between different areas* The large fam­
ily house in Cape Coast and other towns may contain more than 
100 residents, (many of these are not members of the family,
155. Sees Codjoe v* Kwatchey* ante; the remarks of Webber, 
C.J*, at p* 376*
156* (1940) 6 W.A.C.A* 52, at p. 55.
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but dependents and affines)*
Where a self-acquired house passes by inheritance to the 
minimal sub-lineage of deceased, and more particularly to the 
successor, then the successor may prevent other members of the 
family from living in that house without his prior permission, 
(exclusive of those close relatives already residing there, 
whom he cannot eject).
A member of a family has at least a moral right to ask 
for accommodation, but this is subject to there being room 
available.
Once he is in occupation, however, he has - although still 
without an interest in the house - a right to continue living 
there, provided he observes certain rules. He must conform to 
the directions of the person managing the house, whether the 
family-head or another; so that wilful insubordination, lack 
of co-operation, and trouble-making, may be grounds for his 
ejectment, or for refusal of accommodation. He also has to 
take whatever room; or rooms is/are offered to him. He must 
not deny the title of the family to the property as a whole, or 
assert a title over the portion which he occupies. He must be 
willing to make the necessary contributions, both to the main­
tenance of the house, subventions to the family, and assistance 
for dependent members, where required. If he has been dis­
owned by the family, then he has no right to occupation (but 
this rule is stated to be inoperative today, with the abolition
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of “cutting ekalM)» He must not attempt to deal with his
right of residence, which is not, as such, transmissible or
*  x.-, 157transferable*
The usual remedy today for any failure to observe these 
rules is a warning, and - if this fails - consideration of the 
matter before a family arbitration*
There seems to be a distinction made between permanent 
residents, and what may be called visiting members of the fam­
ily. Occupation given to the latter is purely on a temporary 
basis*
(ii) Dependents; The wife, children and servants of 
a member have a right to accommodation during the lifetime of 
the.member, which right is dependent on the right of that mem­
ber. Domestics of the family as a whole are entitled to ac­
commodation as members of the family, so long as they continue 
to render their customary services. There appears to be a 
principle of “one member, one room”; this principle extends to 
the member’s dependents, so that one finds that the room is oc­
cupied by the member, his wife, and minor children. If the 
member is a female, then she occupies it together with her 
children.
157. Brandford Griffith, C.J., referred in Lokko v. Konklofi: 
(1907) Ren. 450, att p. 452, to the difficulties which 
would flow from making the right of a member in his family- 
house attachable in execution. It would mean admitting i
a stranger in to share occupation with the family. !
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At the death of the member, then his wife is sent back 
to her own people if she refuses to marry the successor. 
Exceptionally, however, she may be allowed to continue to re­
side in her late husband's house, though remaining a widow: 
but this right is subject to good behaviour; and is in no 
circumstances transmissible.
Children of a deceased male member have a right to live
158
in their father's house; this right appears in practice to 
be stronger than as it is commonly stated (that it is subject 
to good behaviour). Children are rarely if ever ejected for 
any reason, and it is doubtful how far custom would permit 
their ejectment. Cases were given where the children's child­
ren similarly resided in the grandparent's house; but in 
these cases the residence is by leave and licence only.
158. Cf. Richardson v. Fynn: (1909) Earn. 13: the children
of a deceased member have a right 11 to continue living in 
the house their father occupied, if that house is part 
of the family house belonging to the family of which 
their father was a Member. They can only be ousted for 
misconduct.” (At p. 14).
P A R T  II
THE INSTITUTIONS OP AKAN LAW.
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CHAPTER V,
SALE,
I. WHAT MAY BE SOLD,
A, ABSOLUTE INTEREST#
Although It is common to speak of ”the sale of land”, 
properly speaking it Is not land which is the subject of sale, 
but rather interests in land. We consider first the sale of 
an absolute interest, taking care to use this term in a sense 
which has meaning in Akan law. By ”absolute interest” in any 
property is meant here the closest approach to ownership of 
which the native law is capable; which implies that when this 
interest is disposed of, there remains nothing more in the 
hands of the vendor. Whether or not the bundle of rights 
which a vendor can transfer to a purchaser is as extensive in 
African as in English Law will become apparent as we proceed.
It is most Important to stress at this point that the use of 
the term ”absolute” does not necessarily mean that the holder 
of such an Interest has a completely free and unfettered right 
over the thing owned, as wide or wider than an English fee 
simple, or as wide as ”dominium” in Roman Law. The use of 
”absolute” serves to distinguish the manner in which an inter­
est Is held from that where the Interest .held is Itself depend­
ent upon some superior Interest or title. The customary law
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is not static, and through the influence of English legal ideas, 
English methods of conveyancing, and English legal terms, 
changes have occurred, and still occur, in African concepts of
V t irights and ownership.
The interests which may exist in property are divisible 
into three main heads, according as they are enjoyed in the 
land itself, things in or on the land, and movables entirely 
separated from the soil; and the sale of such interests must 
be similarly divided. Besides categorizing from the nature 
of the subject-matter, it is also possible to classify accord­
ing to the size of the interest of which any legal person is 
seised; and these two classifications I have endeavoured to 
wed together so as to ensure a thorough treatment of the subject
1. ABSOLUTE INTERESTS IN LAND.
It is necessary to deal first of all with the sale of an 
absolute interest in the land or soil itself. It is a common­
place to the student of African customary law that the sale of 
land itself was not formerly recognised, since the soil was the 
property of no man, but might be variously attributed to the 
possession or care of an Earth-god or goddess, to the spirits 
of the ancestors, or of the tribe, past and present} However
1. As was recognised by Hayes Redwar, J., in the case of 
Abessibro v. Ama: (1893) P.L.R. 78, where he said:
^According to the contemplation of ancient native
customary law (as embodied in numerous decisions in
/over
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this may have been in the past, there can be no doubt that at 
the present day in the Gold Coast (and for some time past) the 
land itself has been the subject of sale. This development 
may be said to have originated on the Coast, where the infil­
tration of European ideas, and the disruption and corruption of 
native custom, proceeded the earliest. Whilst on the one hand 
stools tended to become increasingly impoverished by the ex­
pense of lawsuits, and ostentatious display in warfare and cere­
monial, on the other there appeared other stools, groups and 
individuals with the wealth to buy and develop land for their 
own purposes. Chief among these were the rising middle classes 
- lawyers, public servants and the like; and, besides them, 
the European commercial interests, which had discovered in the 
forests and mines of the Gold Coast a source of wealth. We may 
add to this as persuasive factors the progressive desiccation 
of the country through cutting down the rain-forest and over­
cultivation, and the introduction of cacao as a staple crop.
This last, since it remained for many years in the ground, and 
placed little burden on the cultivator by way of maintenance,
1. (cont. from previous page) -
this Court...), there is no such thing in the interior 
as an absolute transfer of land as between natives, 
whether by sale or gift, and the only thing that passes 
is the usufruct, or licence to use the land in certain 
ways...11
And the court in I&patasle Concessions Inquiries 164 
and 169: (1902) F. L. ft. , at p. 136, referred to
"sale by native custom, which was extremely rare.”
The reader is also referred to Danquah, A.L.C., pp.
212 et seq.; and to Sarbah, F.C.L. 85-95.
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allowed the common farmer continually to extend his farms, 
thus leading to a land-shortage; it also, of course, encour­
aged farmers from less fortunate areas to invade the interior 
in search of land for cocoa-farming?
If we observe dealings in land at the present day, we 
find that there are three groups of persons enabled to sell, 
of which the earliest is the stool. Since, however, some 
stools in the Colony have recklessly disposed of their stool 
lands to any purchaser, it follows that we find individuals 
and families in possession of land, that is to say, of an ab­
solute interest therein. But it would be an incorrect present- 
atiohbf the historical picture to maintain that none of the 
land of which such families are seised could have had any other 
derivation than from stool lands: here is a perfect illustra­
tion of the difficulties of generalisation. In those parts of 
the Colony furthest away from the Coast, and showing the great­
est affinity with the Ashanti peoples, families and individuals 
have (or had) no absolute interest in the land which they occu­
py; whilst in states near to or bordering the coast, it seems
2. F.G. Crowther, the then S.N.A., commented on these points 
in his evidence before the Belfield Commission, (pp. 55 
et seq.). Note for instance:
"Y. When the European capitalist made his appearance 
the Chiefs began to take more interest in their stool 
lands than before. They recognised that the possession 
of these lands by the tribes was likely to be a source 
of pecuniary benefit to themselves...11
”9. Some stools are in a very precarious financial 
condition owing to the existence of stool debts...”
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truer to say that formerly the stools had no interest in land
comparable with that enjoyed, for instance, in Ashanti today.
The land here was originally in the hands of the families, and
stool-families took their turn with the other families in the 
3
state. Since the time when the tribal lands, if any, were al­
most no-man* s-land, and there was certainly no elaborate theory 
of stool ownership in trust for the tribe (a rarefied concept 
which one may attribute in part to the efforts of writers on 
the subject, and in part to rationalisation of the claims 
gsserted by stools to land) certain states have endeavoured to 
develop the idea of stool-ownership where it formerly was not 
found, usually at great profit to themselves.
(&) Sales by stools.
Here one is dealing with the sale by stools of the absol­
ute interest in stool lands; so that first a word of warning 
about terminology is necessary. The term 11 stool land” can be 
and often is used - to the perplexity of the reader - in at 
least three different senses? It may be used to mean the 
reserve of tribal lands, (the primeval forest), which any cit­
izen has the right to clear and cultivate. It may (for in­
stance, in Ashanti) mean all the lands which are subject to a 
certain stool. It may also be used to mean ”stool-family 
lands”: these are the farms, etc., in the possession of the
3. Cf. Chapter II, pp. 105 et seq.
4. Cf. Chapter I, p. 29.
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stool-family; with regard to them, their use and disposal,
the stool-family is in no better and no worse position than any
other family. It may also be used of farms acquired by the 
stool and thenceforward attached thereto, whether through gift 
by a subject, exploitation, or purchase by the stool. These 
again are of a different nature from the stool-lands proper.
The term nstool lands” may properly be used to describe 
the forest or tribal lands, in which no limited Interests have 
been created, since It illustrates in those states which do not
recognise the power of a family or individual citizen to ac­
quire any interest larger than usufruct - whether perpetual or 
not - that the ultimate reversion to all the land in the state 
remains vested in the stool in trust for the people of the 
stool. It may also be used to Indicate all the land subject 
to a stool, but in this case it must be emphasised that the
right of the stool may be only one of jurisdiction, and not 
5
of ownership.
Even in those cases where the stool is recognised as in 
the
some sense/”owner” of the stool lands, it is still hardly cor­
rect to describe it as owner, since the stool is properly an 
agent, manager, or trustee, for the tribe; but analogies with 
English law are highly dangerous, since, of course, it is not
5. For a discussion of the Interests which a stool enjoys in 
different types of land, and the distinction between 
jurisdiction and ownership, see the Chapter* on THE STOOL, 
esp. at pp. 28 et seq.; and JURISDICTION AND OWNERSHIP.
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the case that the legal estate is vested In the stool, and the 
beneficial interest with the members of the tribe. The inter­
est, if any, is vested in a sense in the members of the tribe 
as a whole. What is more, the former essence of this interest 
was its inalienability, thus indicating its complete distinct­
ion from any English type of interest.
Although in former times tribal lands could not be per­
manently and absolutely alienated, there is no doubt that they 
have in the recent past-- and also the present - been frequent­
ly disposed of for cash. The strict legal theory said that 
this could not be done; the facts say that it has been done.
To attempt to restore the pristine condition of the customary 
law, and to declare invalid all those sales of stool, or tribal, 
lands which have taken place, would produce an absurd situation, 
and great hardship as well as disappointment to purchasers who
have taken bona fide. The law relating to the disposal of
6
tribal lands has thus changed in practice, and the only solution 
for the analyst of the law is to describe those changes, and 
leave the decision whether such sales should be permitted in 
the future, and, if so, on what terms, to the legislator and 
the judge.
6. ”The sale of land was formerly unnecessary and was un­
known, but is now recognized by custom and if Sale is 
effected with the consent of the Head Chief and his 
Elders the freehold title to land passes11: (1954).
Warr. 36.
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A contrary movement la now observable: In Ashanti, for
Instance, It is not now possible for a stool to sell its com­
plete Interest In stool lands; this reversal has been brought
7
about through a declaration of the Ashanti Confederacy Council,
which, although it lacks the force of enacted law through a
technicality, is of at least great persuasive weight - so that
one cannot doubt that this principle of inalienability will be
(and is so at present) upheld in the Ashanti courts. Again,
the Wassaw Confederacy in the Colony has proposed to ban hence-
0
forth the sale of stool lands within the Confederacy; and 
other states, such as Akim Abuakwa, are restricting the aliena­
tion of stool lands either by granting land only on lease, or 
else by denying the wider character of the rights which are 
conveyed by a so-called sale.
It will be appreciated that in the subsequent discussion 
we are concerned primarily with the disposal by or by the 
agency of the stool of the root-title to stool land, both un­
occupied and occupied (or encumbered by the interests of citi­
zens and others). The sale of stool property in the narrow 
sense is a somewhat different matter.
Who may sell stool lands: Where stool lands are vendible,
it is in accordance with the theory of ownership that the
7. Cf. Matson, Digest, pp. 18-19 (especially paras. 81, 82).
8. According to a report of a meeting of the Confederacy 
Council in the Daily Graphic newspaper for 26 April 1951, 
p. 4.
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owners thereof should alone he capable of alienating them.
The owners of tribal land are, as has been shown, the members 
of the tribe - dead, living, and to be born; as a body they 
are an impracticable party. So in present-day practice the 
stool is considered to have a mandate from the tribe to manage 
the tribal lands, a management which Includes a right of dis­
posal, The stool, that is to say, the Chief, his Elders and 
Councillors - is the granting party for the disposal of stool 
lands. (For the disposal of stool-family lands, It may be 
worthwhile to remark that those lie within the control of the 
stool-family; any portions of the stool-family*s land which 
have been temporarily allocated to the stool-holder remain part 
of their property, and may not be alienated without the consent 
of the family.) Properties donated to the stool - frequently 
these will be given to the stool-holder for the time being, 
but with the intention of benefiting the stool and not the 
Individual - remain within the control of the stool, and may 
not be disposed of by the chief acting individually.
Where a stool possessing land serves another stool, the 
subordinate stool may be the landowner, and the superior stool 
have a purely political right over the land; or the superior 
stool may have merely portioned out the use or control of the 
land among its subjects. Whilst in the former case the sub­
ordinate stool is owner of its lands, yet in certain areas it 
is still necessary for the sub-stool to have the consent of, or
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at least inform, its paramount stool before alienating land.
This necessity the student should not confuse with the latter
case, where the subordinate stool, if it wishes to alienate its
land, must receive permission to do what is in fact impossible,
10, 11
i.e., to sell what it has not got - the full title.
(b) Sales by families: Where the interest of a family
in its family lands is not recognised to be subject to any 
other interest of a proprietary nature vested in a stool, that 
family may now, by custom, dispose of its interest absolutely. 
Such absolute sale by a family of its family lands or a portion 
thereof must be distinguished from that of a family disposing 
of its limited interest in land, held subject to the superior
9. “The local stool and the Okyenhene execute the conveyance 
jointly; if the stool has already executed the document, 
then the Okyenhene must sign as confirming party":
Akim Abuakwa.
10; I propose to consider the position of parties to a sale 
more fully in a subsequent section: the reader is there­
fore referred to "II.Who may sell", at pp. 313 et seq.
11. It should be noted that the Local Government Ordinance, 
1951. s. 75, regulates the disposal of stool lands:
(1) Any disposal of any interest or right in 
land which involves the payment of any valuable 
consideration or which could, by reason of its 
being to a person not entitled by customary law 
to the free use of land, involve the payment of 
any such consideration, which is made -
(a) by a Stool ....
shall be subject to the concurrence of the Urban 
or Local Council, as the case may be, for the area 
concerned, and shall be of no effect unless and 
until such concurrence has been obtained and 
certified in writing ..."
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title of a stool, for this interest is one of usufruct only.
The latter case (which occurs wherever the stool makes an over­
riding claim to the land itself, as in Ashanti, Akim, etc#) is 
of altogether a different nature, though in practice one migjit 
observe little distinction, and even language may give no hint 
of the distinction.
Sales by a family of its absolute interest in land are 
most frequently met with in such areas as Fanteland, Akwapim, 
etc; but they may also occur in those states which, while in­
sisting on the ground-tltle of the stools to land, yet permit 
outright alienation to individuals.
(c) Sales by Individuals: An individual may be seised of
a similar Interest to a family, and may dispose of it in a like | 
manner. Viewed from outside, both family and individual have 
the character of a single legal person, each holding a similar 
Interest. From this head must be excluded the sale by an in­
dividual of a farm which he has made out of virgin forest, in 
a state where no absolute title to land is conferred on a cit- 
izen in such circumstances. But in other states, where virgin 
forest remains (but this is diminishing or has already vanished) 
and a citizen can, by exercising his right to cultivate, acquire 
a farm there which is his individual property during his life­
time, a right to sell such a farm will be recognised; although, 
if the stool is strong, it may lay claim to the forest as tribal 
land, and then not permit a citizen to create anything more 
therein than a limited interest of usufruct.
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2. ABSOLUTE INTERESTS IN THINGS IN OR ON LAM).
So far the right of the stool, family or individual to 
sell their absolute Interests in the land Itself has been the 
subject of enquiry* The dichotomy which exists in the cus­
tomary land-tenure between the ownership of the soil Itself, 
and ownership of the things which are thereon, is no doubt 
familiar to all students of Akan Law. Thus a citizen may 
own absolutely the farm which he has made, but, if it is on 
stool land, then it is the stool which owns the absolute in­
terest in the soil itself.
At the present time almost anything which is found in or 
on the land may be the subject of sale by the person entitled. 
The stool, where the land is stool land, will usually have 
the prerogative of disposing of the timber, minerals, and 
other natural forms of wealth, within the soil.
(a) Sale of timber.
12
The timber-trees themselves may be the subject of sale: 
this procedure is adopted by some stools as a more convenient 
way of exploiting the forest, since it involves the grant of no 
right in the soil Itself (as would occur if a timber-lease were 
granted). The method is especially useful where the purchaser 
is a small contractor, to draw up a lease or timber-agreement 
for whom would be a waste of time. It is largely the stools
12. See: Sar. P.C.L. 92, et seq.
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who sell timber in this fashion, since even when an individual
has acquired a usufructuary right over the land on which the
trees stand, the timber trees themselves, being part of the
resources of the tribe, cannot be disposed of by the cultivator
for cash (although he la permitted to cut them down or use them
13
for his own purposes in the normal course of fanning).
Sale of timber trees may be either of specified trees 
marked by the purchaser, and approved by the grantor, or of 
trees unspecified at the time of agreement, and to be selected 
by the purchaser to the number and kind laid down in the agree­
ment, Even when the land itself has been sold to a purchaser, 
stools may sell timber trees standing on it later separately to 
another purchaser, since it is now common form to reserve tim­
ber and mining rights to the stool when a conveyance of land of 
this nature is made,
(b) Sale of other trees and crops.
Kola and rubber trees in their natural state were, and
perhaps still today sometimes are, the perquisite of the land- 
14
owning stool, and could not be sold without the consent of the 
stool. Their position in custom is similar to timber trees.
As regards natural rubber, licences to collect on payment of
13, Though some information indicates that where there are 
timber-trees standing in an Individual’s cocoa-farm, he 
may cut them down and sell them; he should give 1/3 of 
the purchase-price to the land-owning stool, however,
(This is probably either a local variation, or a recent 
development, in custom.)
14. Not today in Adansi and some other states at least.
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abusa seem to be the more common method of exploitation.
Palm trees were formerly the most valuable adjunct of 
farming land, at least on the coast. Both palms self-sown 
and plantations of trees were to be found. Palm-trees, al­
though they have declined as a source of transferable wealth, 
belong In the coastal fringe (where they are mainly found) to 
the owner of the soil, and may be bought and sold independently 
of the land on which they standi
The Introduction of cocoa has meant the creation of a con­
tinuing and valuable right in the trees and their produce.
It is possible to sell the trees themselves without selling 
the land; but normally an African sells his farm, which means 
that he also passes his limited Interest in the soil. Advance 
sales of the crop are fairly frequent; as Is raising money on 
the security of the crop, whereupon the creditor has a lien on 
the crop in the case of default. The absolute ownership of 
the crop from cacao-trees is generally recognised when the crop
has been severed; but It equally applies whilst the crop is
17
still on the tree.
(c) Sale of houses and other buildings.
By far the most valuable (after cocoa-farms) of the things 
united to the soil are houses and other buildings. It is
15. See: Sar. F.C.L. 92.
16. Cf. Sar. F.C.L. 92.
17. It is hoped that the distinction between sale of the 
crop whilst on the tree, and sale of the tree Itself, 
is patent to the reader.
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generally admitted that a citizen is absolute owner of hie
18house, and a limited owner of the plot upon which it stands* 
Whilst in theory it is possible to pass the house without the 
limited interest, yet in practice this is not done* Where the 
sale is to a stranger, then the stranger may take a lease or 
tenancy of the plot from the stool, the citizen's limited inter­
est in the plot merging in the stool's title. But it may 
happen that, whilst the absolute Interest in the land is held 
by the stool, the limited interest dependent upon this in the 
plot is held by a family, who allow a stranger to them to build 
a house thereon, using the plot on a kind of permissive and 
free tenancy* Often in such circumstances the right of the 
house-owner to sell the house is fettered: if the plot is not
purchased, but leased by the house-builder, then he may often 
be required to request the permission of the land-owner and/or 
the person with the immediate interest in the site, before he 
sells the house: otherwise, he might compromise the title of
the latter^
Portions of a house are capable of separate ownership, 
and it is possible in such cases to sell a portion only*
The Ahenfie or palace - which is either a house built or
18. Where a stool owns the absolute Interest in the land.
Cf* Chapter III .(pp. 150 et seq.).
19* E.g., in Akwapim the tenancy is granted out of the
absolute interest of a family: the letter's permission
Is required. In Hew Juaben, permission from the stool 
is required.
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purchased by the stool-family, and dedicated to the service of 
the stool, or else is constructed out of stool funds - falls 
in a class by itself* It is an appurtenance of the stool, and 
is inalienable, unless the oman consent*
(d) Rivers« pools. etc *
Rivers, pools, and other bodies of water may be sold* 
Ownership of such bodies of water may lie with the stool - 
representing the tribe - or with the riparian inhabitants on 
one or both sides* In modern conveyances, such bodies of 
water are often reserved to the granting stool when the land 
Including them is sold* Rivers and lakes which are sacred 
are, in the nature of things, incapable of sale, for obvious 
religious reasons*
(e) Sale of gold, diamonds and other mineral wealth*
In theory It is possible to sell such deposits in situ*
The usual form, however, is to grant a mining lease or concess­
ion, where the exploiter Is a large European concern - the 
effect is then similar to the grant of a profit a prendre (a 
licence to come on the land and mine, and a grant of the min­
erals so won)* In the case of small-scale mining or washing 
operations, such as individual Africans engage in, an informal 
agreement, similar in scope to that made with small tlmber- 
contractors, is made*
(f) Fetlsh-groves and other sacred places*
These are obviously not saleable* It seems that where
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their ownership is vested in a family, they are inherited as 
other property by the fetish-priest (or at least the control of 
them is so inherited). One may also note here that as a matter 
of custom clan or family burial-grounds and cemeteries are not 
sold (or indeed ever disposed of if it can possibly be avoided).
3. ABSOLUTE INTEREST IN MOVABLES
(a) Large chattels.
It will be noticed that movables are divided here into 
three categories. It is inevitable that large chattels, 
though movable, should assimilate same of the law relating to 
immovable property, since they represent considerable capital. 
(In a sense, houses are movables in customary law.) One may 
note a similar attitude in English Law; it seems that "coven­
ants running with a ship" may be recognised on the analogy of 
20
leaseholds; and it is absurd to have one law for persons in­
jured on dangerous premises, and another for those injured in
21or on dangerous chattels.
This division of chattels into large and small does not 
affect the question of their vendibility, but goes rather to 
the question of who may sell, and when. Under the head of 
large chattels might be collected such ancient objects as fish­
ing canoes; and such modern ones as lorries and taxis.
20. Of. Lord Strathcone S.S. Co. v. Dominion Coal Co.: (1926)
A.C. 108. (P.O.)
21. Cf. Duncan v. Cammell Laird: (1943) 171 L.T. 186.
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(b) Small chattels: It Is unusual to find a chain of 
interests operating over a chattel* English law similarly 
provides a simple formula for chattels as compared with real 
property* Any transaction affecting less than the whole or 
absolute interest in the chattel concerns bailment, loan, etc*, 
rather than sale* Little need therefore be said here about 
the requirements for the passing of the whole property in 
chattels.
(c) Chattels of special significance; Under this title 
are to be collected speoial objects such as male property, so 
called, which was formerly the expression of the warlike trad­
ition of the man - his spear, his gun, etc. Again, under the 
heading of woman's property are found those things passed down 
from mother to daughter, to which the latter may have a prefer­
ential claim. These chattels are of greater significance when 
we consider the law of succession than in the law of the sale, 
the contra-suasions to their alienation being moral and custom­
ary rather than legal.
Of a slightly different nature are those chattels which
are attached to a stool - the stool regalia, etc*, and the
stools themselves, which are obviously not capable of being
sold, as this would be an affront to the dignity of the stool
22and the memory of the ancestors. And in fact legislation has
22. But I was informed by one African that in Ashanti before 
the restoration of the Confederacy there had occurred an 
instance where a stool, which was in debt, had all its
/over
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23
been passed to prevent the disposal of such regalia by stools*
B. LIMITED INTERESTS*
It is now necessary to consider the sale of limited inter­
ests in property* The term “limited interest” is a wide one, 
and can imply either of two things: that the interest is lim­
ited by the nature of the subject-matter of the right, or that 
it is limited in legal extent, l*e*, it is not the widest legal 
bundle of rights in the subject-matter, being either part of or 
subject to a larger interest (perhaps itself limited) in the 
hands of another* It Is true that In certain cases It Is 
difficult to say whether the interest is limited ”in nature”
(as I have chosen to describe it for the sake of brevity) or 
in legal extent; but this is of little consequence, so long 
as the facts of the case are correctly presented*
The limited (because derived) interest of a family in the 
stool land which they cultivate would seem to be of a different 
kind from the fishing and other rights which may be possessed 
by a family as members of a larger community, or which may have 
been the subject of grant by the land-owning stool.
22. (cont. from previous page) -
property taken In execution of the suit of its creditor, 
including its blackened stools, etc* I have not been 
able to verify this information.
23. Stool Property Protection Ordinance, 1940, for Ashanti; 
Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance * 1944, S. 27A, for
the Colony*
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LAND:
1. SALE OF INTERESTS LIMITED BY THE NATURE OF THE 
SbBJECfr-faATTER*
(a) Timber-righta:
Rights in timber may be of various kinds: there Is the
ownership (or control) by the stool of timber on stool-lands; 
there Is the interest of citizens in tImber**products, which 
they may customarily use for their own purposes - tie-tie, fufu 
poles, fencing, roofing, etc.; there Is the interest of a far­
mer in timber-trees which happen to stand in his farm, etc.
The only person entitled to sell rights in timber when the
24
timber itself stands in the forest is the stool: there Is a
distinction between the sale of timber-rights, or their grant, 
and the sale of the trees themselves. In the former case, 
commonly a timber-lease is given which implies the grant of an 
Interest in land - hence the popular African expression - "sale 
of land for timber-purposes". Such a sale would imply the 
right and power to control the use in the future as well as In 
the present of trees standing thereon, and also of trees not 
yet in existence. Sale of the trees themselves Involves the 
grant of no Interest In land, although, to make the sale effect­
ive, it is necessary for the grantor to couple his grant with 
a licence to the grantee to come on the land and take the timber<
But such a sale is a possibility rather than an actuality, 
since either a lease is usually given, or else individual trees
24. Or other holder of the absolute interest in the land.
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are sold by licence*
The communal rights arri privileges of citizens in trees
and forests cannot be the subject of sale by the citizens them-
25
selves acting individually* A citizen who has right to take 
poles or firewood could not assign this right to a stranger*
It is possible for the whole body of citizens to grant such 
rights to strangers - sometimes not exclusively, but implied 
in, for instance, the grant of permission to farm to strangers. 
The stool which the citizens serve will be the effective party 
to such a grant; but it will be appreciated that the grant of 
such communal rights is a mere accessory to the grant of farm- 
lng-rights to a stranger, and cannot be severally granted.
Where the land is sold outright to a stranger by the stool, is 
one to presume that these "communal11 rights are also exclusively 
granted to the purchaser? To hold so would be inequitable in 
the extreme, if, for instance, a village on or adjacent to the 
parcel of land so sold had been accustomed to get its firewood, 
building materials, and so on, from the adjacent forest* In 
one or two cases where a stool has sold land to an individual, 
the purchaser has maintained that he has thenceforth the right 
to exclude citizens from their former customary privileges: but 
the proposition Is doubtful. It is possible, however to pre­
sume that some of such rights have passed by such an outright 
sale, at least so as to restrict the right of citizens to come
25. For a description of these rights see Chapter III, pp. 16°
et seq.
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on the land sold for various customary purposes (more espec­
ially so as to restrict them from developing new farms, as they 
may do by pure custom). But there is a distinction between 
the citizens concerned exercising rights they already possess, 
and their extending the scope of their rights. Certain pur­
chasers of land from a stool have gone so far as to maintain 
" that thenceforth they are in the position of an independent 
chief, and they have endeavoured to set up new states.
(b) Sale of Fishing and Ferry Rights.
Fishing and ferry rights are another example of limited 
interests in one aspect of the land's wealth; in this case the 
wealth of the water which it bears on its surface. Rights to 
operate ferries, including the power to exclude unlicensed per­
sons from operating ferries, are commonly the perquisite of the
26
land-owning stool, although it is possible to find areas where
27
such a stool monopoly is not recognized. One finds that where 
two states have common boundary at a river, ferries over that 
river may be in the Joint disposal of the communities on either 
side. Ferry~ and other water^rights are today often reserved
when land is sold by a stool to an individual stranger; but, 
apart from this, it is possible to make such rights the subject 
of a sale, although the more common practice is to lease them, 
or at least give individuals licence to operate them.
26. nA ferry is always State or Stool-owned” - Akim Abuakwa.
27. See Chapter III, pp. 166-7.
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The fight to fish in rivers and lakes - not the subject
of private ownership - is one of the ccamminal rights of the
28
citizens, similar to their communal forest rights. In cer­
tain cases rivers - which will all be owned (where the stool 
has an absolute title to the land) by the stool, seem to fall 
into two categories: free rivers, in which citizens may fish
free and without permission; and restricted rivers, where fish 
ing is only by permission of the stool, to whom a proportion of 
the catch must be paid. The stool can sell the right to fish, 
provided it does not conflict with the conmninal rights of the 
citizens; but in general the practice is merely to grant a 
licence to fish, either commercially, or for personal consumpt­
ion, in return for a proportion of the catch, or its worth.
Thus one finds a fishing syndicate operating on the River Pra, 
composed of immigrant Nigerians.
(c) Sale of Mining Rights.
Mining rights are also often reserved today when land is 
sold; again, either a lease, or special licence to take out 
minerals, Is the usual form of exploitation. The case differs 
from that of timber-rights in two respects only: first, that
citizens have as a rule no rights in mineral deposits; and sec 
ondly, that disturbance of the top-soil is Involved In the win­
ning of the minerals, which may conflict with the rights of 
others to farm in the area.
28. See: Chapter III, pp. 167-8.
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2. SALE OP RIGHTS LIMITED IN INTEREST,
If one asstapes that there are persons who enjoy an absol­
ute interest in the land, then other persons occupying or inter­
ested in the same land can have only limited interest in the 
land, and derived therefrom* The juridical basis of the 
family's interest in the stool land which they cultivate, and
of a member's interest in family land which he holds, is dls-
29
cussed elsewhere*
(d) Sale of family interest in the usufruct of land 
vi a-a-vls the atool;
Land belonging to a family may take the form of land under 
present cultivation, fallow-land and land adjacent to their 
farmed land. The interest of a family in land under present 
cultivation may be disposed of at the same time as a farm is 
sold; and to make such a sale effective should normally be 
included In the sale. The interest of a family in its farm is 
not limited but absolute; but since, to engender the right In 
the farm, it is necessary to have a right in the land (and this 
latter right is limited), the absolute right in the farm is in 
a sense dependent on the stool's absolute interest In the land. 
Hence the common restrictions on alienation of farms, espec­
ially to strangers. Fallow-lands held by a family may also be
30the subject of sale, for the family retain an Interest in them.
29. See: THE STOOL, pp. 31^3 ; and TBS FAMILY, pp. 233-8.
30. The Akim Abuakwa Declaration denies power to a person to 
sell an mfuwa, or fallow-land; but other evidence
acquired orally tends to show that a citizen may sell 
an mfuwa.
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The family also possess an interest in land adjacent to 
their farms, which is reserved to their use for future cultiv­
ation* It is doubtful whether they can dispose of their right 
in this adjacent land separately; though commonly it may be 
included when the family sell the farm to which it is adjacent* 
When an individual has a self-acquired farm (subject to 
the rights of the stool) his position is comparable to that of 
the family above, and similar considerations apply in regard 
to sales by hlm?^
What has been said above with regard to the sale of farms 
applies mutatls mutandis to the sale of houses and houseplotss 
the distinction between the limited interest in the plot, and 
the absolute interest in the house, is clearer in this case than 
in that of a farm*
(e) Member*s interest in the usufruct vis-a-vis the family: 
(I) Self-made farm on family land; The various
rights of a member of a family in a farm which he has made him­
self on family land can be analysed as follows:
(1) That of part-owner of the family-interest in the land 
itself.
(2) That of owner of an absolute Interest in the product 
of the farm*
(3) That of owner of a limited or derivative Interest
vis-a-vis the family in the soil.
31* See: Ratt, A#L.C# 356.
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(4) That of owner of a limited interest in the area of 
new farming, and the area of potential farming, both as regards 
the family and strangers to the family.
The derivative interest of the member arises by virtue of
the fact that the farm-land has been allocated to him by the
family; and his new interest in the farm is created by his
effort in making new farms on and adjacent to the fallow-land,
and by extending the area of potential farming attached to the
farms in question. Although 30 complicated in appearance, in
practice little distinction is made between the various rights,
but it appears to be recognized that the labour of the member
in making farms on what was fallow-land implies that he should
remain solely entitled to the product during his lifetime. The
title of the family to the land usually restricts him from
alienating the new interest in the farm which he has created
for himself without the consent of the family: so that, as
regards alienation, the member is usually in a similar position
32to the holder of an inherited farm.
(ii) Inherited farm on famlly-land: When permanent
crops were not yet in cultivation in the Gold Coast, little 
distinction would be made between this case and the last, since 
the farmer would have had to make a new foodstuffs farm each 
year in either instance. But with the coming of cocoa a real
32. I am not sure whether the Africans themselves make the 
distinction between farms on the fallow-land, and farms 
newly made adjacent to the fallow-land.
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distinction can be made: a cocoa-farm is a continuing asset,
and may represent not the occupier's, but some other person's, 
effort. The difference from the last case is that the member 
in question does not have the last right, in that he has not 
created a new farm by his own effort. In general, inherited 
farms may be sold only with the authorization, or by the action, 
of the family.
(f) The wife's or child's Interest in the land of husband 
or father:
A wife may assist her husband during his life to make
farms, part of which may be presented to her in recognition of 
33her services. Whether she may sell her interest or not dep­
ends on the nature of the gift, Such gifts are, without more, 
temporary only, and do not extend beyond the lifetime of her 
husband, unless her husband's family consent. A wife may have 
a right to use her late husband's farm for her sustenance 
whilst she remains a widow, but such a right is of course in­
alienable.
Children also receive gifts from their father, perhaps in
33
return for their assistance on the farms. Again, a gift of 
usufruct may be alienable or not by. the children, depending on 
whether the gift is outright or not. The interest of a son 
so acquired commonly continues beyond the death of his father, 
but is not, as far as 1 know, alienable.
33. See: GIFT, pp. 523-5.
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(g) Sale of a subordinate stool's limited Interest where 
the superior 3tool owns:
The case is that where a stool enjoys its own stool lanis
34
and has a recognizable interest therein; but, since it serves 
a superior stool, the interest of the junior stool is deriv­
ative from, and dependent on, the interest of its superior 
(which might itself be derivative). (The case is different 
where a stool recognizes the political paramountcy of another 
stool, but owns its own land.)
Where the subordinate stool owns such a limited Interest,
it is possible for it to dispose of its interest for cash, but
35
only with the consent of its overlord to the sale.
(h) Sale by overlord where the sub-stool owns;
In such a case, the right of the overlord is commonly one 
of paramountcy, or jurisdiction, and, since this is a political, 
and not a proprietary, right, it cannot be the subject of sale. 
The overlord cannot sell the Interest in the stool-lands of its 
subordinate, since title to 3uch lands is not vested in it. At 
the most, one finis a claim that the overlord should be a party 
to a sale by the subordinate stool of part of the latter's
34. See Chapter II, pp. 86 etseq,
35. As agrees Ratt. A.L.C. p. 35o (but subject to the proviso 
that the alienee must also be a subject of the Head-Stool); 
and this might be put forward as the position in Akim 
Abuakwa, although it appears that subordinate stools enjoy 
at least a joint interest with the Paramount Stool in their 
stool lands (vide the Declaration): and probably some­
thing more.
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lands; or else that it should be a confirming party; or 
finally, that it has no say in the matter.
For a discussion of the juridical position, the reader 
is referred to the Chapter on JURISDICTION AND OWNERSHIP, 
pages 96 et seq.ante.
THINGS IN OR ON LAND:
The limited interest in things in or on land will commonly 
be a derivative Interest: such is the interest of a member of
a family in the house belonging to his family, the Interest of 
a successor in a house which he inherits, the interest of the 
wife and children of members in the house of the husband and 
father, etc. A family or individual have an absolute, rather 
than a derivative or dependent, interest in a house belonging 
to them, even though the land on which it is built belongs to 
a stool.
Where a stool possesses stool land, but has derived its 
title from its superior stool (which continues to own the land) 
the interest of the subordinate stool in certain of the things 
in or on the land is derivative and limited. And one can 
similarly construct chains of dependent ownership.
The interest of a member of a family in a family-house 
is not vendible, since the title is not divisible. Still less 
can he dispose of his right of residence in a family house, 
although there Is a suggestion in a case from Lagos. Nigeria,
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that such a right is attachable or transmissible there.
A fortiori, the rights of a wife or children in the house of 
their husband/father are not vendible.
The interest of a successor in a house or farm, title to 
which is with the family, is neither vendible nor attachable. 
Where cases of sale of such inherited property take place, then 
one must suppose authorization, either express or implied, by 
the family. But in such a case it is not merely the limited 
interest of the holder which is transferred, but also the title 
to the property.
Where a man has built a house on a family plot, his posi­
tion when he wishes to sell is similar to that of the farmer 
making a farm on family land: he may sell only with the per-
mission of the family.
MOVABI&S:
It is much more difficult to find limited interests in
movables, since with movables in any system of law possession
rapidly becomes equated with ownership. The interest, if any,
of a chief in stool ornaments and regalia is not vendible 
37
or assignable. It is really Incorrect to describe a chief as 
having any Interest in such property at all, since it belongs
36. Of. Odeloke v. J. Holt: (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 152. In Lokko
v. Konklofit (1907) Ren..450. at p. 452, Brandford Griffith, 
. C.J., pointed out obiter the difficulty of accepting such 
a view in the Gold Coast.
37. One must also include the State motor-car nowadays.
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to the stool and cannot - as stool property - he disposed of
except by the stool. Besides juristic obstacles, there is
also a strong prejudice against disposing of such property,
even by the person rightfully entitled to do so (the stool).
legislation reinforces this prejudice, since the Stool Property
38(Ashanti) Protection Ordinance, for Ashanti, and the amendment
39
to the Natlvg Authority (Colony)Ordinance. for the Colony, 
forbid or impede the pledging or disposal of such property.
38. No. 22 of 1940: see especially s. 3.
39. No. 22 of 1944, amended by No. 13 of 1947; new section 27A. 
But see APPENDIX post.
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II. WHO MAY SELL.
A. THE STOOL AS VENDOR,
The stool Is fully empowered to sell stool property which
is subject to its ownership or care, even though, as we have
40
seen, stool lands were not formerly the subject of sale; and,
of course, a stool cannot even now sell stool property where
41
its right to do so is no longer recognized, as in Ashanti.
But before considering the powers of the stool more fully, it
is necessary to draw the reader's attention to the distinction
42
between town and family stools: the distinction is important
in this field of property, because just as with the election 
of a person to a family stool it is the family who perform not 
only the selection but the appointment, so with the property 
attached to a family stool. But with the town stool, the con­
trol and disposal of property attached to the stool is the
40. Subject to S. 75 of the Local Government Ordinance. 1951. 
which requires the concurrence of a Local Council before 
a disposal of stool land is valid.
41. But sales of land by stools in Ashanti appear to have 
been fairly frequent.in pre-war, and especially pre-1935, 
Ashanti, as the paper by Mrs. I. Matson on "Land Disputes 
in Adansi" bears out. In one case, pending whilst I was 
In the Gold Coast, it was alleged that one of the Wing 
Chiefs of Adansl had sold part of his unused stool lands 
to some strangers from Akwapim; the present contest con­
cerned not.so much the alienability of .the land as such,
. but rather whether the proper parties had joined In the 
conveyance. See also: Ratt. A.L.C. 363.
42. The distinction is considered more fully in the Chapter 
on THE STOOL, especially at pp. 17-21.
ti
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concern of the occupant, and the elders and councillors (as 
representing the Oman), and not the stool-family* It was some­
times put to me that stool property is not under the control 
of the chief, hut of the elders, whose duty it is to safeguard 
the interests of the tribe in the tribal possessions* Where 
the chief is of strong character the impression may be given 
that it is the chief who deals with the stool property, and the 
elders give only their formal concurrence* But it would be 
more accurate to describe the position as the exact opposite: 
it is the elders who have the power, and the chief - as so 
often in Africa - has the position but not the power which 
goes with it*
The chief by himself cannot sell stool-property, and such
43
a disposition is prlma facie of no effect. The case reported
44
by Danquah from Akim Abuakwa appears to involve a different 
principle* In this case the sale by the stool-occupant of a 
farm which had formerly been the property of a previous de- 
stooled chief , but which had been declared on his destoolment 
to be stool property, was held illegal, and the sale annulled* 
The sale was made by the chief (an Odlkro) alone; but the 
operative factor was that the sale injured the nequitable
43. But, to take an instance from Mrs. Matson's paper,
Kobina Poll, former Adansihene, appears to have fre-
, quently engaged in dealings with the stool lands and 
property in a semi-individual capacity;
44, Case A. 62: Cases in Akan Law* pp. 108-9.
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title" of the ex-chief to the property. But in another case 
concerning sales of stool land by the Ohene of Begoro the native 
court had this to say:
"Owing to the very reckless way in which 
lands at Begoro were disposed of at the 
time Ohene (now Ex-Ohene) K.T. was chief 
of Begoro, ... the Oman of Begoro, i.e., 
the Elders, Councillors, Stofcl heirs, and 
the Asafo Company with the concurrence of 
the Ohene, laid down a rule strongly for­
bidding the sale of the lands without proper 
authority from the Oman, and with a view to 
giving due effect to this rule the Oman 
vested all necessary powers connected with 
all dealings with the land in the present 
Ohene, who was then Mr. Thompson, and from 
that time any sale of land which Mr. T. did 
not approve of was deemed revocable."
This case is most interesting as illustrating the reitera­
tion of the principle that authority for the stool-occupant to 
deal with the stool lands flows by reason of a mandate from the 
people (or oman) of the stool; the remedy actually put into 
effect went beyond that normally required by custom, since the 
elders and councillors of the stool are expected to watch the 
interests of the people. Although the elders, councillors, 
etc., of the stool have such powers in regard to alienation, 
yet the elders by themselves cannot sell stool-property: if a
chief is obdurate and refuses, then no doubt the remedy is to 
destool him.
Although, when stool property is the subject of dealings, 
it is customary to call the council together for a meeting at
45. Case A. 37: op. cit., pp. 59 et seq.
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which the decision is taken, anddespite the fact that many 
conveyances recite that the "chief of so-and-so (conveys) with 
the consent of his Elders and Councillors, whose consent and 
concurrence is necessary according to native custom1*, or some 
such words, yet it appears unnecessary for all the elders to 
join actively in the conveyance; and usually only a repres­
entative selection of their signatures (if a deed is in quest­
ion) is taken. The recital is not conclusive, but it estab­
lishes a presumption. It is possible for the stool to delegate 
some or all of its powers of management of stool property; and 
it may authorize, for instance, an agent to conduct all deal­
ings with its lands, including that of sale. Persons appointed 
caretakers for the stool cannot sell unless expressly author­
ized. The question of parties to a sale is more fully con- 
46sidered below.
It should not be forgotten that where a subordinate stool
is vendor, then the consent or confirmation of Its superior
47stool may be required; and that when a Paramount Stool disposes 
of land within its dominions outright, this may be a matter 
for the State Council, and not merely for the smaller body of
46. At p. 333 et seq.
47. Cf. Ratt. A.L.C. 356: where a sub-stool sold, It could
do so only "with the consent of the Head Stool and of
his (the sub-Stool's) councillors, and in the latter 
case the alienation could only be to someone who was
a subject of the Head Stool.11
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councillors round the Paramount Chief*
B. THE FAMILY AS VEKDOR.
The family may sell family property which it owns or con­
trols, whatever the nature or size of their interest; and to-
49
day they operate in this regard as freely as any individual.
The right or power is subject, where necessary, to notice to 
or permission from the stool, primarily where a stool is the 
owner of the absolute title in the land concerned. This limit­
ation cannot apply where no stool enjoys the absolute interest 
50
in the land* Consents and permissions from stools and others
51
are examined below.
It i3 necessary to examine the general statement that "the 
family may sell family property” in order to find out what is 
meant in this context by "family” and "family property". The
48. Cf. Ratt. ibid: "The Head Stool /which actually owned 
the land/ could /cCispose of the land/ only with the full 
consent and approval of the heads (Chief and Queen- 
Mother) and councillors of the Stool."
49. Sarbah, F.C.L. 79, seems to make this right subject to 
the sale's being necessary or justifiable (because of
, family debts, etc.) or beneficial. Today, at any rate, 
the power Is unqualified.
50# But an unreported judgement of Jackson. J., goes in a 
contrary sense, for he declares that: "sales of family 
land were by ancient custom wholly unknown, and that 
at the highest it was an alienation of the user of the 
land”. This is, with respect, too wide.
51. See: pp. 334-338.
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extent and basis of the family are considered in the Chapter 
52
on THE FAMILY; as also the various categories of family prop­
erty, But certain points must be raised, especially here.
The first is the position of the head of the family in 
relation to the sale or other alienation of family property. 
What are his powers in relation to sale? The head, as such, 
is entrusted with the general management of the family prop­
erty in.the wide sense, and will at least initiate dealings 
with it. How far do his powers of management go? Can he
sell the family-property of his own motion, and without the
53
knowledge of the family? He cannot do this; the usual an­
swer received from informants is that the head of the family
54
may sell only with the consent of the family first obtained.
But this answer is not entirely accurate, since the head is not 
owner of the family-property: it is the family which own it.
52. See ante at pp. 192-196.
53. Sar. F.C#L# 79: ’’Neither the head of the family acting
alone nor the senior members, of a family acting alone can 
make any valid alienation or give title to any family 
property whatsoever.” And ”... although an alienation may 
be necessary for some family purpose, or for the discharge 
of a family obligation, nevertheless, unless confirmed by 
the senior or principal members of the family, such 
alienation is revocable.”
Information from Akwapim, Akropong; ”The head of the 
family must always have the consent of the family before 
selling. Even if the sale is a forced one, he must have
- the consent of the whole family (and not merely of one or
two members).”
54. Cf., e.g., ”the head of the family may sell with the con­
sent of all the members of the family”: Assin Apimanim.
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For greater convenience they have delegated their powers of 
day-to-day management to the head; but when the head appar­
ently sells with the consent of the family, it is not the head 
who is the vendor, but the family. Perhaps the head alone 
will appear in a conveyance as a party: even so he is acting
in his representative, and not his personal, capacity -if he 
appears in his own right he cannot sell.
There is a suggestion by Hayes Redwar, J. in the case of
55
Abba Galsiwa v. Kwa Akraba (reported by Sarbah) that there is
an exception to the general rule that the consent of the family
(more correctly, their authorization) is necessary before the 
head may sell family property. The learned justice said:
WI am satisfied of the existence of the native 
custom of the head of the family being en­
titled to sell family land without the con­
currence of the members of the family, when 
the head of the family has asked the members 
to contribute to the expense of litigation 
in defence of the family land and they have 
refused to contribute.1
\
Three of the referees in the case gave it as their opinion 
that the family should have been notified of the intention to
e g
sell the property before selling. Sarbah, appears to support 
this statement; but information from Akwapim, quoted ante 
(at p. 318, n. 53) tends to disprove it. It will be noted
55. (1896) F.L.R. 94.
56. F.C.L. 78; but note the apparent contradiction with 
the passage cited above.
I did not meet any such custom as alleged in the 
course of my investigations.
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that Sarbah talks of the question of "confirmation” of the sale 
by members of the family post hoc: this raises a somewhat
different point involving questions of ”equity” and "estoppel”, 
as those terms have been used in, for instance, dealing with 
cases involving long possession or laches*
What is meant by the phrase: "with the consent of the
1
family"? The practice of different families in the Gold Coast 
varies, since each family tends to evolve its own conventions 
for its family life; but one may say in general that the like­
liest variations are:
(i) a family meeting is called, and the decision
57
taken to sell (this is the most formal);
j
(ii) the head consults the senior members of the
58family, formally or informally. j
:
When the first alternative is adopted, the family meet in the
same way as they would for the election of a new head. It will i
be noted that some information says that all the family must j
59
agree, and other that only the senior members need be consulted.
57. So it was said that the head of the family "convenes a 
meeting”: Manso; and see Sar. F.C.L. 91.
58. The head consults "other responsible members of the family 
(i.e., the senior persons in each section). If they 
agree, the house will be sold”: Mankessim.
"The head of the family consults near relatives on a 
sale”: Cape Coast.
”.. .with the consent of or notice to all the principal 
members of the family": Sar. F.C.L. 90.
59. ”'Senior and responsible1 members of the family are con­
sulted for important family dealings, e.g. ..sale of 
family property": Cape Coast.
"If it was desired to sell the (family) land, it would be 
necessary to ask the senior members of the family"L Essiam.
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The custom varies. It usually depends on circumstances within
the family, and personal facts: such considerations as the
absence of a member in a distant place, the age, position and
worth of a member, will all be taken into account if after the
sale one of the family objects that he was never informed about
the proposed salef^
Must all the family (i.e., those who have been consulted,
informed, or are present at the meeting) agree to the sale?
Again, either the custom or the information varies. In some
61
places It was stated that the decision must be unanimous.
Elsewhere a majority decision is taken; or one or two dissent-
62ients, if of little position In the family, will be ignored.
63
As has been shown in the chapter on THE FAMILY, property 
may be reserved within sections or sub-line ages of a family, 
and Its use reserved to them alone. It seems to be a general
60. "Before a sale, the more distant relatives are consulted. 
Absent members are asked for their comments, though their 
absence does not vitiate the decision of the present 
members": Cape Coast. . \
"The greater part of" the family, should be consulted, 
according to Sar. F.C.L. 90.
And in Awortchie v. Eshon. F.C.L. 171, it is said that 
, "as many members as could be got should represent the 
family".
61. E.g., ttA majority is not enough: there must be unanimity":
Asikuma.
62. E.g., "if one member of the family Is not present, or dis­
agrees, the head will still have a right to sell": Manso. 
And: "If the majority agree, the house is sold":Cape Coast.
63. See p. 225 ante.
322
rule that where this is the case that section may engage in 
less important dealings with the property, hut for major opera­
tions - such as sale - the formal consent of the whole family 
is necessary, although the initiative comes from the section.
It was strongly denied that one section can by itself sell
tt tt 6 4section property . The only exception given was where there 
was a split between two houses of a family, and they thence­
forth go their own ways. In such a case, two new families are 
set up, and the former section acquires complete powers of 
alienation over Its own property;
What may happen in some cases is that the section elder 
informs the head of the family that he wishes to dispose of 
some of the section property; the head then informs the elders 
of the other sections of the family. Once approval has been 
given, the section goes ahead with the sale, in somewhat an 
analogous manner to the individual holder of inherited property 
authorized by the family to alienate It.
Can the family - If they agree together - sell family prop­
erty without the consent or the co-operation of the head of
66
the family? Sarbah denies the possibility; and, although I am
64. MOne section cannot sell by itself”: Essiam; and similar 
information from Akwapim.
65. Information from, inter alia. New Juaben.
And cf. the case of Fordjuor v. Ayakwa: (1950) (Unreportad) 
New Juaben A Court, Suit No. 75/50, cited under THE FAMILY 
(at p. 228 (90) ante).
66. F.C.L. 79.
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not aware of actual instances, from my own experience it 
appears that the more usual course in such circumstances would 
be for the family to attempt to persuade the head to fall in 
with their wishes; if the persuasion fails, then he might 
perhaps be deposed, and a more amenable head appointed*
C. THE INDIVIDUAL AS VENDOR,
The power of the individual to sell can be considered
from two angles, according as one views him as a member of a
family, or as a subject of a stool. The restrictions on the
power of a citizen to sell are naturally similar to those which
exist in the ca3e of a family vis-a-vis the stool: both are
67
considered in detail below. It is sufficient to remark here 
that in general, when a citizen alienates his interest, he 
passes only a limited interest if the absolute interest is 
vested in a stool?**
Further restrictions also exist for the individual dealing 
with “his11 property, since his family also have rights and pri­
vileges in this regard. It is a fairly recent novelty to find 
an individual either possessing anything vendible, or having
67. At pp. 335-6.
68. ”A sale by a private individual ... is a sale only of the 
agricultural rights possessed by the individual and does 
not affect the ownership of the land.”: Warrington, 37;
(i.e., unless authorized to sell the absolute interest by 
the land-owning stool). But this does not apply where a 
private Individual is himself owner of the absolute 
interest.
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the power to sell it, since in former times - when the family 
was the unit of land-holding and enterprise more than it is 
today - he had nothing much that a purchaser would care to take. 
One finds at the present day that an individual may wish to 
dispose of three different kinds of property:
(1) property self acquired;
(2) property created by himself but on land belonging 
to his family; and lastly
(3) inherited or ancestral property.
Let us consider the disposal of these three in turn.
1. SELF-ACQUIRED PROPERTY.
Typical instances of this are a farm made by an individual 
on land which he has either cleared from virgin forest, bought, 
begged, or been given by a land-owner other than his family; 
and houses built or bought by an individual and standing on 
land not belonging to his family; finally, chattels of various 
kinds acquired by the individual's own efforts or cash.
During the life of the individual such property is his own, 
the fruits of which he may freely dispose of as he pleases.
There are certain restrictions on alienation (e.g. by gift) 
sometimes found, but these seldom if ever apply to the sale of 
the property. The reason is that on the death of the owner 
self-acquired property not otherwise disposed of becomes - as 
to title - family property. Hence the family stand to lose
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their rights in futuro by a voluntary transfer of the property
to another during the lifetime of the acquirer* But if the
property passes only for money, then theoretically the family
is not the loser thereby* Whether notice to the family is
69
required or not, it is often a wise precaution to give them 
notice, or obtain them or their signatures in witness of the 
transaction, since this will prevent the family or the success­
or from disputing the validity of the sale on the decease of 
70the vendor* As a further precaution against litigation the 
Nifahene of New Juaben has introduced a local rule that all 
pledges and sales made by citizens in his Division are to be 
taken before the Chief for countersignature by him* The Chief 
satisfies himself that the owner is entitled to sell: he does
this by enquiry from the head of the transferor's family*
Members of the transferor's family are called also to sign the 
document (if any) of transfer as ancillary witnesses* This 
prevents the family coming later and proving, or attempting to 
prove, that the property sold was really family property* This 
i modest attempt at control and quasi-registration is worthy of 
notice and perhaps of emulation.
69. Cf. Ratt. A.L.C. 338, who maintains that no consent or 
notice is theoretically required*
70* The kindred of the vendor will be informed that they may 
be witnesses of the transaction: Ratt. A.L.C. 356, note 1;
wIf the property is self-acquired, he (the vendor) need not 
inform the family first, although he usually does so”:Bekwai, 
Sometimes the individual will send a bottle of rum to the
head of his family after the sale, and out of the proceeds 
of the sale*
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It must be stressed that even if the individual is req­
uired or expected to consult the family before selling, or give 
notice to them before or after, it is he alone who has the 
power to make title; the family have no such powers, as they 
have no present interest in the property. At most, then, the 
individual's power of sale is fettered; but the power remains. 
In the more sophisticated districts individuals commonly sell 
today without consulting their families first; and even in
71
other districts this seems to be the more usual practice today.
I have to thank Professor Vesey-FitsGerald for drawing my
attention to a parallel in the Hindu Law of India. The Mitak-
" c ^  ' shara lays down that the consent of the sons Is required before
a father may dispose of his self-acquired immovables or slaves.
In practice, however, the British courts departed from this
strict requirement, and allowed a more liberal power of aliena-
72tion of all self-acquired property.
2. A FARM OR HOUSE MADE BY AN INDIVIDUAL ON FAMILY LAND.
The case envisaged here is that of the member of a family 
who makes a farm or builds a house on family land. In the case 
of a farm, the land Is a "farmstead” or land formerly fanted
71. Opinion in Ashanti seemed to be equally divided between 
the view that notice is required, either before or after, 
and the view that no notice is required. Lack of notice 
can always be cured after the event, and it does not 
avoid the sale.
72. Col. Mit. 1.1.27; ibid. 28.
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and now lying fallow. In this the family still retain an 
interest. The case is even stronger in those areas where an 
absolute interest in land is recognized in favour of the family.
In the case of a house, the individual has built on a plot 
owned by the family - either never previously built on, or on 
which a family house once stood.
It can easily be seen that the interest of an individual 
in such a farm or house is not on all fours with his interest 
in self-acquired property. The family already have a vested 
interest in the land in the former case, whilst, if the indi­
vidual sells his self-acquired farm, he can sell not only the 
crops and the right to work the land In the future, but also 
the limited (or absolute) interest in the soil Itself, free of 
family interests. There are thus competing interests in the 
case we now consider: there is the interest of the family in
the soil; and the individual's interest in the farm. No-one 
would deny to an individual the right to enjoy the fruits of 
his own labour; so that one would say In theory that the indi­
vidual^ powers of alienation would not be so limited in the 
case of a self-made farm as with an inherited farm, which may 
consist of cocoa-trees planted by his predecessor and represent 
no effort of labour on the part of the present holder. This 
being the case, the Individual should be free to dispose of his 
self-made farm, provided it is in a way which safeguards the 
family interest In the soil. The reconciliation between these
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different rights In practice leads to a certain confusion in
the statements of customary law received. Some informants
said that the holder could sell his farm only with the consent 
73
of the family; others said that he was required to give prior
74
notice to the family. None said that he could sell without 
consulting the family at all.
Perhaps the answer is that in all cases he cannot sell 
the farm without notice to the family, since this avoids his 
compromising their interest In the land unbeknown to them.
Where, in addition, he seeks to pass all the interest in farm 
and land, so as to divest both himself and the family of their 
interests, the family must grant him permission to do so first. 
But the custom does not appear to have settled down yet in all 
areas.
3. INHERITED PROPERTY.
This is property which has passed to the successor by 
inheritance, even though it was self-acquired by the de cu.1us.
73. E.g., in information from Bekwai, Mankessim and elsewhere.
74. "He must inform members of his family”: Adansi;
”He must consult his family": other Information from Adansi; 
"He cannot sell...without Informing the family first":
Bekwai;
"If a member of a family has made a cocoa farm, he may 
sell It, but the head of the family must sign any docu­
ment. The money is paid to the member, who accounts to 
the head of the family, who takes a dash, usually 1/3":
Asikuma.
And other informants from Ashanti favoured notice.
With regard to inherited property the individual, acting alone, 
has no power of sale. There was uniformity of information 
from all areas on this point. To sell the holder requires 
at least the permission of the family. In appearance it may 
be that it is not the family, but the individual, who sells 
when he has received such permission. He may be an apparent 
vendor, but it is the family who genuinely sell, since they 
are jointly owners of the property. Truer it would be to say 
that the individual must be authorized to sell by the family.
75. Mr. Justice Jackson said, for instance, in the unreported 
case of Appreku v. Kwakyi: (1950) Land Court, Kumasi, 
6/3/50 thStj"
“It isrwell accepted principle of customary 
law that family lands cannot be sold by one 
of its members other than with the express 
consent of the head of the family and its 
principal members; and by sale I mean the 
sale of the user of the land as a heritable 
estate.“
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III. FORM OP SALS.
All sales mast be concluded In prescribed form, although 
some elasticity is permitted, particularly as between the alien­
ation of different interests, and between land and movables.
The general programme for the parties, after making sure that 
the Interest to be sold is one capable of being sold, and that 
the party selling is the proper party to sell (and is also 
capable of making a contract), is to satisfy other preliminar­
ies which may be required - such as the consent of some persons 
to be obtained, and notice to be given to others. There must 
be agreement about the price; the subject-matter of the inter­
ests sold must be ascertained or ascertainable. Nest come 
the conveyance Itself, which in the case of a sale of land in­
volves delimitation of the land sold by tracing its boundaries, 
the customary observances for sealing the bargain, the evidence 
of the sale, and the payment of the price or part thereof. Then 
come the notification - if any - which may or must be made to 
any parties, and the payment of any part of the price still due;
with, finally, payment to third parties entitled to a part of
76
the purchase price. Rattray, in Ashanti. suggests that the 
essential parts of uthe formula of sale” were:
“1. The competency of the contracting parties,
i.e., the participation of all members of 
the family.
76. At p. 236.
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2. The witnessing by the proper persons 
in authority,
3. The viewing of the land and fixing of 
the boundaries,
4. The valuable consideration,
775. The payment of the traroma,1
Most of the points he put3 forward will emerge in the course
of this section. In the special case of sales of land, the
78
procedure was described to me as follows:
(1) If the vendor is a stool, the preliminaries are indic­
ated by payment of a "knocking fee" (opon akyibo de) to the 
vendor. The purpose of this is to open negotiations, and pre­
dispose the vendor in the purchaser's favour. The knocking 
fee is paid by the purchaser in person, or by persons deputed 
as messengers where there is a group of prospective purchasers. 
The "fee" is in the form of "drink”, although money is some-
77. In Mensah v. Carthy: (1949) (Unreported) Land Court, 
Sekondi, Land Appeal No. 15/48,) Mr. Justice Ragnar Hyne 
said (although the point was, he found, obiter):
"Learned Counsel for the appellant has pointed out 
-that to constitute a valid sale of land in the Gold 
Coa3t /sc. by customary law/ there must be
1. Competent contracting parties. (Compare this
with Rattray above).
2. Mutual assent of such parties.
3. The marking out or inspection of the land 
and its boundaries, and, If necessary, the 
planting of boundary-trees, and fixing of 
boundary marks.
4. Valuable consideration, that is, gold, 
money, or chattel, paid, given, or promised.
5. The payment of trama (earnest money*) to the
| vendor or his representative, In the presence
[ of some of the members of his family and
| witnesses."
78. Information largely from Akwapim.
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times offered today in lieu. If the purchaser is favourably 
received, then a time is arranged for making the purchase,
(2) At the appointed day and time the purchaser returns, 
and accompanied by the vendor, proceeds to the land in order 
to inspect it. If the land is found to be good, fertile, 
forest-land, the sale will proceed,
(3) The vendor and purchaser will then agree as to the 
price to be paid: their agreement will be determined by the 
area of the land, its condition, and so on; and the price will 
be quoted at so much "per rope".
79
(4) Boundaries are then cut and measured. For this 
purpose labourers are employed, the purchaser finding them and 
bargaining for their remuneration. The purchaser pays the 
labourersf° but when the purchase-prlce is paid a portion is 
deducted to represent the vendor9a share in the cost of the 
labourers * wages, which are a joint expense between vendor 
and purchaser.
Before the labourers enter on the land to cut the boundar­
ies, the vendor pours libation to invoke supernatural blessing 
on the transaction with drink provided by the purchaser.
The labourers proceed to cut the boundary-lines as indic­
ated by the vendor and his representatives. They will be
79. See: Sar. F.C.L. 86, who makes it compulsory.
80. According to Danquah (A.L.C. 216-7) the boundary- 
cutters are usually remunerated by 5% of the price.
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followed by the vendor, purchaser, witnesses, and represent­
atives of the vendor and purchaser, who measure the lines out
81
accurately in terms of ropes”.
The boundary usually runs from large tree to large tree, 
which will be marked by the boundary-cut ter s to indicate the 
line*
(5) Once the boundary has been cut and measured, the 
parties sit down and the price is paid. Commonly only a por­
tion will be paid at the time, but this does not affect the 
validity of the subsequent proceedings.
(6) Then follow the customary observances (the cutting of
planted with ”ntamew or boundary-tree s.
(7) Frequently thereafter today a written conveyance is 
made and signed.
A. CONSENTS AND AUTHORIZATIONS.
It is a frequent requirement of the customary law that the 
consent or authorization of certain persons must be obtained 
before a sale of property takes place. The term '’consent” is 
used here for the permission which a party requires, who has 
power to sell, but cannot exercise this power unless some other 
party signifies his consent. The term "authorization” is used
then the corners of the land may
81. Here given as 24 fathoms.
82. See: pp. 354, 355 post.
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to cover cases where a party selling has no power to sell that 
particular interest (although he may have power to dispose of 
a lesser one), but has to be clothed with authority given him 
by some other party to sell that interest (or the larger inter­
est), In the former case the vendor already has that which he 
wishes to sell; in the latter case he has not*
1. CONSENTS*
These divide into two main classes, according as they con­
cern property-relations between family and member, or between 
stool and subject*
A member does not usually require the permission of the
83
family before selling his self-acquired property. He may need
the consent of the family before selling property self-made or
84
self-acquired bn land belonging to the family. He does require 
authorization before selling his interest in inherited family 
property?5
85* Cf* the dictum in SampiaSr'iSe ors v. larboyoe: (1946) (unrep*
New Juaben A Ct, Suit 216/46), where the native court con­
sidered the validity of a sale of self-acquired property:
"As to the contention that no member of the family wit­
nessed the sale, a building or property made by a member 
of a family is regarded as private property in his life­
time, only the privacy of ownership dies with him after 
his death...There is nothing in record that the family 
interest is in the properties in dispute.11 
84* See the discussion ante, pp. 326 et seq*
85. Cf. the dictum of Morgan, J. at P.L.R. 136, which covers
also the case of a stool's interest:
"To render /ji&le? valid, the consent of the family as 
regards dealings with family land, and that of the 
community as to dealings with land attached to a village 
or town stool, would be required, such consent being 
given through the head of the family, or the chief of 
his village or town stool."
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A family (or individual) selling its interest in immovable
property may require the consent of the stool which owns the
land before disposing of the property. In the areas where the
absolute interest in land is commonly owned by a stool or
stools, the stricter observance of the customary law is that
the consent of the stool is required before a citizen sells his
86 ,
limited interest in farm or house to a stranger (this ensures
that the stranger pays rent or tribute to the stool, and also
preserves the title of the stool in the land itself). It was
sometimes stated that even when selling to another citizen a
87
family or individual requires the consent of the stool: this -
if true - is probably the exception, since in most cases no 
more than notice to the stool is required, and in some areas 
no notice or permission is required at all. In those areas 
where the family or individual holds the absolute interest in 
the property, he or they require no permission or notice at all.
86.,Cf., for instance, the statement from Akim Abuakwa that
"where a native of Akim Abuakwa sells his farm or house 
to a stranger the local Chief must sign with the vendor. 
The Okyenhene must be informed of any such sale.” The 
local Chief must give his permission before such a sale.
87, Rattray, A.L.C. 356, seems to suggest that alienation was 
only possible when the person to whom the holder of the 
limited interest wished to convey that interest was a 
subject of the Chief who owned the land; the footnote 
adds: "the custom being now for the Chief (who must of
course be informed) to take 1/3 (abusa) of the valuable 
consideration paid for the transfer, the vendor taking 
2/3." But there appears to be a confusion here.
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In any case, the rule only applies to immovable property and 
does not apply in the sale of chattels, or to the sale of crops 
(except to the sale of the right to tap palm-wine in some 
cases).
What consents, if any, are needed where a sub-stool sells 
land? As to this point, there is a certain amount of varia­
tion of information from place to place, and from one informant 
to another. Fart of the explanation lies in the differences 
from state to state in who is the owner of the land, the para­
mount or the subordinate stool. But even in those cases where 
it is apparently the subordinate stool which owns its stool 
lands (the Faramount Stool having a jurisdictional interest 
only), yet today the tendency is for the Paramount Stool to 
join in the conveyance, at least as a ''confirming party”. In 
theory, a subordinate stool owning its own land does not need 
the consent of the Paramount Stool before it sells any of that 
land. Where the subordinate stool owns only the ”usufruct” 
(i.e., a dependent interest), then obviously such a stool is 
not by itself a competent contracting party, and the consent
88. Rattray, A.L.C. 358, considers the special case of Ashanti 
as it was; where a Birempon of the Asantehene wishes to 
sell any part of his lands then uthe King of Ashanti had 
first to be informed of the contemplated sale”. But to­
day of course the matter does not arise, since outright 
sales by stools are no longer permitted in Ashanti; it 
could not arise in Rattray s time, since the Confederacy 
was then in a state of dissolution.
Cf. also C. Hayford, G.C.N.I., 45.
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(or rather the authorization) of the paramount stool will be 
essential.
Let us consider some of the generalised statements which
have been made about this question of consent, and also later
89some of the exceptions which emerge. In Sintim v. Apeatu. 
which was a case which concerned Akim Kotoku, it was laid down 
that the consent of the superior stool is necessary when an 
inferior stool sells its lands. But examination of the facts 
discloses that the vendor here was an Odikro who served a Divi­
sional Chief: the question was whether the consent of this
Chief was required (the answer was that it was); the consent
of the Paramount Stool to the transaction was not mentioned, or
90apparently needed. Rattray says that a sub-stool which pos­
sesses the usufruct of the land can only sell Mwith the consent 
of the Head Stool and of his (the sub-stool's) councillors”.
But in Ashanti generally, of course, title to land within a 
division is with the Paramount Chief# Some other opinions
were given from the Colony that permission of the Paramount
91
Chief is needed; but these perhaps are concerned with juris-
92
dictional questions. Although Danquah gives it as an absol­
ute rule that it is necessary to acquire "the sanction and
89. (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 197.
90. A.L.C. 356.
91."Before the sale of land, the Omanhene must approve":
- Asikuma.
"If a Divisional chief wishes to sell his land, he should 
inform the Omanhene first": Essiam.
92. A.L.C. 214.
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approval of the Paramount Chief" to a sale, and traces this to
the fact that “there is not an acre of tribal or stool land in
Akan land over which a Paramount Stool has not inherent right
of ultimate ownership11, yet he admits exceptions for Akwapim
and the Fante states; and even for Akim Abuakwa admits immed-
93
iately afterwards that where a sub-stool owns its land “our 
constitution as it stands at present recognises the Paramount 
Stool's acquiescence as indispensable in so for as its rijght
of paramountry is concerned".
94
Casely Hayford, writing principally of the Fante states, 
says that:
"To him ^the Paramount Chief or King^, indeed, 
belongs the power of ratifying and confirming 
what the subject grants, though he may not him­
self grant that which is given. Such ratifica­
tion is not even absolutely essential to make 
the transaction valid, though as being evidence 
of good faith, such ratification or confirmation 
is resorted to, and is, indeed, becoming quite 
common in modern grants." (95, 96)
2. AUTHORIZATIONS.
Again these may be split up as between the family and 
stool.
93. A.L.C. 215.
94. Gr.C.N.I. 45.
95. The reader should also refer to the chapter on THE STOOL, 
| especially at pp. 27 et seq.
96. "Any disposal of any interest or right in land" for
[ a valuable consideration by a stool now requires the
| "concurrence" of the Local Council - Local Govt,
Ordinance, s. 75 (1).
i
ii
I
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The head of the family must he authorized to sell family 
property by the family; this is frequently but inaccurately 
described as “obtaining the consent of the family”. Sections 
may be authorized by the family to sell property the use of 
which is restricted within that section. Members of the fam- 
ily may be authorized to sell inherited property. This will 
especially occur where a member wishes to raise money, and has 
only inherited property which he holds on which to raise the 
money. If he sells this property (or even charges it), then 
he must be authorized by the family first to do so. In some 
cases It appears that a member may satisfy this requirement by 
informing the head and one or two other responsible members, 
perhaps including the potential successor.
A stool serving a superior stool may be authorized by the 
latter to sell not only Its own limited interest, but all the 
interest in the property. Wherever such a sale by the subord­
inate stool has the effect of extinguishing not only its own, 
but the superior stool's, interest in the property, then that is 
a case of authorization. This happens of course only where 
the stool serving a paramount stool enjoys nothing more than a 
derivative interest in its lands. In such cases the superior 
stool may sign as a Consenting party”, or a3 one of the grant­
ors; but the effect is the same. A citizen or family serving 
a land-owning stool may in theory be authorized to sell not
only his or their limited interest, but all the interest in the 
land which they occupy.
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B* NOTICE TO INTERESTED PARTIES.
Even where authorization - permitting a person to sell a 
larger interest than he possesses; or consent - to permit a 
person to sell that which he owns, is not required by* the cus­
tomary law, it may still be necessary to give notice to other 
parties who are interested in the subject-matter of sale*
Such notice may be required before or after the sale.
1. NOTICE WITHIN THE FAMILY*
According to the custom of different areas, notice by a
member to his family may or may not be required before he deals
97with his self-acquired property. In any case, it does no harm 
to give notice to the family, so as to stifle subsequent argu­
ment. Such a result can equally be achieved by making some 
members of the family witnesses to the sale. The question of 
notice will particularly arise in the case of sales by public 
auction under order of the court of a member's farms in satis­
faction of his own debt* It is noteworthy that there is a 
tendency today to take the advertisement of the attachment and 
sale as notice to the family, who are liable to forfeit not 
only the member's limited interest in an inherited or self-made 
farm, but also the family interest in the land. Normally at 
least consent would be required if an individual endeavoured to 
sell by himself; but in this case there is the tendency to
97. Notice required; Ratt. A.L.C. p. 356, note 1.
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replace the requirement of consent with that of notice (and
98constructive notice, at that).
Is subsequent notice as good as prior notice? Where the
99
aim of notice is to pacify the family, probably yes. Other­
wise the answer is In the negative, although in actual cases 
instances of subsequent notice or consent being accepted are 
found.
2. NOTICE OUTSIDE THE FAMILY.
Where a villager sells a farm or a house within the area 
of his village, he may be required to inform the Odikro of the 
village, even where the Odikro does not occupy the position of 
land-owner. Again, even when it is not required, it Is a wise 
precaution, since the Odikro supervises and looks after the 
village and village-affairs. Variations which are observable 
in regard to the method to be adopted by a citizen who wishes 
to make a farm out of the virgin forest, or build a house in 
the village (either he need inform no-one before doing these 
things, or he may be required to notify the Odikro of his 
choice, or lastly he may be shown by the Odikro a place to
98. But In one case in New Juaben, a sale by quction was rev­
ersed after many years for lack of consent,; and inform­
ation from Akim Abuakwa stresses the stricter view*
99. "Such family disputes usually end in getting the aggrieved 
member who has not been consulted prior to the sale to 
express his concurrence in the transaction after some 
amount of pacification money has been paid him by the 
vendor." - Ratt, A.L.C. 356.
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farm or a site for his house) are observable also in the 
requirements for alienation - at least as between citizens 
(perhaps even only between co-villagers).
Must a vendor give notice to neighbouring farmers or
householders? In theory probably not. But in practice,
since a person who sells his farm or plot will be required to
trace out the boundaries of his holding, he should inform his
neighbours that he is doing so, and get their co-operation.
From the point of view of the purchaser, such a procedure will
prevent many of those arguments which later arise, since alleg-
100
ations of encroachment will be freely made.
The requirement that the stool should be notified of any 
sale of a house or farm on its land is traceable to either of 
two principles: where it is a landowner, then this is part of
the wider principle that a landowner should be notified before 
lesser concurrent interests in or connected with the same sub­
ject-matter are disposed of; where it is not a landowner, then 
a jurisdictional principle is involved. There is a certain 
amount of conflict as to whether the consent of a landowner 
(a family or individual) is required before a person may sell 
a house, for instance, which he has built with permission on
100. Cf. Sarbah, F#C.L. 93: wThe owners of land adjacent
to and abutting upon land under Inspection are in­
vited to be present, so that disputes as to boundary 
marks may be averted in the future.11
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the land. But it may be given as a rule that notice at least
should be given to the landowner; otherwise the action of the
house-owner in selling the house may jeopardise the title of
the landowner to the land (contrary to one of the implied terms
of the tenancy), as the transferee may later deny the landlord's
title. Where the stool is a landowner, then - as already
noted - sales of limited interests by citizens to strangers
require the consent of the stool; sales between citizens need
102
no more than notice, and often not even that.
Those with concurrent interests in the same subject-matter,
apart from the case of landowners and sale of farms, etc., may
require the giving of notice. A stool cannot alienate land
103
occupied by a subject without that subject's consent; but - 
a lesser case - if citizens have farms on land granted for min­
ing or timber purposes, then notice should be given to them 
collectively of the transaction.
No notice need as a rule be given by individuals or fam­
ilies disposing of their land or interests therein in those
101. The house, of course, belongs to the builder: an inform­
ant from Mankessim maintained that the consent of the 
land-owner would be necessary in the case of a sale, but 
not in the case of a mortgage.
102. "If. a citizen sells, he should inform the Chief on whose 
land the farm or house is situated": an Ashanti inform­
ant. - If a citizen of Akim Abuakwa sells his farm or 
house to another citizen, then the local Chief should be 
informed.
103. Q,uarm v. Yankah II: (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 80.
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areas where they hold the absolute interest.
Where notice needs to be given, in many cases it is 
equally acceptable either before or after the sale takes place.
The form in which notice is given varies: where property
has been attached in execution, notice of an intended sale is 
usually given by displaying a copy of the order or auction- 
notice on the property, as warning to all those adversely af­
fected to come in With their claims within the time allowed.
But in general notice may be given orally or in writing of an 
informal nature. Making affected parties witnesses to the 
transaction gives them effective notice. The fact that all 
customary transactions are (or were) made publicly usually en­
sures that notice is correctly given; hence secret dealings, 
such as are permitted by the increase in the use of written 
instruments, run counter to the former spirit of the law, and 
may infringe its letter as well.
C. THE PURCHASE-PRICE.
(1) When agreement has been reached about the property to 
be sold, and about the price payable therefor, the sale is made 
effective by conveyance or delivery. The purchase-price is 
not necessarily payable either in a lump sum or before convey­
ance of the property takes place. Usually at least a portion
104. E.g., in Akwapim; and also “there is no need for an 
ordinary family to inform their chief before selling
their land": Essiam; and in other Fante states./
545
is paid on account to the Vendor (though often after the actual
conveyance has taken place). Payments either by way of
’’earnest11 or as tokens to witnesses should not be confused with
such part-payments, even though these also may be calculated as
a portion of the purchase-price. What is paid and when is
determined by the agreement of the parties; but, unless the
contract expressly provides otherwise, the validity of the sale
is not affected by the question of whether the price has been
105paid in full or not. The payment of ”tramma” is often looked
upon as the payment of ’’earnest” or part-payment, serving a
comparable function to such payments in. the English law of sale 
106
of goods. But its significance is disputed, and one does not 
get much help by describing it as earne3t-money. As Danquah 
points out in Akan Laws and Customs at p. 217, earnest is given 
in English and Roman law to indicate the serious nature of the 
negotiations preceding a sale, and is given before the sale 
takes place. Tramma is paid after the sale, and is evident-
■ i ^ - • p.— "'1
iary: it may or may not be calculated as a portion of the
pur chase-price. (More is said on this topic below, at pages«
558-361.)
As is the case with all requirements for fulfilling ob­
ligations - whether to pay money or perform some service - in 
Akan custom, the purchaser may ’’beg” for time to pay the
105. Cf. Danquah, A.L.C. 217; and evidence from Akwapim 
and elsewhere.
106. Cf. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 4.
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purchase-price; or to pay the amount outstanding after the 
sale has taken place - such a request is not usually refused.
(2) Abus a: or the one-third share: It is frequently
stated that one-third of the purchase-price is payable to cer­
tain third parties in the event of a sales when is such a pay­
ment exacted? The application of abu3a is not limited to the 
case of sales* since (apart from tenancies) It is frequently 
stated that all unusual profits derived from the land - gold- 
nuggets, treasure-trove, sale, etc., are subject to abusa if 
they are not such as derive from the use of the land for ord­
inary cultivation. In the specific case of sale, the logic 
of demanding such a payment when the holder of a limited Inter­
est sells to another Is evident when the one-third share rep­
resents the capitalisation of the holder of the absolute inter­
est^ rights in the same land, rights which are compromised or 
destroyed by the sale. When a citizen sells his limited inter 
est in a farm to a stranger from outside, it Is reasonable that 
one-third should go to the stool (the holder of the absolute 
Interest), since the stranger is acquiring something to which 
he is otherwise not entitled, and Is - by his acquisition - 
barring the rights of the citizens (whom the stool represents) 
to take up the land for farming in accordance with their right 
to land for free cultivation. It is difficult to see why the 
one-third share should also be exacted (or declared to be exig­
ible) in cases where the interests of the stool are prejudiced
347
only partially or not at all, as is the case when one citizen 
sells his limited interest to another; in such cases the 
stool's interest remains unaffected, and charging ahusa becomes 
a profits-tax on internal dealings.
Where a stool does not hold the absolute interest in the 
land, abusa is not paid on the purchase-price to the stool.
Where stools hold the absolute interest, then if a citiz­
en sells his limited interest to another citizen, in general
107
the modern information is that no abusa is payable. But on
108
this point Rattray, writing in regard to Ashanti, said that
(in the case of a sale from citizen to citizenJi 11 the custom
/isJ  now for the Chief,,,to talce one-third (abusa) of the
valuable consideration paid for the transfer, the vendor tak-
109
ing two-thirds” * The Akim Abuakwa Declaration laid it
down that:
nA tribal member may sell his farm on Stool land 
to another tribal member without permission of 
the Stool or of the Paramount Stool, and no Stool 
is entitled to any share of the purchase money 
thereof,”
This declaration harmonizes on this point with the actual 
practice as observed.
Where a stool holds the absolute interest and a citizen 
sells his interest in, for example, a farm to a stranger, then
107. Or so it was stated in Ashanti: Adansi, Essumegya,
Bekwai, etc.
108. A.L.C. 356, note 1.
109. 1932, para. 26.
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the custom is that abusa is payable on the purchase-price rec­
eived. But not only do the proportions vary, but the legal
110
position thereby produced also varies. Warrington says that:
"The custom with regard to the proceeds of such 
sale is different in each Division. In the 
Juaben Division the Stool receives l/2 of the 
purchase money; in Kumasi and Bekwai the Stool 
receives 1/3; and in Kokofu 1/4."
But this description for Ashanti between the wars refers to 
the case of sales to individual strangers to which the Divi­
sional Chief and his Elders have consented, authorizing the 
passing of their absolute interest to_thejoverlord of__the 
£urchaser, the limited interest of the citizen passing to the 
stranger himself. In modern sales to strangers by Individual 
citizens only the citizen's limited interest passes, and the 
stool of the purchaser does not acquire the absolute interest 
of the vendor's stool. Hence, although it may be given as a
principle that the stool is today entitled to charge abusa on
111the proceeds of such a saley yet in practice other methods of 
acquiring revenue from such transactions are adopted; for Akim 
Abuakwa, for instance, it was stated that:
"Often a Chief may forgo this share of one-third 
if the farm is really established and not a 
mere pretence to dispose of the land with a new 
cultivation and little crops on it."
And in many parts of Ashanti today payment of abusa on the
110. At p. 37.
111. Cf. the Declaration for Akim Abuakwa, para. 24: "one- 
third of all moneys received from such sale shall be 
paid to the Stool of which he /the vendor^ is a member".
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purchase-price to the stool is taken as alternative to charging
the stranger-farmer ahusa on his yields from the land (as cocoa-
tribute), or as rent; and the latter seems to be the more
112
usual practice. Again, in New Juaben the theory of such a 
sale to a stranger is that the citizen surrenders his interest 
to the stool, and receives compensation therefor from the Stool 
(the passing on of what the stranger pays by Y/ay of considera­
tion); the Stool then grants a fresh interest to the stranger 
in exchange for an annual rent.
Is a stranger who acquires a farm or house-plot, either 
by transfer from a citizen, or by grant from the stool, to be 
charged anything if he later disposes of his interest? In 
theory, whether the transferee Is another citizen or stranger, 
the answer should be in the negative (since the stool has either 
received payment in commutation of its Interest, or has never 
barred that interest). But there are contrary opinions, some 
of which root in the former custom, no longer prevalent, by 
which a stranger wishing to depart, and to transfer his inter­
ests for cash first, could only surrender them to the stool, 
unless the stool permitted otherwise?'13
112. Adansi: the landowning stool is entitled to l/3 of the 
proceeds of the sale;
Essumegya: the stranger pays tribute thenceforward for 
cocoa, but it is not done for the Stool to take any 
share of the purchase-price;
Bekwai: In the case of houses, the Stool takes no share, 
but charges the stranger a rent for the plot.
113. It was stated that in Essumegya that If a stranger sold 
his interest, then the Treasury would receive one-third 
of the purchase-price.
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When a subordinate stool (owning its lands) sells its
land, abtisa may not be payable to its overlord. In other
114cases it is stated that the one-third share is payable; and
115it was emphasized by Atta v. Amoah that such a payment was 
not necessarily attributable to ownership, but may only be in 
recognition of paramountcy. But in general payment of abusa 
from subordinate to superior stool is by virtue of the absolute 
interest in the paramount stool, and is the price of the bar­
ring of that interest, effected by the sale of the whole inter­
est authorized by the paramount stool. Casely Hayford agrees 
with this view:
"Where a paramount chief happens to receive 
abusa, that is l/3 share of the proceeds of 
land, then it is by reason of the fact that 
the right to possess is ultimately traceable 
to his stool. (116)
?The wording might be more refined, if "the right to possess"
- an English concept - were excluded or modified.)
D. EVIDENCE OF SALE.
Some of those things which serve as evidence when a sale 
has taken place may also be the binding element of the tran­
saction, or else may be validating or essential factors. The 
cutting of guaha and the giving of tramma (and perhaps the 
modern use of writing) serve both to evidence the sale, to
114. E.g., in Akim Abuakwa.
115. In re Asamangkese: 1 W.A.C.A. 15 P.O.
116. G.C.N.i. 48.
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"stamp” the bargain, to make it enforceable, and to convey 
the property irrevocably*
The problem that occurred in Roman Law and also with the 
English Statute of Frauds - whether a prescribed element such 
as writing is merely evidentiary, or is a vital part of the 
contract (i.e., the lack of it means there is no such contract 
as intended) - is met also in the field of African Law. It 
makes the matter more complicated that the use of writing - 
originally foreign to the customary law - has now obtruded it­
self into customary transactions. Again, the presence of wit­
nesses is not significant only as evidence that a transaction 
has taken place, or that a document is the act of a party, but 
may also bind the witnesses themselves as to the contents of
the document, or some interest which they possess over the
117subject-matter.
.1. WITNESSES.
As has been noted above, one of the significant elements 
of most (if not all) customary transactions is their publicity, 
which means that any secret dealing is at least suspect. Any 
party endeavouring to prove a sale will be asked: "Where are
your witnesses?" There are two kinds of witnesses: those who
are in some sense parties to the transaction, and those whose 
presence is purely evidentiary. Where the consent or knowledge
117. One may compare the medieval laudatlo.
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of the family is required, the joining of members of the family 
as witnesses will serve the purpose both of gaining such con­
sent or giving such notice, and of evidencing the sale as ag­
ainst the likeliest objectors by a quasi-estoppel* It is
118suggested by some sources that there should be both family 
and extraneous witnesses to a sale of property by a member 
thereof. It was suggested that the family witnesses might
119
consist of the abusuapanin, the obaapanln. and a: nephew or two. 
Outside witnesses may consist of chiefs, elders, headmen, or 
other prominent citizens.
Witnesses are called in when boundaries are traced out, 
and to assist in or witness the giving of tramma or the cutting 
of guaha. Where there is a written document, even though 
there is no idea of any requisite number of witnesses in accord­
ance with the English law of deeds (or indeed like some other 
modern African customary laws]’20 witnesses are always employed - 
so that it is unlikely that a document without any witnesses 
signing at all would be admitted.
118* E.g., Rattray, A.L.C. 356; Sarbah, P.C.L. 87: tramma is 
paid 11 in the presence of some of the members of his /the 
vendor's/ family and witnesses.11; ”there should be both 
family and stranger witnesses” - Akim Abuakwa; see also 
$ F.L.R. 101-104, and Danquah, A.L.C* 217.
119. Akim Abuakwa.
J.20. E.g., the Haya customary law (of N.W. Tanganyika) seems 
to lay down fairly rigid requirements as to the number 
of witnesses for different sorts of transactions; but 
the number is a guide rather than an exact requirement: 
(cf. Cory & Hartnoll, Customary Laws of the Haya Tribe).
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It is customary to remunerate witnesses to all transact­
ions. This remuneration may take the form of drink, or of
sharing in a small amount of money. Some informants say that
121witnesses share the tramma; at any rate, it is certain that
it is the duty of both the vendor and the purchaser to contri-
122bute to the payment of witnesses. The payment serves rather 
to bind the memories of the witnesses, than as an essential 
part in the sale or transaction. It is doubtful if unremun­
erated witnesses would in practice testify, so that their re-
123
ward is a practical essential, if not a theoretical one.
2. THE! ROLE OF rTRAMMA* AMD * GUAHA*.
What the object of the giving of tramma or the cutting of
guaha is in customary sales will perhaps become clearer if first
I give a description of a sale of land as collected from some 
124
informants. The information relates to purchase of land by 
a group of persons from a stool: mutatis mutandis it applies
however to sales between other persons.
The preliminaries of sale have already been described, 
namely, the "knocking fee", inspection of the land, fixing of 
the price, cutting of boundaries, etc.; when the boundaries
121. E.g., Akim Abuakwa, and many Fante areas; Ratt. Ash. 234: 
it "...was set aside and given to the witnesses of the 
transaction."
122. Cf. Danquah A.L.C. 217.
123. The token they receive may be drink, as when aseda (for 
instance, in the case of a gift) is distributed amongst 
them. The remuneration of witnesses is comparable with 
the "hearing fee” which is, or used to be, paid not only
124. (See next page) /over
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have been cut, then, whether the purchase-price has been paid 
in full or not, the parties, after returning from the forest, 
proceed to ”cut guaha”, which has the effect of making the sale 
complete and outright. The ceremony takes place indoors be­
fore many witnesses. It is as follows:
Vendor and purchaser each provide a representative (usu­
ally a small child) to cut guaha. The vendor must provide a 
piece of fibre or ”string” oh which are threaded six cowrie- 
shells (ntramma: the Twi for ’’cowries”). The two persons 
cutting guaha squat down; each passes his left hand under his 
right leg and grasps one end of the string of cowries, holding 
the three cowries nearest to him. At the due time the string 
is broken, and each is left holding three of the cowries. This 
is known as ncutting guaha”. During the cutting of guaha the 
vendor may make a declaration that he has sold the land to the 
purchaser, and cut it for him; and that henceforth it is only 
to be for the purchaser, his heirs and successors. If at any 
time the vendor tries to sell the lands to someone else, or
denies the title of the purchaser, he must refund double the
125purchase-price. If the purchaser refuses the sale without
123. (cont. from previous page) - to the persons' actually 
hearing a case, but also sometimes to bystanders.
124. Prom Aburi, Akwapim: the Adontenhene and some of 
his elders.
125. In Twi: "Nne me Asiamasi anase Obenteng masase a eda
ha ne ha yi maton ama Asiamasi anase Obenten atew neti 
guaha ama ono ne nasefo wo adansefo yi anin. Efi nne a 
matew guaha yi so mere ton asase no bio anase mepe se 
megye nsem a, metua sika no nnoho. le ono nso se onto 
a, ende metua sika kora no ma no.”
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cause, the vendor will have only to refund the purchase-price 
without interest. The respective parties keep the cowries 
used during the ceremony for ever, in order that in case of 
dispute between them or others over the sale, the cowries may 
be produced as evidence. In fact, it was said, production of 
the cowries is (or was?) an essential piece of evidence as to 
the sale.
When the ceremony is over, the purchaser customarily pro­
vides drink and sheep for the vendor, to confirm the sale (the 
reason being to soothe the feelings of the vendor, who is now 
deprived of his land). The- witnesses to the sale sometimes 
take the hairs of this sheep as evidence of the sale, to be pro­
duced in the future in case of dispute. Immediately after 
guaha is cut, the parties return to the land and plant boundary- 
trees.
It was stated that guaha Is used in all cases of outright 
sale, and whether the land sold is forest or fallow-land (nkwaen 
or nmfuwaH).
126
Danquah, in his Cases in Akan Law. refers to guaha and 
tramma; he says, under the heading of ^Sacrifice to land sold*1, 
that:
11A small sum of money called "Ntrama” is given 
to the two actors In the nguaha,! ceremony, and 
this completes the sale. This money has been 
called, I think by Sarbah, "earnest” money11, 
after the Roman arra ^sic/, but it should be
126. P. xxxii.
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noted that whereas in Roman law earnest 
money preceded completion of a contract and 
was only evidence of the parties' intention 
to carry out promises, the payment of ”Ntrama” 
in Akan law is the final evidence of the ab­
solute performance of a contract. In all 
sales of land the vendee should consider the 
transaction imperfect tbt the cutting of nguaha” 
and the payment of Ntrama are omitted in the 
final ceremonies. A sheep Is generally 
killed as a sacrifice to the gods or spirits
of the land on completion of the sale.
I have cited this passage at length, because It contains much 
of importance for our present enquiry. The learned author 
admirably disposes of the fallacy that tramma ha3 anything to 
do with earnest; but It will be noted that he implies that
both tramma and guaha occur for the sale of land, that the pay­
ment of tramma is to the participants in the ceremony, and that 
the sheep is killed for religious reasons. For Danquah's des­
cription of the guaha ceremony, the reader is referred to Akan
Laws and Customs, p. 217.
/ \ n - 127(a) Guaha:
What is the extent of the custom of cutting guaha? Dr. 
Danquah calls it an essential element In sales of land; and 
this - at any rate for customary law purposes - is undoubtedly
127. I have been unable to discover the exact meaning of this 
word. One Ashanti man I asked, not knowing the meaning 
of ”twa guaha”, thought it referred to killing sheep 
(“oguan”): whilst another thought It was a direction to
the boundary-cutters (“cut here ). Rattray, at Ash.L.C. 
358, says: “The idiom *twa gwan' (cut a sheep) was also 
sometimes used to designate this transaction11 (the pay­
ment of tramma). In Akim Abuakwa I was told that it 
meant “cut the forest”. I wonder whether it is a 
non-Twi word?
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true for certain states, e.g., Akim, Akwapim, Akwamu, Kwahu, 
(even Krobo, according to one informant - but I have not- 
checked this). Enquiry in Ashanti revealed that guaha was 
unknown there today; that this may be due, not to the absence 
of outright sales of land in Ashanti today, but to unfamiliar­
ity with the custom, was indicated by some of the explanations 
of the phrase "Twa Guaha” which were given to me in Ashanti; 
some said: u0h, that Is an Akim custom”.
The effect of guaha: all information seems to concur in
the necessity for it (in those areas where it applies) in order
to make a sale complete and irrevocable. It was noticed in
128the case of Sintlm v. Apeatu, where Lord Maugham said:
”^K.AJ  and another man performed the ceremony 
of cutting the "Guaha”, a very important cere­
mony, which, according to the evidence would 
have the result of transferring the property 
in the land to the purchasers,..” (at p.203);
and
•••there seems also to be doubt as to the effect 
of the ceremony of Guaha in cases where the 
purchase money for lands has not been paid.
The ceremony, as the law stands, does not require 
any permanent record whatever and it is evident 
that after the lapse of years it may be almost 
impossible to prove that the ceremony has been 
performed.” (at p. 205) (129)
128. (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 197.
129. But after a short lapse of time an.English Court would 
apply the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite et solemn!ter 
esse acta.
358
. , 130
(b) Tramma:
Danquah says that the giving of tramma (cowries), a small
payment to seal the bargain, is confined to dealings with mov-
131
ables, and that for immovables guaha is used. There is a 
great confusion of information, and it is doubtful if this 
statement completely covers the question of the use of tramma. 
Official answers from Akim Abuakwa (Dr. Danquah*s own state) 
said:
11 Strictly, ntrama is the term used upon the 
sale of a chattel. The fee paid for the sale 
of land is called guaha ("cutting the forest").."
But it was also stated (in regard to sales of land) that;
11 An ntrama fee (originally a cowrie, but now any 
handy sum, 5/- or £5 or more) must be paid by 
the vendor and purchaser or by the purchaser 
alone. This amount is shared by the witnesses 
to the sale and serves as a stamp."
In sales of land the provision of cowries was originally purely 
symbolic; they were provided by the vendor, and divided after­
wards between vendor and purchaser as evidence of the convey*
132ance. Rattray in one place seems to imply that tramma is
133
used for all sales; whilst from another passage it might be 
inferred that sales with tramma were confined originally to 
movables only. The expression 11 no ntrama" seems to be 
very widely used throughout the Akan area in the sense of "to
130. In more usual spelling "ntrama"; it also appears in 
old reports as "trimma".
131. Akan Laws & Customs. 217.
132. A.L.C. 358.
133. Ash. 234.
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sell outright”; ani Rattray calls sale as such tramma. In
the course of my inquiries in Ashanti there seemed to be no 
familiarity with sales with tramma; but whether this was be­
cause of the prohibition on outright sales of land there I 
cannot say. The rule that guaha is appropriate for sales of 
land, and tramma for movables, seems (in lack of further evid­
ence) to be limited to Akim. Another view, that the terms 
are interchangeable, and are used for all outright sales, was 
given me in Akwapim. But another Akwapim informant said:
"In Panti custom they give ntrama (cowries) 
instead of cutting guaha.”
There is no doubt from Fante informants that tramma is used
for sales of land; and even that its principal use Is for
sales of land. The cutting of guaha is apparently not found
there. It seems likeliest that either the giving of tramma
alone is a watering-down of the old custom of guaha; or that
tramma is standard, and guaha is an Intrusion from the non-Akan
tribes to the East (which may explain the fact that It appears
confined to the states of the former Eastern Province).
In Fanteland I discovered a certain amount of confusion 
regarding the mode of payment of tramma. It seems certain 
(but note the information from Akim Abuakwa above) that it is 
paid by the purchaser. But there was conflict on the person 
to whom It was paid. Three answers were given:
134. Ash. 234, A.L.C. 355 et seq.
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(i) to the vendor alone, or to his representatives;
136
(11) to the witnesses alone;
137
(ill) to the vendor and witnesses.
It seems possible that there may have been confusion between 
the symbolic cowries that were divided between vendor and pur­
chaser, and the remuneration of witnesses; and that now one 
payment serves a double function, as " stamp” for the sale, and 
as a payment to bind the witnesses5 memories. One notices the 
alteration in the scale of tramma (from a token to a pro rata 
amount), which may also point in the same direction.
When is tramma paid? Although there was some confusion
in information, there seems no doubt that it is paid after the 
138
sale. All Informants stressed that without payment of tramma 
the sale was not complete, and if it is not paid, the vendor
135. Cf. Sar. F.C.L. 93: f,without the payment of Trama to
the vendor no contract exists** ;tutRatt. Ash. 235: ”it
was not originally paid to the vendor.11
136. “Tramma is paid to the witnesses for both sides”: Ajumako.
”The Trama is sometimes distributed among the witnesses 
to the contract, as token of their presence when the 
bargain was struck”: Sar. F.C.L. 94.
”This amount is shared by the witnesses to the sale":
Akim Abuakwa.
” given to the witnesses”: Ratt. Ash. 234, 235.
137. It is divided between the vendor, purchaser and witnesses 
in three equal shares: Ratt. A.L.C. 358.
”It is paid to the vendor, who then pays all or part of 
it to the witnesses”: Essiam.
138. Cf. Ratt. A.L.C. 358; and “paid immediately after the 
sale is concluded”: Essiam; “Tramma must be paid immed­
iately after the sale, whether the purchase-money has 
been paid or not”: Ajumako; Sar. F.C.L. 93; and many 
informants.
361
can take the land back. It was said that even If there is an
English-style conveyance, tramma must still be paid.
On what scale is the tramma? Some informants said the
amount was a mere token (six cowries originally); all agreed
that the amount varied; in many cases it varied in accord with
139
the value of the subject-matter of the sale. The idea that 
it 3hould be proportionate to the purchase-price seemed the 
most popular, though often on no fixed scale.
Is it part of, or in addition to, the purchase-price? 
Again, there were two answers. There seems little doubt that 
it is in addition to the price - which makes the use of the 
English term "earnest11 as a translation of tramma still more 
inappropriate. In English law earnest is paid before the con­
veyance is made, and forms part of the subsequent price, unless 
It is the consideration supporting a separate contract to 
negotiate.
Whether originally tramma and payments to witnesses were
140
distinct, which seems likely, there seems little doubt that
141
they are confused today.
139. "Sometimes l/- in the pound"; "any handy sum, 5/- to £5" 
"There is no special value, and It varies"). it was a
fixed proportional amount": Ratt. Ash. 234.
140. My view is supported by Sarbah, F.C.L. 94: "it is more 
usual for the vendor on receiving the Trama to give to 
the witnesses a distinct amount of money".
141. One may note lastly the unintelligible statement In 
Kofi v. Kofi: (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 284, that "there was
no evidence of tradition as to the price paid, whether 
as guaha or as ntrimma". *
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3* ASEDA.
Aseda is included in the list of customary modes of seal­
ing or “stamping” a bargain here, since it is such an outstand­
ing feature of other transactions in Akan Law. It is the 
thank-offering that a recipient gives to a donor or grantor; 
it occurs in marriage, where the prospective husband gives 
aseda to the person giving in marriage, and so regularises the 
union. Aseda is given by the donee to make a gift or bequest 
Irrevocable. A person who, at an arbitration, has “begged 
back” his land will give aseda in token of his thankfulness.
One can see at least some resemblance between it and the pay­
ment of tramma as it now is. In sales of land where guaha is 
cut the purchaser customarily provides drink after the ceremony 
is completed, which is shared by the parties and witnesses. It 
was alleged that this was to soothe the feelings of the vendor, 
who now stands deprived of his land. The empty bottles may 
be buried later in the land (sometimes at the corners), In 
order to establish the new claim to ownership.
4. WRITING.
We come lastly to the use of writing to evidence a sale.
This is obviously a fairly recent development, though writing
has been in use since the last century. It is Intended to
consider the significance and development of the use of written
142
documents in the customary law elsewhere; and therefore
142. See the Chapter on WRITING passim^
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discussion of its role is similarly postponed, whether - when 
English forms of conveyancing are used between Africans - it 
is the operative part of the transaction, a defect in which 
invalidates the sale, or an optional mode of evidencing a sale, 
i.e., as a note or memorandum.
Here we consider the use of writing as evidence of a con­
tract of sale and/or conveyance. The propensity of the Afric­
an for written evidence is well-known; the kinds of documents
used vary from the most informal to the formal. Commonly, a
receipt for money paid, which also specifies the purpose for 
which it was paid (the causa) is given. Alternatively, there 
may be a memorandum that the land has been sold, especially 
where part of the purchase-price is outstanding. Not uncom­
monly a written conveyance in English form is given after the 
land has been customarily sold, the value of which is probably
evidentiary only. Lord Maugham, in the case of Sintim v.
143
Apeatu already cited, pointed out (p. 205) that
"The ceremony, as the law stands, does not require
any permanent record whatever... In small cases
where the purchase-money is paid and possession 
is taken this leads to little trouble;"
but the noble Lord thought it should be considered (at p. 206)
whether in larger cases
"and especially if all or some of the purchase- 
money remains unpaid, a written contract should 
not be made essential in the interests of the 
natives and with a view of preventing useless 
litigation."
143. (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 197.
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All such written documents will frequently be signed by wit­
nesses, who - besides their evidence of a sale orally conclud­
ed - will also be bound by their mark or signature as testimony 
to the sale having been carried out.
It has been ruled that, where a conveyance is used, it is 
sufficiently executed if it is signed by the Chief and his
3.44
linguist - in cases of sales by stools - on behalf of the Stool, 
Where two stools are concurrently interested in the subject- 
matter - as where a subordinate stool has a dependent interest 
from its Paramount, or where the confirmation of the superior 
stool is required before a grant by a land-owning subordinate 
stool - then it is the present practice that either both par­
ties, the Paramount and subordinate stools, should be co­
grantors, signing the conveyance to this effect; or else that 
the grantor should be the subordinate stool, but the Paramount 
Stool must sign as Confirming party” *
Conclusions; To summarise our conclusions on the need 
for evidence of a transaction;
(1) Many of these forms are alternative, but some at 
least are universally present, e,g,, witnesses.
(2) Some of these forms go to the validity of a sale, some
to its proof, some to both. Ouaha and tramma go to the
145
validity of a sale, as also may writing. The presence of
l U .  Q,uarm v. iankah II: (1950) 1 W.A.C.A. 80.
145. ^Without tramma the contract is not valid”: Ajumako.
”Where ^Ehis custom of guaha^ is not observed the sale
is considered null and void.” - Danquah, A.L.C. 217.
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witnesses goes firstly to proof of a sale; although, as al­
ready noticed, notice to witnesses or their consent may he an 
essential element of a sale. Both guaha and tramma go also 
to evidencing a sale, though - as said one informant - nall 
sales are now encouraged to be made with a document, and not 
by guaha alonew.
(3) The courts have not always kept clear the distinction 
between proof, enforceability, and validity, so that one cannot 
expect to find clear statements of the law either in the text­
books, the law reports, or the views of informants.
E. BOUNDARIES AND MEASUREMENTS.
The following are some of the indications of the boundar­
ies of land sold (apart from plots in town3, etc.):
(1) The path made by the boundary-cutters, who cut away 
croepers, etc., but leave the large trees standing.
(2) The blaze or mark put on large trees standing on the 
boundary.
(3) Natural features - paths, streams, etc.,- since it
is often the custom to use natural features as delimiting lines.
(4) Special ^ntome” or boundary-trees planted at the
146
corners of the land sold.
146. The boundaries were marked with rows of pineapples in 
Acquah v. A. & Tsetsewa: (194!) 7 W.A.C.A. 222. And in 
a case in a native court, it was said that ”rikrangyedua*1 
or candle-trees were planted.
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(5) The bottle from which libation is poured (or the
bottles of drink provided at the conclusion of the ceremony
147as aseda) which is buried under one of the ntome trees.
(6) Sheep are slaughtered under one of the ntome trees.
(7) The evidence of witnesses, including neighbours.
The delimitation of boundaries is of importance, first
for ascertaining the subject-matter; and secondly, as evidence 
of the sale. It also prevents disputes with neighbouring 
farmers.
Customarily, all land is measured and sold off a baseline;
148this base is always clearly defined. If the land ABCD is to 
be marked and measured A ----- ~ --------B
D
D
B
then the base CD is first marked and measured
C ________
and the side BD then cut on it
D
147. The corners of a farm were marked each with a buried 
empty bottle in Darko v. Agyakwa: (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 163.
148. Cf. Baatse Angmor v. Teinor Angmor Ter: (1943) 9 W.A.C.A, 
148: wThe custom is that, after the bargain of sale
and purchase is complete, the purchaser's wbottomn 
boundary ... is demarcated and the direction of the 
two side boundaries indicated but the points to which 
they respectively extend are not fixed then; when 
payment of the purchase price has been completed the 
top1* boundary ... is demarcated, between two points
/over
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and accurately measured. The direction of cultivation is 
then along the line DB. The remaining sides, AB, AC, are 
then cut, but not accurately measured:
A . t B  .
ri w
O.H© 4->
The sides CD, BD, are measured in “ropes" each of 24
fathoms (a fathom of six feet or a full arms-span) - but the
149
measurement appears to vary slightly in different areas.
If CD s 5 ropes, and BD » 10 ropes, the purchaser pays for CD
plus BD a 15 ropes. Rope-measure is thus a linear measure of
a plane! It is obvious thatthis measure may produce freakish 
160results. The method is not as unreasonable as it appears, 
taking into account the typical method by which Africans cul­
tivate their farm3, proceeding outwards year by year, clearing 
and cultivating a further zone each year.
148. (cont, from previous page) -
which are then fixed, and Guaha is then cut, and 
that has the effect of passing ownership."
(But whose custom? The parties were Krobos, buying 
land in Akim Abuakwa.)
149. In Tupri v. Wayo: (1912) D. & P. ,11-,16, 28, a rope of 
17 armslengths is mentioned - there is also an error
of arithmetic in the judgement.
150. Cf. Darko v. Agyakwa: (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 163:
MTRopes *&re only linear measures and not 
sufficient to define a superficial area."
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Religious observances: We may note these briefly here.
They lend a supernatural sanction, rather than a legal one,
to the transaction; but they also serve to publicise, record,
and solemnise the sale. They include the slaughter of sheep
151
and the pouring of libations to the ancestors.
151. Cf. Danquah, A.L.C. 217: flthe cutting and measuring of 
the land is completed by the slaughter of sheep, which 
act is considered customarily essential.11 
Also Ratt. A.L.C. 358: "(c) The Samanfo were informed”.
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF A SALE.
Assuming that the interest sold is capable of being sold, 
that the proper parties have been joined, and that the necess­
ary form has been observed - witnesses, an agreement to sell, 
determination of the subject-matter of sale, fixing of the 
price, tramma. guaha or writing, etc., we must now ask what is 
the effect of such a sale, both on the parties themselves, on 
other persons interested in the subject-matter, and on the sub­
ject-matter itself.
Before doing this, however, I wish to consider when an 
agreement to sell is deemed to have been reached, when the 
actual sale or conveyance takes place, and what opportunities 
are given to each party to withdraw either before a sale is 
completed, or to rescind it once it has taken place.
A. THE FORMATION OP A CONTRACT OP SALE.
The agreement to sell and the sale Itself are distinguished 
in English law (vide the Sale of Goods Act, 1893). The dist­
inction between a contract and a conveyance is of vital import­
ance in English law; in Akan custom too the distinction can be 
made, so that, until the conveyance is completed, the title to 
the property does not pass, although a claim in personam by the 
purchaser is feasible. But in Akan customary law the distinct­
ion is not of the same importance as in English law; since it
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seems that even if there is a valid agreement to sell, there is 
no possibility of a decree of specific performance if the sale 
is not completed, nor (probably) of an action for breach of 
contract. Once the sale itself has taken place, on the other 
hand, then it is possible for the purchaser to ask the court to 
put him in possession of the piece of land sold; or, if this 
is impossible (as where the vendor has already sold the land to 
a third party) to decree that the vendor who unjustly warranted 
his good title to sell should replace the parcel sold with one 
of equivalent value.
The agreement to sell is not, then, of itself actionable; 
but no sale can take place (obviously; without a previous agree­
ment in that regard. The object of such observances as guaha 
and tramma is to indicate the time when the sale takes place, 
and no locus poenitentiae is left to either party. Before the 
sale, either party can resile from the contract; though no 
doubt the party at fault would be made liable by the court to 
refund any expenses caused by the breach (and perhaps "pacify” 
the disappointed party).
Once the sale has been carried out, which (in the case of 
immovable property) would be indicated when guaha has been cut, 
or tramma given, in the presence of witnesses, or the writing 
(if an operative conveyance) signed or marked, then - according 
to Sartoai52- it is still open for either party to withdraw.
152. F.C.L. 95.
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If the purchaser withdraws, he will forfeit his tramma and the 
expenses of witnesses. If the vendor withdraws, then he must 
refund the tramma and pay expenses. I do not feel that this 
correctly states the law today, and I am sure that the courts 
today would enforce such a sale, certainly as against the vend­
or who wishes to go back on his agreement. Nor, in any case, 
would the vendor be able to revoke the sale if part of the 
purchase-money had been paid, or the purchaser had actually 
been put into possession. Information given to me was that 
after guaha has been performed (or tramma paid), then the vendor
cannot take back the land. The actual words used in the
153
guaha ceremony imply that if the vendor attempts to deny 
the title of the purchaser, or to sell the land to another 
person after its valid sale to the purchaser, he must refund 
double the purbhase-price. Customary lav/ therefore seems to
contemplate the possibility that the sale will not be respected. 
There is also an idea that if the vendor does resell the land, 
then he must replace it free with another land of equal value. 
Neither of these rules argues for a complete, irrevocable, 
perfect sale.
The fact is that in the ancient customary law the idea 
of a permanent and absolute alienation of land was unknown, 
and even a sale which appeared to be outright could apparently
153. Quoted at p. 354 (note 125) ante.
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b© re-opened. The affinity of sale and pledge was close, 
even if they were not two aspects of the same institution. In 
pledge there was never any idea in the minds of the parties 
that all interest in the property could pass in any circum­
stances from pledgor to pledgee - there was no such thing as 
foreclosure or power of sale. In sale the vendor's interest
in the property apparently passed to the purchaser; but the 
vendor
purehebfl-oP' could redeem his land in the future if he could re-
155
fund the price and some overplus. When a vendor desired to 
redeem land which he had sold, it is true that he would go and 
"beg" the land back, and not demand it as a right - so that it 
would be wrong to talk of any right of redemption. Anyone 
familiar with African usage today would be aware that rights 
are frequently begged for. Today such a practice still seems 
to be common: the vendor will beg through someone else, perhaps
a chief, odikro, or elder; and although it cannot be said that 
the redemption is of right In such circumstances, a purchaser 
would be considered very hard-hearted if he refused a request 
of this nature, except for good reason. The vendor will ten­
der the price, a sum to cover expenses and improvements on the
154. As given also by Rattray, Ash. 236-7, q.v.
155. Rattray, A.L.C. 358, corrects his assertion in Ashanti 236; 
he says: "...the land could not be recovered directly once 
it had been sold. A legal fiction was employed whereby 
it was assumed that it had only been mortgaged. This 
having been arranged the mortgage was redeemed in the 
customary manner."
And cf. Danquah, A.L.C. 218.
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land, and also a sum to pacify the disappointed purchaser.
Such a redemption is of most frequent occurrence in cases 
where, for instance, family property has been injudiciously 
disposed of, and the family desire to recover it - so that it 
will be scarcely distinguishable from the right of a family, 
discussed below, to demand rescission of a sale when one of the 
rules relating to consents, etc., has been infringed. Gener­
ally the effect of the giving of tramma is the same as that of 
aseda in the case of gifts - the transaction becomes irrevoc­
able and permanent,
B, THE EFFECTS OP A VALID SALS.
1. ON THE PARTIES.
Little need be said of this here. One may note that it 
is commonly claimed that when stools sell land to individuals 
today, only surface-rights (usufructuary farming interest) are 
alleged to pass, and that title to timber, minerals and treas- 
ure-trove does not pass. Ex majore cautela where a stool is 
vendor of stool lands today, it will commonly retain by express 
agreement (perhaps in consonance with implicit custom) the 
following rights:
(a) Jurisdiction.
(b) Right to timber.
(c) Right to minerals.
(d) Right to tribute of snails; (this is retained for the
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stool, "but usually when land is fully cultivated for farms 
the snails disappear")*
(e) Right to treasure-trove; ("always reserved for the 
stool, like minerals").
(f) Right to tribute of game; ("not fully enforced now­
adays, except in the case of an Obopon, big game, such as an 
elephant (esono)").
(g) Wator-rights: ferries, rights in river-beds, etc.
136
(h) Perhaps other customary privileges and incumbrances.
2. ON OTHER PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE SAME SUBJECT-MATTER.
Interests which other persons may have in the subject- 
matter of sale validly sold by the person entitled may vary 
widely. The question will be discussed with especial refer­
ence to any right of pre-emption which may exist in other par­
ties; with the right of retreat which may be enjoyed by other 
parties - to cancel or draw back a sale which would otherwise 
be valid; the effect on the concurrent interests of other per­
sons in the same subject-matter, whether these are the Interests 
of the family In an individual member's property, of the stool, 
or of citizens where stool lands are sold; or finally of per­
sons who, for instance, hold mining or timber rights where 
agricultural rights are sold, and vice versa.
156. Information from Akim Abuakwa.
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(a) The Interest of the family:
Where an individual sells his self-acquired property, the 
family have at least a spes successionia which may be adversely 
affected. Sometimes an Individual has complete and free power 
of sale over his self-acquired property without reference to 
anyone. In such a case, of course, the family are in no posi­
tion to object to the sale* Where the family are required to 
be notified first, if they are so notified and the sale goes 
ahead, they have no ground for objection. If a member of a 
family is in debt and requires money which he wishes to raise 
by selling or mortgaging his property, then there is at least 
a recommendation that he should offer it to the family first, 
and - if they are unwilling or unable to provide the money - 
then he may freely offer it to strangers. At times this would 
appear to be more than a recommendation; but it is probable 
that courts today would not upset a sale by an Individual of 
his self-acquired property simply on the ground that he did not 
give his family first chance to buy it (and we have met no cases 
to such an effect). If the individual did sell in this fash­
ion, then, although there is no right of retreat in the family, 
they have a strong equitable claim to redeem the land from the 
purchaser - which they would realise by begging for the land 
back.
Where the Individual member sells his self-made farm on 
family land the conditions are more stringent; and if he did
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not consult the family first about the sale they might succeed 
in a claim for retreat if the family's claim (which is a pre­
sent interest) to the land were adversely affected.
Where an individual sells an inherited property, then a 
sale without the consent of the family is void and meaningless. 
There are today two competing views about the effect of such
a sale. The former customary rule was undoubtedly that the
family had the right to demand the land back on satisfying the 
claim of the purchaser for reimbursement - if he was innocent. 
They could exercise this right at any time, even if they had 
notice of the unjust sale (since a family's title to its land 
is never lost). No kind of estoppel or prescription could bar 
the family's claim. Today it is claimed that such a sale is 
voidable; but the word "voidable” may have two meanings: 
either that it is void unless approbated by the family; or 
that it Is valid unless repudiated by the family. The former 
view is supported by expert information from Akim Abuakwa:
"^The sale is void/^ unless they ^the family^
for many years sit by and allow the third
party, i.e., the purchaser, to occupy and 
improve the land beyond its normal value.
Even so the Courts have always recognised 
the indefeasible right of the family to 
question such a sale which remains voidable."
The latter view was put in the old case of Q,uassle Bay aide e
157v. Kwamina Mensah before the Full Court. The Court said:
157. (1878) Hen. 45, at p. 46.
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"Now although it may be, and we believe it is, 
the law that the concurrence of the members of 
the family ought to be given in order to con­
stitute an unimpeachable sale of family land^-~ 
the sale Is not in itself void, but is capable 
of being opened up at the instance of the family, 
provided they avail themselves of their right 
timeously and under circumstances in which, upon 
the rescinding of the bargain, the purchaser can 
be fully restored to the position in which he 
stood before the sale."
150Again, in the more recent case of Manko v. Bonso. a case 
from Gomoa Assin, W.A.C.A. held that the family must act in 
good time: if the purchaser cannot get restitutio in integrum,
then the family are deemed to have acquiesced In the sale.
The facts were than one Botsio sold the house in question, 
which was family property, In 1885. W.A.C.A. found that 
"...the fact that Bentll /purchaser from Botsio/^ and those who 
inherited from him paid no rent is no evidence that the family 
acquiesced in the sale of the property to Bentll.n But the
Court went on to hold that
"...the plaintiffs having taken no steps to set it /the 
voidable sale of 1885/ aside have no title to the land in dis­
pute." The plaintiffs (the family of Botsio) had not dis­
charged the burden of proof of title necessary in order to 
ground an action of ejectment.
159The case of Appreku v. Kwakyi is of considerable point 
here, although the question at issue In this case was whether
158. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62.
159. Unreported: Land Court, Kumasi, 6/3/50; coram Jackson, J.
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a portion of land held by a member of the family is attachable
for his private debts^since the question of the rights of the
family came up here. The facts, as found by the learned
judge, were:
K.A. (the judgement debtor; exercising his 
citizen's right, cleared a portion of the 
virgin forest on Kumawu Stool land and 
planted a cocoa farm there. He alleged that 
he divided it into three parts, one for him­
self, one for his wife, and one for his child­
ren. The apportionment to the wife was taken 
as proved.
The part which was allocated to the wife Jackson J. found not 
to be attachable for the debt of the husband:
nClearly that part of the land having been 
severed from that of the husband, it is un- 
attachable in payment of the husband's debts.u
The learned judge gave as his reason that:
' if]
"By customary law what family land is apportioned 
to a man's wife with the consent obtained from 
the Head of the Family is land which the family 
are entitled to inherit and which in the law of 
succession would include a woman's children."
On the question of the attachability of the remaining 
portion of the land, the learned judge quoted the opinion of 
the assessor:
"The Assessor tells me that the part of the land 
retained by the husband is attachable in respect 
of his private debts and may be sold, and sold 
outright. He says that the reason for that is 
that the family, by the attachment of the land, 
must be deemed to have had notice of the debt of 
a member of the family and that they should pay 
that debt on behalf of that member or permit the 
land to be sold outright."
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This view was rejected:
”1 cannot believe that this can be customary j
and ancient law for two very good reasons. i
Firstly that sales of family"lands were by 
ancient custom wholly unknown and that at the 
highest it was an alienation of the user of 
the land, and with which proposition the 
Assessor concurs. Secondly a sale by public 
auction could in its nature never have been 
an incident of ancient law, and what this 
Assessor is telling me is rather the /course/ 
which has been adopted in comparatively modern 
times in distinction to what was ancient and 
which alone can constitute native customary 
law, i.e., apart from any amendments and mod­
ifications formulated by Ordinance.”
Mr. Justice Jackson continued that if it was the ancient law 
that an individual could sell family land (or have land seized), 
he would hold it repugnant to justice, equity and good con­
science. He continued:
”That life interest of the judgement debtor, 
i.e., his rights in this case to enjoy the 
usufruct of the land is one which he can con­
vey to another without that family's consent 
and to that extent and to that extent alone 
his interest in the land may be sold. Its 
value will depend upon the length of the. 
judgement debtor's life since whoever may pur­
chase such an interest at a sale purchases it 
for the period of the judgement debtor's life 
and which interest after his death ceases and 
becomes vested in the 'successor'.”
One may, with great respect, submit that there are several 
points here worthy of notice, and indeed of modification. One 
may note, first of all, that K.A. cleared a portion of virgin 
forest for his own use; the effect of this is to make the farm 
self-acquired property in his hands, in which his family has no
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more than a spes successionls until his death, a hope that may 
be defeated by an alienation inter vivos, or by a death-bed 
disposition* It is therefore inappropriate to treat of his 
interest in the present case as though it were an inherited 
interest only dependent on the family interest in the land.
The land is not, until the death of K.A., family land; the 
question is not of the right of an individual to dispose of his 
interest in inherited property without the consent of his fam­
ily, but of his right to dispose of self-acquired property vis- 
a-vis his family; this misconception, it is submitted, ha3 the 
effect of making the whole of the judgement obiter. One can, 
however, take it as persuasive authority of a contrary tendency 
in the courts today In regard to the disposal by an individual 
of his interest In inherited property. (It will be noted that 
the assessor rightly gave the law applicable regarding the 
seizure of a member's self-acquired property for his private 
debt). Jackson J. strengthens the family's hand by equating 
a member's inherited interest with a life estate at English law. 
It need hardly be remarked that life estates form no portion 
of Akan customary law: a member's inherited interest is one
of use, dependent on the family's title to the property; it is 
true that it may endure for his lifetime, and in no case longer. 
But there is no reason why It should last so long, since the 
family have power to dispossess a successor and appoint another 
for good reason. A stranger cannot step into a family-
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member's shoes - for at least one very good reason, that he is 
not a member of the family. It is not suggested in customary 
law that a member may freely alienate his inherited limited in­
terest, without disturbing the family's title; since in all 
cases the family in practice join with the individual in alien­
ating his interest, and their own. The only alienations which 
an individual can make are to his wife and children; and these 
are gratuitous. They do not endure, unless the family consent, 
after the member's death; so that they are faintly analogous 
with an estate pur autre vie. But the wife or child cannot 
alienate this interest.
The attitude of the courts, then, at the present day, is 
that if a person sells his interest in inherited property with­
out the previous consent of the family, then
(a) the sale is valid, but voidable at the family's
option;
(b) this option must be exercised in good time;
(c) it is not exercisable if the family approbate 
the sale, either expressly, or impliedly, by failure to take 
action in good time;
(d) the right is exercisable only if restitutio in 
integrum is possible.
It is submitted that these rules are unsatisfactory, since, 
inter alia, they tend to defeat well-established principles of 
customary law. It is suggested that a better result would be
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obtained if it were held:
(a) that the sale is priina facie void (since the
160
vendor conveys that which he has not title to convey);
(b) that if at the tine of the sale the purchaser is
aware (or but for his failure to make proper enquiry would have 
been aware) that the land is family property, the onus, is upon
him to show that the consent of the family was obtained;
(c) that if tho purchaser fails to show this, then 
the sale can never be validated by any subsequent action or 
inaction on the part of the family;
(d) that if the purchaser is not aware that the prop­
erty is family property, the sale is void, but it may be adopt­
ed or approbated by the family, either expressly, or impliedly, 
by failure to take action for a considerable period after the 
fact of the ^sale" comes to their notice;
(e) that in particular it is inequitable for the 
family to sit by and allow an innocent purchaser to effect 
improvements to the land, thus putting himself in an inferior 
position to their knowledge.
It must be appreciated that there are competing equities 
at stake,that of the innocent purchaser, and that of the in­
nocent family. It Is therefore ultimately up to the court,
160. Cf. Koran v, Bafour Kofi Dokyi: (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 78, 
when the native court held that there was no power to 
sell under writ^ of fi.fa. family property for a member,s 
private debt; and were supported by W.A.C.A.
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if the error is not challenged for a considerable period, to 
decide which of two innocent parties should suffer - there is 
no prima facie reason why this should be the family (who have 
good title) as opposed to the "purchaser" (who has none). As 
a guide to deciding what Is a "considerable" period, it may be 
indicated that in customary law there is no period of limita­
tion - rights are not lost by lapse of time) and that in Eng­
lish law (and in the Gold Coast, if the Statutes of Limitation
.161
were applied there) the period would be twelve years.
It might be of interest to recount what was done in one 
town of New Juaben on local initiative in order to prevent such 
a competition of equities arising. Formerly, I was told, a 
man might pledge or sell some property; and later his family 
would come along and prove that it was family property, and 
exercise their right to cancel the sale. This produced hard­
ship for purchasers. The rule now is that all pledges and 
sales of land within the area must be taken to the chief for 
counter-signature. The chief satisfies himself that the vend­
or or pledgor is entitled to sell or pledge. This he finds 
out by consulting the family of the transferor (viz., from the 
head of his family). A document is made, which the relatives 
of the transferor must sign as witnesses (which also binds them, 
of course). Such a simple solution might be adopted elsewhere.
161. The Statutes of Limitation apply in the Gold Coast to
dealings with land under English law, but not to dealings 
regulated by customary law. (See WRITING, post, at p«68r.
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The customary law is similar where a head of a family sells 
family property without the consent of the necessary members of 
the family* If only one or two from amongst those who should 
have been consulted are not consulted, then at most the sale is 
voidable - if they act with despatch; but in some cases the 
defect is ignored.
(Tb) The interest of the stool or landowner:
A stool may have the £ower ,to_jrescind the sale of a lesser 
derivative interest in its 3tool lands, which has taken place 
without its consent or knowledge. This applies in particular 
to sales by citizens of their limited interests to stranger- 
farmers. As far as I know, the stool's power is rarely exer­
cised; and any want of consent or notice is frequently cured 
after the sale, perhaps with some pacification to the stool.
The power is not applied in dealings between citizens. The 
rule is stricter where a subordinate stool, if required to have 
the consent of its superior stool before disposing of its 
lands, alienates some or all of its interest in its lands. In 
such a case the paramount stool may cancel a sale which has 
taken place without its knowledge; though frequently the para­
mount stool will ratify such a sale ex post facto (on suitable 
terms).
The case is different where the subordinate stool is the 
landowner, and the paramount stool has a mere jurisdictional 
right over it. If the subordinate stool Is required only to
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give notice of a sale to its paramount, and if the paramount 
stool has not signed as confirming party, then the sale is still 
valid; the defect can he remedied subsequently* In such a 
case it is submitted that the paramount stool has no power to 
rescind the sale.
Apart from the power of a superior stool to revoke or res­
cind sales by stools serving it, one has also to consider the 
vexed question of paramountcy or jurisdiction. The problem is 
this: if a subordinate stool validly sells some of its lands,
does the paramount stool retain jurisdiction over the lands?
One cannot be dogmatic, but it seems true to say that even 
where land is sold outright, jurisdiction will still be ret­
ained over the land and the persons occupying it. Such is 
probably the rule today: though it was probably not the rule
in former times. Today it would seem absurd to say that be­
cause a state sells some of its land, it thereby diminishes 
the area of its state; though this would not have been so 
absurd at the time when jurisdiction was concerned principally 
with persons, and not with land: and states or stools could
transfer both their subjects and the land which they occupied.
182Some of the problems are considered below.
There is also some evidence of a right of jpre-emption in 
favour of stools. This particularly arose where a stranger 
took a limited interest in stool land from the stool, which he
162. And see JURISDICTION AND OWNERSHIP, ante.
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wished to dispose of because he was quitting the state. One 
example given me was in the case of a house built by a stranger: 
if a stranger wishes to dispose of a house which he has built 
on a plot granted him by the stool, because he Is going away, 
then he must offer it to the stool first* If the stool is not 
willing to pay him the economic price for it, then he may sell 
the house to another individual, who will hold it on the same 
terms as himself* This really ties up with the rule that pro­
perty acquired by a stranger escheated to the stool at his 
death or departure. Today, when many stools find the grant 
of interests to strangers a profitable activity (not only fin­
ancially), the rule is falling into abeyance, as it discourages 
fresh settlement*
We have considered so far the position and powers of the 
holders of superior Interests in the subject-matter* What is 
the position of the holders of subordinate or concurrent inter­
ests when a sale of the superior interest takes place?
(c) The interest of cltizen-farmers in stool lands:
Citizens are interested in stool lands in a dual capacity; 
generally, as members of the tribe (and thus sharing in the 
absolute interest), and specifically, as makers of farms on 
stool or tribal land (thus acquiring an Individual dependent 
interest). Besides their share in the common title, citizens 
also enjoy common rights in the stool lands, such as their 
rights to collect snails, firewood, mushrooms, to gather wood
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for building and fufu poles, rights of way, and rights to hunt 
and fish* Apart from the particular interest which a citizen 
has acquired by making a farm, ho also has a latent or prospect­
ive interest in unallocated stool land, since he might decide 
in the future to exercise his right as a citizen to farm there.
When stools dispose of their mineral or timber rights in 
land, the interests of citizens farming there may or may not be 
affected. Where a mining concession by way of lease is grant­
ed, the free access of citizens to the land for farming or 
other purposes may be restricted or altogether curtailed. Where 
either standing timber is sold, or a timber lease granted, in­
terests of farmers may be affected. For one thing, the stool 
may have granted to the timber-exploiter the right to make 
roads; and the question of compensation for damage done to 
farms by this, and by the processes of felling and hauling, 
arises. One cannot be altogether satisfied with the stool's 
having power thus to affect its citizens5 interests, unless the 
citizens have been previously consulted. It is true that in 
such a case the customary law says that there is an onus on the 
landowner to replace the affected land with other of comparable 
size and quality. But where a cocoa-farm in bearing has to be 
abandoned, the grant of a plot of untilled forest-land will
bring greater effort and diminished returns to the farmer - not
163
an equitable procedure.
163. In New Tuaben, at any rate, a scale of compensation (so 
much per cocoa tree) is laid down for land taken by the 
State for such purposes as building.
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Stools also purport to sell the land outright, i.e., their 
absolute interest in the soil, both where the land is unoccup­
ied and where farms have been made thereon. Where the land is 
lying unused, the present common rights of the citizens are 
prejudiced; where the land is occupied, the citizen cannot 
take the change of landlord (not a landlord in the English sense) 
lightly. Citizens cannot be evicted from their farms by the
purchaser. These farmers should in any case have been con- 
164
suited.' At least consultation is recognised in custom; the
165
consent of the citizen-farraer is required by the Courts. But
an indispensable adjunct of an African farm is its ability to
expand: the farmer's interest goes beyond the cultivated area
itself to the forest surrounding it. By such a sale of the
absolute interest in the land the farmer's accessory right is
threatened. Threatened also are all the common rights which
a citizen-farmer enjoys. And apparently the interest of the
tribe is barred for ever from realising itself by new cultiva-
166
tion. This is again questionable; and the difficulty could 
not have arisen at a time when sale of land was either unknown 
or not permitted.
164. nLand with farms on it belonging to natives of Akim 
Abuakwa cannot be sold by a CUef at all, except under 
special circumstances, and in that case with the ex­
press permission of the owner of the farm. Once the 
land is sold the native loses his right to his farms.M 
(Information from Akim Abuakwa}
165. Cf. Qnarm v. Yankah II: (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 80.
166. The citizen's right to farm is lost, but it may 
revive.
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If the customary law now permits absolute sales of land 
to take place (a point which is practically decided in the 
affirmative) it is time for the legislator to consider whether 
the process has not been carried too far. One may read Dr, 
Danquah/s impassioned plea for reason, and those of others who 
have reported on this problem: should the rights of citizens
now and in the future be irretrievably bargained away by the 
stool they serve for a mess of pottage?
0. EFFECT OF THE PERSONALITY OF VENDOR OR PURCHASER.
This is a most important topic, since It Involves consid­
eration of the position where either party is a stool; and,
even where neither party is a stool, it is suggested that the
stool of the purchaser may acquire rights In the subject- 
matter. It is also a topic on which it is difficult to find 
out information by question-and-answer; mostly one must elicit 
rules by considering past transactions; and such transactions 
are less frequent today.
1. STOOL TO STOOL.
One is mainly interested to discover whether sales by 
stools pass jurisdiction as well as ownership. Where a stool 
Is vendor and another Is purchaser, then the presumption Is 
that all the vendor-stool's rights, whether of ownership or 
jurisdiction, pass to the purchaser-stool unless expressly 
agreed otherwise. Now to take some special cases.
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(a.) Paramount stool to its subordinate stool:
This very rarely if ever occurs; more frequently in the 
past a paramount stool owning the land may have transferred the 
land to a stool serving another paramount stool# In such a 
case the presumption that all rights pass operates; whilst 
rights of ownership such as may be exercised by a subordinate 
stool pass to it, the vendor's rights inherent in paramountcy 
pass not to the purchaser, but to the purchaser's paramount 
stool#
(b) Subordinate stool to paramount stool:
As above this very rarely if ever happens in the case of 
a stool serving the purchaser paramount stool. But It may 
occur In the case of another paramount stool. If the sub­
stool owns the land, then confirmation by its paramount stool 
passes the rights of its paramount stool to the purchaser. If 
the sub-stool does not own the land, then, if authorized by its 
paramount stool to sell, the vendor can pass the absolute inter 
est and Jurisdiction; if not so authorized, the sale is in­
valid.
(c) Subordinate stool to a stranger subordinate stool:
If the vendor owns the land, as with (b) above; but the
practice of obtaining confirmation by the vendor's paramount 
stool is of fairly recent origin. Hence, if there is no con­
firmation, the sale probably stands, but jurisdictional rights 
do not pass (although by effluxion of time they may accrue to
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the purchaser)* If the vendor does not own its land, then as
with (b) above* The purchaser cannot deny his relation with
his own paramount stool, even if he owns his own lands. Hence 
his purchase is held in the same way as his existing lands, and 
subject to his paramount stool's rights. That is, he cannot - 
as to the land bought - pretend to set himself up as an indep­
endent state.
(d) Stool to stool, both serving the same paramount*
167
This has sometimes happened, according to Warrington.
In particular, it would occur where there is an unredeemed 
pledge, the benefit of which is taken, or is enjoyed, by the 
purchasing stool. The transaction then takes the form of a 
surrender by the first stool of its existing rights (to the 
reversion) to the second stool. Paramountcy i3 not affected, 
and the purchasing stool holds from its paramount with respect 
to his newly-acquired lands as for its existing lands.
2. STOOL TO INDIVIDUAL.
This class of transfer causes the most difficulty. The 
rights of the stool over the land which are attributable to 
jurisdiction and not to ownership cannot pass to an individual 
purchaser; but they may pass to the purchaser's stool. Since 
this kind of sale is that most frequently met with, it is the 
cause of most of the disputes regarding jurisdiction which occur.
167. Cf. Matson, Digest, pp. 58 et seq.
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(a) Stool to subject;
Jurisdiction will not pass, and - as a pure commercial
163transaction - such a sale is most rare* Two cases may, how­
ever, occur.
The stool has pledged some of its land; one of its 
wealthy subjects redeems the land. The citizen then holds 
the land and works it - the stool having no right to allocate 
it for farming, etc. As soon as the stool has collected suf­
ficient money, it redeems the land, which then becomes stool 
land again. This is not a true sale; but a peculiar aspect 
of the customary law of pledge.
Alternatively , stools sometimes sell their land outright 
to their subjects, who may then sell to strangers (often non­
natives). This is done to avoid the odium which falls on a 
stool selling land direct to strangers. The citizen in such 
a case is little more than an agent. The jurisdiction of the 
stool cannot pass to the citizen, and will probably not pass to 
the ultimate purchaser's stool (although where there is a 
judicial sale, and a man buys with the intention of reconveying 
to his stool, it has been suggested that jurisdiction may pass).
(b) Stool to individual stranger:
This is one of the commonest forms of sale; and difficult 
points arise therefrom. A citizen - where land is owned by
168. It is theoretically possible, but usually it is trans­
ferred by Deed of Gift, subject to payment of a thank- 
offering (Akim Abu&kwaJ.
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the stool - can found a village in the forest (i.e., on stool 
land) of which in time he may become Odikro. His position is 
then as follows: ownership - the absolute title remains with
the stool; jurisdiction - he will exercise jurisdiction, sub­
ject to his overlord's paramount jurisdiction.
A stool can sell land to a stranger - even a large tract.
Case A. If the sale is not of the absolute interest, the
stranger may found his own village as above, but:
ownership - remains with the granting stool; 
jurisdiction - is exercised by the stranger as Odikro 
or headman, subject to the granting stool. At the same time, 
the stranger will owe allegiance (personally) to his own stool; 
so a dual jurisdiction may be claimed.
Case B. If the sale is of the absolute Interest, a fortiori
the stranger can found his own village, in which case
ownership - is with the stranger;
jurisdiction - is exercised by the stranger, subject 
(probably) to the over lordship of his own stool. That at any 
rate was the probable result in former days.
Sales In which certain special rights do not pass may be 
of two kinds:
absolute_sale of_J;heJLani, but with reservation of 
mineral and/or timber rights (which will be an example of 
Case B);
sale_of agri£ultural_right:s, in which case minerals
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and perhaps timber are automatically reserved to the vendor.
This will probably be an example of Case As the sale will be 
treated as absolute only in opposition to the idea of tenancy 
or pledge, but it is limited in extent.
Are these two types the same thing stated differently?
One remembers that in English law the limitations to A, a widow, 
with a gift over, "but if she remarries", and "until she re­
marries", have a different effect in the nature of the estate 
granted. It is permissible to conclude that the two types of 
sale are not the same thing stated in different terms.
The history of land sales (in the Eastern portion of the 
Colony, at any rate) appears to have passed through three 
stages:
(i) a sale by guaha was absolute; all rights of the
169
vendor - including jurisdiction - were barred.
(ii) the sale by guaha was absolute, but did not pass
absolute title to minerals, which were subject to abusa to the
vendor, or (but this was contested between the different sides) 
jurisdiction;
(ill) a sale of land to individuals is a sale of 
agricultural rights only.
The important thing is that at no stage could jurisdiction 
pass to the individual stranger (i.e., of the same type as
169. Cf. Sarbah, F.C.L. 92.
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enjoyed by a stool). This ha3 been contradicted, however, by 
certain individual purchasers in the Colony, who have claimed 
that they take free of any stool'3 jurisdiction.
Further complications are caused by:
the use of written conveyances alternatively, or in 
addition to, customary modes of sale;
the purchaser being, not an individual stranger, but 
a group of individuals.
Written conveyances: in general, if the "fee simple" was con­
veyed, the assumed intention of the parties was to transfer the 
absolute interest. This applies only if the conveyance takes 
effect as an instrument; and, of course, only where there is 
no specific conveyance of agricultural rights only (which is 
now increasingly favoured by vendors). If the conveyance 
takes effect only as a memorandum, then the previous intention 
and acts of the parties must be scrutinized.
Group purchase: land-hungry groups of strangers (especially
170. Warrington, pp. 36-7, says in regard to sales with the 
consent of the Head Chief ard his elders, that "the 
freehold title in the land passes. The individual is 
however incapable of freehold ownership, and such owner­
ship is transferred, not to the individual purchaser, 
but to the Stool which he serves." And at the present 
day (1934) the land becomes a part of the Stool lands of 
the Head Chief whom the individual purchaser serves.
But "this system of selling land is quite modern."
Akim Abuakwa informants said: "The Stool never
loses Its right over a land when sold: absolute owner­
ship of a piece of land is always subject to the Stool's 
jurisdiction and the customary incumbrances."
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Akwapims and Krobos) have frequently in the past approached a 
chief - say in Akim - and applied to buy a large tract of land 
as a group. Where a group is purchaser, then the presumption 
for transfer of jurisdiction may be strengthened.
(c) Stool to subject of allied stool:
Stool A might sell land to X, who serves stool B, both A 
and B serving the same paramount stool. I am not aware of 
actual instances of such a case, though it is possible. If 
the sale is outright, then - whilst the land will not be owned 
by stool B, presumably it acquires jurisdiction.
3. INDIVIDUAL VENDOR.
CITIZEN.
(a) To his stool:
A citizen may acquire land or own land situate in the 
state; if he conveys this to his stool, then, if the citizen 
owned the land absolutely, the stool acquires the absolute 
title In the land (which becomes stool land) and the farms, etc, 
thereon become stool property In the narrow sense. If he 
acquires land outside the state, and sells it to his stool, 
then it seems probable that it would acquire jurisdiction as 
well. There was certainly at least an inkling of a theory 
that a man who goes to another state and buys land absolutely 
there - though not himself acquiring jurisdiction - yet bars 
the jurisdiction of the granting stool. This dormant juris-
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diction would be revived in favour of his own stool if he re- 
conveys to that stool. This is probably not true of today.
(b) To hi3 Paramount Stool:
An unlikely occurrence, though gifts to the stool are not 
uncommon. It might raise the question whether a citizen serv­
ing his paramount stool, P, through a chief, W, who is care­
taker of his stool-lands for P, will create rights of care- 
takership for W over the land sold tp P by his act.
(c) To a stranger stool:
If the citizen'3 stool owns the land, a citizen cannot 
pass the absolute interest unless expressly authorized to do 
so; no question of the passage of the absolute interest and 
jurisdiction therefore arises. But since sales to all stran­
gers, even of limited interests, are subject to control by the 
stool, it is very doubtful whether such a sale would be per­
mitted, for fear that the grantee might raise a claim to juris­
diction. \7here stools do not normally own the land, there is 
nothing to prevent such a sale. If it occurred, it would pro­
bably raise enormous difficulties of construction and adminis­
tration. I should be interested to know if such sales have 
taken place.
(d) To a stranger:
In Class I areas (where the stools own the absolute 
interest), restrictions are placed on a citizen's power of dis­
posing of his limited interest to strangers. Such arrangements
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must normally be notified to the landowning stool. In fact, 
the position is anomalous, since the stranger becomes a kind 
of tenant of the stool, unless a permanent settler; and he 
cannot acquire a citizen’s interest in the land. Hence in 
theory certain states deny a citizen’s power to sell his limited 
interest; and say that he can only surrender his interest to 
the stool, receiving <3°pi£ensatlpn in exchange (which equals the 
purchase-price paid by the stranger), the stranger thenceforth 
becoming a lessee from the stool. Other states, however, talk 
about "sales". The most exact description is as follows: 
a citizen has a limited Interest in the land; and an absolute 
interest in the house or farm thereon. The citizen’s limited
interest is not vendible to strangers; but it Is replaced for 
strangers by the Interest which they take as tenants under a 
lease or grant from the stool. The citizen’s absolute inter­
est Is vendible; hence no lease is taken (despite words in 
leases to the contrary) of the house or farm bought.
In Class II areas there are no restrictions on sales by 
citizens to strangers.
STRANGER.
(e) Stranger to citizen:
This case is a peculiar one. If the stranger has an
(i) Ab£Olute_interest;: in Class I areas, where sale
of the absolute interest Is permitted (e.g., in the Colony),
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then a stranger may have bought this interest, and later resell 
it to a citizen. The effect of this double transaction, as 
far as one can see, whilst giving the citizen the absolute in­
terest, is of course not to give him jurisdiction, which will 
be in his stool. Other rights possessed by the stool may be 
revived.
(ii) Limited interest: a stranger may be seised of
property (a house or farm), either bought from a citizen, or 
made by the stranger under tenancy from the stool. Saving 
rights which the stool may have of pre-emption or forfeiture, 
the stranger may sell such property back to a citizen. The 
effect of this is generally to restore the status quo ante: 
the citizen does not become a tenant of his own stool, but 
enjoys a citizen's interest in the land; and usually, if a 
lease was made between stool and stranger, it is ignored or 
torn up.
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CHAPTER VI,
PLEDGE AND MORTGAGE,
A. HISTORY OP SECURITY.
1. PERSONAL SECURITY,
Forms of security have always been divided into classes,
real and personal, according as the security is taken on the
person of the debtor, or on his property* A similar division
exists in African Law, and analogies with Roman Law present
themselves throughout* It is useless to argue whether real or
personal security came first: but the taking of the person of
the debtor, or of his representative, as security is a very
ancient practice* It will be recalled that one of Solon's
reforms at Athens was to forbid security on the person of the
debtor, which had led to widespread enslavement. In Rome too
it was customary (in the early period) to seize the person of
the debtor under any obligation (obligation here being wider
than contract, and covering obligations in delict). In African
1
Law persons acting as security for debt are called "pawns";
2
and persons might become pawns by various circumstances.
1* Awowa acc. to Ratt. A.L.C* 47.
2. See Ratt. A.L.C. 47 et seq. for a full treatment of this 
institution.
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(a) Voluntary Pawns;
(1) for debtor for his own debt: 
in this case the debtor surrendered himself to the creditor to 
work for him for as long as the debt remained outstanding.
This was, however, more frequently replaced by -
(ii) by a representative of the debtor: 
in this case the pawn pledged his own person as security for 
the debt of another; this would usually be for the debt of his 
family, or of another senior member of his family, or of his 
stool or political superior. In such cases it was considered 
a correct thing for a junior member to volunteer himself as a 
pawn.
(b) Involuntary Pawns:
(i) by act of the creditor:
t
who might seize the person of the debtor for better security 
for his debt. At the same time it is likely that he would 
seize the debtor's assets.
(ii) by the family of the debtor:
if one of the family was in debt, the family would meet to­
gether; if no-one volunteered (as above) as a pawn, they would 
select one or more of the junior members to be pawned. The 
person chosen was then expected to submit; but it was diffi­
cult, if not impossible, for him to resist, especially as he 
or she would be a junior member of the family. The children 
of the debtor might be similarly liable. (This practice, al-
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though officially abolished, still goes on under the guise of
sending a young relative as servant of the creditor.)
(iii) by the stool: 
when stools ran into debt, they might (and it seems frequently 
did) pawn some of their subjects as security for the debt. The 
persons thus pawned might remain in pawn for a very long time, 
and might in fact never be redeemed. Their status was, how­
ever, little inferior to that of free subjects of the creditor
3
stool. Whole villages were thus pawned to neighbouring stools.
2. REAL SECURITY.
Very frequently when persons were pawned, their lands also 
4
went in pledge; and this is especially true of cases where 
stools pledged villages to another stool; but Rattray in 
Ashanti Law and Constitution, p. 357, denies this. Both land 
and inhabitants were pledged. It was not essential that pawns 
and pledges should always go together: at the time when we
have reliable knowledge, pawning of persons is disappearing,
3. According to Warrington, the Odikro could only pawn his 
own subjects Ti• ©•, members of his own abusua) in the 
village; and not the whole village: - sed dublto.
4. Pledge: The use of this word to describe the giving of 
land as security has a hallowed history in works on 
African customary law. It is true that in English law 
it can refer only to the giving of chattels as security.
I follow the customary usage, but only for those cases 
where possession, or the use, of the property pledged 
passes to the creditor. Where it does not pass (as in 
the fnative mortgage1), the term 'mortgage1 is preferred.
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and pledges of land were taken alone.
Although theoretically possible, pledge of chattels seems 
to have been never (or hardly ever) practised; although it is 
not unlikely that a creditor would keep an article of the 
debtor’s, especially where the debt was a trifling one, and if
5
the debt was in some way connected with the chattel.
It is customary to talk about pledge of land and sale of
land as two distinct institutions in the old days; but it is
doubtful if genuine sale of land existed at all formerly; and
when it appears it resembled pledge very closely, traces of the
resemblance appearing in the law to this day. The idea of an
outright sale of land was abhorrent to the Africans, even if
6
they had thought it possible.
If redemption of the property which passes is the test of 
a pledge, we find that in the ancient pledge the land pledged 
can always be redeemed by the pledgor or his descendants on re­
fund of the sum owing, whatever the lapse of time; whilst, even 
where there was a !,salen, it seems that the vendor had the right 
in ancient customary law to redeem the property on refund of the
purchase-price (and certainly not less than amoral right).
7
The old pledge was not for a determined period; nor was 
interest usually charged: the occupation of the land (which
5. Ratt, A.L.C. 367 et seq. gives rules regarding the pawning 
of chattels.
6. See, for instance, Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws: 86;
Danquah, Akan Laws & Customs: 212-214.
7. Cf. Ratt., Ash. 232.
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always passed to the creditor) was itself the interest on the
debt* The land was redeemable at any time on tender of the
8original debt, provided this did not inconvenience the creditor 
(e.g., by being in the middle of the planting season). The old 
Akan pledge is thus merely a representative of the customary 
pledge of land as found in the tribal law of many different 
peoples all over Africa,
B. PLEDGE: ITS DEVELOPMENT.
Owing to the effect of the legislation passed by the Gold
9
Coast Government prohibiting slavery, the institution of pawn­
ing of persons was officially abolished, and is now illegal, 
although, as noted above, it may still continue in modified 
form.
Pledge of land, on the other hand, has developed and grown. 
This is a consequence of the increased commercial and agricul­
tural development of the Gold Coast, and the propensity of the
African farmer (encouraged by the fluctuating prices for his
10crops) for running into debt.
Prom the juristic point of view, pledges of land can be 
separated into three main divisions:
(i) A pledge may be exacted as security for an already
8, Of. Rattray, Ash. 232.
9. Slaves Emancipation Ordinance, 1874,
10# Though for the development of peasant agriculture, it 
is essential for a farmer to be able to raise capital; 
and the land is usually the only security he can offer.
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existing debt or loan; in this case, the main aim of the pledge 
is security for debt on the part of the creditor, and relief 
from calling in of the loan on the part of the debtor,
(ii) A pledge may be given for a loan created at the same 
time that the pledge is made; in this case, the aim of the 
debtor is to exchange the use of his land temporarily for ready 
cash; on the part of the creditor, to invest his surplus funds 
and/or acquire a piece of land to work.
(iii) A pledge may be a concealed form of sale. This is 
especially the case where outright alienation of land is pro­
hibited. In this case, the debtor's aim is to exchange the 
use of his land for cash permanently, but with a hope of red­
emption if possible in the future. On the part of the credit­
or, the acquisition of land for permanent cultivation is the 
aim.
It must be stressed that in the first case the debtor is 
the poor man, short of money, while in the other cases he may 
be as rich as the creditor, but anxious to achieve a more rat­
ional spread between his liquid and frozen assets.
The first case seems to be the primeval form of pledge all 
through Africa. The second is a more advanced concept of law, 
through the influence of commercialism; the last the immediate 
precursor of sale.
All three forms are found in the history of Akan law; once 
direct sale is permitted, the last form becomes unnecessary;
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but the first two forms are still found, though their rul©3 
have been made more precise, and more rigid. These last have 
now to compete with adaptations of the English-type mortgage. 
The modern pledge: In modern customary law, the primeval form
of pledge has almost entirely disappeared; but if there are no 
express terms, an ancient pledge will still be presumed (though 
this rarely happens). It Is necessary, however, to keep 
clearly in mind the distinction between pledge and mortgage.
1. DISTINCTION FROM MORTGAGE.
The higher courts of the Gold Coast, nurtured as they are 
on the study and enforcement of English rules of law, tend to 
look for some type of English mortgage In every case of the 
giving of real security. The distinction has indeed become 
more difficult to make, since the terms are loosely used in 
practice, and the mortgage in unsophisticated African hands 
takes on an African dress; whilst the pledge, owing to the in­
fluence of persons knowing a little lav; and the use of writing, 
is growing more different from the pledge as it used to be.
Where there is real security on property, the presumption 
Is that the African parties intend a pledge, unless it can
rigorously be shown that they intended a mortgage. This 
indicates some revision of attitude on the part of the courts 
applying English Law, since the law holds that Where there is 
an instrument purporting to be a mortgage, but through some 
want of form it fails to take effect as a legal mortgage, it
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must take effect as an equitable mortgage or charge# (In some 
cases the parties can call for the rectification of the mort- 
gage-deed, or for the execution of an instrument of legal mort­
gage in proper form.)
It can be argued that the mere fact that a document is 
drawn up by African parties in the case of the giving of real 
security does not necessarily imply that the parties are bound 
by the rules of the English law of mortgages; how much more so 
when there is only an approximation to the correct form.
2. FORMS OF PLEDGE.
There now appear to be three forms of what the African 
will call pledge:
(a) Pledge for an Indefinite period: where A pledges
property (usually a farm) to B for an indefinite period, until
such time as A is able to repay the money. Possession of the 
property pledged passes to B until A redeems*
(b) Pledge for a fixed term: where A pledges his property
to B for a specific period, fixed at the time of pledging (ag.,
two years). In this case, possession again passes to B, and 
when A repays, he may take back possession.
(c) Self-liquidating pledge: where A pledges his property 
to B, with the agreed proviso that part of the proceeds of the 
property are to go to interest, and part to reduction of the
11. Cf* the chapter on WRITING, especially at p.
406
principal. If B goes into possession, then there is a true
self-liquidating pledge. More commonly, he does NOT go into
possession, in which case the transaction is an example of a
self-liquidating African Mortgage (q.v.).
But a true self-liquidating pledge as opposed to mortgage,
i.e., where possession and use pass to the pledgee, is found.
The terms vary widely: see, for instance, the details given in
the case of Anokye v. Abu (referred to at p. 411 below). This
was a most interesting case because here a self-liquidating
pledge wa3 combined with a fixed term; and the native court
12
had to adjust the conflict between them. A similar case is 
considered in the abortive declaration of customary law relat­
ing to pledge made by the State of Akim Abuakwa, namely, that 
one-third of the proceeds of the pledged farm must be credited 
to the pledgor's account until such time as the property is 
redeemable; at the due date this amount la deducted from the 
total payable, and the balance is due and owing from the 
pledgor. The declaration was rejected, since it was felt that 
it did not accurately represent the existing customary law (see:
C.E.P. File 2178/1932). The motive behind the declaration was 
laudable, even if the procedure was wrong.
And again, it was put forward as a ground of appeal in
12. And Rattray, Ash. 232, mentions this type of pledge as an 
alternative form: he says that ”the sale of the produce
for a fixed time was taken as liquidating the entire loan 
and interest.” See also Ratt. A.L.C. 357 in regard to 
the pledging of a river, where the loan was liquidated by 
the fish caught by the pledgee.
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one case from a native court that it was customary for pledges 
where the term exceeded six years to be of the self-liquidating 
variety.
3. THE TERMS OF A PLEDGE.
In former times a pledge would not have embodied any 
express terms - there was no need for any provision about 
redemption, since redemption was automatically permitted at 
any time under the customary rules. Nor was there any need 
for powers of sale or foreclosure, since neither of these rem­
edies was open to the pledgee. There was no need to set any 
term to the pledge, since the pledge might run indefinitely.
Nor was there any call for provisions affecting the payment of 
interest or the destination of improvements made to the pledged 
property during the continuance of the pledge, since the inter­
est on the pledge was satisfied by the profit which was made out 
of the pledged property by the pledgee during his occupation of 
it; and Improvements belonged to the pledgor, and were handed 
back without compensation when the pledge was redeemed.
Today, all has changed, and it is open to the parties to 
set what terms and conditions they please at the time that the 
pledge is given, or by mutual agreement thereafter. It will 
be understood that possible terms can vary widely, and the 
notes below can be no more than generalisations.
(a) Term.
It is still not essential to set any term to the pledge,
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and unless the contrary is agreed at the time, the pledge con­
tinues indefinitely. But it is becoming increasingly common 
to set a definite term to the pledge, i.e., a certain number of 
years or months, after which the pledge must be redeemed, or 
the security enforced. In theory, if there is no term, then 
the pledgee should be unable to foreclose, sell, or sue on the 
original loan. Owing to confusion in the African mind on 
remedies, it has sometimes been hold in the native courts that 
the creditor does not lose his right to enforce the debt by 
action, which, if it is successful, is realised by execution 
against the property of the debtor, including the pledged 
property. But this seems erroneous, as in the ancient custom­
ary law the real security for the debt was limited to the prop­
erty pledged alone. An opinion was ventured by some informants 
that if no term is fixed, then after a number of years the 
pledge comes to an end (determined on principles of equity),
there is no need to repay the original loan, and the pledgor
13
receives back his land unencumbered.
Apart from this, I was given many different examples of
terms customarily set to pledges:
14
one year;
15
for a certain time;
13. Essumegya, and others.
14. Bekwai.
15. Essumegya.
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a term certain; 
two years}7
"an appointed period"; 
after the term is complete, it generally follows that either 
the debtor must pay back or the pledged land is taken in sat­
isfaction*
But in many cases where a debtor is unable or unwilling 
to redeem on the expiry of the term he will "begn for addition­
al time to pay; and this will often be granted him.
(b) Redemption:
In former times the pledgor had the right to redeem at any
time, and this right could never be barred by any act of the 
19pledgee. When a term is now set to a pledge, then the pledgor 
must redeem on or before the date fixed, or he will forfeit9 j
this right. Sometimes very short terms are set, and this has 
an effect quite contrary to the spirit of the pledge as known 
to the customary law. There is no court of law which has pre­
served the right to redeem as zealously as the Court of Chancery 
has done for English mortgagors. It is submitted that where 
provisions about redemption are inequitable, the Gold Coast 
courts should not enforce them. The aim of a pledge is
16. Akim Abuakwa; and see Danquah, A.L.C. 219.
17. Nyako v. Atladevie: (1935) D. Ct. *31-'37, 120.
18. Danquah. loc. c i t.
19. Length of time is no bar to recovery of land pledged:
Kofi v. Kofi: (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 284, (sc. in the absence 
of terms to the contrary ?). And see Sar. F.C.L. 83.
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security for debt, and not the chance to pick up a property on
the cheap* So long as the creditor keeps the property pledged,
and is allowed to enjoy the profits therefrom as interest, he
cannot complain.
fledge is nov; a commercial transaction, and Danquah hints
that a pledgor who redeems unseasonably, so that the creditor
does not gain the interest which he expected to get from his
investment, may be required to compensate the mortgagee for any
20
improvements he improvidently made to the property pledged.
(c) Interest:
In the true pledge, possession passes to the pledgee, and
the profits which the pledgee makes from his operation of the
land are his interest on the loan. It is possible to fix the
matter of interest at the time the pledge is given: it is
possible for the pledgee to leave the proceeds with the debtor
to reduce the amount of the principal, and continue to exact
21
a raoney-interest on the loan.
It is a matter of some chance what sort of interest the 
pledgee derives from his pledge; if the land prospers, and the 
price of produce high, then he makes a good profit; if times 
are poor, or the land sick, he makes little. It is possible
20. Danquah, loc. cit.
And in Kwasi Anokye v. Kwaku Abu (Adansi B. Ct: 1948) 
the plaintiff maintained (unsuccessfully) that a pledgor 
could not redeem before the term fixed for the pledge 
had expired.
21. See: Danquah, A.L.C., 219.
/
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for the operation of the rule regarding interest to work in-
22
justice: an instance may be given:
The pledgee took the land on pledge for a term of 30 years 
for a sum of £23.3.6, the proceeds of the farm for the term 
going to full satisfaction of the debt. At the time of taking 
the land, the price of cocoa was very low. It later rose con­
siderably, so that the pledgee realized large profits from the 
sale of the cocoa from the pledged farms over the period of 
currency of the pledge. These profits were many times larger 
than the whole of the principal lent. After 17 years, the 
pledgor asked for his farms to be returned, since the principal 
had been satisfied more than tenfold; the pledgee refused, 
since the 30 years9 term had not expired. The court held that
wthe terms of agreement of pledge was harsh 
and unconscionable, and must be set aside.
Because he had recovered more than tenfolds 
the principal amount loaned. He was wrong 
to refuse redemption.M
But the native court ordered that the pledge was to be redeemed
on payment by the pledgor of £23.3.6, the original amount lent.
(d) Improvements:
These originally went with the land, so that if the land 
was redeemed the pledgor kept the improvements made by the 
pledgee without the necessity to reimburse him. Whilst no 
general principle of compensation for improvements seems yet
22. Kwasi Anokye v. Kwaku Abu: (Adansi Divisional Native 
Court B: 2579.1948)".
23. Cf. Ratt. Ash. 233.
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to have emerged, the customary law appears to recognise that 
the pledgee can take with him any improvements - made by him - 
if they are easily severable. Those which he cannot take away 
without damage to the property he may still be able to retain 
ownership of, through the operation of the customary rule that 
ownership of land and of the things in or on it do not necess­
arily go together. But such a rule does not apply to improve­
ments designed merely to restore the land to the condition in 
which it was when pledged. Hence it has been held that, in 
the case of a cocoa farm, plantings of trees merely as replace­
ments of trees already on the pledged property go to the pledg­
or. But separation of ownership has been allowed, for instance^ 
in the case of plantain suckers from plantains planted by the 
pledgee. Other improvements revert to the pledgor without
compensation, since the pledgee has no doubt made the improve-
24
ments in order to earn a larger profit from the land.
The pledgee is contrariwise under a duty not to waste the 
property pledged during his occupation; otherwise the pledgor 
will find on returning to his land that it has depreciated 
through neglect.
There is obvious scope for legislation laying down distinct 
rules regarding the ownership o£dmprovements, and compensation 
for them when not severable; but the Africans and their courts
24. Danquah, A.L.C., 219: "The cost of such improvements
is not repayable by the mortgagor...", except perhaps 
when the pledgor redeems unseasonably.
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may evolve satisfactory rules to deal with these points, as 
they have done with other difficulties in the past*
(e) Sale:
It was contrary to the former type of pledge to permit the 
pledgee ever to sell the property pledged in order to enforce 
his security. At the present time, the parties frequently 
insert in the written memorandum of the pledge a provision em­
powering the pledgee to sell the property pledged either pri­
vately and/or by public auction, in case the debtor defaults in 
repayment at the due time.
It also seems to be admitted by some of the native courts 
that a creditor has this power even if no express provision is 
inserted in the memorandum of pledge at the time; but some in­
sist on his coming to court first. Where sales take place 
without a prior order of a court, there is little scrutiny of 
the merits of the terms of the pledge; and frequently injustice 
is thus done to the debtor. It is questionable how far the 
parties can agree on provisions designed to oust the jurisdict- I 
ion of the courts, inasmuch as the Supreme Court especially is j 
always ready to hold that there is an English equitable mort- j 
gage, which means that the creditor can sell the pledged prop­
erty only by order of the court. This was the case in Sei v.
25 26
Ofori: but in Nyako v. Atiadevle. Strother-Stewart, J., held
25. (1926) P. Ct. *26-*29, 87-93
26. (1935) D. Ct. 'Sl-^, 120.
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that where there was a pledge of land, with a memorandum by
which the pledgee was "empowered to sell publicly and privately
in case of failure to repay",
"I am satisfied that the document in question, 
as it sets out in its own wording, is a pledge 
of the land mentioned in it, according to 
native customary law. It can therefore be 
distinguished from Kwaku Adu Sel & Kweku Ansa 
v. Johnson Oforl.. .Tl
The distinction rested on the fact that possession passed under
the pledge to the pledgee: since it was a customary pledge,
the pledgee could, in the terms of the document, sell the land
at once, and no injunction was granted as claimed to restrain
the defendant from selling the land.
Apart from the fact that the customary pledge does not (or
did not) recognize any right of sale in the pledgee, it is to
be hoped for once that the courts will treat customary pledges
<■
accompanied by memoranda as equitable mortgages for the purpose 
of sale, thus requiring that the creditor should in all cases 
go to the court for an order before selling; if this runs con­
trary to the cases, it will be necessary to introduce legisla-
27
tion to rectify the situation.
(f) Foreclosure:
As with the power of sale, modern pledges sometimes permit
'27. Danquah, A.L.C., 219, indicates that at least notice to 
the debtor is required before the creditor enforces his 
security: "If payment is not made within an appointed
period, the creditor may, after due notice to the debtor, 
sell the property."
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the pledgee to realise his security by foreclosure* This is 
not, however, such a popular course of action, and the native 
courts naturally scrutinize it more closely, since it may be 
the instrument of personal gain to the creditors. This will 
especially be the case where the creditor is a person who make3 
a profession of lending money. The activities of money­
lenders are intended to be circumscribed by the Moneylenders 
29
Ordinance; but in practice, the provisions of this ordinance 
are not observed; and there should be stricter enforcement of 
them.
4. WHO MAY PhEDGE.
(a) Individual versus family:
The list of those who may pledge property is wider than 
that of those entitled to sell. Although an individual may 
be prevented from selling inherited property without the con­
sent and authorization of the family, in many cases it was 
stated that he might pledge the property without the family's 
consent. But in as many or more cases the opposite opinion
28. There was no true foreclosure in the old days, since the 
remedy of the pledgee who wanted his money back was (i) to 
ask the pledgor for repayment; (ii) to ask the family of 
the pledgor to repay if the pledgor did or could not;
(iii) if this course failed, to lay a complaint before his 
chief; in which case, says Rattray (Ash. 234) either the 
pledgor*s family satisfied the debt, or the pledge was 
converted into a sale. Since sales were redeemable (from 
moral rather than legal causes), the possibility of red­
emption was even then not entirely gone.
29. No. 21 of 1940; see below, p. 448.
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30was also given. Opinion does not seem to be divided by areas, 
but probably depends instead on the customs of the different 
families. I prefer the view that the pledgor must generally 
obtain the consent of his family, since it has great weight of 
authority behind it. It seems that a person may pledge inher­
ited property without the consent of his family only in except­
ional cases; and then only when the property involved is of 
minor importance. The proper course for a member of a family 
to adopt if he is in debt is to go to his family for aid; if 
they cannot provide him with the money, then they may authorize 
him to pledge a farm to which he has succeeded.
Despite the fact that in general, then, a person is not 
entitled to pledge inherited property without the consent of 
the family, this is still possible and also frequently done in 
practice. This arises from the difficulty of verifying the 
title by which a person is entitled to possession of property. 
The creditor may not know (or may not care to know) whether a 
farm pledged to him is inherited property or not; and in cases 
where inherited property has been so pledged without the consent 
of the family (cases which are often encountered in the re­
ports), the rule seems to be that:
(i) the interest of the family is not affected if the 
property is taken in satisfaction;
30. Evidence from: Akim Abuakwa, Ashanti, Adansi,
New Juaben, etc.
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(il) the conduct of the pledgor Is sufficient to 
justify his being relieved of the inherited property, since 
he puts the family title in jeopardy;
(iii) the family may however be bound by the pledge 
if: (1) they allow the pledge to continue to their knowledge 
for a long time, thus placing the pledgee in a false position 
(especially where he improves the pledged property); or (2) 
they fail to contest a sale in enforcement of the unauthorized 
pledge, after it has been brought to their notice - although 
they are under no necessity to contest it by interpleader action 
at the time of the sale; they may do so subsequently by a suit 
for a declaration of their ownership;
(iv) the signature of members of the family to the
31
pledge-memorandum may bind the family; conversely, the absence 
of any family-signatures will make the pledge unenforceable
32
both against the land, and against the successor of the pledgor* 
It should be pointed out that if it is held that a judicial 
sale even under such an unauthorized pledge of inherited prop­
erty takes the property out of the control of the family (as 
some native courts have tended to hold), then family property 
is liable to be dissipated by improvident members; and, what is 
more, the individual can then do indirectly what he cannot do 
directly, namely, dispose of inherited property. Nor is there
31. So: New Juaben.
32. New Juaben.
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any need for the family to offer to satisfy the debt of the 
member, when a sale of inherited property under an unauthor­
ized pledge is brought to their notice, with the penalty of 
forfeiting the property in default - though this is consonant
with the former rule, now non-existent, that a family is liable
33
for the debts of its members.
The erroneous attitude of some courts comes from a con­
fusion between the taking of the debtor’s property in execution 
under a writ of Fi.Fa. t when the creditor has treated the 
pledge as a simple debt; and a sale by order of the court en­
forcing the terms of an unauthorized pledge of inherited prop­
erty. It has been suggested that if an individual’s inherited 
farm is seized in execution under a writ of Fi.Fa. . then a pur­
chaser at a sale by public auction acquires only the right, 
title and interest of the judgement-debtor in the property, 
that is, he acquires an estate pur autre vie, conditioned on 
the life of the judgement debtor. The view that the purchaser 
takes an estate pur autre vie is not to be recommended, since: 
first, Africans do not recognize the possibility of a stranger’s 
acquiring a person’s interest in inherited property in any man­
ner (of stepping into his shoes, as it were), since this inter­
est is dependent on membership of the family and appointment 
and confirmation in the position of successor by the family;
33. If a member of a family In debt has given land to
someone to satisfy a debt without the knowledge of the 
family the latter (when they find out) can gay back the 
money to the creditor, and redeem the land from him.
- Essumegya.
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and secondly, since a person's interest in inherited property 
can be terminated at any time by decision of the family, it
would seem that the family could similarly determine the pur-
, 34
chaser s interest as freely. Nigerian cases to the contrary
are not worthy of extension to the Gold Coast, even as a per­
suasive precedent; in Lagos, partition of family property is 
an established institution; the same cannot be said of the 
Gold Coast.
It is a better rule that the family should forfeit their
interest only when they have expressly or tacitly acquiesced in
35
a pledge by a member of family property; and in the latter 
case only when the acquiescence is of long standing.
An individual must at least give notice to his family
36
before pledging a self-made farm on family land.
Even if permission of or notice to the family is sometimes 
necessary when a person sells his self-acquired property, in no 
case is it necessary to give notice to the family, or obtain
37
its consent, before a member pledges his self-acquired property.
Where the family is divided up into sections, and sections
have section-property, if the absolute title is with the family,
38
the section will in general need permission to pledge it; if
34. Cf. Ode .joke v. J. Holt: (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 152.
35. E.g., New Juaben.
36. -do-
37. So, for instance, in Akim Abuakwa.
38. In Akim Abuakwa, for instance.
Cf. Chapter IV, THE FAMILY, ante. esp. at pp. 223-4.
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title to the sections property is with the section, this per-
39
mission will not be necessary. Even in the former case, the
power of a section to pledge the property controlled by it is
admitted if, for instance, the property is of little value and 
40
unimportant. Since pledge does not immediately take the 
property outside the family, the rule is less strict than it 
is with sale#
(b) The Family:
The family, working through the head, may in all cases
pledge the family property, just as they are empowered to sell
it. The head of the family must of course be authorized so to
.pledge the property by the family, and if he is not so author-
41ized, the pledge is not valid. If the family acquiesce in
the pledge when it comes to their notice, lapse of time may
42make it enforceable against them.
But in all cases where the family, or one of its members, 
is short of ready money, It is customary to approach other mem­
bers of the family, and only if these refuse or are unable to 
help will family land be pledged to an outsider# Where an 
Individual has pledged part of his ancestral land, another 
member of the family may pay off the debt, and then either hold
39# Cf. Essiam (Pante).
40# Akim Abuakwa.
41. Effiduase (New Juaben).
Edmund v. Ferguson: (1939) 5 W.A.C.A. 113.
And cf. Chapter IV ante. esp. at pp. 220, 237.
42. - do -
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the pledged land himself, or allow the debtor to continue to 
occupy it. Where the family have pledged land, and one of the 
individual members, with his own money, redeems it, then it 
seems to be accepted that he has first claim on the land. His 
position is not that of an owner of the limited interest in 
the family-land, which is transmissible to his successor; he 
is in no better position than the pledgee, and he cannot keep 
the land for ever. The family may pay off the debt to him; 
but up till that time (it is a debatable point) he will have 
exclusive use of the land.
(c) Individual versus Stool:
Where the land is not owned by the Stool (i.e., owning 
the absolute interest, or an interest dependent on the absolute 
interest of a superior stool), the individual needs no permiss­
ion to pledge his land. In other cases, the custom varies.
In general, an individual needs the permission of his Stool 
before selling his limited interest in a farm or house to a 
stranger. Even where this rule operates, it is sometimes ad­
mitted that he needs no permission to pledge his property to a
stranger, although in such cases he may be required to notify 
43
the Stool.
43. A farmer should inform the land-owning stool before 
pledging his farm: Kumasi.
A person should inform the Odikro before pledging his 
land, especially to a stranger: Adansi.
All pledges - especially to strangers - should be 
countersigned by the local Chief: this avoids
litigation: New Juaben.
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In those areas where it is not customary to inform the 
Stool before pledging a limited interest, judicial sale of the 
pledged property may take place whether the stool knows any­
thing of the matter or not; and the sale will still be of 
effect. Willy-nilly, the stool will then be called on to ac­
cept the stranger - if such a one is the purchaser - even though
the stool exercises a discriminating choice as a rule of those
44strangers whom it permits to farm within the State. The 
stranger-purchaser is expected to go before the Chief when he 
has completed his purchase, so as to regularise his position 
concerning the payment of rent or tribute, If this Is exacted.
i
(d) Individual versus land-owner:
This situation occurs especially in Fante areas, where an
individual owns a plot upon which another has by permission
built a house; and also In areas where the owner of the plot
has only a limited interest. Two different answers were given:
(l)that the pledgor should give notice to the landowner of his in-
45
tention to pledge; (2) that he must obtain the consent of the 
landowner?6
Some informants also gave it as their opinion that the 
pledgor need neither inform nor obtain the consent of the land­
owner.
44. According to different informants in Ashanti.
45. Mankessim.
46. Akim Abuakwa: the house-owner 1 cannot pledge without 
the knowledge of the family owning the plot, but he 
may pledge with their consent, and not mere knowledge".
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(e) The Stool:
Whenever a Stool is permitted to sell part of its stool 
lands, it can pledge them. But as in the case of sale, it 
must not do so if the effect is to disturb actual occupants of 
the soil. This category of pledge was formerly a most import­
ant one; but nowadays stools which have fallen into debt have 
preferred to sell their lands outright, or else leave them to 
be taken in execution. The powers of the Stool to pledge its
Stool property are now regulated, for Ashanti by the Stool
47
Property Protection Ordinance; for the Colony by the Native
48
Authority (Colony) Ordinance, 1944.
(General Notes: (i) At first only land was pledged, and houses
would not be pledged, since (a) a person could always build 
his own house; (b) it would not be possible to gain any profit 
from the house, since in those times tenancy of a house was 
unknown. Today, especially in the towns, where the letting of 
rooms is a major occupation, pledging of dwelling-houses is a 
valuable method of security. Similar rules apply as in the 
pledge of land; but the terms are usually shorter, and the
47. No, 22 of 1940; see especially s. 3.
This ordinance has now been replaced by the State Councils 
(Ashanti) Ordlnance, No. 4 of 1952 (Part V), 3 3 . 23 and 24. 
(See also APPENDIX below).
48. S. 27A: No, 22 of 1944 as amended by No. 13 of 1947.
The provisions of this section have now been replaced 
by those of the State Councils (Colony and Southern 
Togoland) Ordinance, ss. 15 and 16.
( See also APPENDIX below).
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conditions more stringent, and further away from the ancient 
form of pledge*
(ii) The pledge by stools of entire villages 
subject to them in former times may well appear to be contrary 
to the general nature of pledge, since the pledgee-stool did 
not receive the right to occupy the land, and evict the persons 
already on it. The whole transaction illustrates the fact 
that formerly it was the persons who were the substance of the 
pledge, the land being merely accessory to them. The allegiance 
of the subjects was pledged, and as they were together in a 
village, they were pledged with their lands. Such a pledge 
differed from a sale of the land, and a compulsory transfer of 
the citizens9 allegiance. The land was not sold, but remained 
the property of the pledging stool. All present rights in the 
land were forgone by the Stool, as was all present jurisdiction 
over the inhabitants. All that was left was the eventual 
right to redeem. If the land was ever returned, the status 
quo would be restored: until then, the inhabitants served
their new chief. Such claims to have pledged and not sold 
land form the basis of actions by stools regarding land today 
(especially in Ashanti). Where such a pledge is in existence 
( and some have been recognized to apply today), although the 
subjects of the pledgee stool have settled on the pledged land, 
it is agreed that they cannot be made liable to pay tribute to 
the pledgor stool, which is, however, permitted to charge
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strangers from other states. In regard to this, argument 
may arise, as the pledgee stool may claim the right similarly 
to tax strangers, and will in any case tax members of the 
pledging stool who settle on the land after the pledge was 
made .)
5, MEMORANDUM OF PLEDGE,
It is by no means essential that a pledge should be 
recorded in writing: in fact, Africans have managed for a long
time without written record of their transactions. In former 
times pledge - like other African transactions - was concluded 
publicly in the presence of witnesses. Rattray in Ashanti at 
page 233 describes the ancient form, which bears many resem­
blances to the form used for a sale. He says that a proport­
ion of the sum lent was paid to the witnesses in order to bind 
their memories (like the ntrama in sale). Today, although 
witnesses are a wise precaution, in order to be able later to 
prove the existence and terms of the pledge, if necessary, and 
are an essential if the pledgor requires, for example, the con­
sent of his family, yet they are no longer an essential part of 
the transaction, whose absence would be fatal to the validity 
of the pledge. The most than can be said is that a pledgee 
endeavouring to prove a pledge today which was secretly con­
cluded would be met with a certain amount of suspicion, a 
suspicion which the use of writing in a large measure overcomes.
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But since writing as a record of all legal transactions has 
become so popular, very few pledges are given at the present 
time without there being some note or memorandum recording the 
transaction. It must be stressed that the written document 
is not the operative part of the transaction. It merely re­
cords the terms agreed between the parties, and may have been 
made some time after the pledge is given. It is valuable at 
times in that' it carries the names of witnesses to the tran­
saction, both independent and interested.
It follows that where there is conflict between the actual 
terms agreed, and the writing, the oral agreement prevails.
Such documents must not be construed strictly by the law applied 
in England to the interpretation of deeds, but should be inter­
preted liberally; and in particular, so as to preserve as far 
as possible the typical features of a customary pledge, and 
equitably, so as not to cast injustice on either party. Since 
the writing accompanying a pledge is only a note of the oral 
agreement, such writings are very various in form. Frequently, 
indeed, they do not appear to record a pledge at all, or if 
they do, merely as an afterthought. It is especially common 
to make the writing in the form of a receipt for the loan 
granted in respect of the pledge; and then to record lower 
down that such-and-such land has been pledged to the creditor 
as security for the loan. Even where legal terms are intro­
duced into such a writing, they are not to be construed in an
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exact manner, as if the parties fully comprehended all that the
English Lav/ understands by such terms. The rule is therefore
different from that which applies in England to wills, where
the aim of the court which is interpreting a will is to fulfil
the intentions of the testator - even where informal language
is used - holding, however, that if he employs legal terms,
these must be construed strictly.
Memoranda of this kind are frequently drawn up by letter-
writers, lawyers* clerks, and others who have little or no
acquaintance with the law. Where they have some acquaintance,
49
the result is often more disastrous than when they have none.
6. EFFECTS OF THE PLEDGE.
(a) On the debt?
Whilst the pledge is in operation it might be maintained
that the normal action by which a creditor might recover his
debt, by action, is not open to him, i.e., he cannot, ignoring
the existence of a pledge, sue on the debt. Once the term of
the pledge has expired, he can no doubt sue either on the
50
pledge, or on the debt. In English law a creditor can, of 
course, once the contractual period for repayment has expired, 
ignore the mortgage and sue for the debt on the covenant to
49. See the chapter on WRITING for a fuller consideration 
of the effect to be given to such documents, especially 
at pp. 678 et seq.
50. Where the pledge is for a definite term, then the creditor, 
when the date is due, may sue for the loan; but frequently 
makes a fresh arrangement (New Huaben).
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repay. In customary law the pledge Is the record of an agree­
ment to give the debtor time to pay, coupled with the giving of 
property as security. Where the pledge is for no certain term,
then the custom seems today to be that the creditor can sue at
51
any time on the debt itself, ignoring the pledge.
(b) On other property of the debtor:
Although it appears somewhat inequitable that where the
creditor has received real security for the debt, he should be
able to ignore the pledge, and sue on the debt, which he may
satisfy by execution against other property of the debtor, the
custom is for him - if he wishes - to satisfy himself out of
other property of the pledgor; and he will do so particularly
where the pledged property has declined in value. In olden
time3, a pledgee would not have been able to take any action
52
against other property of the debtor.
(c) Sale or foreclosure: its effects:
Of these, sale is by far the more common. Where the prop­
erty pledged is sold in default of redemption at the due date,
it appears that in some cases the practice has sprung up of the
creditor's taking and keeping the whole proceeds of the sale. 
That is, where a property worth £100 is pledged for a debt of 
£10, if sale of the pledge takes place, the creditor keeps the
51. Where the pledge is for an indefinite period, then 
(acc. to New Juaben) the pledgee cannot sue for the 
loan (until the pledgor is in a position to repay?).
52. Cf. Sarbah, F.C.L., 84.
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whole £100, after paying expenses to the auctioneer. Such a 
course is obviously inequitable and wrong: it is likelier to
happen where the sale is not by order of any court, and usually 
indicates collusion between the creditor and an unscrupulous 
auctioneer, the creditor buying in at a low price, or else 
pocketing the proceeds of a sale to a third party.
When a person pledged a farm formerly, he could be sure 
that when the debt was satisfied, he would receive back the 
pledged property entire; .that is, his expenses were limited 
to the amount of the loan. Today he should receive back the 
balance after deduction of
(i) the amount of the principal;
(ii) accrued interest, if any;
(iii) costs of the sale, and legal action.
If the pledged property by itself is insufficient to cover
53
these expenses, then the debtor must make good the difference.
Where a sale takes place by order of the court, then the 
money is paid into court, the proper deductions are made, and 
the debtor receives the balance; hence the value of requiring 
a court-order before sale of the pledged property.
(d) Fi.Fa.:
There is some confusion in the mind of individuals and
53. It is for consideration by the legislator whether it 
should be provided that neither sale nor foreclosure 
may in any case take place without a regular suit in 
court, and a court-order (as is the practice in India).
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native courts between a sale under a pledge, and execution by 
way of writ of fi.fa. Pi.fa. is not the appropriate remedy 
where a creditor wishes to enforce a;pledge; nevertheless, a 
writ of fi.fa. is often issued in such circumstances. A certain 
amount of laxity has been detected at times in making sure that 
the proceeds of the sale are properly accounted for to the 
court.
It is advisable, in my opinion, to develop concrete rules
for the guidance of native courts in the matter of sales in
enforcement of pledges, and under fi.fa. Where pledges permit
the creditor to sell the pledged property without any order of
54the court at all (a provision approved in Nyako v. Atiadevie), 
then some regulative action is obviously needed. j
(e) Competition between creditors;
This is a topic where it was found practically impossible
to observe any concrete rules as enforced by native courts.
Some members of native courts were apparently willing to allow
55
a creditor A to seize the property of debtor D pledged for 
another debt to creditor B; and to hold that B could only pro­
tect his security by taking action in the court first. There 
is little or no question of priorities between different 
pledgees of the same piece of land, except where this is 
through the fraud of the debtor in pledging the same land twice.
54. See above, pp. 413, 414.
55. This opinion is of course not typical.
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Since the typical pledge is usufructuary, there is little 
opportunity for second and third charges over the same parcel 
of land.
(f) Powers of the pledgee:
The primary right of the pledgee, unless different terms 
are agreed, is to possession of the property pledged, and ex­
clusive enjoyment of the proceeds therefrom, during the con­
tinuance of the pledge. This right of use and possession is 
in lieu of interest.
The pledgee can probably thus maintain his right to ex­
clusive possession by action for trespass against anyone in­
fringing it.
The pledgee may in no case sell the land pledged outside 
the terms of the pledge. It is stated that he customarily 
grants an extension of time (in conformity with common African 
practice) if the debtor is unable to pay at the due date.
The pledgee may only repledge the land pledged with the
56consent of the pledgor. Such a case occurs more rarely today
56. ”By customary law ... a mortgagee cannot transfer to 
another any rights which he may have under the mortgage 
without notice to the. other party to the mortgage tran­
saction...” per Jackson. J., in Clarke v. Nkrumah: (Cape 
Coast: Land Court: 22.12.48; unreported);
”... if a land is in your possession by pledge you 
have no right to pledge it to another without the orig­
inal owner s knowledge...” - evidence of an expert 
witness in the same case.
See: Sarbah, P.C.L., 83.
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that it did in the past, when the creditor could not raise 
money by sale of the property pledged. I am not aware of any 
cases which deal with the competing rights of pledgee and sub­
pledgee; but the opinion was put forward that the effect was 
only a substitution of creditors. That is, if the pledgee 
wishes to get his money back, and the pledgor is unable or un­
willing to repay, either the pledgee will transfer the benefit 
of his pledge to a third party, who then becomes sole creditor 
vis-a-vis the debtor; or else, on the part of the pledgor, the 
pledgor will find another person from whom to borrow enough to 
pay off the loan due; the pledgor and the third party may then 
make a new pledge or other arrangement between them.
(g) Death of a party:
Can the benefit of a pledge be claimed by the successor of
a pledgee after his death? The answer is in general, Yes.
It is, according to one case, customary to offer drink to the
successor of a deceased pledgee in order to !lkeep alive and
57
evidence the transaction of the pledge”. This would presum­
ably be done to avoid the danger that the family or successor 
of a pledgee would later allege that the transaction had been, 
not a pledge, but an outright sale, an allegation often met 
with in the reports.
Is the burden of a pledge enforceable against the successor
57. In Clarke v. Kofi Nkrumah: (unreported: Cape Coast (Land 
Court: 22.12.48). per Jackson. J.
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or family of a deceased pledgor? Again, the answer is gener­
ally ”Yes!!, provided the pledge is a valid one (made with the 
knowledge or consent of the family where this is required).
If the family were not consulted, or there is no written evid­
ence of the pledge, it is possible that the family will contest 
the existence of any pledge. It is customary for all credi­
tors to put their claims in evidence at the meeting of the 
family of deceased called for this purpose; and they will 
customarily offer drink on such occasions. In these days,
there is not such insistence on the observance of the time-
58
limit.
C. MORTGAGE.
This is, of course, not an indigenous institution, and 
has been borrowed from English Law (as it was before the sweep­
ing reforms made for England by the legislation of 1925), The 
choice of a mortgage form rather than that of a customary 
pledge by the Africans indicates a desire for greater rigidity, 
security, and sophistication. Wherever an attempt is made to 
draw up a document as a record of real security taken, then - 
except where the writer is completely ignorant of English law - 
a certain copying of the features of an English mortgage takes 
place. In this fashion powers of sale have been created for 
the pledgee, a definite term set, specific conditions agreed
58. See: SUCCESSION," post, at"p. 569.
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on. There comes a point when one must say whether a document 
is a pledge or a mortgage. The natural tendency of the Sup­
reme Court where there is a document is to apply English law in 
order to decide whether a pledge or a mortgage is intended.
The criterion adopted by the courts has in general been: does
the mortgagee go into possession under the mortgage or not?
If he goes into possession, then the transaction is a customary 
pledge, or "native mortgage"; if he does not, then it is some 
form of English mortgage or charge. If it is too imperfect 
to operate as a legal mortgage, then the courts will hold that 
it takes effect as an equitable mortgage.
Professor Vesey-FitzGerald has observed with mixed feelings 
59
in another context the introduction of English equitable 
rules into the Indian law of property: and here too one can
see the dangers. Can one make the same distinction between 
legal and equitable estates or interests in Africa as one does 
in England? The equitable estate in England is a grafting on 
the English estates in law - fee simples and the rest. Can 
these equitable interests be grafted on to the very different 
interests in property found in the Gold. Coast? No - it is 
like trying to play chess with a pack of cards.
Once it is held that an equitable (or a legal) mortgage 
exists so as to affect an African interest in property, there
5 9 . In his Inaugural Lecture as Professor of Oriental Laws 
in the University of London.
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is a whole series of rules which must he presumed to apply.
Can the African parties he lightly held to have agreed, even 
tacitly, to bind themselves by such technical provisions of a 
foreign law? It therefore requires very strong evidence be­
fore one is willing to accept that the African parties intended 
an English-type mortgage; and in default of proof of such in­
tention, they must be presumed to intend to govern their rela­
tions by the unwritten rules of the customary law, as developed 
in practice.
What is such evidence? - Where the parties are literate, 
conversant with English ideas, and where the property-laws have 
approached the English most closely - in the towns and coastal 
areas - then it is probable that the parties wish to bind them­
selves by English law, if they U3e a written deed or document#
Otherwise, one must conclude that the Africans have adopt­
ed an English form for the record of their agreement, because 
they know no other, and because they attribute mystical power 
to such formal records to safeguard their interests# One may 
compare the written lease executed between a stool and a 
stranger-tenant-farmer, where the parties nevertheless regulate 
their day-to-day dealings solely by reference to customary law; 
and the conveyance which may be given by the vendor of land to 
the purchaser often years after the land has been customarily 
conveyed, merely to serve as evidence in a law-suit, or for 
some similar purpose#
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The conclusion is that ona cannot take such documents at
; ^ :
i their face-value: no more need one accept even a perfect Eng-
60
lish mortgage by deed executed by Africans at its face-value#
1. VARIOUS FORMS OP MORTGAGE#
Since the salient distinction between a pledge and a mort­
gage in Gold Coast law is that the former is usufructuary, and 
the latter is not, I propose that wherever the mortgagee, or 
pledgee, has the power to enter into immediate possession of 
the property pledged, and enjoy its use and the profits there­
from, or some part of them, the agreement should be termed a 
"pledge"; otherwise, it is some form of "mortgage" or "charge"# 
It may be thought that it matters little whether any one 
transaction is termed a mortgage or a pledge, because the re­
sult is much the same. On the contrary, in the pledge the 
pledgee enters into possession, and enjoys the fruits of the 
pledged property during the continuance of the pledge. It has 
never been suggested that a mortgagee in English Law can do the 
same; even when he enters into possession to enforce his sec­
urity, he is held strictly accountable by the Courts, not only 
for what he receives, but for what he ought to have received.
He can deduct from the receipts only enough to satisfy payments
60# The above puts the view of the African, and his attitude 
of mind in his dealings; for the attitude of the Gold 
Coast courts, the reader is referred to the chapter on 
WRITING, post, passim.
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of interest, and necessary expenses in connexion with his 
possession. At African Law, all is different.
The pledgee is not so accountable when he enters into 
possession of the pledged property. The pledge is usufruct­
uary, and so he is entitled to the use and profits of the 
pledged property. His only duty is not to waste the property 
in such a way as to depreciate unreasonably the value of the 
property when it is returned to the pledgor.
The various 3orts of mortgage which may exist can then 
be indicated.
(a) English:
At the head comes the English legal mortgage, which is 
presumed to be the rarest of them all,
Next comes the English equitable mortgage» which the courts 
have found to exist in certain cases, principally where some 
form of writing has been used by the parties.
(b) African:
In the field of customary institutions, there is a further
form of security, for which one must appropriate a special des­
ignation. The Courts have tended to hold that the charges to
61be specified are English equitable mortgages. I prefer to
61. "Possession is an essential element of a native mort­
gage"; hence if the mortgagor remains, in possession, it
is not a native "mortgage (sc. pledge). There is no 
third category - there is a document; 'therefore it must 
be an equitable mortgage - Asafu Ad.iei v. Dabanka:
(1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 63.
438
think that they indicate the creation of a new category of 
mortgage by the Africans, and belong to the sphere of African 
rather than English law.
This is so because in most cases their parentage is ob­
vious: e.g., the self-liquidating pledge mentioned above
develops into a self-liquidating mortgage by the omission of 
the mortgagee to go into possession.
There are also certain charges over house-property, which 
will be considered below. In them, the mortgagee may not be 
entitled to exclusive possession, or not entitled to possession 
at all.
The following types of such charges have been observed:
62
(i) Self-liquidating African mortgage:
This type of mortgage is only suitable where the property 
pledged yields a high rate of interest or profit; its only 
application so far encountered is in connexion with the mort­
gaging of cocoa-farms.
The essence of the self-liquidating mortgage is that the 
profits from the cocoa-farm mortgaged (unlike in the normal 
case of a pledge) do not all go to the pledgee in lieu of in­
terest, but are rather used to satisfy both principal and 
interest. This is no doubt a result of the higher cocoa 
prices now prevailing.
62. Information from New *Juaben; also reported from 
Akim Abuakwa.
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Term: If A mortgages his cocoa-farm to B on this kind of
arrangement, then the mortgage continues until such time as 
either A repays the loan with any interest accrued (or the 
balance thereof); or the principal is satisfied from the 
proceeds of the farm.
Possession: remains with A. the mortgagor. A looks after
the farm in the interests of B, - in African terms, ho is 1!care 
taker” for B. Juristically, it would no doubt be more exact 
to say that possession is with B, the mortgagee; and custody 
with A, the mortgagor; since at the time the loan is made, B 
(at least notionally) receives possession of the farm, but 
hands it back to A to look after for him. The close analogies 
with pledge are thus obvious.
Proceeds: A, the mortgagor, manages the farm, engages labour­
ers, and disposes of the crops. He sends the proceeds to the 
creditor, B. The proceeds are divided by B into three parts:-
One part to A: this goes for the payment of
the labourers and the expenses 
of upkeep of the farm.
One part to B: as Interest.
One part to B: to reduce the principal lent.
(ii) African charge:
Where there is what might be thought to be a pledge, since 
it makes no attempt at English form, but the pledgee Is not en­
titled to immediate possession, it would be inappropriate to
hold this any kind of English mortgage. It Is a new form of 
charge, developed In African custom.
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One finds, for instance, that a dwellinghouse is taken 
as security; the chargee is not allowed to take the exclusive 
possession, use and profits of the charged property; hut if 
default in payment of the debt occurs at the due date (usually 
a short one), then he is entitled to sell or to enter into pos­
session. Frequently, such a charge is accompanied by an agree­
ment for his free occupation of one room in the house. This
is not a pledge, ancient or modern, nor an English mortgage.
64It falls in the category of an African mortgage or charge.
Such charges are also created over cocoa-farms; the main 
essentials are (1) possession does not pass;
(2) a high rate of monetary interest is
charged;
(3) the charge is for a 3hort term.
All such charges may be converted into varieties of pledge 
if the pledgee-chargee enters into possession.
2. VALIDITY OF MORTGAGES.
(a) Competition between English and African Law;
In the field of mortgages, as elsewhere, there is competi­
tion between English and African forms, and it seems likely 
that the more sophisticated will drive out the less. English 
form is used increasingly. How far is this permissible? The 
question is considered in Chapter XI on WRITING, so need not
63. Reported from, inter alia, Adansi.
64. A similar charge on a farm was considered in
Adu Sei v. Ofori; (1926TT.C, '26-'29, 87; but the 
Court held it to be an English equitable charge.
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be treated comprehensively here. It is enough to Imagine here 
the possible results if the positions were reversed, and Eng­
lish individuals were endeavouring to regulate their property- 
positions in England in accordance with African customary law* 
If the court3 were called on to deal with such phenomena, and 
especially if the parties endeavoured to create a usufructuary 
mortgage, the courts would try to make this fall under some 
category of English law, perhaps as an equitable charge coupled 
with a tenancy. They would likelier hold that the whole 
arrangement was bad, because it clogged the equity of redempt­
ion. (Similarly, if a vendor In England endeavours to pass 
"an absolute Interest" in land, it Is submitted that the courts 
would say that he Intended to pass the whole fee simple.)
The courts in the Gold Coast should, similarly, attempt to 
give effect to the intentions of the parties, so far as is 
possible within the framework of the law to which they are sub­
ject; and should especially abstain from attempting to force 
modern customary developments in the law of mortgage Into the 
English legal system. Just as English real-property law dev­
eloped as a result of the activities of the conveyancers, so 
African Law develops new institutions (where every man is his 
own conveyancer).
English mortgages by deed are now frequently executed by 
Africans, more especially in commercial transactions. If the 
parties intend to be bound by English Law, then it should be
442
noted that the writing is an instrument and not a memorandum.
(b) Permitted terms of mortgages:
There is little need to say anything here, except to warn 
the interpreter of a mortgage deed made by an African that 
terms derogating from rights customarily enjoyed must be strict­
ly construed in favour of the party who thus forfeits his 
rights (which, for instance, he might have if the transaction 
were a pledge).
(c) Who may mortgage:
Theoretically, the same persons may mortgage as may pledge. 
But the fact that customary rights are much cut down by use of 
an English mortgage, and in particular that the contractual 
right to redeem is extinguished in six months (or the term ag­
reed), means that the mortgagor may quickly lose his right to 
the property; and more important, that other interested per­
sons (e.g., his family), may be taken by surprise.
At present individuals are sometimes permitted to pledge 
property when they have no strict right to do so (inherited 
property); this practice is tolerated by their family, since 
the likelihood of the family's losing its land is much postponed 
This does not apply where an English mortgage is used.
Legislation may be necessary to prevent undue hardship 
arising in this manner.
65. Cf. WRITING post, especially at pp. 646-7.
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D. MISCELLANEOUS.
It is intended to consider here a few questions which 
arise owing to English forms of procedure now adopted, and cer­
tain ordinances. ri*he major topics are the question of Fi.Fa.;
66 67
and the Moneylenders Ordinance and Loans Recovery Ordinance.
1. FI.FA.
Attachment by way of writ of Fi.Fa. is the appropriate 
form of execution in the Gold Coast as against real property, 
thus differing from the law of England, where it is a remedy 
against personal property only, the proper remedy against real 
property being by way of elegit. Again, it is usual to fi.fa. 
property as a means of securing execution for an unsecured debt, 
any real property of the judgement debtor being liable to seiz­
ure and sale in satisfaction. It thus differs from an order 
for judicial sale of mortgaged property, when the right is ex­
ercisable against the property mortgaged. These distinctions 
are not kept clearly in mind by the Africans and their courts.
There are also some contrary dicta with regard to the 
rights of persons who are true owners of property, which has 
been seized in execution for the debt of a person who is not 
owner, but at best the holder of a limited interest in the prop­
erty. Such cases especially occur in connexion with inherited
66. No. 21 of 1940.
67. Cap. 146.
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property. What are the rights of the family, arid what method 
should they adopt to assert their rights, if an inherited prop­
erty is seized in execution for the debt of the holder, the 
successor to that property? In view of the dicta in Bobo v . 
Anthony and Sri II v. Anthony, it seems clear that the real 
owner of the property need not interplead at the time of the 
execution proceedings; and if the property is in fact sold 
unlawfully, he may afterwards sue to set the sale aside, pro­
vided he has not been guilty of laches. The certificate of 
purchase is evidence only of purchase by the purchaser at such 
a judicial sale of the “right title and interest” of the judge­
ment debtor; it cannot thus operate to bar the title of the
69true owner or owners. It has, however, been suggested that 
where inherited property is sold in execution, the purchaser 
acquires the right, etc., of the successor, which means that he 
thus acquires an estate pur autre vie in the property, the life 
in question being that of the successor. On the principle of 
nemo dat quod non habet, it is obvious that he cannot acquire 
more; but does he acquire as much? It is submitted that he 
does not, and that the sale is in fact a nullity; since the 
view above assumes that the successor has a life-interest in 
the inherited property; he has, however, nothing of the sort. 
His interest is one unknown to English Lav/; it is terminable
69. For the effect of a certificate of purchase, see:
Miller v. Kwayisi: (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 7, and see also,
Bobo v. Anthony: (1931) 1 W.A.C.A. 169.
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by the family which granted it at any time, if the proper form­
alities are observed* It is not transferable; and it is 
rather a delegation of management, together with a right to 
enjoy the proceeds of the property.
It is therefore recommended as a matter of some urgency 
that this question should be regulated by statute, so designed 
as to preserve the interests of the family where they have not 
adopted the debt, acquiesced in the pledge or mortgage, or per­
mitted the purchaser to alter his position substantially to his 
detriment for a considerable time.
70
It was stated by some African informants that a creditor 
can enforce his security under a pledge or mortgage by:
(a) Pi.Fa: "after judgement of the Court";
(b) Private Sale: (where this is permitted by the terms 
of the pledge) "but it is wiser to sue first";
(c) Foreclosure: "rare, except between commercial people,
under a proper English mortgage";
(d) Public Sale: on the same conditions as private sale;
71
(e) Action: by suing for the debt.
Another matter that needs consideration and possible 
rectification is the present Sheriff Law of the Gold Coast.
The distinction between movables and immovables is not an 
entirely apt one for the Akan system of land tenure I and the
70. Akim Abuakwa.
71, See also ante, p. 428.
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probability that in theory crops and structures on land seized
adhere (as in English law) to the realty for the purposes of
the Sheriff Law is not very satisfactory either. Such an
attitude applied to a land tenure where severance of interests
between the land itself, and the things thereon, is freely
recognized, leads to confusion and injustice.
The seizure of stool property in execution is now limited
72
by ordinance, for Ashanti by separate ordinance, and for the
Colony by s. 27 A of the Native Administration (Colony) Ordin-
73
ance. No. 22 of 1944.
The Stool Property Protection Ordinance. 1940, (s.3), 
provides for Ashanti that no Native Authority or other person 
may alienate, pledge or mortgage any stool property without 
the consent in writing of the Chief Commissioner. If this is 
not obtained, then the transaction is null and void.
(s.4) It is also provided that stool property cannot be 
seized in execution if there has been no pledge or mortgage in 
accordance with the terms of section 3.
72. The Stool Property Protection Ordinance. No. 22 of 1940. 
The Ordinance applies only to Ashanti.
(This Ordinance is now replaced by the provisions of the 
new State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance. No. 4 of 1952, 
espec!ally s.24. See APPENDIX below.)
73. The new section was inserted in the N.A,(C).0. by the 
Native Authority (Colony) (Amendment) Ordinance. No. 13 
of 1947, s.6.
(The functions of this section are now performed by s.16 
of the new State Councils (Colony and Togoland) Ordinance, 
No. 8 of 1952. See APPENDIX below.)
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(3.2) "Stool property" is defined to include:
1 (a) the stool itself;
(b) insignia or other property usually 
held or enjoyed by the occupant of 
the Stool or used at ceremonial 
functions;
(c) official buildings belonging to the Stool;
(d) Stool land."
The terms of this Ordinance are very much wider than those of 
the corresponding provisions in the amendment to the Colony 
Ordinance.
A new section is inserted by Ordinance 13 of 1947 in the 
N.A.C.O. The section reads:
"S. 27 A. Preservation of Stool Property.
(1) It shall not be lawful for any Stool 
property to be alienated or pledged 
in any way, and any instrument and any 
transaction or agreement (whether in 
writing or not) which purports to effect 
any such alienation or pledge shall for 
all purposes be null and void."
(A provision about inventories of Stool 
property.)
" ... For the purposes of this section
* Stool property* shall be deemed only 
to include the insignia and such other 
property as may be attached for custom­
ary, traditional and ceremonial pur­
poses to the Stool of any Chief.
Stool lands are therefore not affected by this provision, 
unless it is held that stool lands are "attached for customary 
purposes" to a stool. The phrase is difficult of interpre­
tation.
The Ashanti ordinance thus effectively deals with cases 
which had previously occurred where stool property other than
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insignia and the stool itself had been seized in execution, or 
cases where stool lands had been pledged to creditors* The 
Ordinance might be improved if under (d) it was made clear 
that stool property in the narrow sense, e.g*, stool farms, 
were also incapable of pledge or seizure*
74
2* THE MONEYLENDERS ORDINANCE: was designed to restrict
the activities of moneylenders, confining them as far as 
possible to registered or licensed moneylenders. It is not, 
however, observed in practice to any great extent. The 
Ordinance provides:
(s.4) That every moneylender shall have a licence* The 
term "moneylender" is defined at section 2. The saving terms 
of section 3 are worth quoting in full as additional to this 
definition, since they import a presumption of law, which in 
general operates in favour of a debtor:
(s.3) The section provides that persons who lend money at 
interest or for repayment of a larger sum are presumed to be 
moneylenders until the contrary is proved.
(s.12(1)) No moneylender's contract is valid unless there 
is a memorandum in writing of it*
Permissible interest-rates are laid down in ss. 13 - 17. 
(s.20) There is in general a limitation period of 12
74. No. 21 of 1940.
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months from the date when the cause of action arose, operating 
against a moneylender suing on a contract.
75
3. THE LOANS RECOVERY ORDINANCE: is also more often
ignored than enforced. It provides:
(s.3(1)) In suits by creditors on a secured or unsecured 
loan any court (including a native court) can re-open the 
transaction where the interest charged is excessive, etc.; or 
comprehensively, where "the transaction is harsh and uncon­
scionable", and can (i) "relieve the person sued from payment 
of any sum in excess of the sum adjudged by the Court to be 
fairly due in respect of such principal, interest, or charges.1.1;
(ii) order the creditor to repay such an 
excess if it has already been paid;
(iii) set aside or revise any agreement in 
connexion therewith.
(s.3(2)) At the instance of the debtor, a court may 
exercise similar powers as though there were proceedings be­
fore the court for the recovery of money lent.
76
4« TEE CHATTELS (TRANSFER) ORDINANCE: this very new
Ordinance is considered in the APPENDIX below.
75. Cap. 146 of the 1936 revision.
76. No. 51 of 1952.
450
CHAPTER VII,
TENANCIES AND LEASES.
The different forms of legal relation which may be com­
prehended under the term "tenancies” in Akan Law are very 
various: this is attributable mainly to the differing terms
and purposes for which these tenancies are brought Into exist­
ence?- One may pass all the way from the free tenancy between 
relatives or friends, by way of abusa tenancy, to leases in 
proper English form. Doubt may be cast on the propriety of 
collecting all these forms of dependent interests under the 
single heading of "tenancy"; and, especially where no rental 
or consideration is charged, then it is hard to separate (and 
African terminology does not clearly separate) the tenancy from 
a temporary partial gift of rights. Is it pointless to sep­
arate the tenancy from the gift? It is not entirely so, since 
a juridical distinction may be made between the gift, where one 
considers the form of the transaction or conveyance or grant by 
which the tenancy comes Into existence (with especial emphasis
1, The line between tenancy and subordinate ownership is 
often difficult to draw. Of certain relations one can 
state confidently that they are not tenancy - for example, 
the Interest of a citizen. Of others one can be sure 
that they are merely tenancies - e.g., the grant of land 
for cultivation for one season. Since it appears that 
there is a definite historical connexion between the two 
forms of interest, and many of the same rules apply, the 
customary law is given below without any attempt to draw 
a hard-and-fast line between them.
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on the fact of its being for no valuable consideration), and
the tenancy or continuing relation which thereafter subsists
between owner and tenant, and which determines their mutual
2
rights and duties* Abus a tenancy is too far removed from gift, 
as being a tenancy where annual rent is payable, to fall with­
in this last statement; but since it is possible for a free 
tenancy, or one for a nominal rental, to be converted into an 
abusa tenancy, it is arguable that they are members of the same 
genus (and this is perhaps the historical explanation of them); 
the process of acquisition of such a tenancy (by ’’begging” the
landlord, and thanking him when the tenancy is granted) is sim-
3
ilar both for the abusa and free tenancies.
Finally, it is possible for the parties to substitute a 
lease in English form instead of an abusa tenancy, though this 
is obviously a recent alternative. In this manner the differ­
ent forms of tenancy are related to each other in increasing 
degree of stereotyping and commercialisation.
A. CUSTOMARY TENANCIES.
1. FREE TENANCIES AND THOSE WITH A NOMINAL RENTAL.
"Free” tenancies, those which are for no valuable con­
sideration, are of frequent occurrence in customary law. They
2. See: GIFT, at pp.516 et seq;and see also: Quay son v. Abba: 
(1934) D.Ct ’Sl-’W ,  5~0.
3. Such lettings may be called adiasie in Twi; this is a 
general term meaning ’’previous arrangement”, ’’agreement”, 
or ’’contract”.
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are usually granted on the basis of some relationship - whether 
of blood or friendship - existing between the parties: this
relation is the causa of the transaction. The characteristics 
of such tenancies are:
(1) that they are free (no rental being charged);
(2) that they are friendly (express terms being at
a minimum);
(3) that they are of indefinite duration;
(4) that this benefit is not assignable without
the consent of the landlord.
(a) Between relatives by blood:
If A has a self-acquired farm or farm-land, he may be
approached by B (a relative by blood) for some land on which
to farm. It is open to A to refuse, and B cannot demand a
tenancy, even of unused land, as a right; but if A has unused
land to spare, his refusal may be censured by a family arbitra­
tion if B chooses to complain; and this is much more likely 
if A holds the farm or land, not as self-acquired, but as fam-
4
ily or inherited, property.
4. An example of such a grant of a free tenancy is to be 
found in Kofi v. Manu & Mens ah: (1949) (TJnrep: N. Juaben 
Native Court A, Suit 57/49), where an uncle now deceased 
gave to his maternal nephews (i.e., his sister’ssons), land 
without cocoa trees then on it "to plant cocoa trees thereon 
for their use, to avoid them from future embarrassment after 
his death". The nephews were then little boys, "who had 
very unfortunately lost their parents (orphans) and were 
living under the supervision of their said uncle". During 
the uncle's lifetime, the nephews did not account to him 
for the proceeds of the trees which they had planted on the 
land; and the case arose through a dispute, after the 
uncle’s death, between the nephews and the family, who 
claimed that, at his death, the land had become family 
property, a contention which did not succeed.
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In a similar fashion, if A has a self-acquired house, B
may approach him for a room in which to reside, which A may
5
give to B if he agrees. Again, as with farms, if the house is 
not self-acquired but inherited, B may place the matter before 
a family arbitration if A refuses to comply with B's reasonable 
request.
The termination of such tenancies is usually either by
mutual agreement, or else by the unilateral desire of either
the tenant or the landlord. But in general the landlord
should not determine the tenancy unreasonably, otherwise he
may be taken before a family arbitration to justify his actions.
Sufficient reasons include:
(1) the setting up by the tenant of a claim to title in
the property so as to prejudice or deny the title of the land- 
6
lord;
(2) ingratitude or bad behaviour by the tenant to the 
7
landlord;
5. It might be maintained that in this latter case it is too 
much to describe B’s right as a "tenancy"J even English 
common law would no doubt call him a "tenant-at-will"; 
and the original arrangement might in African custom 
crystallize into something more durable and permanent than 
a mere right of free lodging.
6. Cf. Adai v. Darku: (1905) Red. 231; and see also 
Onisiwo v. Gbamgboye: (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 69, (a Nigerian 
case), where a tenant purported to make a lease of the 
property which he held, under a claim of title as owner 
in himself.
7. This is necessarily a very vague reason; what is such 
bad behaviour depends on the view of the family arbitra­
tion.
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(3) wasting of the property.
If a farm is granted for one purpose, and it is quite cus­
tomary so to do, then the tenant must not use it for another 
purpose without the consent of the landlord. The tenant can­
not create subsidiary interests in the property he holds with­
out the permission of the landlord. He cannot, a fortiori, 
sell.or pledge his interest without first consulting the land­
lord. Where the tenant plants permanent crops, and the ten-
9
ancy comes to an end, the tenant customarily receives compensa­
tion for them, which may take the form of a physical division 
of the property into thirds. If the arrangement continues for 
some time, the tenant comes increasingly to think of himself as 
an owner; and his successor will continue to farm there. The 
successor,should, however, approach the landlord first; the 
latter should not refuse to admit him except for good reason. 
Since both landlord and tenant are of the same family, no 
danger of injuring the family's claim to title in the property
8. A tenant acquires no right to valuable trees already grow­
ing in the land, or to minerals therein; hence, if there 
are palm-trees on the land, they cannot be felled by the 
tenant unless he first obtains the consent of the landlord: 
Yaw Donkor v. Kwesi Ayaah: (1946) (Unrep: Land Ct, Cape 
boast, 51/10/46, coram Jackson, J.). If there are timber- 
trees on the land, similar rules apply.
9. According to some informants a new arrangement must be 
made if the tenant had planted trees, and these die.
At such a time the land reverts to the landowner; and 
there must be new terms before the tenant may plant more 
trees. - Asikuma, Essumegya.
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exists, since, at the death of either party, the family contime 
to have a claim: if the landlord dies, the family take the ab­
solute interest; if the landlord A gradually relinquishes his 
rights in favour of the tenant B, as may happen as cultivation 
progresses, then B's holding is likewise subject to the family's 
claim. Where a stool is the owner of the absolute interest in 
the land, no difficulty or prejudice to its title is caused by 
the creation of such tenancies, which need not be notified to 
the stool; nor has the stool any claim to tribute or rent.
It will be appreciated that the juridical position differs 
slightly where A, the grantor, holds not an individual, but an 
inherited, interest in the property. A does not own the ultim­
ate interest, which is with the family; hence, in a sense, he 
is not the landlord to B. It might be argued that B's interest 
supplants A's interest, instead of being carved out of it; but 
this may merely be begging the question in verbal form - does A 
retain any rights over the property in question? No general 
principle seems applicable to such cases, each of which must be 
dealt with on its own particular facts.
This is the commonest form of free tenancy, occurring when­
ever A allows his wife, or children, or servants (in former 
times his slaves), rights of cultivation over a portion of his 
property. This is frequently done, either for economic reasons,
/  ' a
(b) Tenancy for dependents:
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as a reward for services rendered, or as a method of setting up 
the recipient with, as it were, a tfstartn in life* Assistance 
in cultivation rendered to A is thus frequently rewarded by the 
grant of a tenancy of this nature.
In a tenancy of this type, the grantees do not belong to 
A's family; in theory, therefore, there is a sharp distinction 
from the last category, in which the rights of the family of 
both tenant and landlord could not be said to be imperilled in 
any circumstances* Despite the difference, little objection 
is ever raised in. practice to such an arrangement for the bene­
fit of dependents. Over his self-acquired property the holder 
may create usufructuary interests as he wishes, and family con­
sent is not required. The grant of such interests to depend­
ents is not an outright gift unless
(1) the family concur; and
(2) the intention to make an outright gift is present. 
Outright gifts of the land are rare, and normally the wife is 
given a portion of her husband's land for her own purposes, and 
especially for the growing of foodstuffs (these may be inter­
planted between her husband's permanent crops); as for the 
children, these, especially the sons, are similarly benefited 
as they reach a suitable age. The rationale of such gifts is 
obvious: a man, his wife or wives and children, frequently
form a cultivating or economic unit.
Such tenancies come to an end on:
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(1) for the wife -
(a) the divorce*^ or death of the wife - the tenancy 
is not transmissible;
h , (b) the death of the husband; the tenancy may how­
ever be prolonged by the family of the deceased husband if she 
marries the successor, or remains to look after the children of 
the deceased; or if her conduct has been pleasing to the fam­
ily (as by being a good wife to her husband, by showing respect 
to the family elders, etc,): but all such matters are in the
discretion of the family, and she has no claim as of right;
(2) for the children - on the death of their father: 
normally their tenancy does not determine, but continues; it 
is no longer at the absolute discretion of the father's family 
to evict them or not, and usually good reason for doing so must 
be advanced;
(3) for servants - probably when they cease to render the 
services which Justified the grant of the interest;
(4) and in any case - at the wish of the landlord, before 
any of the above occurrences - but this is necessarily rare.
The basis of the wife's and children's occupation of the 
husband/father's house (if self-acquired) is not tenancy, but 
if a man is owner of more than one house, he may make his son
10. Unless the family consider the divorce unjustified.
The family receives the land on the death of the husband, 
or the divorce of the wife; if there was no outright 
gift. - Adansi.
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a free tenant of one of them. Whether the son, in such a case,
has power to enjoy the proceeds of the house depends on the
terms of the arrangement; and he cannot 3© 11 or pledge without
his father's authority.
As with other such free tenancies, the tenancy is not
alienable or transmissible without more: usually there are two
interested parties, the father or husband, and his family.
Pledging, sub-letting and sale of all such properties by the
tenant - whether over land or houses - are impossible without
the authorisation of the interested parties; and are a ground
11
for forfeiture if attempted.
A man may also create subsidiary interests in favour of 
his wife and children over inherited farms. This power is, 
however, restricted. There are three possible courses which 
a father may adopt in favour of his son. First, he may permit 
his son to farm on inherited property in the father's control
11. In the Nigerian case of Onlsiwo v. Gbamboye: (1941) 7 W.A.CJV 
69, where G,, a domestic, was given permission to occupy a 
portion of the family property in accordance with native 
law and custom, and leased the property to P.J. without the 
consent of the family, the Court said that:
nThe real foundation of the misbehaviour which involves 
forfeiture is the challenge to the overlord's rights.
This is commonly shown by some form of alienation and 
such alienation may take the form, as in this case, of 
leasing under claim of ownership. But it is not dif­
ficult to Imagine cases in which the granting of a lease, 
e.g., for a short period, would carry with It no chall­
enge to the overlord's right and consequently involve 
no misbehaviour or forfeiture.”
In this particular case, the lease was for thirty years 
without consent of the landlord; and the tenant forfeited 
his rights thereby.
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without the knowledge of the family. Although exceptionally 
the father might he dispossessed by the family for doing so 
when they find out, the arrangement is customary and normal, 
and no objection is raised. The arrangement cannot continue 
after the death of the father, unless the family agree* The 
second course is for the arrangement to be made to the know­
ledge of close relatives of the father, and this is the general 
practice. Again the interest does not automatically endure 
beyond the father’s death, but the family will generally con­
tinue it* Lastly, with the consent of the family, a permanent 
and outright grant may be made to the son, in which case the 
right obviously continues even after the father’s death; but 
this course is not so frequent.
Apart from cases of outright gift, the father contemplat­
ing such an arrangement for his son should not extend it over 
too great a portion of the property; and it is wise to bring 
the matter to the notice of the head of the family, although 
the head’s consent is not essential.
Although a father may not instal his son as tenant in a 
house which he controls, but which is the property of the fam­
ily, unless the family consent, yet the wife and children may 
freely reside together with the man in an inherited house with­
out the family’s consent or knowledge, since this is a right 
consequent upon marriage.
It is possible for all 3uch free tenancies to be converted
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into longer tenancies, or into an outright gift. Whilst the 
interest-holder is alive, if he wishes to make his gift of 
rights to wife or children absolute it is necessary for him to 
call in his family and obtain their consent. After his death, 
the family have the right to determine such a tenancy, but in 
the case of the widow they may, and in the case of the children 
they must .either:
(1) continue the tenancy on the same terms, subject to 
good behaviour, unless for good reason; or
(2) make an outright grant, thus taking the property
entirely outside the family’s control and ownership for the
future. Prom the former alternative arises the so-called
"right of residence in his late father’s house subject to good
behaviour" in favour of the son; but rights in regard to
agricultural land may be equally or more important. Where a
son thus continues to reside in his deceased father’s house,
if he makes a claim of title to the house or part of it, this
is sufficient grounds for his eviction. There is evidence
12
that even such a claim may not be ground for eviction; and
also evidence that the usual remedy open to the family if the
13
son is troublesome is not to evict him. Some informants said 
that if the father dies, and the son continues to cultivate
12. See: Richardson v. Fynn: (1909) Earn. 13; (incorrectly 
spelt uFenn" in Br andford Griffith’s Digest.)
13. According to informants from Adansi, tor example.
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that portion of land granted to him by his father - as he is
entitled to do - the free tenancy continues provided the son
does not give offence to the family; if he does give offence,
14
then he will be charged abusa by the family.
(c) Tenancies between friends:
A man may create a free tenancy in favour of a friend over 
his self-acquired property; in fact, this appears to be one of 
the more popular methods of acquiring land, whether for farming 
or for house-plots. The grantor may be, and frequently is, a 
family owning land rather than an individual. As regards 
house-plots, it was said that
"If a man wants a plot on which to build a 
house, he will approach a person owning land 
in the town. Such land may be given to him 
• ••« or given to him on condition that he 
gives a sheep annually to the landowner.”
But it appears that such arrangements are restricted largely
to those areas where land or a house has little commercial
value for sale or letting. And, as regards land for fanning,
it was said by one informant that:
nit is frequently done for one man to approach 
another family for land on which to farm. He 
should specify the purpose for which he wants it”; 
is
and this purpose/often commercial (i.e., for the growing of
, 16 cash-crops).
14. Information from. Asikuma.
15. Aburi; information also from, inter alia. Essumegya, 
Kwahu, Mankessim.
16. Essiam.
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The grant of such a tenancy is informal, and apart from
the usual 1 stamping-fee" (rum or sheep) no payment is made,
unless there is a nominal annual payment. If the land begged
is a house-plot, then the tenant of the land will own the house
which he builds thereon absolutely, and his successors will be
similarly entitled.
The tenancy is of indefinite duration; but if the grantor
is an individual, then normally the tenancy does not continue
. %
after his death, except by agreement between the grantor's fam­
ily and the grantee. Other information maintains, however, 
that the normal rule is for the tenancy not to come to an end, 
and in fact to be permanent (unless there is some breach of the 
Implied customary terms). This means that the successor of
the tenant is automatically entitled to continue his predecess­
or's tenancy, and that the arrangement is not affected by the 
death of the grantor. Obviously, where the grantor is a fam­
ily, no possibility of the death of the grantor normally arises. 
Hence the tenancy will be indefinite in duration, limited to 
the life of neither the tenant nor the landlord. Yet another 
rule given is that the tenant may be evicted at any time (with 
allowance to gather standing crops) if the land held is a food­
stuffs farm; but not at all if the crop is cocoa. Some of
the statements with regard to the duration of the tenancy are
, 17,18,19
given below.
17, 18, 19. - See next page.
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(From previous page) -
17. His successor continues farming on the same terms, pay­
ing at the most drink to the landowning family at the time 
when he enters upon his succession: Essumegya.
There is no agreement for definite terms; the tenant 
does not farm for a fixed number of years, or so long as 
the farm is in bearing: he farms it indefinitely (i.e.,
in perpetuity). His successor continues to farm on the 
same terms as he did; and he does not require the per­
mission of the land-owning family before doing so: Adansi.
In the case of house-plots, the landowner could theo­
retically tell the tenant of the plot who has built a house 
thereon to pull the house down; and then tell him to quit. 
But this is rarely if ever done in practice: Mankesslm.
The donee has permanent rights in the house-plot: Kwahu.
A tenant may or may not be charged for his tenancy of 
land for farming; if the land is begged free, then the 
landlord may claim back the land at any time when the crops 
have been gathered; but this does not apply if cocoa is 
planted: frumapo, N. Juaben.
18. The case of Kuma v. Kuma: (P.O. 1938: reported at 5 W.A.C.A. 
4), shows that there is a certain danger that courts might 
allow the landlord's right to be extinguished by the long 
possession of the tenant. The highest legal tribunal, 
however, authoritatively reversed W.A.C.A. (cf. 2 W.A.C.A. 
178), and restored the judgement of the trial judge, hold­
ing that possession by defendant's ancestors for six gen­
erations is not conclusive evidence of the defendants' 
title" (p.7.). Plaintiff followed the practice of his 
ancestors "in not extracting tribute from the persons 
occupying the land: and ... he onl^_ objected when the 
defendant tried to dispose of it" </by sale/. The Privy 
Council summed up (at p.8):
"It appears, therefore, that among the natives occu­
pation of land is frequently allowed for the purpose of 
cultivation but without the ownership of the land being 
parted with. The owner of the land being willing to allow 
such occupation so long as no adverse claim is made by the 
occupier; the occupier knowing that he can use the land 
as long as he likes provided he recognises the title of 
the owner."
19. According to some informants the arrangement automatically 
comes to an end when trees planted by the tenant die; and 
new terms must be agreed before the tenant may plant fresh 
trees: Asikuma, Essumegya.
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In the case of Owusu v. Nyatsia, which reached the Supreme
Court, the contest was between plaintiff 0, representing the
family of deceased B, and defendant N. The question at issue 
♦
was the interpretation to be put on a transaction between B and 
N some fourteen years before. 0, for the family of B, main­
tained that
"the land was merely given to the defendant for 
friendship's sake by [b/ and only for the 
purpose of temporary cultivation and that on 
the cessation of such cultivation the family 
had a right to claim it back and did so."
The learned Chief Justice agreed that if this was the case, and 
N was merely given a right of occupation for food cultivation, 
then N could obviously have no claim to the land now.
N maintained that there had been a valid outright sale of 
the land to him, and that in any case he had been left in un­
disturbed possession of the land for 13 or 14 years by the fam­
ily. This last statement of fact was conceded. So also was 
the finding of the Native Court below that the land was family 
land; the question was whether, if there was a sale, the con­
sent of the family had been obtained, as was requisite.
The Appeal Court reversed the finding of the court below 
on the facts, holding that there had been a sale, and that the 
family had joined in the sale. The Court branded the proceed­
ings as a "try-on".
20. (1950) Unrep: Land Appeal No.72/1949, S.Ct Land Division, 
Accra, coram Wilson, C.J.
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Whilst one would not, of course, dream of objecting to the 
terms of this judgement, it does reveal one pitfall or one 
difficulty in the interpretation of the evidence with regard 
to title which may be presented to a court. Absolute undis­
turbed possession is a feature equally of an outright sale and 
of a free tenancy of indefinite duration: one of the sole dis­
tinguishing marks between them will be in the fact of aseda or 
some payment of a nominal amount having been given in the case 
of the grant of a free tenancy; whilst the payment in the case 
of a sale will bear a relation to the value of the land granted. 
Over inherited property it is more rare to find that the 
holder grants a free tenancy of this nature and duration, since 
he cannot as a rule act without the consent and concurrence of 
his family, the holders of the absolute interest. The custom­
ary procedure, therefore, when A, holder of inherited property, 
is approached by B, a friend, for land on which to farm or a 
plot on which to build, is for A to take B before the head of 
A ’s family; and B will be expected to pay the aseda to the 
family. It thus happens that, since the most frequent instance 
when there is land for farming or houses to spare is when land 
is lying fallow or a plot previously occupied by a house is now 
free, these will probably be family property, and the family is 
the proper party to grant the tenancy to B. At the very least
the tenant should be known to the head of the family, or pay a 
annual
nominal/rental, so that the family may see that A has not com-
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promised the family's title, thus giving ground for at least
displeasure, and at most dispossession.
The rules with regard to the rights of landlord and tenant
21
are similar to those already given above. The purpose for
which the land is required should usually be stated at the time
when the arrangement is made, and this purpose should be
followed. In particular, the tenant must not dispute his
22landlord's title, as this may be a ground for eviction.
Alternatively, the tenant may be treated thenceforth as an
23
abusa tenant, and abusa demanded from him. The tenant may 
neither sell nor mortgage the land without the consent of the 
landlord. If he builds a house on a plot thus acquired on a 
tenancy, the house is the absolute property of the tenant.
The tenant almost certainly should inform, or obtain the 
consent of, the landlord before selling his house. Since the 
land reverts to the landlord if the tenant abandons his holding* 
or goes away, the tenant is under an obligation not to waste
24
the holding, though this does not apply to "meliorating waste".
If the tenant abandons his holding, or is evicted, then 
the land reverts to the landowner who granted it.
21. See ante pp. 453-4, 458.
22. Adai v . l>arku: (1905) Red. 231.
23. But in Kufuor v. Kwamin: (1910) P.Ct. Ren. 540, Brandford 
Griffith, C.J., said that the rule that a tenant denying 
his landlord's title may be evicted is a hard rule, and 
should not be extended.
24. An example of waste is cutting down economic trees 
already on the land: Dorikor v. Ayahh; (cf. p. 454 ante).
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It is unusual to set definite terms to the agreement, and 
it is not customary to use writing for this purpose, Aseda 
is paid when the arrangement is made: the rum given has the
effect of stamping the agreement.
The fights of the original owner are not extinguished by
fluxion of time; the possession of the tenant is not adverse
25
to the title of the landlord.'
(d ) Tenancy at a nominal rental:
Such tenancies are in fact a sub-type of free tenancies, 
and do not differ in their essential points from them. At the 
time when the tenancy-agreement is made, it may be agreed bet­
ween the parties that the tenant should make a nominal annual 
payment to the landlord, usually of drink or sheep. The main 
object of this is to preserve the evidence of the landlord's 
title to the land, which might otherwise tend to evaporate as
25.“Ownership of land by customary law can never become
extinguished by long possessory rights enjoyed by a tenant 
who has a right to occupy free of rent subject to customary 
rules.“ - Donkor v. Ayaah: (1946) (Unrep: Land Court, Cape 
Coast, 31/10/46) per Jackson, J.
But the convolutions of transfer are sometimes surpris­
ing: in one case, according to plaintiff, B his grandmother
permitted A to farm on her fallow-land; A permitted defend­
ant to farm there. A went away, and therefore the land 
reverted to B, though farmed by defendant D at the time.
According to defendant D's story, A asked D's uncles 
for land on which to farm; he was shown virgin land on 
the edge of D's uncle's farm. A later stated at a family 
funeral that as he was given the land by D's uncle, and as 
he was now going away "and no more returning" he would 
hand back the land to D. The court did not dispute the 
existing ownership of B, but non-suited plaintiff as not 
officially representing B, and thus having no locus standi.
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the possession of the tenant continued year by year. The pay­
ment is nominal, and bears no relation to the annual value of 
27
the holding. It is therefore distinguishable from those ten­
ancies where annual substantial payments are required. Ten­
ancies where the annual rent is payable in "sheep-moneyTt may 
be an extension of this idea; although the sum thus expressed 
is rather more substantial than that connoted by the nominal 
rental. In any case, tenancies for sheep-money are tending to 
be related more and more to the size of holding.
The payment of a nominal annual rent does not radically 
affect the rights of the parties to such a tenancy; but it 
s e r v e s  to strengthen also the right of the tenant to continue 
in possession. It is a practice which is customarily followed 
where the grantor is an individual requiring the consent of his 
family to grant such a tenancy; but families also frequently 
ask for its payment.
2. TENANCIES FOR A DEFINITE TERM.
So far the tenancies which we have considered have had no 
definite term assigned; but it is possible to have a specific 
agreement for a tenancy for a certain number of years. In the 
agricultural sphere we find the aboriginal tenancy of this kind
26. And so, in Kuma v. Kuma: (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 178, the fact 
that drink was not paid to plaintiff for permission to 
farm told against his claim.
27. The payment is variable: l!it depends on what is charged
for the drink (aseda). The payment is often enough, but
the landlord^ title must never be denied by the purchaser, 
or he loses his right to occupy. Akim Abuakwa.
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in that called “corn tenure”, by which the tenant is allowed 
to cultivate the soil, and reap one crop of foodstuffs, e.g., 
maize. Once the crop is reaped, the tenancy determines, un­
less expressly renewed. Some proportion of the crop may be 
given to the person owning the land; but no definite amount 
was stated to me. It is possible for the grant to be for no 
rent at all, for a small fine or premium before commencing
farming (which may be drink); for a fixed sum; or for whatever
28
the tenant thinks appropriate at the end of the tenancy.
29
There are few express terms.
Apart from corn-tenure, a tenancy for a fixed term may be 
for a fixed rent, a nominal rent, no rent, on the abusa or 
crop-sharing system, or granted by way of demise and the use 
of documents in English form. It will thus be appreciated 
that of themselves such tenancies are not a distinct species; 
but rather that the fixed term may be written into any type of
28. I found it difficult to get much information about "corn 
tenure” on the spot; information to hand refers mainly 
to the coastal regions (i.e., Fante and so on) where 
cocoa is not the staple crop, and there is little spare 
land for farming. I surmise (perhaps wrongly) that it 
is of little importance elsewhere.
See Sarbah F.C.L. 68-9, where it is called “sowing 
tenure".
29. Where there are palm-trees on the land, these - if com­
mercially valuable - are the property of the landlord. 
Under the "abehyem” tenure the tenant has to give a spec­
ified portion (usually one-third) of the oil derived 
from oil-palms on the land to the land-owner annually.
- (Consolidated Suits Nos. 2 & 5 of 1945: Land Court, 
Cape Coast, per jacksonV J.)
And see: Sarbah P.C.L. 70.
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tenancy. Fixed terms (obviously) are however encountered 
oftener with the more sophisticated and commercial types of 
tenancy - abusa, money rental, leases; and especially where 
writing is used, either by way of instrument or of memorandum. 
Even when a definite term is assigned to a tenancy, however, 
this is in practice frequently disregarded; so that a position 
somewhat similar to that of statutory tenants in England hold­
ing over ensues.
Rattray says in Ashanti, p. 231, with regard to the grant 
of tenancies that the grantee becomes 1 to all intents arai pur­
poses owner of the land*1; but this is to put the position far 
too strongly, else how could it be that the reversion remains 
in the grantor?
Perhaps the most frequent instance of tenancies for a 
definite term is to be found in the letting of houses or rooms. 
The practice of letting rooms is prevalent; rent is payable 
monthly, and the tenancy is therefore by English law a monthly 
tenancy. These tenancies are usually informal and without 
written agreement. Although English-type law has intruded, 
sufficient of customary ideas remains for one to consider such 
tenancies as customary in nature, as modern developments of 
customary institutions, and not as the pure offspring of English 
law. English law cannot in any case apply in its rigour, 
owing to the possibility of a separation of title as between a 
house and the land on which it stands, and also between differ­
ent rooms in the same house.
471
I was informed that in the larger towns it is now the 
practice for some persons to build large houses especially to 
use for letting-purposes, and not for the owner’s private oc­
cupation. This indicates the increasing commercial attitude
30
developed by modern urban conditions.
3. TENANCY ON THE ABUSA SYSTEM.
31
(a) The definition of abusa:
The word itself means nothing more than 11 division into 
three parts”. The commonest form of tenancy in Akan custom
32
for agricultural purposes is the tenancy on the abusa system, i
and it is so called because the annual gross produce or proceedsi
of the property in the hands of the tenant are divided into 
three parts, of which the landlord takes one. One meets with 
the word and the notion in many different spheres of the
30. Such tenancies may be subject to the provisions of the 
Rent Control Ordinance» No. 2 of 1952 (which repealed the 
Rents (Control) Ordinance, No. 30 of 1947). The provisions 
of the Ordinance, though admirable, appear to be often 
evaded in practice, to my own knowledge. S. 12 prescribes 
some of the offences which a landlord may commit: sub­
section (1) (a) forbids demanding or receiving more than 
the standard rent, (1) (b) forbids the exaction of prem­
iums, subsection (5) demanding excessive rent in advance. 
Both premiums and payments of up to a year’s rent in ad­
vance are frequently demanded by landlords, according to 
my information.
31. Variously called "abusa", "abusah", "abusa11, of which 
the first is Pante, and the last Twi. Field, Akim 
Kotoku, spells it "bu’sa".
32. Df. Danquah; A.L.C., 220, for this point; and pp. 220-1 
for a description of abusa tenancies in Akim Abuakwa.
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customary law: a subordinate stool selling its timber may
have to pay one-third of the proceeds of the sale over to its 
Paramount Stool; a citizen may have to pay over one-third of 
the purchase-price for land or a house which he sells to a 
stranger; one-third of extraordinary gains from the land may 
be the due of the stool. It does not follow because a person 
pays abusa that he is therefore necessarily an abusa tenant.
What is essential is that there should be in addition a rela­
tionship recognisable as tenancy existing between payer and 
payee. The theory which underlies all payments of abusa is 
however similar: uone-third of what comes out of the land should 
go to the landowner11. The rider for this rule is that citi­
zens should not pay for the occupation of land controlled by
33their State or overlord. The rule for citizens is therefore 
modified to read: 1 one-third share of extraordinary or windfall 
gains derived from the land should go to the landowner1 • On 
the former rule is based the right of a landowner to exact 
abusa from a tenant on his land. On the latter rule is based 
the right of the landowner (i.e., usually the stool) to receive 
one-third of the profits from the sale of land, houses, miner­
als, timber, of snails gathered and gold nuggets found, etc.
In this connexion the notion of "tribute" is wider than abusa: 
abusa is an incident of ownership, whilst tribute may be payable
33. The rights of citizens and strangers are considered in 
Chapter III, THE INDIVIDUAL AND PROPERTY, ante.
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even where the superior stool does not own the land. The 
rules are alternative, so that we should find, and do find, 
that a stool which charges one-third of the purchase-price for 
the sale of a house or farm should not charge one-third of the 
annual profits from the new stranger-occupier.
The right to receive abusa from a tenant or occupier is a
right of landowners, i.e., those with a proprietary interest 
35
in the land. It is necessary to make a distinction, therefore, 
between cases where a stool does, or does not, own the land 
occupied by the tenant. Where a stool has only jurisdiction,
it cannot charge abusa. Where the stool owns the land, abusa
is charged on strangers who cultivate stool land. Citizens 
are not charged, even where the Wing Chiefs own their own land, 
and the subject of a stool cultivates on land belonging to a 
different stool in the same state: this is however a principle
34. Cf. Atta v. Amo ah: (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 15; and Impatasi 
Caseb at C. Hayford, p. 50; see also Ren. 221", and 
P.L.R. 134.
35. Although this is in theory correct, yet there is no doubt 
that this statement should be limited to unoccupied stool 
land. The stool is not concerned with transactions bet­
ween citizens affecting land the dependent interest in 
which is owned by a citizen family or individual, even 
though the stool holds the absolute interest in such fam­
ily land. It follows that a citizen, though not owning 
the absolute interest, may grant a tenancy to another 
citizen out of his interest in occupied stool land (an 
interest which is exclusive as far as the other individuals 
are concerned). But he cannot grant a tenancy to a 
stranger without the consent of the stool; and in certain 
states he cannot apparently grant a tenancy to a stranger 
at all: this is the province of the stool (even when the
land concerned is held by a citizen).
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which has been tardily recognized. The effect is to extend 
the exemption from citizens serving the landowning stool to 
citizens of the same state - a wider loyalty, perhaps. This 
abusa chargeable on stranger-tenants is thus found in such 
areas as Ashanti, Akim and other parts of the Colony where 
stools are landowners.
Where individuals own land, e.g., in parts of the Colony, 
abusa is charged by the private landowner on all tenants who 
occupy his land, whether they are fellow-citizens or not.
Although almost any form of profit-making property may be 
held on abusa. the commonest form is as ap. agricultural tenancy, 
and there is usually a further restriction to land carrying 
permanent economic crops. Such crops include palm, kola, 
rubber, and last - and by far most important e cocoa. Sub­
sistence or foodstuffs farms are not usually subject to abusa;
36but often payment is made by a small annual sum or tithe. It 
is possible for abusa to be substituted when the foodstuffs 
are grown, not for personal consumption, but for sale on a largs 
scale (especially corn). It is unusual to hold houses on 
abusa. since, although receipts from rents are growing in im­
portance in the larger towns, a normal lease at an annual rent­
al is preferred.
36. So: Field: Akim Kotoku. 76: ”The growing of mere food
is not taxed by the landlords even when the tenant 
make s he avy profi t s...w
Danquah, A.L.C. 220, mentions foodstuffs farms on the 
abusa system.
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(b) How the tenancy arises:
The tenancy may arise by prior agreement: where the stool
is the granting landowner, then a stranger who applies for land 
from the stool on which to farm cocoa will be given such land 
to hold on the abusa system. Normally abusa is only exacted 
by the stool when the stranger is going to farm on unoccupied 
tribal or stool land, so that if he farms on family-land (i.e., 
land belonging to a citizen-family) the stool does not demand 
abusa. Even in such circumstances, however, the stranger may 
still be charged by the stool. If the grantor is a private 
individual or family, then a tenant may similarly pay abusa.
It is a general rule that anyone who cultivates another’s land, 
with or without permission, is to pay abusa unless otherwise 
agreed.
Or the liability to pay abusa to the stool may arise 
through purchase: a stranger purchasing a farm from a citizen
will have to pay abusa on the annual proceeds of the farm to 
the stool. This rule is not always applied.
The liability to pay abusa may arise without previous
agreement: if a stranger is found farming stool land he will
usually be allowed to continue in occupation, henceforward pay-
ing abusa. If he is troublesome, a successful clahnmay be
made for retrospective payment of abusa, or, failing that, for
37eviction. But in Pobee v. Takye it was said that "there is
37. (1912) Ren. 699
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no recognised custom that a tenant at will should pay as trib­
ute one-third of the cocoa grown on the land”. In this case, 
where a free tenant planted cocoa without the permission of his 
landlord, the court fixed the terms on which he might remain. 
This case rather illustrated the rule (given before) that a 
tenant in breach of the customary rules of a free tenancy, one 
of which is that the land is to be used only for the purposes
for which it is given, is liable to be treated as a commercial 
38
tenant. Despite this case, the custom is recognised; but to­
day, as far as stools are concerned, something less than full 
abusa is often asked of the tenants.
The payment of abusa i3 most important evidence of the 
title of the landlord, since occupation for some years by A of 
land to the knowledge of B, the alleged landlord, without pay­
ment of abusa is taken as evidence against B*s claim, if any, 
unless he can show that A was a permissive tenant on some other 
basis.
(c) The term of the tenancy;
There is usually no fixed term to the tenancy, although it 
may be coupled with a tenancy for a fixed term. Normally the 
tenancy is of indefinite duration, and the tenant - unless the
38. Cf. Danquah A.L.C. 220: tta landowner who has levied a tax 
on a free user of his land can, whenever he chooses to do 
so, call on his tenant for payment of an abusa share of 
the proceeds henceforth to be obtained by the tenant; but 
of proceeds already obtained the landlord would be well 
advised not to disturb his tenant*3 title with respect 
thereto.n
477
parties fixed otherwise - cannot he disturbed except for good
39reason. Danquah says that:
"where the crops cultivated are of a permanent 
nature, £abusa tenancjT* always made on the 
understanding that the tenant’s successors-in- 
ordinary are entitled to enjoy the interests 
of their predecessors."
A stranger who is cultivating stool lands has the right to
continue cultivation throughout his lifetime, and the good
reasons which entitle the landlord to terminate the tenancy are
few: one is the non-payment of the abusa share to him by the
40 41
tenant; others are denial of the landlord’s title, abandon­
ment by the tenant, etc. The former rule with regard to all 
tenants from a stool was that the 3tool could take the property 
if it so wished at the death of the tenant or when he abandoned 
the property. In the former case, the tenant’s successor was 
entitled to remove improvements made by the tenant, provided he 
could do so without damage to the realty. But today this cus­
tom has largely or entirely fallen into disuse; the tenant’s 
successor is entitled to continue cultivation on the same terms,
usually paying some drink to the stool by way of introduction
a o
at the time when he enters on his inheritance;^
39. A.L.C. 220.
40. Although it was said in Pobee v. Takye: (1912) Ren. 699, 
that "non-payment of cocoa tribute by the tenant is no 
ground for ejectment’1, vet there is general agreement 
(cf. Danquah A.L.O. 220) that it is a ground for eviction.
41. Cf. Adai v. Darku: (1905) Red. 231.
42. Cf. THE INDIVIDUAL AND PROPERTY, at pp. 186-7, ante.
478
43The case of Bodoa v, Ofoli illustrates what the law is 
not. The facts were that plaintiff claimed damages from his 
tenant, who held lands on abusa. The tenant had cut down the 
oil-palms on the land, and planted cocoa there instead without 
the permission of the landlord.
Earnshaw J, said that this was the first action for waste 
in the Colony, and then proceeded to apply the English lav/.
On this basis he found that it was "meliorating waste", and 
there was therefore no right to damages. Although there was 
no claim for eviction, the learned judge considered the nature 
of such a customary tenancy obiter:
"This tenancy, by native custom, may continue 
for a long and indefinite period..... No-one 
can fix a time at which, by native law, the 
possession of this farm will revert to the 
owner of the land."
Both halves of this statement are at first sight an accurate 
description of the customary law, but the second part is un­
helpful, since we are interested in the right to possess, and 
not in the actual possession; one can definitely fix a time 
when the right to possess reverts to the owner of the land.
One such instance would be in facts like those of the above 
case;. The case brings to notice the rule of African law that 
if land is granted for one purpose, it must not be used for 
another without the permission of the grantor. Changing the
43. (1910) Earn. 51; (spelt "Bodaa" by Brandford Griffith, 
Digest).
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course of husbandry, whether ameliorating or not, is therefore 
a ground for determination of the tenancy* The intricacies of 
English law are entirely out-of-place on this topic; and can­
not in logic be applied to what is conceded to be the prime ex­
ample of customary tenancies in Akan Law.
It is probably still open to a private landowner to refuse 
permission for the tenant's successor to continue in operation; 
and a fresh agreement is necessary, unless the landlord con­
sents tacitly to the successor's continuing by conduct. Other­
wise the tenant is assured of a perpetual right, provided he
continues to pay abusa. The presumption to this effect is
44stronger in regard to cocoa, than for foodstuffs, farms.
(d) Method of receiving and calculating abusa:
With cocoa farms, where there is a private landlord, after 
the crop has been collected and sold, the proceeds received and 
the labourers paid, the remainder may either be taken to the 
landlord, who takes one-third and returns two-thirds; or the 
tenant sends one-third to the landlord, and pockets the re­
mainder. There seems to be no fixed custom on this point. In 
general, the landlord's share Is calculated from the gross
profits of the land held, so that all the expenses (the wages
45
of the labourers, etc.) have to be met by the tenant. Accord-
44. The “tenancy" thus becomes for most purposes a form of 
subordinate ownership in such a case.
45. But in a written agreement made in Adansi, abusa was 
calculated on the net proceeds.
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ing to on© informant, the 1/3 share is calculated from the 
loads: if 30 loads of cocoa are produced from the farm, then
20 loads go to the farmer, and 10 loads go to the landlord, and 
there is no question of dividing the money which is received in 
payment for the cocoa. But some evidence suggested that work­
ing expenses were sometimes deductible from the profit for the 
purpose of calculating abusa.
Whilst the standard ratio for division of the proceeds is 
2/3:1/3, other ratios are possible; and it is open to the 
parties to vary the proportion in whatever manner they agree - 
so that the proportion §:-J- is sometimes found (“if the landlord 
is lucky11, said my informants).
Where the stool is landowner, tax-collectors are sent out 
to collect the tax or cocoa-tribute. The difficulties of 
assessment are great: hence it ha3 become the custom in some
areas for the stool's representatives to make an estimate of 
the annual yield, and levy 1/3 on this; or else to substitute 
a simpler and more definite mode of assessment, as by Id. a 
tree, or the payment of "sheep-money". The total revenue from 
the farm is not, however, paid into the stool treasury and out 
again, as is sometimes done by a private landowner.
Abusa is only reckoned on the commercial yield of the 
farm, so that if the tenant plants foodstuffs in between his 
cocoa, these are not liable to abusa.
481
(e) Rights of the landlord:
^ ie abusa tenant is a farming tenant; other rights of the 
landlord are therefore not affected, so that he remains the 
granting party for leases, concessions, or sales, in respect of 
timber (or other valuable trees) and minerals in the same land. 
Where the tenant is exceptionally permitted to exploit timber 
as well, the landlord is entitled to 1/3 of the proceeds from 
this. Palm-trees and kola trees, if already standing in the 
farm, are the property of the landlord, and he alone is en­
titled to their fruits; although it i3 sometimes the practice
for the tenant to be allowed to tap palm-trees for palm-wine,
46in which case he sends a portion to the landlord. The land­
lord has no right to evict the tenant from his holding except 
for good cause; and he must not do anything which will impair 
the tenant's enjoyment of the property without the tenant's 
consent and/or paying compensation for loss which is caused 
thereby (as by granting mining rights to others in the same
land)*__________________________________________________________
46. Danquah, A.L.C. 221; and see, for Fante areas, the dictum 
of Jackson J. in regard to palm-trees, in Consolidated 
Suits Nos.2 & 5/1945: (Unrep: Land Ct, Cape Coast):
1 By a study of the judicial decisions covering the 
past 80 years, it is quite clear that ownership of palm 
trees remains with the true owners, and never pass to 
the tenants unless by specific agreement. This area is 
one in which palm trees are few, the fruit is apparently 
not used except in a few instances; the trees are used 
primarily for the production of palm wine.
The customary law is quite clear that the owner 
retains the right to tap these palms, or alternatively 
that a portion of the wine is given to him by the tenanti*
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(f) Right3 of the tenant:
He has no right to work or get timber and minerals with- 
47out permission.
He has a right to security of tenure; he has also ancill­
ary rights - similar to those enjoyed by citizen-farmers, where 
necessary to his farming: i.e., common rights of way, water,
to forest-produce, etc. But in general he does not qualify 
for these rights unless he is a permanent settler.
The tenant has a right to interplant food-crops between 
the young or growing cocoa-trees, and is solely entitled to 
the proceeds thereof. Apart from this, he should use the land 
only for the purpose for which it was given him.
The tenant is not permitted to alienate his interest with­
out the prior consent of his landlord; but he may transfer his 
interest (not of course the land itself) to a third party if 
the landlord agrees. I am not sure what is the position in 
regard to pledges of his interest by the tenant. But, gener­
ally, the landlord is not bound to accept dealings with the 
tenant's interest unless he has been consulted.
The tenant has, however, the right to introduce his dep­
endents (wife, children, servants) to work on the farm; and 
may leave the farm in charge of a caretaker.
47. Cf. Danquah, A.L.C. 221; and Field, A.K., 76: "All 
big trees of any market value must be left standing 
and remain the property of the town."
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(g) Form of agreement:
Abusa tenancies are usually contracted orally, and no
v/ritten agreement is made# Instances do, however, occur of
48
written agreements# Likewise, although the rights given above 
are those which are customarily attached to the tenancy, it is 
open to the parties to vary them in any way by oral or written 
agreoment#
(h) General comments:
The abusa system is not really analogous to metayage or 
profit-sharing schemes, such as are to be found in France, 
Turkey and elsewhere# The basis of the tenancy is not a 
partnership, where the landowner contributes the capital, and 
the tenant supplies the labour. Unlike systems in other
49
countries, the landlord does not supply tools, seeds, or labour 
nor does he give any assistance in marketing, etc# The land­
lord, apart from permitting the tenant to occupy the land, does 
nothing. The land, and the things in and on it, which are al­
ready naturally present (e.g., minerals and timber) already 
belong to the landowner# The things artificially growing on 
the land would belong to the landlord also, were it not the 
tenant's labour which made them grow there. The competition 
between two rules of customary law: "what is in or on the land
48. As, for instance, in Adansi; and the agreements incor­
porate all the customary terms#
49# Cf# Danquah, A#L#C# 220: "The landowner never pays any 
part of the cost of working or keeping the property."
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is for the landowner", and rta man is entitled to the fruits of
his own labour”, has resulted in the present division of the
50
proceeds into thirds. The owner-caretaker relation is at 
first sight more analogous to an abusa tenancy; but the two 
mu3t be sharply distinguished. It is not merely that where 
there is a caretaker the caretaker takes 1/3 and the owner 2/3. 
The abusa tenant receives an interest in land, which is trans­
missible to his successors; the caretaker receives none.
Although the original proportion is 1/3, one-quarter and 
other fractions have sometimes been substituted, as the 1/3 was 
felt to be too high, having regard to the parts played by the 
landlord and tenant respectively. But the law applicable re­
mains the same.
Division of the proceeds or the yield must be disting­
uished from physical division of the farm or land itself. There 
is sometimes a voluntary arrangement that A will supply the 
land, and B the labour. B is to clear the ground, and plant 
cocoa. Vs/hen the cocoa reaches the bearing stage, the farm is
physically divided, l/3 going to A and 2/3 to B. But this
51
can only apply where the land is virgin forest. The Africans
sometimes say that B is employed as a “caretaker"; and gets
52, 53
only 1/3 for his labours and not 2/3. There is also the
50.Cf. Chapter VIII, post.
51. Reported from, inter alia, Bekwal and Ajumako (where 
the division is into halves).
52 & 53, (See next page)
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Involuntary, arrangement, where B has cultivated A's land for
some time without A's permission or knowledge* If this was an
honest mistake, and A asserts his title, a native court may
order ex aequo et bono (if cocoa has been planted) that the
54
farm be divided physically, l/3 to A, and 2/3 to B,
Until the cocoa comes into bearing, no abusa can be pay­
able* Where there is a stranger-tenant from a stool, he may 
pay nothing or a fixed annual sum to the stool until the fourth 
year, as recognition of the stool's title; and thenceforth
abusa on the cocoa harvested.
55
Direction
of
cultivation
52. Another method of working by a caretaker was put to me 
as follows:
B makes 3 successive farms 
from virgin forest belonging 
to A, the landlord.
B hands over 1 and 2 to 
A, and keeps 3 for his own 
benefit.
B may sell 1 and 2 only 
with the permission of A.
B works 3 for himself, and 
keeps the proceeds. He does 
not pay l/3 share of the 
proceeds to A.
If B leaves, he hands 
back 3 to A.
A's successor inherits 
the right to 1, 2 and 3.
53. See Chapter VIII post.
54. Information from New Juaben. This is a special case, 
and no doubt a modern development.
55. Cf. Field, Akim Kotoku, 76: ...it is not till the
cocoa begins to yield that the landlords take their 
one-third.”
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The effect of the abuaa system is that the rent varies 
with the prosperity and size of the farm, the yield of the 
cocoa and the price realised therefor. It operates equitably 
both for the landlord and the tenant (since in a bad year the 
tenant pays less, in a good year more), even though the prop­
ortion of one-third may appear high for the contribution of the 
landlord. It thus differs from tenancies at an annual rent
in usheep-moneyM, which have now been largely substituted for
56
tenancies on the abusa system, in Ashanti at any rate. Abusa 
going too much against the tenant, stools had to reduce their 
terms (in order to attract strangers) and charge a fixed annual 
rent. The terms of the tenancy are otherwise identical with 
an abusa tenancy, except that the abusa tenant has a guarantee 
that his rent will not rise beyond his means. The tenant for 
sheep-money appears to have no guarantee that his rent will 
stay as it was originally fixed, as actual cases and complaints 
shov/. If the tenancy were transitory (i.e., to grow food­
stuffs) this would not matter. But as permanent crops are 
grown, he is threatened with an increase of rent as prices 
rise. If he refuses to pay, then he is evicted or placed on 
the abusa system.
(i) Improvements and devastation of the sub.lect-matter: 
Owing to the character of the tenancy (that it is of in­
definite duration), it rarely happens that questions on the
56. For this type of tenancy, see post pp.489-490.
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destination of improvements to the land subject to the tenancy
arise. If they do arise - and the planting of cocoa-trees is
the most obvious improvement today - then a Native Court's
likely answer would be to recommend a physical division of the
subject-matter, of so much (with trees) to the landlord, and
so much to the tenant.
The contrary question: who is to bear any loss - arises
somewhat more frequently today. The swollen-shoot disease is
mainly responsible; and disputes thus occur principally in
connexion with the payment of Cocoa Rehabilitation Grants. If
the farm - planted with cocoa by the tenant - is devastated
by swollen-shoot, then (were there nothing more) the loss would
lie where it falls. Government, however, has in the past paid
monetary compensation for the loss, and replanting grants as an
encouragement to bring the farm once again into production.
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In one case, W.C.A. gave fallow-land to K.A. on the abusa
system; K.A. planted cocoa. The successor to K.A. (M.A.)
received a Cocoa Rehabilitation Grant in respect of the farm.
It was stated that W.C.A. was receiving 2/3, and M.A. l/3, of
the proceeds of the farm; the reason for the reversal of cus-
58
tom was not given in the case; W.C.A. claimed then that 2/3 
of the C.R. grant should be paid over to him.
57. Kwame Apawu v. Mark Addo (succr to W.C.Addo): (N. Juaben 
. A. Court: Suit 54/49; 11/7/49). ! —
58. Perhaps because the land given was fallow-land? (K.A. 
was certainly not a mere caretaker.)
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The Native Court declared:
"The grants provided by the C.R.S. are solely 
paid to farmers v/ho have planted cocoa trees 
on their land to foster them to maintain 
their farms property, and not to a mere 
owner of a farmstead.”
This is, the grant is due to planters, and not to owners of
land on which cocoa trees happen to stand: nevertheless the
court then ordered that M.A. should pay over half the grant to
W.C.A., the landlord: the reasons for this order were not
given.
4. TENANCY FOR A FIXED RENT.
Owing to the difficulties, which have been mentioned
above, which are caused by an abusa tenancy both to landlord
and tenant, many tenancies between stools and stranger-farmors
(and also sometimes between private landlords and tenants) are
59
now based on a fixed annual rent; and it is increasingly tak­
ing the place of the abusa tenancy, especially in Ashanti (and 
in Akim Abuakwa). A fixed rent may be combined with any 
length or form of tenancy; but we shall particularly discuss
59. In Akim Abuakwa, for instance, abusa tenancy was formerly 
the rule; but the policy now is to substitute a "hiring 
or lease for a fixed economic rent. This is because of 
the difficulty of calculating abusa annually, and of the 
discouragement to permanent settlers.
60. Cf. Danquah, A.L.C. 221: "Rent or tax is a modified
form of the Abusa system; both tenant and landlord der­
ive mutual benefit from the property involved and similar 
laws apply to both a taxed or rented farm and a farm on 
the Abusa system.”
489
here customary tenancies between stool and stranger of land
for farming, and especially for cocoa. In such a case, the
61fixed rent may be known as "tribute” or "toll".
(a) Calculation of the rent:
The rent may be either
(i) at so much per cocoa tree;
(ii) in "sheep-money";
(iii) a fixed money rental.
(i) For Ashanti the rate per cocoa-tree was originally fixed
by resolution of the Ashanti Confederacy Council at Id. per
tree. This has been progressively reduced to ^d; but in
practice different Ashanti divisions charge as they think fit,
and may vary the amount without reference to the latest A.C.C. 
62ruling. The "Id per tree" rate has been employed outside
>2
Ashanti, but is not now in favour in the Colony.
64
(ii) "Sheep-money": such sums as £4.13. 0. and £9. 6. 0. per
annum, calculated on the nominal price of sheep, or of the 
former gold-dust weights, are met with as rents of land held on 
such tenancies. The actual amount charged varies according :to:
the willingness of the farmer to pay;
the amount of land taken (but only a rough scale
61. As in Danquah, loc.cit.; arid in common parlance in 
Ashanti.
62. See Matson, Digest, paras. 72-75, p. 17.
63. Both sheep-money and "so much per tree" have been used 
in Akim Abuakwa; but not today. In 1927 the rate was 
Id. per tree in Akim Abuakwa.
64. See GLOSSARY.
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per acre - or "per farm*1 - operates);
the price of cocoa;
the favour in which the tenant is with the stool;
65
the amount desired by the stool,
(iii) Fixed money rent; is especially applied in the case of 
houses. Tenancies for a fixed money rent are (where agric­
ultural and from the stool) only a variation or extension in 
many cases of the tenancies for a rent payable in the distinct 
amounts of sheep-money; but, as they get away from the custom­
ary figure, so they tend to be coupled on the one hand more and 
more with written agreements; and on the other to bear a much 
closer relation to the value of the land taken (by size). In 
both these aspects the rent indicates increasing commercialisa­
tion.
A short study of actual case-histories (whether of farms 
under "Id a tree", sheep-money, or fixed money, rent) reveals . 
that the term "tenancy for a fixed rent" is perhaps a misnomer. 
One observes (so far as stranger-tenants from a stool are con­
cerned) that some stools vary the rent unilaterally without 
reference to the farmer. Nevertheless, the rent can be called 
"fixed", in that a sum is agreed on at the time the tenant 
first enters; and also because the rent is ascertainable 
before the harvest v/ithout reference to the crop of cocoa
65. Some or all of these factors - given me by informants - 
may influence the agreement arrived atj but a prospective 
tenant seems to be in the weaker bargaining position.
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actually realised. From the tenant's point of view, it is 
dubious how far stool landowners are entitled to vary the 
amount of rent payable without reference to the tenant. Call­
ing the rent (or tax?) "cocoa tribute" gives only the appear­
ance of legality to this variation: if in fact the "id per
tree" or abusa or sheep-money is a tax demandable from strang­
ers, and not a rent payable by those not entitled by citizen- 
right to farm free, then one cannot quibble: the tenant must
be taken to have entered into an agreement for a tenancy of 
indefinite or perpetual duration, subject to whatever tax may 
be demanded from time to time. But, where there is an agree­
ment for a money-rent, this should bind the landlord, whoi
should not be able to vary the rent unilaterally. That the 
latter is probably the correct position to take up seems to be 
so from comparisons with the rights of an individual landlord, 
and also from the fact that today, when stranger-tenants are 
admitted under written agreement (in the form of a lease), it 
is more obvious that they are tenants at a rent, and not set­
tlers subject to a tax. To put the landlord's point of view, 
one should not lightly water down the rights of a stool-land­
lord, since the tenant's rights are now stronger: in custom he
is entitled to security of tenure for himself and his success­
ors unless he fails to pay the rent or tribute, (or otherwise 
fails to meet his obligations?). Hence the only means by 
which a landlord may now be able to recover possession is by
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raising the rent, with the intention of forcing the tenant to 
quit.
(b) Term of the tenancy;
Just as with the abusa tenant, and the tenant at a nominal 
rental, the tenant on a fixed rent enjoys his tenancy indef­
initely, unless specially otherwise stated at the formation of 
the agreement for the tenancy. The tenancy endures for the 
lifetime of the tenant, for the benefit of his successor, and 
is continued by the successors in title of the landlord. The
tenant has security of title and from eviction except for the 
66usual reasons; and his position is almost on all fours with 
that of a citizen owning a farm or house in regard to his right 
to compensation if he has to quit his holding. Formerly, when 
the stranger-tenant died, the stool would take his farm unless 
a successor quickly put in his appearance; and the stool today 
still has the reversion to both the land and the farm, so that 
if the tenant dies without anyone coming to succeed him, the 
stool takes back the property.
(c) Rights of the landlord:
The rights of a landlord in such a tenancy are similar to
67
those which he possesses in regard to an abusa tenant.
66. The stranger seems assured of perpetual rights provided 
he pays the annual tribute: Bekwai.
The flusual reasons” include those mentioned at pp. 478-479 
and 481-482 ante.
67. See ante p. 481.
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(d) Rights of the tenant:
The tenant has a right to the exclusive use of the land 
held for the purpose for which it was leased, absolute right 
to the proceeds of the farm from his own labour, power to 
create minor interests (like a citizen-farmer) in favour of his 
wife, children, etc. If he abandons or quits his holding, 
then - if he does not sell - he has a right to remove every­
thing he has put on the land - houses, trees, plants; but to­
day instead he is increasingly awarded compensation, or 
allowed to sell.
(e) Writing:
It is becoming commoner, especially as between stool and
stranger-farmer, to execute a lease or written agreement, but
68
this is not compulsory, and a tenant previously holding by ver-
69
bal agreement cannot be forced to take a lease thenceforth.
68. nIf the parties desire a written document, that is done. 
The Okyenhene has approved forms which must be exec­
uted on an abusa/* - Akim Abuakwa.
But, in regard to the holding of house-plots for a 
rent by strangers, certain states have switched over 
to written agreements; and certainly - at least for 
new tenants - there is now no option: cf. Bekwai,
Kumasi town, Koforidua. Bekwai does not use written 
documents for agricultural tenancies.
And cf. post, pp. 494 et seq.
69. According to Akim Abuakwa.
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B. LEASES,
From a consideration of native tenancies and leases, we
turn now to the effect of the introduction of written agree-
70
ments and formal leases. There are two major classes of lease 
to be examined: the first is where, if there were no writing,
an ordinary native tenancy would exist; the second is where 
there is a proper lease in English form. In the first case, 
the tenancy is the Important part of the transaction, and the 
lease or writing, although perhaps approximating to English 
form, .‘m a y  be intended only as a record or memorandum, and 
especially to preserve the landlord's reversion. In the sec­
ond case, without the lease itself the transaction would be 
null and void. In general, writing or leases are used for 
house-land rather than for agricultural tenancies, and espec­
ially for grants of land to non-natives,
1. NATIVE TENANCIES AND WRITING.
(a) Farms:
States where writing or leases are now used by stools for 
the grant of agricultural tenancies to stranger-farmers include 
Akim Abuakwa in the Colony, and Adansl in Ashanti. In Akim 
Abuakwa the tenancy is created by written document, and may 
sometimes be called a “hiring11. Resident strangers usually 
pay 10/- per annum, whatever the size of the farm. Approved
70. And see Chapter XI, WRITING, post.
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forms are used by the State Lands Office for the purpose. The 
position of the tenants appears to be similar in other respects 
to that of a customary tenant holding by oral agreement. Non­
resident strangers may be given an abusa tenancy in writing.
In Adansi also documents are used where a stranger acquires a 
farming tenancy. ‘1116 Chief granting the tenancy prepares the 
documents, which are taken before the Omanhene for his approval. 
If the stranger wishes to make a cocoa farm on land controlled 
by a family, again documents must be prepared, and again the 
arrangement must be approved. Customary terms are incorpor­
ated in the tenancy agreement.
(k) Houses; and House-plots;
There are more states which use documents for the grant 
of house-plots to strangers; but such a practice is usually 
confined to the larger towns. Adansi does not use written 
documents for such purposes.
In Bekwai leases are used both for citizens and strangers 
who desire house-plots in Bekwai town. A standard form is 
used. The granting parties ("lessors") are given as tfThe 
Bekwaihene and Elders of Bekwai11. The plot demised is indic­
ated by a rough sketch plan which is annexed. There is pro­
vision for the determination of the lease by the lessors on 
five years * notice (but in intention the grant is of indefinite
71. See also: REGISTRATION, pp> 755 et seq.
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duration). The lease is subject to covenants on the part of 
the lessee:
to pay the rent reserved;
to fence off the plot within 12 months of the
indenture;
to build a house or store thereon within 18
months;
to keep in good repair and fence;
not to assign, underlet or part with the possession 
of the premises without the consent in 
writing of the lessors.
Despite the terms of the lease, the tenancy is (so far as 
citizens are concerned, to whom the same form is applied) sub­
ject to the usual customary terms, is of indefinite duration, 
the tenant (if a citizen - and perhaps if a stranger) underlets 
freely, and is owner of the house, and not merely lessee there­
of, as he would be in strict English Law.
Other towns v/here written documents are used include 
Kumasi and Koforidua. Kumasi is a special case, as tenure 
there is governed by the Kumasi Lands Ordinance, 1943 (as am­
ended by the Kumasi Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1945, All 
persons, citizens and strangers, must hold their house-plots, 
etc., on lease from the Asantehene. Such leases must be in 
accordance with English law (s.2). A "Kumasi Hative" pays 
only a shilling a year nominal rent in respect of one house- 
plot. All leases must be registered, so - although the 
Ordinance contains no express provision to that effect, all 
leases must be in, or recorded in, writing. Leases - or deal­
ings with interests under them - not so registered are void.
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Kumasi is the only town where such a position exists; it 
may well he that the system will be extended later to other
centres, as it works well in practice*
2, LEASES TO NON-NATIVES*
In former times land was often acquired, especially by
missions, as a gift from the local chief; this transaction
v
appeared to differ from the grant of a tenancy to an African
in that - after an initial present - the stool usually laid no
further claim to the land granted, and it was not thought that 
the grantee was a tenant of any kind. Even today such grants
to missions for no valuable payment are reported as being made.
Commercial enterprises, however, are now usually required to 
take under a lease,, paying an economic rent. Reference has 
been made to Bekwai above; the same printed form, both here 
and elsewhere, is apparently used both for grants of plots to 
Africans for residential purposes, and for leases to commercial 
firms. One such lease I examined contains a covenant by the 
lessee to build within an agreed period, subject to a right of 
re-entry in default. But it goes on:
1 PROVIDED ALWAYS AND IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND 
DECLARED that the Lessee shall have a rigjit and 
be at liberty to erect any building or buildings
on the land hereby demised at any time whatsoever
during the continuance of this lease and such 
building or buildings so erected shall be the 
property of the Lessee after the expiration of 
the said term hereby granted but the Lessee shall
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upon such expiration pull down and remove 
therefrom any building or buildings fixtures 
articles and things that may be erected and 
set up or left on the said land.”
This provision that buildings erected on the leased land are 
the property of the lessee is of course in consonance with the 
customary land tenure. The provision for removal of such 
buildings is more appropriate for dwellings of perishable mat­
erials, and at least in the case of commercial firms compensa­
tion is usually paid if the lessee surrenders the land to the 
lessor. And the provision mu3t be read with one subsequent 
to it providing that the lessee has the right to sell such 
buildings, but that the lessor has the right of first refusal.
The rent reserved under such a lease naturally varies; 
but it is considerably higher proportionally than that demanded 
of individual strangers. The term also varies; in leases of 
which I have information it usually ran from about 40 to 99 
years; but 60 years appeared the most popular, and I have not 
met leases for terms exceeding 99 years.
By the terms of the Concessions Ordinance, 1939, s.3, 
agreements purporting to grant rights of any kind in land from
a native to a non-native must be in writing; and, if not in
72
writing, are void. •
72. The Ordinance is more fully discussed under REGISTRATION 
at pp* 750-5.
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CHAPTER VIII.
CARETAKERS,
A, MEANINGS OF THE WORD "CARETAKER".
A word that is frequently encountered in customary law is
1
that of 11 care taker". It is unfortunately used in many differ­
ent senses, some exact, some inexact. Although always term- 
inologically appropriate where one person takes care of some 
property for another, yet confusion can easily be caused by its 
use to describe different positions and duties. In brief, the 
word always suggests that ultimate title is not with the care­
taker, who has possession only or some lesser right.
1. ORDINARY CARETAKER.
(a) For individual farmer or house-owner;
First we have the ordinary caretaker appointed by the 
owner of property to look after it for him, to be in the posi­
tion of a factor or agent in the management and upkeep of the 
property, and for the receipt of proceeds - cocoa sales, rents - 
from the property. Where farms are the subject of c are take r- 
ship, these are usually of cocoa; but caretakership can be 
over any type of farm.
1. Christaller gives ohwefo as the Twi for "caretaker"; and
nhweso for "care taker ship" (though he does not use the 
actual word "caretaker" in his definition). I was given 
the word "ohwesofo".
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The individual (or family) farmer or house-owner appoints
someone to look after the farm or house for him, if he himself
is unable to do so because of absence, ill-health, old age, or
other commitments. Such a caretaker may engage labourers to
assist him, or may himself be of the labourer-class; although
it is by no means unknown for a relative of the owner to be
2
caretaker for the property.
The caretaker of a house usually resides there.
Families owning property appoint caretakers most fre­
quently in the case of town-houses, where someone is required 
to collect the rents and repair the house when necessary.
The institution of caretakership is an aid to the acquisi­
tion and control of properties scattered over different dis­
tricts; and one can accumulate properties in this manner. It 
will be appreciated that this is of interest in connexion with 
the development of an absentee-landlord class.
(b ) For stool property:
Stools (in particular those with a large amount of stool 
property in the narrow sense - farms and houses) have to ap­
point caretakers for these properties. Such a caretaker of 
stool properties is quite distinct from a stool which is des­
cribed to be caretaker for a superior stool. Both are care­
takers for the stool; but in the first case, care is taken of
2. !,Any-body can be a caretaker, whether labourer or 
relative.” - Akim Abuakwa.
”But a brother is preferable” - an informant from Kwahu.
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the farm; whilst in the second care is taken of the stool's 
ultimate title in the land. The former has no interest; 
whilst in the latter the subordinate stool has a dependent 
interest in the land.
(c) Caretaker and abusa tenant:
Although a caretaker may reside on the property which he 
is looking after, or may work it like a tenant or owner, and 
he is remunerated with a share of the proceeds, yet caretakers 
aru^  a^u3a tenants are quite distinct in customary law:
The abusa tenant pays l/3 share to the landlord by virtue 
of the landlord's title to the land; the caretaker is paid l/3 
share as a reward for his services.
The abusa tenant has a valuable interest in the land; the 
caretaker has none.
The caretaker is an employee of the landlord; the abu3a 
tenant is not.
The abusa tenant's right to occupy the land endures indef­
initely: the caretaker may be discharged (unless there is
agreement for a definite period of service) at the wish of the 
landlord.
The abu3a tenant owns the crops; the caretaker does not.
2. SUPERIOR AND SUBORDINATE STOOLS.
One stool is frequently described as "caretaker1 for 
another. This statement implies that the caretaker stool is
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not the owner of the land it occupies. This relation is
3
entirely distinct from the preceding one, since the caretaker 
stool is not the employee of the landowning stool, although it 
is that stool’s subject and servant by virtue of the political 
bond between them. Most frequently in Ashanti a village 
Odikro was described as caretaker for his superior landowning 
stool. By reason of his position, he controlled the occupa­
tion of land in the village, sent strangers wishing to farm to 
report to the superior stool, and generally protected the in­
terests of the landowning stool. In return for these services, 
he would receive l/3 or other share of revenue coming from that 
land to the superior stool. His position must therefore be 
contrasted with that of an Odikro owning his own land (who may 
send l/3 share of extraordinary profits from his land to his 
political superior by reason of his allegiance).
Some of the towns (e.g., Bekwai, Koforidua), are divided 
up between different caretakers for the Paramount Stool (of 
the Division concerned), who are chiefs or elders, and immed­
iately supervise affairs in their quarter.
3. DOMESTIC AND CHILD - MEMBERS OF A FAMILY.
Domestics are sometimes appointed to look after the in­
terests of members of the family under age, which they will do 
by representing their views and interests at family councils,
3. l.(b) above.
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and especially by looking after property they have received by 
will or otherwise until the beneficiaries are of full age, and 
capable of managing their own affairs.
4. SUCCESSOR AND FAMILY.
Successors appointed to succeed to inherited family prop­
erty are not infrequently described as being ” care taker s” of 
that property for the family. In so far as a successor must 
take care of the property In the family Interest, and inasmuch 
as the successor does not have the absolute interest in the 
property - which Is with the family - the terminology i3 apt.
But of course a successor is in quite a different position from
an ordinary caretaker:
He has a qualified interest in the property.
He has a right to exclusive use and possession.
He has an absolute right to the proceeds of the
property, out of which he does not pay any share -
4
qua ownership - to the family.
But on the other hand, a member of the family is sometimes 
appointed as caretaker of family property in the wide sense, 
e.g., houses, with instructions to collect the proceeds for the 
family; but his appointment will be made expressly for this 
purpose, and he may incorrectly be described as 11 the successor”
4. A person who acts as agent of the familv may be called a 
caretaker: Ruttmern v. Ruttmern: (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 178.
The caretaker must account for all the proceeds from the 
property, and for the property itself.
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with regard to such property.
5. MORTGAGOR IN POSSESSION.
In the variety of pledge where the mortgagee does not go
0
into possession of the pledged property, but leaves the mort­
gagor in possession to collect the proceeds (1/3 going to cap­
ital repayment, l/3 to interest,1/5 for working expenses), then 
the mortgagor finds himself in the position of caretaker of his 
own property, since the pledge has not affected his title to 
the land, but only his right to possession. The mortgagor 
acquires custody, and not possession. In such a case, then, 
he is a special variety of caretaker.
7
In one case, Donkor v. Ologo, in a native court, the 
brother of the pledgor was appointed caretaker of the pledged 
cocoa-farm by the creditor. The caretaker rendered accounts 
to the creditor. The case was interesting, in that the def­
ence (the pledgor) claimed that the debt for which the pledge 
was given had already been satisfied by the caretaker's felling 
of palm-trees on the pledged land, and sale of them for palm- 
wine. The evidence of this was rejected by the court.
5. " Care taker" may include a "trustee" under a will; see 
SUCCESSION, p. 618; and Nelson v. Nelson: (1932) 
1 W.A.C.A. 215 (a Ga case).
6. See PLEDGE AND MORTGAGE, p. 438.
7. (Unreported) New Juaben A Court: June 1950.
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B . RIGHTS AND DITTIES OP CARETAKERS,
1. APPOINTMENT AND DISCHARGE.
The ordinary caretaker, whether labourer, relative or
friend,may be appointed at any time. One must distinguish
between the caretaker of a virgin forest or fallow-land, and
of an existing farm. A caretaker of an existing farm is a
true caretaker; but there is also the custom of appointing a
so-called caretaker over virgin forest or fallow-land belonging
to the person appointing hira# Frequently the land is adjacent
to an existing farm of the owner, over which the caretaker
additionally undertakes supervision.
An ordinary caretaker^ rights and duties are specified
at the time of the appointment, as also is his term of office.
If no agreement is made, he is dismissable at pleasure; but
will receive compensation for his loss of employment if this
occurs before, say, the cocoa-season (so that he loses his per-
8cent age remuneration).
It appears to be sometimes made a condition of a care­
takers appointment that he should clear a new portion of the
8. Term of office:- May be for a season, a year, several 
seasons, or unlimited: Akim Abuakwa.
He may be sacked at any time if he offends the owner, 
but will receive compensation if terminated before the 
cocoa-season: Kwahu.
His appointment is determinable by either side at any 
time, but without prejudice to rights already acquired:
Akim Abuakwa.
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virgin forest for the owner, as well as supervise the picking
9
of cocoa from the existing farm. But the practice in regard 
to their appointment seems to vary widely from village to 
village?*0 It is possible to appoint a caretaker for part of 
the year only - from January to June being usually a slack 
season in the agricultural world.
2. REMUNERATION.
Unless otherwise specified a caretaker is entitled to one-
third share of the proceeds of the farm. But the parties can
agree for any proportion, or for a fixed wage (which is espec-
ially appropriate in the case of house-proper ty). According
12
to lawah v. MasiHeno, if the caretaker is a relative he is not 
entitled to a share in the rent of land if leased or sold, but 
only to reasonable remuneration from the owner. A relative
9. "It is general custom of Buoyem /Wenchi/ persons to give 
their cocoa farms to labourers to pluck without receiving 
any rum from the caretakers. The labourers are also not 
forced to make new forest farm for the owner of the cocoa 
farm as other people of Ashanti do to the caretakers of 
cocoa farms.” (Prom a statement by the Buoyemhene 
recorded in Bekwai District Complaints Pile for 22.10.49).
10. 11 In every village of £&£[ own there is a different 
laws /sic7 in respect of caretakers for cocoa farms.1 
(Buoyemhene).
11. uHe is entitled to a remuneration of l/3, or whatever
sum is agreed on between him and the farm-owner”: N.Juaben.
MWhether relative or labourer, and for an economic or 
cash crop, the recompense is invariably one-third, unless 
special conditions are attached.11: Akim Abuakwa.
Other proportions are found (e.g., i); but inform­
ants said a caretaker would be lucky to get so much.
12. (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 87. But this was a Ga case.
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seems equally entitled to receive a third share (compare the
statement from Akim Abuakwa in footnote 11); in Abena Donkor
13
v. Kwaku Nusin & ora, a criminal case in a Native Court - but 
really involving only civil claims - we find that a woman ap­
pointed her younger brother as caretaker of a cocoa farm, he
to take half the proceeds, and she the other half. This case 
is interesting as showing some of the complications which may 
arise. The full facts were:
A.D. (the plaintiff) acquired the cocoa farm as 
a gift from her brother K.J. by will. She went 
away for three years with her husband, and left 
the farm in the care of her younger brother K.N.
(the first defendant). A.D. said in evidence:
”1 handed the said cocoa farm to him to take 
care of it, and it was agreed that in every
season he should take or use half the pro­
ceeds and the remaining half of it to me to
pay debts left to my care by my said brother 
2k #J. deceased^*"
K.N. then disposed of the property (it was con­
tested whether by gift or sale) to K.O. (fourth 
defendant), £12 being paid by K.O. either as 
stamping fee (if a gift) or consideration (if a 
sale). When A.D. returned, she begged through 
the Odikro to K.O. for the return of her farm; 
the terms offered were the refund of the £12, and 
payment of £15 for expenses. This offer was 
refused. Hence the instant case, a criminal 
prosecution, in which the defendants were variously 
accused of stealing land, receiving it, or aiding 
and abetting.
Where a caretaker is expected to clear a portion of the 
virgin forest each year, then customarily he is entitled to a 
one-third share of the land so cleared and planted with cocoa. 
The most popular practice appears to be for the farm to be
13. Heard at Dadiasi: 10.1.1950.
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physically divided, two-thirds becoming the absolute property 
of the landowner; and one-third going to the caretaker absol­
utely. The caretaker is entitled to sell the portion he thus 
14
acquires. Where the land is fallow (farmstead or secondary 
bush), then the farm is not physically divided, although the 
caretaker is entitled to one-third of the proceeds of the farm. 
A fortiori« if there is a cocoa-farm already in existence, he 
is entitled only to 1/3 of the proceeds.
Is the one-third calculated on the net or the gross yield 
of the property? If the caretaker himself employs labourers, 
does their reward come out of the caretaker's one-third, or are 
such expenses deductible? No very clear answer emerged; but 
the conclusion seemed to be favourable to the caretaker.
At the present time in Akwapim and Akim Abuakwa I was told 
that cocoa caretakers are remunerated by one-third share, or by 
so much per load of cocoa produced (the present rate being 
about 5/- to 10/- per load). Payment per load will apply only 
where the caretaker did not plant the cocoa.
If there is an abusa tenant, A, growing cocoa on land held 
from B on the abusa system, and if A employs a caretaker C to 
look after the farm for him, I was told that the division of 
proceeds might be as follows:
B, the landlord, would still get his l/3;
14. But the information (from a different source) given ante 
in Chapter VII, p.485, n.52 should be compared, as the 
rules vary.
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A would still receive his 2/3, out of which 
he would pay something to C:
C would thus get, e.g., l/3 of 2/3 » 2/9.
3. POWERS AND DUTIES OF CARETAKERS.
(a) Control of the Property:
First of all we had better consider the question whether
the caretaker has an interest in the property. The Privy
15Council found in Essell v. Davies that:
HThe caretaker of land, according to the law or 
custom of the Colony, appears to be not a mere 
rent collector, but to be entitled to the poss­
ession or receipt of the rents and profits of 
the land in his own right as against third per­
sons, though, of course, he has to account to 
the real owner.1
There are really three questions: the rights of the caretaker
as against third parties; the rights of third parties as ag­
ainst the caretaker; and the relation of the owner and care­
taker inter se.
The caretaker is entitled to exclude trespassers from the
property being looked after; and to take all normal steps in
defence of his employer's right. He is not normally allowed
to enter litigation about the property, but should instead
report the matter to his employer. In case of necessity,
where the employer is not available, he can take legal steps
16of his own initiative in defence of the property.
15. (1929) P.C. 2 W.A.C.A. 5, at p. 7.
16. It was stated in Essell v. Davies that the appellant 
as caretaker had on several occasions successfully 
brought actions for trespass in defence of the property.
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The caretaker of a house is entitled to collect rents 
from the house, of which he must make account to his employer. 
He is empowered to perform necessary minor repairs, and other­
wise do all things for the proper upkeep of the premises.
The caretaker of a farm may be permitted to sell the 
cocoa or other produce, merely rendering the cash received to 
the owner of the farm; or else the owner may sell the cocoa 
and receive the money therefor: which system is adopted dep­
ends on the parties. In any case, the caretaker must pay 
over all proceeds to the owner, who will pay back the agreed 
amount to the caretaker; i.e., a caretaker is not allowed to 
deduct his own pay before paying over the cash. A caretaker 
additionally himself growing, or allowing wife or child to 
grow, foodstuffs on a cocoa-farm entrusted to him, is not ob­
liged to account for the foodstuffs, but he will customarily 
send some portion of the foodstuffs grown to the owner of the 
farm - on his own initiative - or when requested, as a matter 
of politeness.
A caretaker of a farm may himself employ labourers if this 
is necessary for cultivation or picking.
The caretaker of a house may be expressly empowered to 
admit monthly tenants of his own accord.
Although custom seems to recognize that a caretaker has 
only custody, arid not possession, and that he is not entitled
511
to sell his interest (as he has none to sell) or his master’s
(as this would be outside the scope of his authority), it will
be seen that his powers are considerable; and that in some
cases he will appear to the outside world like an owner dealing
with his own property. Whilst customary law is not familiar
with exotic concepts such as that of ’’ostensible owner”, it
appears that Native and other courts are prepared sometimes to
invoke some such doctrine. To take an example, in Yaw Anto 
17
v. Kwaku Anto the brief relevant facts were:
Three brothers acquired a cocoa-farm jointly. They 
eventually died in turn, and were finally succeeded, as to the 
cocoa farm, by K.K. K.K. appointed one K.B. as caretaker of 
the farm. K.B. fell into debt; and his creditor, J.S.A., 
took action against him for this debt. K.B. ’s property was 
taken in execution (including the farm of which he was care­
taker). At the judicial auction, the farm in dispute was 
bought by the same J.S.A. The sale took place in 1929. In 
1949 the present action was brought by the family of K.K. to 
recover the farm, which they claimed was not liable to execu­
tion for the private debt of its caretaker. They claimed that 
they were unaware of the sale at the time (thus resisting a 
decision that they had approbated the sale by laches). The 
court held that the family should have disputed the sale at 
the time; and that it was now too late (twenty years after)
17. (Unreported) New Juaben A Court: Suit No.20/49: 12.7.1949.
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to try to upset It.
Again, in the ease of Donkor v. Nusin (which has already
18been referred to above), the caretaker K.N. was brother to 
A.D., the rightful owner of the farm in question. K.N. - dur­
ing A.D. *s absence - disposed of the farm by sale in an appar­
ently valid manner with the presence of some of the members of 
his family as witness. As such, the "sale" was obviously 
void. Nevertheless, in accordance with traditional practice, 
A.D. begged for the land back when she returned and discovered 
the dealings with it; and made a very fair offer to the Upur- 
chaser1*. The remedy she sought when the latter refused to 
return the land, was not (apparently) to set aside the sale as 
such, but to bring a qua si-criminal action, alleging " theft” 
of the land.
Third parties may, therefore, acquire rights in the land 
where the caretaker is authorized to dispose of them; or 
where, though unauthorized, the disposal receives tacit app­
roval (through lapse of time) of the true owner.
(b) Use of the property:
House: the caretaker is resident there free, together 
with his wife and children.
Farm: although - if it is a cocoa-farm - all the cocoa is 
for the farm-owner, the caretaker may inter plant foodstuffs in 
between the young cocoa; and use unwanted portions of the
18. See page 507 ante.
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land in the same way. Where the caretaker clears the virgin 
forest and plants cocoa, he will be entitled to a physical 
one-third of the farm thus made# He is thenceforth sole owner
of the portion he thus receives# A caretaker may allow his
brother, wife or children to grow foodstuffs on an unwanted 
piece of the land#
(c) Disposal of the property:
A caretaker may not sell or pledge or mortgage the prop­
erty unless expressly authorized to do so by the owner# He 
may sell freely the portion of a cocoa farm made out of forest 
and allotted to him, since this becomes his self-acquired 
property.
A caretaker has no power to lease the property unless 
authorized.
Permissive tenancies: a caretaker may freely allow his
wife, child, close relative, or even friend, to cultivate food­
stuffs on a portion of the land; but in no case can this en­
dure beyond the period of his care taker ship# When the care­
taker is himself a brother or other close relative of the owner, 
he has wider powers, although even so he cannot dispose of or 
injure the owner's interest permanently. One finds cases
where such a caretaker has pledged a portion of the land, the
19act being permitted by the close relationship#_________________
19# A cocoa-farmer may appoint his brother as temporary care­
taker whilst he himself is away, allowing the brother to 
behave as owner - except for lack of the power of disposal - 
and to take the proceeds of the farm for himself, perhaps 
reserving a portion for the owner#
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4. ANALOGIES WITH AGENT AND TRUSTEE,
It will be seen from this brief exposition that the posi­
tion of caretaker, equivalent to that of a steward, factor, or 
farm-bailiff in the United Kingdom, presents many analogies 
with both an English agent and an English trustee.
(a) Agent:
The caretaker is an employee if he is of the ordinary, 
labourer, type; but where a brother acts as caretaker he is 
not thought of as an employee or servant. It would be far 
from the facts to compare a subordinate stool with either an 
agent or a trustee; the position of the domes tic-care taker 
(A.3.above) resembles trustee rather than agent; relationship 
A.4. above (that of successor) It would again be incorrect to 
compare to either, though one might say that a successor Is 
trustee of the reversion for the family; but he is not an 
agent, since he acts in his own interests. A mortgagor in 
possession (custody) for the mortgagee is an agent for the mort« 
gagee in the management of the land, and a trustee as regards 
his duty to preserve it and its products.
An ordinary caretaker is thus a servant with certain 
limited powers tacitly and necessarily given to him by his 
employer; his scope of authority may be extended if other 
powers are expressly given to him.
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(b) Trustee:
The caretaker's position is one of trust, since he must 
do all in his power for the efficient working and preservation 
of the property, and must render an account of his stewardship 
and of any monies which come into his hands. But he is not 
like an English trustee, since he does not hold the property 
In his name, subject to a trust in favour of another. In 
popular speech the relationship A.3. (domestic-child) is not 
infrequently called "trustee-beneficiary”. The position of a 
successor again resembles that of a trustee (or that of a 
tenant for life in English law); he is not usually described 
as trustee for the family, but sometimes as a caretaker for 
the family. A successor holding property for some specific 
purpose, .e.g., to pay off debts of deceased, to maintain child 
ren of deceased, to keep and hand over the property to the 
ultimate beneficiaries, may be - and is - called a trustee.
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CHAPTER IX,
GIFT.
A. TYPES OF GIFT.
One of the ways by which title to property may be trans­
ferred according to customary law is that of gift?" The es­
sential formalities with which a gift may be made are much the 
same whatever the personalities of donor and donee, or the 
nature of the property given, or the class of interest given 
.in the property. But one must distinguish certain special 
types of gift, about which - although it is said that A has 
"given11 such and such to B, yet one cannot say that they are 
really within the main class of gift, as it i3 known to English 
law. (In particular, a political or tribal superior may make 
a "gift" of land to its servants; and this is the way in which 
many of the subordinate stools are said to have acquired their 
lands.)
At first sight a gift is a voluntary transfer of an in­
terest, that is, it is made for no consideration. A vexed 
point of jurisprudence or terminology is whether the gift, to 
be properly so called, must be outright; and whether it must 
be of the whole interest in that subject-matter. One must 
distinguish so-called "gifts of land", where an individual or
1. Cf. Sarbah, F.C.L., 81 et seq.
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family grants the use of land to another (which perhaps should 
more properly be called "tenancy"); and. an outright gift of 
an interest in land, which will be irrevocable by the donor;
2
and irreclamable by the family of the donor. Q,uayson v. Abba, 
where defendant, a concubine of deceased, was installed in the 
occupation of the house in question by deceased during his 
lifetime, perhaps illustrates this point. Michelin, J., 
found that she had not received an outright gift of the house, 
but only a voluntary tenancy*
Jurisprudent!ally, an interest in land is a bundle of 
rights, which it is theoretically possible for the holder to 
transfer separately or together. He could abstract a certain 
number from that bundle, and transfer them for no consideration. 
For example, a family owning a plot might voluntarily transfer 
their whole interest; or they might reserve some of the rights 
(the ultimate reversion), granting a tenancy of indefinite 
duration. Perhaps one should speak of the gift of the whole 
interest, and the grant of a tenancy, holding that the latter 
cannot be called "gift". Nevertheless, in African speech it 
will usually be said that the family has "given" the land to 
X; on what terms will emerge from a consideration of the in­
tentions of the parties. Perhaps, then, the distinction is 
linguistic; and terminologically, when we call either giving 
land or creating a tenancy a gift, we look to the absence of
2. (1934) D. Ct '31-'37, 50.
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consideration, and the consequent requirements with regard to 
form and consents, etc., which should be present. The gift 
may create a continuing relationship (a tenancy) between the 
parties; under the head of tenancy we can examine the implica­
tions of such a relationship. Or it may be outright; and no 
continuing relationship is set up. Certainly in African term­
inology there is no need for a transfer to be outright before 
it can be called a gift: some even go so far as to say that a
gift cannot be outright.
One cannot entirely agree with Sarbah's statement that:
"In this country gifts invariably clothe them­
selves with the semblance of a sale, and there­
fore, where formal acceptance is wanting, the 
owner can take back the gift.
Gifts, in the European sense of the term, as 
far as regards immovables, seem to be unknown 
here.,
Gifts and sales are not analogous in their form - the giving of
aseda in return for a gift bears no juristic resemblance to the
giving of the purchase-price in the case of sale. There are
certain points in common (e.g., the presence of witnesses);
but to suggest that gifts are made by means of a mock-sale is
4
far from the facts.
1. INDIVIDUAL TO INDIVIDUAL.
The first class of gift is that made by one person to
3. F.C.L., p. 81.
4. Danquah, A.L.C. 219, also says that ngift is a modified 
form of sale"; but the reasons for this statement are 
not gitfen.
519
another, there being no family or political relationship exist­
ing between them. Although to English lawyers such a type of 
gift would seem an appropriate one with which to begin the con­
sideration of the institution of gift, it is by no means typ­
ical of all gifts in customary law, many of which are made 
where there already exists some bond or relationship between 
the parties, and by reason of that bond; gifts where there is 
no such relationship are an exception.
An individual's power of dealing with his property is more 
restricted in the case of gift than in that of sale. The 
requirements are more severe for gift, especially as regards 
consents. Even if a man is dealing with his self-acquired 
property, the effect of a gift made without the consent and 
concurrence of his family will last only for his lifetime; the 
family's consent is required to make the gift absolute. The 
contrast in the rules for gift and sale of self-acquired prop­
erty were explained to me as follows:
In a sale the family's ultimate right to succeed to the 
property is not frustrated. Conversion of the property into 
cash takes place, and they still have the purchase-price (or 
that which is bought with it) to succeed to after the vendor's 
death. (It is true that a man might freely spend the cash, 
so that the family might receive nothing.)
But in a gift the donor receives nothing in return to 
which his family could succeed - hence the family's ultimate
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right of succession is frustrated. They therefore jealously 
scrutinize gifts to outsiders, and would refuse their consent 
except in special circumstances*
What exactly is needed in the way of permission or prior 
notice to the family, or the presence of the family as wit­
nesses, before a man may lawfully give away his self-acquired 
property to outsiders, is not rigorously laid down. It seems 
likely that at least one of these requirements is needed. We 
shall consider them in turn:
(a) Permission from the family: a considerable number of
informants (principally from Ashanti) said that this was es- 
5
sential,
(b) Prior notice to the family: ) these can be
(c) Family members as witnesses:) taken together.
It was frequently stated that the family must be informed of 
the proposed gift; this requirement can be satisfied by call­
ing one or two members of the family (responsible ones) as wit­
nesses. In fact, it is perhaps dubious whether it is possible 
to do without the presence of family witnesses. Informing the 
family serves to bar the claim which the family would otherwise 
make on the death of the donor. Whether notice is essential 
or optional it is at least a wise safeguard to prevent future 
disputes. A donor should always have members of the family to 
witness his gift, since their presence will afterwards prove
5. E.g., in Bekwai, Essumegya, Adansi, New Juaben.
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that the gift is valid (although their absence does not mean 
irrefutably that the gift is invalid). Such members should 
preferably include either the head of the family or the obaa- 
panin, or at least the elder of the donor's sub-lineage, and 
the person who is the potential successor to the property.
It seems likely that the statement that only notice is 
required to the family instead of consent is a watering-down 
of the rule of customary law (observable in other connexions) 
that the family should join in transfers, and that their con­
currence is essential. Custom varies from family to family;
but it should be presumed that the family must consent to a
6
gift, in default of proof that notice alone is sufficient.
(d) Disinterested witnesses: In some places it was stated
that it is the presence of disinterested witnesses which makes 
a gift valid. I do not agree that this is Akan custom. The 
family should witness the gift, otherwise they may raise a 
future claim to the property. Disinterested witnesses should 
also be present, because their evidence may be necessary in the 
future to prove the gift. It should be noted that their pre­
sence is evidentiary, and does not go to the validity of the 
gift itself. Hence it is customary, especially in the case 
of gifts of land, for the Odikro or other political authority
6. And perhaps through their right to refuse the aseda. the 
family can actually withhold efficacy from a gift, even 
where it is stated that only notice to them is required.
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to witness the gift. It should be noted that the Odikro is 
not entirely disinterested, since he should be aware of any 
changes which are made in the ownership or use of land within 
his domain.
The superior courts seem frequently to allege that it is 
the publicity of the gift (i.e., the presence of outside wit­
nesses) that counts. The publicity that is required is in
fact of a somewhat different kind, namely that the family of
7the donor should witness the transaction.
There is no need to satisfy the requirements for either 
kind of witness:
(1) in those areas where a man is held to be able to 
dispose of his self-acquired property without restriction;
(2) 3emble, where the gift is made by deed.
Gifts within the family: gifts within the family (e.g., bet­
ween brother and brother) create no problem about the destina­
tion of the reversion; and therefore for the gift of self­
acquired property from one member of the family to another, it 
seems likely that no formal consent is required. It is sug­
gested that the potential successor - if a third party to the 
transaction - should be informed; otherwise he might create
7. Of. Quayson v. Abba: (1934) D.Ct. *31-*37, 50.
Basel Mission factory v. Suaplm: (1911) D. & P. *11-*16, 13:
- for a gift to be valid, the donee must have a witness. 
Kwakuwah v. Nayenna: (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 165:
- the gift must be before witnesses, some of whom 
should not be of the families of donor and donee.
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trouble. In practice, as with samansew, members of the fam­
ily will probably be present and express their agreement with 
the gift.
Inherited property: it is very rarely that a family will give
its consent to the gift of inherited property by its holder to 
someone outside the family; such consent (or, more appropriate­
ly, authorization) is naturally essential, since the ultimate 
title is with the family.
2. INDIVIDUAL TO HIS WIFE,
It Is a common custom for a man to make presents to his 
wife, and also to alienate temporarily and Informally part of 
the rights in property which he owns or controls to her. Al­
though there is no community of goods existing between husband 
ancjfoife, there Is often community of enterprise and labour.
(a) Farming Rights:
A man is usually assisted In farming by his wife and 
children. He may be assisted by them in clearing the forest, 
and cultivating and maintaining the farm made there. Whilst 
a cocoa farm has not reached the bearing stage a wife may inter 
plant food-stuffs between the young trees. In recognition of 
his wife's labour, a man may grant his whole right of farming 
over a portion of his land to his wife. Where the land is 
self-acquired, or the farm is self-made, no permission Is 
needed from the family; but unless the family ratify the
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arrangement, it ceases with the death of the husband. This
ratification may be made at any time; as regards family land,
a man should not assign or attempt to assign permanent rights
to his wife, but he may and frequently does allow his wife to
farm a portion of the land for her own purposes. No outright
0
gift will be valid without the consent of the family.
(b) Residential rights:
These are granted to a wife as a necessary concomitant of 
the marriage. So long as a man does not try to give such 
rights to his wife permanently (that is, to endure beyond his 
own life-time), no permission or notice to the family is re­
quired at all, even if the house has been inherited.
(c) Money, cloth, chattels.
A man is expected to clothe his wife, but any cloths he 
gives to the wife are customarily reclaimable on divorce. He 
will also give her money with which to trade: this is recover­
able as well. It should be noted that a man may often meet 
his duty of maintenance of his wife by giving her money or
8. An informant gave the rules succinctly as folloY/s:
Q Self-acquired property: the husband needs the family's
' permission for an absolute grant; but not for a limited 
^ grant.
Inherited property: an absolute grant would be rare - it 
would require the family's authorization; a limited grant 
for growing cocoa needs the family's permission; for 
foodstuffs the family raise no objection, provided its 
title is secure. 
j According to other informants, it is the general rule that 
the husband should notify the family (i.e., his family) if 
he permits his wife to farm on a portion of the family 
lands.
5 2 5
chattels (for instance, a sewing machine) which the wife uses
for trade so as to earn her living expenses. Such gifts are
not intended to be outright, but are recoverable when the
marriage comes to an end. If a gift is not made for this
special purpose, it can take effect absolutely.
One observes that the contrary case, that of gifts by a
wife to her husband, also arises, as - for instance, to quote
a case - where a man assisted his wife in the cultivation of a
farm which she had inherited, and a portion of the farm was
given by the wife to her husband in recognition of his services,
9
the gift was upheld by the native court.
3. INDIVIDUAL TO HIS CHILDREN.
Similar rules apply to gifts made by a man to his child­
ren, as to those he makes to his wife. All information agrees 
that the children are treated much more leniently by their
father's family; and gifts to them would frequently be ratif-
10
ied by the family, or enforced by the courts.
9. In Akua Asantewa, etc. v, Okyeame Kwaku Boanylre, etc.: 
(Unreported) (1948) New Juaben A Court, No.8/18/
10. A son may cultivate on his father's land. The head of 
the family should know about it, but he cannot object.
And see Rattray, A.L.C. 15: a father could either give 
the use of a farm to his son (which would revert to the 
father's family), or he might give the trees outright as 
well, which would require the family's consent, witnesses, 
and aseda.
(Cf. also ibid.. pp. 338-9, 353)4 '
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4. INDIVIDUAL TO DOMESTIC*
By ancient native custom a gift made by a man to his
slave reverted to the donor after the death of the slave or
11
if the slave misbehaved* The status of slavery has been
abolished by law* but the status of "domestic” continues in
native custom* The English courts have laid down that the
rule just quoted no longer exists, since it is an incident of
slavery, and therefore contrary both to enacted law and to
12
natural justice: the law is the Slaves Emancipation Ordinance
of 1874. Some of the cases are concerned with the position 
of servants of a stool (which is considered below)* The rul­
ings of the superior courts are not followed in custom in this 
matter. Gifts to domestics go with gifts to wife and child­
ren: they are all examples of gifts made by a man to his dep­
endents (to those who are quasi-members of his family). Sim­
ilar rules (for example, with regard to revocation) apply to 
them all.
5. GIFTS BY A FAMILY*
This heading is inserted merely for the sake of complete­
ness, and to emphasize that the rules regarding family consents 
(as for ah individual member) cannot of course apply to this
11. Cf. Ratt. Ash. 230.
12. See: Kodieh v. Affram: (1930) 1 Vf.A.C.A. 12 (involving
the ahinkwa of a stool);
Ambradu v. Mansah: (1947) Unreported: Land Court, 
Sekondi, Appeal No. l/47 (involving the precedence 
of those of the true blood in succession).
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case. A family making an outright gift or a temporary grant
to a stranger are - ignoring the question of consents - on the
13
same footing with regard to revocation, etc., as an individual. 
The gifts must have been authorized by the family council in 
the usual way.
6. SUPERIOR STOOL TO SUBORDINATE STOOL.
Such gifts are really outside the scope of gift in the 
normal sense, since they resemble rather the granting of a 
feud or fee. Distinction is made between grants of land !!to 
eat on", and grants of land outright. Like other types of 
gift, however, they are ratified by the giving of aseda.
7. STOOL TO INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN.
Such a gift may be either outright or conditional; and
(where it is not a means of circumventing rules relating to
sales) will be as a reward for good services to the stool. If
the gift is conditional, then the donee cannot dispose of it
without informing the stool; and the stool may be entitled to
succeed to him. Absolute gifts are recognised; but they are
14
usually made by Deed of Gift. It appears likely that even
13. Such gifts are naturally rare where the absolute interest 
is conveyed; quite the reverse if only a temporary grant 
of a site for farming or building, in return for a nominal 
payment, is involved.
14. "Subject to the payment of a thankoffering - aseda /note 
its presence even where a deed is used/', a nominal sum 
of about 4/- to £2.8.0 sometimes £5.5.0 - for a plot.11
- Akim Abuakwa.
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apparently outright gifts, made by deed, may remain subject to
15 rr>,various limitations* The presumption is probably against the 
absolute title passing*
8* STOOL TO ITS SERVANTS,
A servant may be either free-born or a domestic. Which­
ever he is, gifts made to him are intended as a rule to be con­
ditioned by his continuing to serve the stool (or for his suc­
cessors to do so); and they must be confirmed to his success-
16ors* The W.A.C.A. in Kodieh v* Affram found the custom
contrary to ordinance, the servant having been a slave. But
17in Nana Juaben Serwah v* Ford jour Jackson, J., stigmatized 
the use of the term "gift11 in describing a similar situation 
as unfortunate and inaccurate. "It appears to me to have been 
rather a grant of land, as a reward for past services to the 
stool and in anticipation of the continuance of the services in 
the future", said the learned judge. "The right", he continued
15. Abrobah v. Moubarak; (1935) D.Ct *31-*37, at 103, is a
case in point. The stool involved was that of Dutch
Sekondi. Plaintiff maintained he acquired the land in 
dispute from A.L. by conveyance approved by the stool; 
defendant said that he acquired the land by deed of gift 
from the stool. Barton, J., put the argument of the 
Dutch Sekondi Stool (the second defendant) as follows: 
"...the land belongs to the Stool of /D.S./ arid that 
the deed of gift to the first defendant was according 
to native custom, the ownership not passing entirely 
to the first defendant, and as regards the alleged 
deed of conveyance to the plaintiff, the second 
defendant alleges that this also was only a deed of
gift according to native custom, and that as the
/over
16. & 17. See next page.
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”to occupy the land and to enjoy Its fruits was one limited by 
the condition that the occupier would continue to render those 
customary services.” And he found nothing unreasonable, or 
contrary to the dictates of natural humanity or Justice, in 
this. He upheld the claim of the stool in question to the 
recovery of the land.
9. CITIZEN TO HIS STOOL.
If a gift Is made to a stool, It becomes stool property. 
Such gifts are not infrequently met with.
10. CITIZEN TO CHIEF.
This paragraph should be taken with the preceding one.
It need merely be remarked here that formerly all gifts to a 
chief were acquired for his stool, that today this no longer
15. (cont. from previous page) -
plaintiff failed to comply with the conditions upon which 
the gift was made,he, the second defendant, revoked the 
gift, as he was entitled to do under native customary law.” 
And further, that ”...as the land was Stool land its 
occupancy was governed by native customary law; the 
occupier for the time being was under an obligation to 
recognise the suzerainty of the Stool, he had no right 
to build on the land without the Stool’s permission and 
was obliged to contribute towards the payment of the Stool 
debts when called upon to do so.”
These claims, some of which are dubious (leading one 
to suppose a confusion with a mere permission to farm or 
to occupy a house-site), were not tested, as the learned 
Judge found for the conveyance, and for the plaintiff.
16. (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 12.
17. (1948) Unreported: Land Ct, Accra, Civil Appeal 
No. 45/48, 15/7/48.
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applies, but it is a question of fact whether the gift is in­
tended for the chief himself or for the stool which he occupies.
It may be prudent for the chief to inform his elders of such a
18
gift; but this is no longer legally essential.
11. CHIEF TO HIS STOOL.
In many areas it is customary that a chief on ascending 
his stool should bring some of his properties to the stool.
The likeliest objectors are his successors and family, so he 
should naturally inform them of what he proposes to do.
12. GIFTS TO CONCUBINES.
It seems necessary to make a special class here, since
19 20Sarbah and the Courts imply that there is a rule of law
that gifts made by a man to his concubine are irrevocable#
I must confess that in my investigations I discovered no such
rule as this in these terms. The fact that .there exists the ,
relationship of concubinage between a male donor and a female
donee is not of Itself significant in ascertaining the effect
of gifts made between them. Such gifts, and their validity
and revocability, must be judged, it is submitted, by the same
tests as apply in all other categories of gift. It is possible
that the "rule" really means no more than that the right of a
18. See THE STOOL, under Chief's Private Property, for a 
fuller account.
19. F.C.L. 50, where he calles the custom "sarwie".
20. Cf. Morris v. Monrovia: (1930) l.W.A.CiV 70;
Ansa v. Sackey : (1923) F.Ct '23-'25, 113;
Quay son v. Abba : (1934) D.Ct '31-'37, 50.
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husband to claim back on death or divorce certain types of
gift made to his wife does not extend to a lover claiming back
such gifts on those grounds from his concubine. The "rule"
then becomes no more than a statement that a concubine is not
a wife, and that the special exceptions existing in the case of
gifts to wives do not apply to their case. A gift made to a
concubine has thus to be judged by the general standard or test,
and will be recoverable on the same terms (e.g., where aseda
has not been given).
The Courts (perhaps unfortunately) state this fact in the
contrary way; but if the gift to a concubine involves rights
of residence, a tenancy-at-will may have been created instead
21
of an outright gift; and this is freely determinable. If
a gift is proved so as to disprove a tenancy-at-will, then it
22 23
would not be recoverable. According to Hughes v. Davies
where sarwle was considered, the custom must be specially
24
pleaded, or it does not operate.
B. FORM OF GIFT.
We now turn to a consideration of the form in which all 
gifts should be made. Whatever kind of property is given,
21. Njle v. Hall; (1931) 1 W.A.C.A. 100.
22* Quay son v. Abba.
23. (1909) Ren. 550; see the discussion of sarwie at 
p. 551.
24. "Concubine" is in Twi mpena.
532
this form should be followed* Where it is not followed, then 
the intention of the donor may be frustrated and the gift will 
be either reclaimable, revocable, conditional or temporary*
The requirements are as follows :- 
1* Subject-matter ascertained;
As with any type of alienation of property the subject- 
matter of the transaction must be certain or ascertainable*
In many cases no difficulty arises, and this is specially true 
of gifts of chattels* Where land is the subject of gift, it 
is necessary that either its boundaries and extent are already 
known, or are described to the donee at the time of the gift, 
or can be discovered without difficulty. In the special cate­
gory of death-bed gifts - samansew - there is often no oppor­
tunity to describe the land more fully than by expressions such 
as "my farm at so-and-so I give to you”. Not only should the 
physical subject-matter be certain, but the extent of the 
interest given should also be made clear, since (juridically 
speaking) It is not land, but Interests in land, which are the 
subject of gift. A man may donate only a part of his inter­
est. The size of interest given is ascertained partly freon 
the express or implied intentions of the parties, and partly 
from limitations imposed by customary law*,
2. Witnesses, consents, etc:
The secret gift is of no effect?® Where a man must Inform
25. There should be no secret gifts of land: Quayson v. Abba:
(1934) D.Ct. *31-'37, 50.
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his family before making a gift (especially of land) this rule 
applies because the family should witness the gift. Where 
notice to them is not required the rule applies because the 
donee will not be able to produce satisfactory proof of the 
gift sufficient to defeat the claim of the donor’s family.
But this rule does not necessarily apply to gifts made out­
right, if they are made by deed. Where consent of the family 
is needed for a gift the presence of the right and responsible 
members of the family as witnesses and their sharing in the 
aseda paid by the donee are sufficient evidence of their con­
sent to the gift. Y/here the gift is in writing they should 
subscribe as witnesses. Where notice to the family is req­
uired their presence as witnesses is sufficient for this pur­
pose also. Some of the information which I collected in re-
26
gard to the necessity for family consent is given below.
This refers, of course, to the case of an individual who wishes 
to give away his self-acquired property.
26. Family consent is needed for outright gifts of: 
all property - Bekwai,
a farm - Essumegya, Adansi, New Juaben,
Mankessim, and other informants. 
Notice to the family, family witnesses, essential:
Family witnesses must be present - an Ashanti
informant.
A gift of self-acquired property can be made without 
the family’s consent; ttit is better however, for 
the gift to be testified by some members of the 
family, otherwise upon the . death (of the donor) 
the family may dispute the gift, and the onus is 
upon the donee to prove it.n - Akim Abuakwa.
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It is advisable for there to be disinterested witnesses 
also, who may give independent evidence of the gift.
The necessity for witnesses is recognized by the superior
27
courts: Smyly, J., said in Basel Mission Factory v. Suapim
that:
,!...for a gift to be valid the donee must have 
a witness: in the present case there is no
evidence of the gift except that of the donees, 
and it is quite evident, if there ever had been 
any such gift, that they could have been got, as 
they allege they were able to bring rum for 
thanks... ”
28And in Quayson v. Abba Michelin, J. said:
"To establish such a gift, however, it must be 
proved beyond any reasonable doubt. It is a 
well-recognized principle of native customary 
law, which has been adopted by this Court on 
numerous previous occasions, that the acceptance 
of a gift consisting of immovable property must 
be made invariably with as much publicity as 
possible.11
With all respect this states the requirement too strongly; 
it is not the publicity that counts, but the presence of the 
necessary witnesses (some of whom are there as interested 
parties, some as evidence of the gift taking place).
3. Presence of donor and donee:
This is also required by the customary law. If the 
donee is absent it is dubious how far the gift takes effect. 
(In the special case of death-bed gifts, the donee who is not
27. (1911) D. & P. 'll-’IS, 13; in the Supreme Court. (But 
was this a non-Ak&n case?)
28. (1934) D. Ct. *31-*37, 50.
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present when the testator announces his intention of making the 
bequest will be hastily summoned, so that he may purchase the 
drink for aseda, and produce it for the donor and witnesses.)
It is possible that modern customary law is less strict about 
this requirement now.
4. Aseda:
This is a most important requirement, since in the African
phrase it “stamps" the gift, and makes it perfect. The first
question therefore that any native court will put in regard to
29an alleged gift is whether aseda was paid. "Aseda"means
"thank-offering"; its primary function is therefore the thank-
30
ing of the donor for his gift. But it serves many purposes:
(i) it signifies the acceptance by the donee of the gift
(ii) it makes the gift irrevocable (except in special 
circumstances) between donor and donee;
(iii) it binds the family who are present as witnesses, 
and destroys their claim (if they share in it);
(iv) it serves as evidence of the transaction, both by
29. In a case in Adansi B Native Court, K.W. "in the presence 
of responsible witnesses and some of the members of his 
family made a gift of this cocoa farm to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff accepted this honest gift and paid the usual 
customary Aseda in the sum of 24/- and one bottle of gin 
to K.W. to seal this gift of cocoa farm as one legal in 
native law and custom. This thanksgiving (aseda) of the 
sum of 24/- and a bottle of gin were fairly distributed 
among the witnesses including the members of the family 
in the usual procedure obtainable in Native Custom in 
Ashanti."
Thus the Native Court’s judgement.
30. Cf. Ratt. A.L.C. 24.
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itself, and by binding the memories of the disinterested wit­
nesses. I am unable to say whether there is a standard aseda, 
but from the cases which I have perused it appears that its 
amount varies considerably. If the aseda is too small in
proportion to the value of the property given, it is possible
31that it might be refused. I am also unable to say whether it
must take the form of drink, or whether cash payments may be
substituted; both forms are met with in the cases. Money-
payments may sometimes be expressed in "bottles”.
Aseda is a common feature of African life, and is found
to be obligatory in most cases where one person has received
some benefit which he wishes to acknowledge and "stamp", even
though that which he receives is not the kind of gift discussed
here. It is, for Instance, payable to arbitrators when they
have made their award, to the family by a successor on his
appointment, to the parents of a betrothed girl, and so on.
32Sarbah also mentions other methods of acceptance of a
gift:
"(i) by rendering thanks with a thank-offering or 
presents, alone or coupled with an utterance 
or expression of appropriating the gift; or
(ii) corporeal acceptance, as by touching; or
31. £12 was the alleged "stamping fee" in the criminal case 
of Dorikor v. Nusifli & ors (Dadiasi Native Court: 10.1.50). 
The size of the amount led the native court to the con­
clusion that the transaction was a sale and not a gift.
32. P.C.L. 81.
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(iii) using or enjoying the gift; or
(iv) exercising rights of ownership over the gift.11
This is perhaps a too-refined analysis, since informants when 
questioned only give the first method as that by which accept­
ance is made and the donor is bound. It is the most'import­
ant; and one might think that the last two methods (even 
though they imply acceptance) are rather evidence of the gift 
having been made if this fact is later disputed.
0. PEED OF GIFT. OR OTHER WRITING.
It Is to be noted that gifts (especially between father 
and children, and between different members of a family) are 
increasingly made in writing, and often by deed. As with 
written wills, the object of using writing is often two-fold: 
first, to guarantee the validity of the gift; secondly, to 
preserve secrecy. The donor who makes a gift by deed to his 
children avoids the attacks of his family during his lifetime, 
and passes them on to be endured by the donees after his death. 
It need not be emphasised that the donor*3 secret dispositions 
of property are contrary to custom; but this fact does not now 
seem to impede either their use or their enforcement, where a 
gift is recorded In writing. But in gift by deed, it is sub­
mitted that the customary formalities as outlined above should 
be observed. In practice they appear to be sometimes omitted
or curtailed. In several places, not geographically or
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ethnically related, I was told that even If a man was required 
by custom to notify his family before disposing of his self­
acquired property by oral gift, yet he could avoid this by 
making the gift by deed, and notice to the family would not 
then be required. Other informants maintained the contrary, 
that the rules regarding consent are not affected (and cannot 
be evaded) by use of a deed. The use of a deed may also have 
another effect, viz., in regard to the right of a donor to re­
voke his gift: some informants maintained that by use of a
Deed of Gift the Donor forfeited all rights in the subject- 
matter, and could not subsequently revoke or claim back his 
gift. Others maintained that his powers were not affected by 
use of a dedd?^
It seems reasonable that a man should not be allowed to 
acquire powers by choice of this method of making gifts which 
he would otherwise not possess. African law knows nothing of 
consideration as such, and aseda is not consideration (whose 
place could be taken by use of a deed). An African should not* 
it is submitted, be able to dispense with the customary form­
alities necessary for the validity of a gift. As far as the
consent of the family is concerned, this may be considered a
.?
defect of capacity in the donor, or a power in his family to
33. The deeds are in form absolute; if English law governs, 
then the donor cannot obviously revoke for ingratitude.
It is still an open question what law should govern such 
transactions*
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reclaim the gift made without their consent. Such a power 
cannot be abrogated by the unilateral act of the person subject 
to it.
I therefore consider that members of the family must sign 
the deed of gift as witnesses to make the disposition final 
(and this was stated to me by some informants).
Stools sometimes use deeds of gift when presenting prop­
erty to their subjects. This is not essential; but it seems 
frequently adopted, perhaps to make the gift certain and indis­
putable (whether by way of enlargement by the donee, or diminu­
tion by the donor). A gift by a stool to its subject by deed 
may be:
(i) merely a record in writing of a customary
34
allocation of land by a stool to one of its citizens;
(ii) a special reward for services rendered;
(iii) a device to avoid a law, or custom, or prejud­
ice, against a stool selling land direct to a non-native or 
stranger purchaser*
In the case of (i), the rights of the parties*are not affected 
by the use of a deed.
34. Such a deed of gift was alleged in Abrobah v. Moubarak:
(1935) D.Ct ,31-,37, 103; where the grantor was the 
stool of Dutch Sekondi. Into which of the three cate­
gories it fell is uncertain.
This type of gift is also commonly reported from 
Accra (which is not, of course, in the Akan area). The 
intention here seems to be principally that mentioned 
in (iii) in the text.
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In the case of (ii), the gift may be outright or conditional; 
and one must scrutinize the terms of the deed and the intention 
of the parties to discover which it is.
In the case of (iii), the intention of the donor is to pass 
the whole interest in the property given to the donee; and 
such interest therefore passes, so that the donor cannot in 
the future either claim to revoke the gift, or allege that a 
subsequent purchaser from the donee holds the property subject 
to a superior interest in the stool.
D. EFFECTS OF THE GIFT.
1* Whether Absolute or Qualified.
Gifts may be either of the whole interest which the donor 
enjoys in the property the subject of the gift, or of the whole 
interest subject to conditions, or of a partial interest. (If 
the limitation is only one of time, the effect is considered 
at D.2* below). Determination of which category a particular 
gift falls under is partly a question of the intention of the 
parties, and partly a rule of law. The main contentions are: 
(i) that a gift is not presumed outright;
(li) that it is of surface-rights only (when the 
donor is entitled to the absolute interest in the land);
(iii) that absence of aseda makes a gift a qualified
one only;
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(Iv) that absence of family consent limits the
duration of the gift.
Individual to individual: if the requisite consents from
the family are obtained, and the correct form followed, the
gift may be absolute if so intended. But certain informants
maintained that the presumption Is that a gift is not absolute
in regard to the extent of the Interest granted, and would not,
35
for instance, extend to minerals, A man can Mgive land" to
36another for one purpose, and to a third for another purpose.
If a man merely grants an interest of use (whether over land or
in a house) the situation becomes that of a permissive tenancy
37
for no, or a nominal, consideration; and the boundary-line 
between gift and tenancy might be said to disappear (subject 
to what was said at the beginning ©f this chapter at p. 517).
Individual to his wife: will not normally be absolute
unless specifically so stated. A gift to a wife is usually 
conditional on the continuance of the marriage. A gift of 
land or a house (or rights of residence therein) to a wife is 
a gift of use only, and there is a presumption to that effect. 
Such a gift is of itself conditional and temporary,
35. Although, where the party is competent, all rights in
and over the subject-matter may be donated, a gift Is 
usually of surface-rights only; so that, unless other­
wise provided, the right to minerals, etc., remains in 
the grantor. - Ajumako.
An absolute gift is not customary - land given reverts 
to the donor if abandoned by the donee. - Essiam.
36. Asikuma.
37. Adai v. Darku: (1905) Red. 231, Ren. 417.
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Individual to children: similar considerations apply to j
gifts to children, except that they are not conditioned by the
38
continuance of any marriage.
Individual to domestic: are usually conditional and
temporary.
Stool to citizen: as already noted, these may be either
conditional or temporary, or absolute. The stool's designa­
tion of a particular piece of land as one upon which the citizen 
may farm or build a house is not a gift of this class at all. 
Stool to its servants: are always conditional.
Citizen to stool: usually such a gift implies the sur­
render of all the citizen's rights in the property to his stool, 
and the position of Citizen to Chief is similar.
2. Whether permanent or temporary:
Gifts can be either temporary, indefinite or permanent in 
duration.
Gifts which lack the consent of the family, where this is 
needed, do not last beyond the life of the donor, unless aff­
irmed by the family subsequently.
Gifts to a wife endure for the time during which the 
marriage is in existence.
Gifts to a domestic are for the life of the domestic, and 
must be re-affirmed to his successor before they will endure.
38. Cf. Sarbah, P^C.L. 81: "... gifts between parent and
child...can be recalled or exchanged at any time by 
the parent in his or her lifetime, or by his will or 
dying declarations."
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Gifts made without aseda are at will only, and determin­
able by the donor.
Those gifts which are not intended to be absolute (even 
where necessary consents, aseda. etc., are present) are really 
grants of tenancies of indefinite duration.
Absolute gifts revocable for good reason are absolute and 
permanent until revoked.
3. Revocation by the donor:
It is alleged in some quarters that a gift once made - not
subject to express conditions - is irrevocable by the donor if
39
aseda has been paid by the donee. It is also stated that all
40
gifts are revocable for good reason; or that certain types of
41
gift are revocable for good reason. The rules appears to be 
as follows:
39. If aseda is not paid, the gift may be taken back. If 
aseda is paid, the gift is irrevocable. - Ajumako.
If aseda is paid, and there are witnesses, the gift is 
irrevocable. - Adansi.
40. A gift may be taken back for ingratitude. - Essiam.
A customary oral gift can be revoked by the donor, even 
if Aseda has been paid, for such reasons as insult or 
ingratitude to the donor. - Aburi, Akwapim.
It is quite clear in Native Custom that a gift is re­
vocable for good cause11: judgement of N. Juaben Native
Court in Nana Juaben Serwah v. Ford jour, as recorded in 
the appeal record (Land Court, Accra (1948) Appeal 45/48). 
(But, as this was the special case of a gift by a stool 
to a stool-servant, it is doubtful how far the native 
court’s dictum was intended to apply to all kinds of gift).
Once aseda is paid, the donor may revoke only for good 
reason. - New Juaben.
41. A gift within the family, i.e., between father and child, 
is revocable for ingratitude and bad behaviour towards
the donor. - Ajumako.
A gift may be revoked, if it is on a friendly basis. -
Akwapim.
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(a) If no aseda has been paid, and there are no witnesses:
the gift is freely revocable, without reason*
(b) If no aseda is paid, but there are witnesses present,
42then the gift is revocable*
(c) If aseda is paid, but there are no witnesses: if a 
gift of land, then it is revocable; if of cash or chattels, 
then it is not revocable*
(d) If aseda is paid, and there are witnesses: then the
gift is not revocable unless either it is not an outright gift,
but a temporary gift of use (when the rules relating to ten- 
* 43
ancies apply): or else the gift was in consideration of natur­
al love and affection, e*g., to a wife; to children; to 
servants; to friends or relatives.
4. Reclamation by the family:
The family have a future "interesttT in property which may 
be owned or controlled by one of its members; and their rights 
must be safeguarded* The safeguard consists of their right to j 
be consulted before gifts of a member's property are made, and
42. One set of informants said that in such a case the gift 
is not revocable.
Of* S«T»V»nVi . T? _ 0 . T. ft! i !,WViftT»o f nwiol on.f».«n,hflnr»fi 1 s  wn ttM -ncr
43. Thi _  n______
Smith, j., said! h No" gifts' of land would be made by the 
natives if such gifts are to be taken as absolute gifts11, 
and it was held that all gifts are revocable for good 
cause, which includes an assertion of ownership by the 
donee; The facts in this case disclose the grant of a 
tenancy only here.
the owner /of the property given/ can take back the giftfj 
their right of reclamation if this requirement is not met.
If a gift is made outright, and family consent thereto has 
been obtained (viz. by their accepting a portion of the aseda 
or otherwise), then they may not claim back the gift on the 
death of the donor.
Gifts of self-acquired property: where the consent of the
family is not required (e.g., in certain areas, especially the
coastal ones, and where there is a deed, according to some in­
formants), then, if there is an outright gift, the family have
44no claim. But such a gift must be strictly proved. If a 
gift is only temporary in intention and effect, then it comes 
to an end on the death of the donor, unless renewed by the fam­
ily. In the majority of cases customary law demands that the
family join in the gift to make it perfect; if this is not 
met, the family have the right to claim back the gift. Norm­
ally this right is exercisable only on the death of the donor. 
The effect of the transaction then is that the donee acquires
only a temporary right, but one which the family cannot disturb
45
during the donor’s lifetime. It is open to the family to con­
tinue the gift on the same terms (i.e., as a permissive tenancy 
of indefinite duration), to make the gift absolute, or to reject 
it. It is not necessary for the family to take any overt
44. Cf. Larkai v. Amorkor: (1933) 1 W.A.C.A, 323.
45. Of. Ratt. A.L.C. 355: "If one gives a man a present, and
he does not return Aseda. one’s heirs can claim the 
thing given from the donee or his heirs, and they wilj. 
not have any witnesses." (quoting an Informant).
546
action to repudiate the gift (though they will usually do so);
but, if they leave it for too long, they may be taken to have
recognised the continuation of the gift, or to have impliedly
adopted it. It is probable that in such a case the donee does
not acquire absolutely; his rights are no larger than when the
donor was alive. It is mainly in connexion with gifts b^ a
member to his wife, child or servant that the question of such 
46
gifts come up.
Gifts over inherited property:
(i) if notified to the head of the family, they 
continue till the death of the donor;
(if) if the donor is authorized by the family to 
give the whole interest, the gift is not reclaimable;
(iii) if the gift is not notified to the family, 
quaere whether the family could demand the ejection or dis­
possession of the recipient during the lifetime of the donor.
If the gift is such as to put the family’s title in jeopardy 
(e.g., by being a gift of the whole of a farm, or by being to 
a stranger, with no acknowledgement of title - such as an ann­
ual payment) the family probably has the right to eject the 
donee. If the recipient is the wife or child of the member, 
the family would probably not Insist on their strict rights; 
and in the case of a son who is grantee, it is doubtful If they
46. The matter is dealt with under TENANCIES AND LEASES 
(q.v.).
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have any power to evict him during the life of his father. The
47
case of Okyeame Apenteng II v. Ama Nfum is of Interest in 
this connexion.
The facts were as follows:
1. A held the farms in dispute as self- 
acquired property.
2. A died intestate.
3* O.A. (the plaintiff) claimed as successor.
4. A.N. (the defendant) based her claim on 
the facts that (a) K.A. (an elderly member 
of the family) "was in his lifetime given 
possessory rights in those farms by reason 
of his great age.1 (b) "The defendant claims 
her interest as being one of unlimited owner­
ship derived from a gift of the farms by 
{YL.kJ to her predecessor in title."
It was held that her claim failed.
"Quite clearly (IL.kJ could not convey a larger 
interest in the farms than the one which he 
possessed, namely, a life interest, and to sug­
gest that a gift of ancestral property can be 
made by a single member of the family, even were 
he the successor, is impossible in law for that 
same reason."
The fact that K.A. 's successor in title had remained in undis­
turbed possession of the farms for ten years was considered 
48
irrelevant. There is unfortunately no evidence in the report 
to show what interest K.A. possessed, by whom he was given 
"possessory rights"; whether the gift to A.N.'s predecessor 
by K.A. was with the consent of the family; whether the gift 
to K.A, or the gift by K.A. was after the decease of A; all
47. (1949) Land Court, Cape Coast: 23.3.49; coram Jackson, J.
48. But it might show acquiescence or consent by the family.
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these facts are of Importance in weighing the validity and
49
effects of the dispositions recorded above.
Gifts of cash: do not require the consent of the family -
50hence they cannot be reclaimed by the family. The same prob­
ably applies to at least the les3 valuable chattels,
5. Death of a party: It should have emerged from the
foregoing discussion that several types of gift are conditioned 
to the lifetime of one or other of the parties. If a gift is 
absolute and perfect, then death makes no difference: the
effect of the gift is to take the property outside the previous
51line of succession completely. A gift which is imperfect 
through want of due form, e.g., for lacking the consent of the 
family, will not endure beyond the lifetime of the donor.
Gifts by a stool to its servant are conditioned by the life 
of the donee, to be re-affirmed by the stool to the successors 
of the deceased servant.
49. One must respectfully note once again that neither a suc­
cessor in general, or K.A. in particular, could have a
11 life interest", this concept being unknown to customary 
law.
50. Information from New Juaben.
51. In a case from Adansi Native Court, defendant succeeded 
to the donor. The Court said:
"He took undue advantage by means of his succession to 
the deceased's estates to revoke the honest gift of this 
cocoa farm made by his deceased uncle. This matter was 
placed before the members of the family. They were 
disagreeable with defendant and strongly laid stress 
that a gift made by a deceased person was irrevocable 
in native law and custom."
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6. Gift and other Relations:
A gift which is intended to he temporary in effect, is 
imperfect because of some lack in form etc*, bears a close 
relation to free tenancy; as already remarked, one can call 
the grant of the tenancy the gift, and consider it as such; 
and the continuing relation can be considered under the head 
of tenancy. This implies that in such circumstances the 
right3 of the holder or grantee in regard to his control and 
disposal of the property may be limited: some of the limita­
tions are set out in the chapter on TENANCIES AND LEASES.
There is also the relationship between gift and samansew. 
Although one informant maintained that an enforceable gift for 
which aseda has been given, to take effect after the death of 
the donor, is not samansew but gift if the family consent dur­
ing the donor's lifetime, I maintain that one can distinguish 
the two types of gift. Samansew is discussed under SUCCESS­
ION (q.v.).
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CHAPTER X.
SUCCESSION,
A, INTESTATE SUCCESSION,
1. HISTORY,
In primitive African societies all succession is origin­
ally intestate, and one must conclude that wills and bequests 
of property are a later innovation, to begin with nothing more 
than the dying wish of a person expressed with regard to the 
destination of certain articles essentially personal to him - 
his spear, hoe, and other minor chattels and belongings. As 
we shall see later, however, the Akan peoples have developed a 
customary form of testate succession, which itself is now in 
process of supersession by testamentary dispositions in writing 
based on English Law.
The development of the idea of any form of succession, 
testate or intestate, wa3 obviously dependent upon there being 
something to succeed to* Whilst the Akan peoples were mobile 
hunters, there was no real property for them to inherit; the 
personal property would have been divided - as in other parts 
of Africa - into "man's property” and "woman's property”; and 
it was appropriate that men should succeed to man's property - 
weapons, etc. (elsewhere cattle), and women to woman's property- 
cooking pots and the like. Today it is a principle which is
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not so widely recognised, as will be seen below. There is a 
suggestion (nothing more) that certain male property may now 
be inherited by a man's son and not his nephew. Certainly, 
this applies with regard to certain occupations, posts and 
crafts (e.g., smiths; and in the Fante towns company member­
ship goes by the male line - from father to son).
When the hunters settled down, and undertook rudimentary 
farming, the emphasis shifts to the family: the individual
has the use for life of the land which he farms, but such 
property comes from and reverts to the family pool. On the 
death of the individual, the land reverts to the family; the 
question then arises of the disposal of its use. It is not 
difficult to see how the idea that land should revert to the 
family may have arisen. The task of clearing the bush in the 
first place usually calls for reinforcement of labour, which 
would come from close relatives, even though the subsequent 
agriculture could be performed by an individual or a unit (a 
man with his wives and children). It is now basic to Akan 
custom that whilst ownership of the title to land is vested in 
the family as a whole, there is little or no communal exploita­
tion by the family of the use of such land. Where the land 
cultivated by the deceased member was allocated to him by the 
family, it is easy to follow the theory which states that on 
the one hand, such title is in the family; and on the other, 
that it should be allotted to an individual member by the
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family. But where an individual member has of his own initia­
tive cleared a portion of the virgin forest and made a farm 
thereon, it is less easy to see why, on his death, the property 
should fall into the general family holding. The probable 
reason is given above, that the task is too large for an indi­
vidual, unless aided by other members of the family; but today 
the rule applies whether relatives have assisted in the clear­
ing or not. Later rationalisations,met with in some reports 
and elsewhere, which state that the land reverts to the head of
the family, who revests the use only in the successor, perhaps
1
reveal how this situation has come about.
Be this how it may, it is the family's task to re-allocate 
the use of the property of deceased, and it is this function 
which is comprehended within the customary law of succession.
2. NATURE AND BASIS OP INTESTATE SUCCESSION.
The nature and basis of customary succession can be 
simply stated:
o
(a) Succession is not automatic but elective.
1. But, as is pointed out in the Chapter on THE FAMILY (q.v.),
the head of a family does not acquire family property in
trust for the family: title is with the family itself.
2. Christaller gives dl ade ("to eat the things (of deceased)”)
for the verb nto succeed*1; adedi for "succession”; and
odedlfo for the "heir” or "successor".
Rattray gives another term for inheritance - awunyadie.
He says (A.L.C. 109): "This term, I think, means the inher­
itance of property by the legal heir." He also (at A.L.C. 
333) gives an expression for "successor" or "the actual next 
of kin", as he terms him: he calls the successor "the die
odi n'adie...(he who 'eats', i.e.,succeeds to his thingHJ"’.
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y (b) The family are the proper elective body,
\ (c) Self-acquired property of deceased, unless otherwise 
disposed of in his lifetime, becomes on his death one of the 
different kinds of family property.
(d) Although succession is not automatic, there are pref­
erential candidates, preference being ascertained by degree of 
relationship to the de cujus.
(e) This relationship is normally traced matrilineally, 
i.e., through the female line.
(f) Succession is, or was, total: i.e., the successor
steps into the shoes of the deceased.
(g) The interest acquired by the successor is a dependent 
one only, the ultimate title remaining with the family.
Let us examine these principles.
(a) Succession is not automatic in Akan customary law; 
there is no-one who is entitled to come to court for an order 
empowering him to succeed, unless he has already been chosen 
by the family as successor. If the reverse is stated or pre­
sumed to exist in any locality, it should be treated with great 
suspicion. As was said in evidence from Akim Abuakwa: nHight 
to inherit does not inhere in any individual except by appoint­
ment of the family.” One does, however, find in the Court 
records cases where individuals have gone to court to establish 
their succession, even against the word of the family; they 
have claimed to succeed as of right, and not by virtue of
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appointment by the family. The Court has no power to make an 
order in such terms, although it may by order recognise that 
the appointment of the successor has been validly carried out 
by the family, or that he has been dismissed from his appoint­
ment in due form by the family.
For this reason the term ttsuccession1 has been preferred
to that of "inheritance”, since Inheritance implies that there 
entitled
are heirs/to succeed, whose existence can be ascertained in the 
lifetime of the de cujus; which is not the case In Akan Law, 
although there are the preferential successors already 
mentioned.
Succession Is electives by this is not implied that a 
regular election takes place in the family, with each member 
having a vote of equal Importance* Nevertheless, there is 
canvassing of opinion, and the appointment of a successor con­
sequent upon such canvass. A similar principle Is to be found 
reiterated through the whole of Akan custom, from the election 
of a chief, through the appointment of a head of a family, to 
the appointment of a successor to an individual. In all cases 
there Is a large body of electors, and a smaller body within 
that body who have a special Interest axxL whose voice has 
special weight in the nomination or choice of a candidate.
(b) In accordance with this principle, in the appointment 
of a successor we are told that the family are the proper body 
to decide on the person to succeed. But what Is meant by
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the family here, and how are they guided in their choice? 
Usually, as will be shown at (d) below, there are preferential 
candidates, occupying the closest degree of relationship to the 
deceased, through common membership of a sub-lineage within the 
family. The sub-lineage of the deceased has the greatest in­
terest in the choioe of a successor, as have the members of the 
house or section of the family to which deceased belonged; and 
it seems to be frequently the case that choice of a successor 
is agreed on among the members of this section, their choice 
being perhaps referred to the rest of the family - as repres­
ented by the elders - for approval. It cannot be too strongly 
stressed that custom varies as between different families; 
although all have a common bails, the superstructures of custom 
erected thereon differ in various ways. No single procedure 
can therefore be identified as the standard one. Whether the 
successor succeeds semi-automatlcally, or is nominated by his 
sub-lineage or section, or the choice is left to the family as 
a whole, a family meeting generally takes place when the formal 
appointment is made.
The position when a head of a family is being chosen, or 
family property in the wide sense is being disposed of, is 
somewhat different, since suoh matters are the concern of the 
family as a whole. Here, on the other hand, the choice of 
9uccessor concerns only the sub-lineage of the deceased lntim- 
atoly* and the peat of the family more remotely.
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(c) It is a basic principle of custom that all property 
of deceased becomes family-property on the death of the de 
cujus, unless otherwise disposed of during his lifetime. A man 
cannot dispose of any of the kinds of family-property outright 
except with the consent of the family; so that all property to 
which deceased himself has succeeded forms part of the estate 
for disposal at his death. Ihiring his life he may have temp­
orarily alienated the use of such inherited property - usually 
by gift to his wife or children; whether such a gift is main­
tained at the death of the donor depends on the family.
Self-acquired property also becomes family property at the 
death of the owner thereof; but during his lifetime he may 
freely dispose of it outright to whom he pleases (certainly if 
the transaction is a sale, and perhaps if it is a gift also).
He may also indicate on his deathbed by customary declaration, 
or before his death by written will, which way he wishes the 
property to go after his death. It is incorrect to represent 
that no man can have under customary law more than a life- 
interest in property, even where it is self-acquired; this 
would require one to hold that if a man disposed of self­
acquired property the grantee would receive only an "estate pur 
autre vie", an idea unknown in customary law. let one must 
admit that his power of disposition even over self-acquired 
property is subject to certain limitations, which are discussed
elsewhere?_____________________________ __ ____________________
S. See SALE!, pp. 324-6; GIFT, pp^ 545-6, etc.
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A man's property becomes "family property” on his death: 
what is this family property, and who acquires the interests 
therein?
The title to the property vests in the family as a whole,
so that disposition is dependent thenceforth on the consent of
the family. If the title of the de cujus was not qualified,
i.e., dependent on the larger absolute interest of a stool or
other person, then his absolute interest vests in the family.
If the title of the de cujus was qualified, this similarly
4vests in the family as a whole*
The interest of use which the de cujus possessed vests in 
his sub-lineage at his death. Such an interest is a qualified 
one, dependent upon the larger interest in the family as a 
whole; but it is Immediate and exclusive, so that only for 
grave reason could the family divert the course of succession 
from that sub-lineage. Out of the sub-lineage's qualified 
Interest is created by the family the Interest of the successor, 
which thereupon Itself becomes exclusive and immediate (if only 
temporarily), so that the successor, whilst he continues to
4. Rattray maintains (A.L.C. 353) that the former rule was 
that all deceased's property went to the abusuahene (not 
personally, but as head of the family); and that grad­
ually the "next of kin” asserted his right. This is a 
reversal of the historical development which appeals to 
the present writer. And in Ash. 41 he maintains that 
the maternal uncle ("the head of his family") "has an 
absolute and undisputed right to succeed", which he us­
ually waives in practice; but this appears a rational­
ization.
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hold this position, has the right to exclusive use and occupa­
tion (even against other members of the family, but subject to 
the rights of certain privileged persons). It is possible for 
other views of the law to be put forward? but whilst recog­
nising that the formal appointment of the successor comes only 
from the family, one must concede that the sub-lineage have 
claims that the successor should be chosen out of their number, 
and also certain residential claims in the case of houses.
Where the successor is under a duty to pay over a portion of 
the profits from Inherited property to the head of the family, 
as sometimes happens in the case of houses, and also to make 
contributions to family funds, it is a question whether such 
payments have a direct connection or not with the family's root- 
title to the property, or only an incidental one.
(d) Succession at customary law is not automatic; there
is a list of preferential candidates: see, for Instance, that
6
contained in Sarbah's Fantl Customary Laws. The general prin­
ciple is to take the most restricted lineage which includes the 
deceased, look therein for potential successors, and only when 
there is no suitable successor within that lineage, to take the 
next larger lineage as the source of a successor. The follow­
ing shows a typical family tree, tracing from a common female 
ancestor through the female line, the ancestress in this case
being F 1. the great-meat-grandmother of MP. the propositus.
5. See p. 557, n.4.
6. at pp. 101-105. And for an aocount of succession generally, 
see Ratt. Ash. 35-44, A.L.C, 333 et seq#
<53> i mp t  „  \ F n s(/)
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The smallest sub-lineage is ascertained by proceeding back to 
the nearest female ancestor, and thence downwards in the female 
line* In this case, MP's sub-lineage contains F 4, his 
mother, and her descendants in the M 5 and F 5 generation, and 
thence to the F 6 generation. Degrees of relationship are to 
be ascertained by counting up to the nearest common female an­
cestor and thence down. From this it is evident that the
typical feature of Akan succession is NOT merely succession by
7nephews, as the table below shows.
MP to F 4 : one step : Mother X
to F 3 : two steps : Grandmother
to M 5) (Brother x
F 5) 
to M 6 
to M 4
two steps 
three steps 
three steps
(Sister x
Nephew x 
Maternal Uncle 
First cousinto M 5(i) four steps 
It will be observed that MP to F 4, succession by the 
mother, comes first in the table. As Sarbah remarks, success­
ion by the mother is not common, her claim usually being waived 
in favour of others in the line of succession.
Next comes the brother or sister, and thereafter the uncle 
or nephew. Nephews are usually preferred to uncles? it will 
be noted that M 6 is within MP,s minimal lineage (marked x), 
whilst M 4 Is not. There also seems to be a dislike of taking 
the successor from ascendants.
7. Cf. Rattray, A.L.C. 333, and Ratt. Ash. 1-2.
8. Ratt. Ash. 41 says that the maternal uncle has ”an absolute 
and undisputed right to succeed*1; nevertheless in practice- 
to my knowledge - he rarely If ever succeeds (except in
the case of deceased minors).
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That the brother is the preferential successor to the 
deceased is shown more clearly by the fact that besides his 
succeeding to the property of deceased, it is also customary 
that he should succeed to the wives of deceased. The funds 
for their maintenance then come naturally from the property to 
which he has succeeded. The gradual obstruction of this uni­
formity of succession, as where the brother refuses to marry 
the widow, but succeed® to the property of deceased; or where 
he fulfils his customary duty of maintaining the widow and 
children, but the property was left elsewhere by will, causes 
great difficulty. It is inevitable that finally a nephew 
should succeed; in our instance, when MP’s brothers are ex­
hausted, the property will have to pass to the next generation. 
Eut first cousins also frequently succeed to a deceased, though
g
not in the same order of frequency as brothers and nephews.
This table is for a deceased ma}e: this prompts certain
questions:__________________________________________________
9. Rattray (Ash. 42) puts the cousin before the nephew;
Danquah (A.L.C. 83) also gives them a high place in the 
order of succession. On the classificatory system a first 
cousin is nua or "brother”; the nephew is not. For this 
reason, in fact another way of putting the principle that 
successors of the same generation as deceased are selected 
before dropping a generation, they do - as noted in the 
text - often succeed. But (without having attempted a 
statistical analysis) I did not get the general impression 
either in the cases or in oral information that their 
position was preponderant.
(And cf. the maxim quoted by Ratt. A.L.C. 333: "Nnuanom 
nsae a, wofase hhi a nephew £or uncle^ does not
succeed provided there are brothers.)
r-K O-r y
yr\lT~
<r J **,
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(1) Is it customary for men to succeed to men, and women
to women?
10
There is no absolute rule which makes such provision; 
informants said, for instance:
Rattray stated originally that a woman succeeds a woman,
14
but later qualified this statement.
There is more than an inkling of such a rule, and normally
men would be preferred as successors to a man when they stand
15
in equal relationship with a woman with the deceased. And 
where a woman dies, the property she leaves which is specific­
ally female property will be taken by female members of the 
family. I have personally encountered frequent instances of 
women succeeding men, and vice versa.
(2) Is succession to a deceased woman on a different basis 
from succession to a man? '
10. Danquah, A.L.C, 184, does not go as far as Rattray orig­
inally did in stressing this principle; he says: "...the 
successor to a female relative's property is usually a 
woman”.
11. Akropong.
12. Akim Abuakwa. 13. Ash. 40.
14. A.L.C. 337.
15. Cf. Sarbah, P.C.L. 102: "a man is invariably preferred 
to a woman.”
”succession is normally from males to males, 
and from females to females. But a man's^ 
mother may succeed, and also his sister."
And again:
"The family appoints a man to succeed a man, 
and a woman to succeed a woman, but sometimes 
a woman succeeds a man." (12)
13
V" hyO~b
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This question arises partially from the last. It must 
be remembered that women in Akan law are, unlike in some other 
parts of Africa, equally capable with men of owning and enjoy­
ing property. Apart from obvious points (such as that there 
are no widows to inherit), the following may apply:
(a) a woman’s property is usually smaller in size, 
since she has less chance of individual acquisition;
(b) "woman to woman” will generally operate;
(c) but men are often preferred to women as managers 
of property; ^  u  &  h r r ~ » *  ,
- e #  g  < ’  t t e *
(d) a woman may step down in favour of her son; , ' L '
(e) but a woman is theoretically first candidate
f\/a „ ***- ' ^  f i ^ ^ A  <4.
for succession to her son; , i /_ . a- < .u  «
(f) succession to a woman is on a different basis 
in one sense, in that her children can succeed her, whilst a
man’s children cannot succeed him.
One informant stated that:
,!The normal successors to a woman are her 
children, both male and female. But if 
the woman has a aister, then the property 
will go to the sister first." (16)
(3) What is the position of: the father; the children;
the spouse; in regard to customary succession?
If a child dies, it seems probable that the parents will
16. Akropong.
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take such property as It possesses* According to Rattray, a 
father used to have power over his^  child's property; but this 
power was not always fully exercised* A mother is theoretic­
ally first in line of succession; hence she might be entitled 
to take her deceased child's property* According to one in­
formant, if the child is young, its brothers (and sisters) may
share its property; none will be taken by its father. If the
18
child is not young, then the normal rules operate.
The children of deceased, apart from their being confirmed
in the enjoyment of any gift which deceased may have given them
during his lifetime, and apart also from any deathbed donations,
or testamentary dispositions, may be given a portion of the
cash, if any, of deceased by the family. This is a reciprocal
19
recognition of their duty to pay for the coffin of their parent. 
Apart from paying for the coffin, children do not usually con­
tribute to the funeral expenses of a deceased father*
Children are of course entitled to succeed to property of 
their deceased mother* It should be remembered that children 
of a deceased male have certain rights of residence in their 
late father's house, even where it has passed as family prop­
erty to the successor*
There are certain duties of a religious and ritualistic 
nature which the spouse of deceased is expected to perform*
17. Cf. A.L.C. 9 et seq.
18. Acc* to Akropong.
19. Cf. Danquah, A.L.C. 187.
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It is unusual for a wife to be given anything of her late hus­
band's estates if she marries his successor, then, of course, 
her position is not altered for the worse• She also may be 
confirmed in temporary gifts made by her deceased husband.
(e) It is said that relationship for the purpose of as­
certaining a successor is normally traced matri line ally. This 
statement covers the exceptional case where there is only a 
fictitious or quasi-relation, e.g., between a slave and the 
person and family whom he serves; and between a 1 domes tie”
(as slaves emancipated under the Ordinance and their descend­
ants are usually termed) and his former masters.
In former times a slave was entitled to succeed by virtue
20
of his adoptive relationship in various circumstances. The 
first was when all other members of the family of the true 
blood entitled to succeed were exhausted. Next, when persons 
entitled to succeed were too young to succeed and manage the 
property, a slave might be appointed as temporary manager and 
"trustee” of the property until the rightful successor came of 
age. Such appointment was not necessarily contingent upon 
there being no other members of the family left.
The relationship of master and slave was not an entirely 
one-sided affair in the old days. It is true that a slave was 
liable to be cut off to celebrate the funeral of a notable or 
chief; but apart from that he benefited by possessing a family,
20. Cf. Ratt. Ash. 43-4.
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which he would not otherwise have done; of having somewhere 
to look for subsistence and protection; and then he had this 
real right of succession. The right was dual: a slave might
succeed his mas ter , the master might succeed his slave. It 
cannot have been the intention of the Ordinance - whatever may 
have been said subsequently on the matter - not merely to give 
the slave his liberty, but also to deprive him of these bene­
fits; and one must therefore hold that domestics are still 
entitled to succeed at law, as they do succeed in custom. The 
domestic has a right, which he would not have, except for his 
slave-relationship, to succeed. If his relation is to be ig­
nored, he is not a member of the family, and therefore not en­
titled to succeed. But as a corollary domestics are postponed
to persons of the free blood; and it is unreasonable to con-
21
cede the right without the qualification. The domestic suc­
ceeds, not by virtue of his servitude, but by virtue of his 
adoptive relation of a special character with the family which 
he serves (in theory).
If the members of one line or section are exhausted, would
21. The rule was rejected by Hooper. J. in the unreported
case of Ambradu v. Mans ah (1947): Land Appeal 1/47, Sek., 
because It was based on slavery, and was therefore con­
trary to the Slaves Emancipation Ord.. 1874, and the 
Re-afflrmatlon of the Abolition of Slavery Ord.. 1930.
But the rule was affirmed in Nelson v. Ammah: (1940)
6 W.A.C.A. 134. “
And, despite the abolition of slavery, the rights of 
children of a slave-mother are preserved: Santeng v.
Darkwa: (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 52.
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the domestics of that line succeed to the property of a member 
of that line before blood-members of the family belonging to 
another line? Although it is open to the family in such cir­
cumstances to appoint a domestic if they so choose, a domestic 
could not claim to succeed of right whilst any relations of the 
blood survive.
(f) Succession in customary law was total: that is, the
successor stepped into the shoes of deceased, succeeding to all 
%the property of deceased. This included his wives, slaves and 
debts. On entering his succession, the successor thereupon 
became liable for the debts of deceased; if he failed, the 
family of deceased had to meet these debts. If the debts were 
more than the assets, and especially where deceased left debts 
and no assets, an46o-one was willing to be appointed successor 
to a "damnosa heredltas1*. then the only solution (it has been 
suggested) was not to hold the funeral custom of the deceased, 
thus declaring him an outcast from the family. More modern 
Information stressed that a successor must always be appointed, 
since there must be someone to look after the wives and child­
ren of deceased. But another principle has operated to make 
succession less onerous, namely, the acceptance of the equit­
able principle that a successor should be liable for debts only 
so far as these do not exceed the assets. This was initiated 
by the Supreme Court; and the attitude of the more sophistic­
ated Native Courts today is that it is useless to enforce the
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old rule, as It would be reversed on appeal. It is worth 
noting the statement given me by one informant, which would 
seem to cover the point today; (1) debts contracted by dec­
eased and not brought to the notice of the family bind the 
family in honour only, i.e., if the family pay them, it is to 
avoid disgrace and not because of a duty to pay;
(2) debts notified to the family bind the family; the liabil­
ity is thus based, not on succession, but on guarantee# The 
family have allowed the debts to bind family property, which 
is what the self-acquired property of deceased has become on 
his death# It will be seen that this statement partly answers 
our question, but that it also concerns a different point, the 
liability of the family and the family property; it does 
little to clear up the liability of the successor personally.
It can be said that the whole law relating to liability for 
debts of deceased persons, and especially the questions: on
whom does the liability fall? to what extent? does the debt 
(if secured) affect the land? what is the effect of notifica­
tion or consent or guarantee? - is in a state of confusion to­
day. Modern native custom may work out a unified and satis­
factory answer to these questions eventually: it has not done
so yet#
& ) rff ^  {><n**
3. THE CHOICE OF THE SUCCESSOR.
Something has already been said at 2.(b) about the choice 
of the successor; it was indicated there that the successor 
is appointed by the family of the deceased, and from the mem­
bers of that family.
(a) Time of appointment:
The burial of deceased, which for obvious reasons must 
take place as quickly as possible, must be distinguished from 
his funeral. The body may be carried to the ancestral house, 
and from there to the family burial-ground. The funeral takes 
place several days thereafter. Usually on the eighth day 
after death there is a family meeting after the funeral. At 
this time the properties of deceased are described and an in­
ventory taken. The debts of deceased are also calculated; 
and it is at this time that a creditor of deceased should put 
in evidence of the debts owed to him by deceased.
(b) Persons eligible for appointment:
The reader is referred to the table at 2.(d), and also to
22 23the works of Sarbah and Rattray. Sarbah's terminology -
"Real, Proper, Ordinary, and Extraordinary" - is unduly com­
plicated. Only (i) persons of the blood; (ii) domestics, 
may be appointed successor. A person not of the blood, e.g., 
the spouse; a child of male deceased, cannot be appointed
22. F.C.L. 101 et seq.. especially at p. 102.
23. Ash. 41 et seq: A.L.C, 40-2 (slaves).
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successor. The task of the successor is religious as well as 
civil; the religious part of his functions can be performed 
only by a member of the family. (The question of who can 
succeed by testament is postponed until later.)
(c) Mode of appointment;
This has also been dealt with: normally the deliberation
and choice take place within a confined circle - of the dec­
eased's sub-lineage, of the elders of the family. Their dec­
ision is submitted to the rest of the family for approval. The 
successor signifies whether he is willing to accept the appoint­
ment or not. If he is so willing then he will give aseda or
drink to the family (to the head of the family?) to signify
24his acceptance, and seal the appointment. The properties he 
is then going to receive are exactly described to him, together 
with any special provisions about the repayment of debts, or 
the devotion of a portion of the proceeds to any special pur­
pose (e.g., the education of the children of deceased). The 
question of succession to the widows is gone into; and por­
tions of the property may be divided between different members 
of the family.
It is not compulsory for the successor to be appointed at 
this time; or, if he is so appointed, for him to accept and 
give aseda at that particular time. The war produced some 
elaborations of custom, as where the person who was preferential
24. Cf. Danquah A.L.C, 184.
successor (perhaps the brother of deceased) was absent on war 
service. In such cases, either the appointment is postponed 
until the potential successor can return; or else he is ap­
pointed and signifies his acceptance as soon as he can.
4. THE SUCCESSOR: HIS DUTIES.
Consideration of the duties of the successor is placed 
before that of his rights, partly in order to combat the grow­
ing tendency to treat succession as a valuable right, whilst 
ignoring the fact that it also implies corresponding duties.
(a) Funeral Debts:
The successor has to pay a portion of the funeral debts 
and expenses. As a member of deceased5s family, and more es­
pecially as a member of deceased’s restricted lineage, he is
liable to contribute; and as successor he is liable to con-
25tribute a larger share. Warrington states that
"The heir is responsible for the expenses of 
the funeral custom, but...if the deceased 
leaves no property the family will come to 
his assistance."
How far this is an accurate statement of the custom is doubtful
when set against other information, personally obtained, that
the successor pays one part, and the family two parts, of the
26funeral expenses.___________________________________________
25. p. 39.
26. From Akwapim; and, in Matson’s edition of Warrington, 
this passage was amended by the Committee to read:
"The funeral expenses of a deceased person have to be 
paid by members of the Family equally before electing one 
to the Stool, or to the vacant room of the deceased. 
(Digest, p. 74.)
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As noted previously, this is a vexed question. There can
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(b) Other debt3 of deceased:
be no doubt that formerly the successor was liable to pay all
27
the debts of deceased, even where they exceeded the assets;
and in certain instances this was still quoted to me as the 
28
rule. This principle is being whittled down, and now in many
cases he refuses - and the native courts may uphold his refusal
29,30
- to pay more than the assets.
What of the liability of the family in regard to the debts 
of deceased? If the successor refuses or is unable to pay 
deceased's debts, then the responsibility comes on the family 
to pay them. Once having paid them, the family may exact the 
amount from the successor, or remove him from the position, if 
the refusal was unreasonable. But - to indicate the conflict
27. E.g., Akim Abuakwa.
Cf. Danquah, A.L.C. 184; Sarbah F.C.L. 108.
28. E.g., Bekwai, New Juaben, Mahkessim; Warrington (p. 38).
29. E.g., evidence from New Juaben, Akim Abuakwa, etc.
30. According to one set of informants, the successor was 
formerly liable to pay -
"all debts, but the British Courts (C.J. Sir George 
Campbell Deane, Kt) have ruled that the successor must 
not be compelled to pay more than the estate can cover, 
unless the debt was secured. This rule has been warmly 
welcomed.
The debts whether known or not (to the family) must 
be announced and declared to the family by the creditor 
at the time funeral expenses are being reckoned, or at 
some convenient time during the funeral. A secured 
creditor may not do this, but his right cannot thereby 
be wholly defeated. All debts are, subject to the 
above, payable whether known to or approved by the 
family before death or not.”
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of evidence in regard to this point - I cannot do better than 
give some of the opinions collected verbatim;
"(the successor) becomes personally responsible 
for all the liabilities of deceased; if the 
deceased is in debt the heir may apply to the 
family for assistance and this will probably 
be forthcoming, but the family has no legal 
responsibility in the matter." (31)
"A man's debts are inherited by the family,
,y  ^ and the family must pay them, even if they
r exceed the assets* The successor is solely
V ;^ r e s p o n s i b l e  for the debts of deceased, al- 
 ^ though usually aided by other members of the
family where they are onerous." (32)
i/t
,  ^ s "The deceased's debts are the responsibility 
^  of the family on his death; but payment of
them falls on the person who succeeds to the 
deceased's property." (33)
"The family is liable to pay deceased's debts, 
provided there are family members as witnesses, 
and the creditor puts in his claim in.due 
form. But the family transfer the liability 
to the successor when he is appointed." (34;
It appears from the evidence that the primary liability to pay 
the debts of deceased rested on the family of deceased. This 
is in line with the former rule of liability, by which the fam­
ily was liable both for the debts and torts of its members. It 
appears to be generally agreed that the liability is trans­
ferred to the successor at the time of his appointment; but 
that he has a dual remedy if the debts are onerous: either to
31. Warrington, 38.
32. Marikessim.
33. Bekwal.
34. N. Juaben,
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refuse the appointment, or else to ask for assistance from
35other members of the family#
The question of guarantee by the family enters in here, 
however. If payment of a debt owed by deceased is guaranteed 
by the family, then on his death the debt probably becomes a 
family debt, and not the debt of the successor. It was stated 
that if deceased leaves a debt guaranteed by the family, and 
the family refuse to pay it, then the successor may himself
36
sell a farm inherited from the deceased to pay off the debt. 
Such a statement serves to show that in such a case the primary 
liability is with the family, and not with the successor. The 
creditor may, however, come against the successor for the debt; 
and the rule quoted (not verified elsewhere) supports the suc­
cessor's recouping himself out of the family property.
A guarantee must, however, be distinguished from mere wit­
nessing by the family or some of its members. Many informants 
stated that there was no liability to pay debts.of the deceased, 
unless members of the family had witnessed them.
And again, it was the original rule that the creditor must
put his debts In proof timously, I.e., within eight days after
37the death of deceased. But owing to the difficulty for 
creditors of attending from distant parts or of being
35. So: Danquah, A.L.C., 184.
36. Bekwai.
37. Confirmed In Warrington, 38-9; and see also Matson,
Digest, p. 27. para. 110* and Ratt. A.fr.C. 370.
RTaT'AV 159.
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immediately advised of the decease, this rule is now being
broadened in practice by the courts to allow payment of debts
38declared within a reasonable time,
(c) Maintenance of dependants of deceased#
Formerly it was one of the prior duties of the successor
to maintain the wife or wives and children of the deceased;
and it is still his duty, although today sometimes not observed
in practice# This duty to maintain dependants was strongly
affirmed from several quarters, especially in regard to the 
39children. It was said that he might inherit the wives of dec­
eased; but this must not be taken to mean that wives are or 
were treated as chattels# By the custom of Mleviraten, the 
successor is married to the widow (without the need for fresh 
payments of head-money, etc.) and the step-children also come 
within his care# This is not so much a new marriage, as the 
continuation of the existing marriage# However, children born 
to him belong to him, and not to his deceased brother#
This custom was by no means harmful to the interests of 
the widow and orphaned children. It in fact served the same 
function as the contributions to Widows and Orphans Funds do
38. And also of better modes of proof, e.g., by writing. 
Although by English Law the Statutes of Limitation db 
not operate over transactions governed by native cus­
tomary law, native law had thus a kind of limitation; 
and In any case where there is a writing English law 
may apply.
39. E.g., Akwapim, New Juaben, Mankesslm, Ratt. A.L.C. 28-30#
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for some civil servants today. The custom is now becoming 
somewhat less common; at the same time some successors are 
endeavouring to avoid their duties of maintenance. It is in­
equitable that the wife or wives (sometimes with their child­
ren) should be left destitute, or maintainable by their own 
family, especially if it is true (as was given by one inform­
ant) that the head-money is not returned, whether the widow
40
stays or is sent back to her own family. It should not be for 
gotten that the children have a limited right of residence in 
their deceased father's house, a right which is enforceable 
against the successor in the first place, and then against the 
family. Widows have a similar right, but it is a Weaker one, 
ated by some to be conditional on her marrying the
Contrariwise, a testator now endeavours to provide for his 
widows and children after his own decease by means of written
40. According to New Juaben.
41. The successor must maintain deceased's children:
Akwapim, New Juaben;
- and the widow, ^unless he refuses to marry her”:
New Juaben.
42. T awl ah v. Addo: (N. Juabenb A Ct: Suit 272/46) Illustrates 
the duty of maintenance, and also the right of residence 
for the children* Defendant was successor to Y.K., who 
left a house. "According to the plaintiffsthe defendant 
was appointed to inherit the estates of their brother late
Y.K. on condition that he should maintain the plaintiffs 
and children and not only his sisters.n In this case the 
immediate sub-lineage of deceased were already resident in 
the house which was Inherited*
41
and other wills - one breach of custom has provoked another!43
43. (See next page).
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44The reader may also refer to Danquah for a description 
of the rights of children, and the duties of a successor.
(d) Duties in the use of inherited property:
The successor is bound to use the inherited property wise­
ly, since such property is now - if it was not before - family 
property and not his own. If the property is land, or build­
ings, he must not commit waste; but must maintain it in
reasonable condition. There is less supervision over his use
45
of movable property.
(e) His liability to be divested:
The successor is appointed by the family; and although
he normally keeps the inherited property until his own death,
46
he is liable to be divested by the family for good reason.
Such reasons Include:
(i) Denying the family's title to the property.
(ii) Attempting to dispose of the property without 
the authorisation of the family.
(Hi) Committing waste; although it is doubtful
43. (Prom previous page) - ~
And both the Ashanti Confederacy Council (as reported in 
Matson, Digest, pp. ,26-7) and the Joint Provincial Council 
. in the Colony are endeavouring to modify the traditional 
r rules of succession.
44. A.L.C. 208-9.
45. But it was stated that if he inherits a house together 
with furniture, then the family will make sure that he 
does not lose .'or dispose of the Inherited furniture.
If he does so, he may be deposed.
46.”The successor...appointed may at any time be disposs­
essed by the Family if he is found to be wasting the 
property.” (Warrington: 38).
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whether the family would divest him for failing to devote his
47
full energies to the property,
(iv) Non-use perhaps,
(v) Bad behaviour to the family, perhaps. This 
might cover such things as failure to contribute to proper fam­
ily debts; failure to pay any portion of the proceeds to the 
family where this is required by the custom of the family, or 
the terms of his appointment; failure to observe the terms of 
any "trust" impressed on his use of the property; insolence, 
turbulence, and the like; failure to maintain widows and child­
ren of deceased; failure to allow other members of the family 
use of portion of the inherited property, where he does not 
require this for his own use; etc,
(vi) Failure to pay the debts of deceased, or share 
in the funeral custom(?).
5. THE SUCCESSOR: HIS RI&HTS AND POWERS,
The successor, unless this is varied by the will of dec­
eased, or by the family, succeeds to the whole property of dec­
eased. This property may be various, and includes both rights 
over persons:
47. An instance of waste was that alleged in T awl ah v. Addo 
(see above), where it was alleged that the successor had 
Cl) demolished the upper story of an inherited house;
(2) disposed of cement blocks lying on the site, but not 
yet used for the building.
The waste was proved, but the plaintiff non-suited on 
another ground.
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(i) wives;
(ii) patria potestas over children of deceased;
(iii) slaves: this is now replaced by rights over 
the property of domestics attached to deceased;
(iv) persons in pawn to deceased: this no longer
applies;
and rights over property:
(v) interests in land of various kinds: farms,etc
(vi) houses;
(vii) chattels of deceased: some of these do not
go to the successor;
(viii) cash of deceased;
(ix) ttchoses in action”: the benefit of debts due
to the deceased, etc*
The rights over persons to which the successor succeeds 
require little mention: the first two have already been dis­
cussed. The fourth is no longer of legal importance, the 
pawning of persons having been officially abolished. There is 
however a modern practice - unrecognised at law - similar to 
pawning of persons* I cannot say whether the successor suc­
ceeds to the benefit of any such contract of service or not 
since the courts are officially debarred from discussing the 
point.
As to the third, although slavery is abolished, the 
position of wdomestic" remains, and the reciprocal rights in
*•
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property which exist between a master and his domestic enure 
for the benefit of the successor. The deceased may have 
allowed the domestic to cultivate land; on the death of the 
domestic the land would revert to the deceased. Now, it will 
revert to his successor.
The successor takes over the rights of deceased in his 
property, but not in toto. Self-acquired property of deceased
is now inherited property in his hands, and he cannot deal with 
it freely. The successor succeeds both to the self-acquired 
and to the inherited properties of the deceased: these are now
on an equal footingf®
(&) Successor's right of use:
If the successor succeeds to farms he is entitled to use
them freely; and the product of the farms will belong to him
absolutely, apart from any portion which he may have to con-
49
tribute to the family. In some families it seems to be the 
custom for the proceeds of such farms (especially cocoa-farms) 
to be collected by the head of the family or his representat­
ives; they are then paid back to the successor holding the
48. The position of the successor in relation to property 
which he inherits was frequently described as that of 
"caretaker" for the family. In the sense that he is a 
"trustee" of the property, and has no personal power of 
disposal over it, this is so. It will be noted that he 
is not like a normal caretaker, since for one thing he 
pockets all the proceeds of the property as a rule.
49. E.g., for the celebration of the yearly festival.
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farm after deduction of a portion for family revenue - this I 
consider unusual. Customarily, it is the successor's duty 
either to pay over a portion of what he realizes from the land 
(which payment is then a charge against the land); or to con­
tribute as required (the payment then being a charge against 
himself). The latter case - which I consider the normal - 
means that his liability to contribute to joint family expenses 
is not a condition or a consequence of his holding the inher­
ited land; although his affluence or otherwise will be taken
50into account in assessing what contribution he should make.
In practice, it would be impossible to tell whether a farm 
which a person was working came to him by way of succession or 
was self-acquired, merely by a physical examination of the 
property and his mode of working; since during his lifetime he 
will treat it and cultivate it exactly the same as other prop­
erties of his.
The successor's use of inherited properties - if these are
50, "The successor does not have to pay over any portion of 
the proceeds from his inherited property to the family.
He may freely use all the proceeds from, e.g., cocoa 
farms or letting of rooms in an inherited house." -
New Juaben.
But if the successor refuses to contribute to family 
funds at all, then the family might dispossess him, on 
the ground of his failure to meet family obligations.
A successor refusing for no good reason to assist 
another member of the family who wanted land, and had 
begged a portion of the inherited property to "eat from", 
would be taken before a family arbitration; and would 
be liable to be divested if found at fault, - Akwapim,
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farms - is exclusive; other members of the family have no 
right to use the property or a portion of it without the per­
mission of the holder, or of the head of the family. The 
successor's right of use is unlimited, although his title is 
qualified or derivative* His right over inherited farm-prop- 
erty therefore differs from his right over inherited house- 
property. Of course, there may be lesser rights already in 
existence over a farm to which he succeeds, the rights of rel­
atives, widows of deceased, or children of the same, rights 
which are preserved despite the change in control.
Where houses have been inherited, then, although the prim­
ary right is with the successor, other rights may also be in 
existence, or later come to exist:
wives of deceased have a continued right to reside in
51
their late husband's house at the will of the family; child­
ren of deceased have a continued right to reside in their late 
father's house* This right is not at the will of the family, 
although they may be evicted for various reasons - bad behav­
iour, and so on. This right does not extend to the children's 
children, except by grace of the family, (We refer now of 
course to the case of male children of a male deceased.)
The successor acquires a right to reside in the inherited 
house, together with his dependants.
51. The successor may send her bach to her family if she 
is of bad behaviour.
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The house, if already an inherited one, may have other 
members of the family already residing there: at the lowest,
members of the sub-lineage of deceased; in time, members of 
a larger circle* These members normally have the right to 
continue their residence in the inherited house.
Apart from these persons, there is a moral duty - in some 
areas perhaps a legal duty - to permit other members of a fam­
ily to reside in such an inherited house, if they are homeless. 
This is quite apart from the rights of family-members in the 
principal family house. To refuse to put up members of the 
family when possible would be considered a very disgraceful 
procedure. It also seems to be the rule that once a member 
of the family has been allowed to reside on a semi-permanent 
basis in a portion of such a house, he has a legal right to 
continue his occupation on the same terms as children of dec­
eased.
The profits received from an inherited house usually be­
long to the successor, and he does not receive them as agent 
for the family, nor is he accountable for them. In particular, 
it was stated that the profit made from letting rooms belongs 
to the successor absolutely. He is bound to use such money 
for the maintenance of the house, since he is under a duty to 
maintain the inherited property in reasonable condition; and 
he could not be heard to say, where he has made such profits,
that he could not or would not maintain the property in good 
condition.
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Movable chattels received by the successor are usually 
treated by him as his private property, and he is not account­
able for them; but there are exceptions to this rule - one has 
already been given in regard to furniture in an inherited house* 
Another may be - though I have been unable to check this point - 
in the case of lorries, and other large capital goods*
Cash inherited by a successor (and also by any other mem­
bers of the family amongstwhom it may have been divided) is ex­
pendable at the discretion of the successor. The family are 
not bound to hand over all the cash of deceased to the success­
or, and they have a right to withhold it, or divide it up 
amongst the family-members. There is, however, a presumption
i
that the successor is entitled to take for his own use such 
assets as deposits in Post Office Savings Banks. Frequently, 
the cash of deceased will be divided up amongst the members of 
the family (including the successor, and also perhaps the child­
ren of deceased - even the widow may get something) by the fam­
ily when they meet after the funeral. It should be stressed 
that the successor has only got a right to such money as the 
family decide to give him; and although there is a presumption 
(as stated above) that he is entitled to claim P.O.S.B. deposits 
of deceased, Cocoa Rehabilitation grants, etc., it is open to 
the family to show that the successor was authorized to claim 
these benefits in his own name, but only as agent for the family. 
In the particular case of C.R. grants, African custom seems to
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be working out a doctrine of conversion: the land of deceased
being converted Into cash, the successor Inherits the cash as 
land; and the family usually insist (as they have a right to 
do) that he convert back the cash into land at the first oppor­
tunity; or alternatively, that he use it in rehabilitating
52deceased’s devastated farm*
(b) Successor's rights of oontrol and disposal:
The successor, whilst he so continues to be, occupies a 
dual capacity, as he acts for himself and for the family. He 
controls the property in the family interest, and uses it in 
his own. If he is delinquent in his control of the property, 
as for instance by:
(i) allowing a title alien or adverse to that of the 
family to be set up;
(11) falling to control receipts and expenditure, 
where these are for the family (e.g., by failing to collect 
rent, or to pay it over to the family);
(iii) wasting the property, including failing to 
secure benefits which might have come to the property (e.g., 
C.R. grants - compare the English law relating to a mortgagee 
in possession);
(iv) not allowing other landless members of the
52. I have heard frequent complaints about the difficulties 
which occur through having P.O.S.B. deposit^especially 
the danger that a person, not even yet appointed success­
or, may go and claim the deposit as "heir of deceased.
The procedure might well be overhauled.
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family - if the property is land (or homeless, if it is a housei 
the use of part of the inherited property;
(v) setting up an absolute claim to the property;
(vi) disposing of the property without the family's 
authorization; etc., etc.,
then he is liable to forfeit in whole or in part - at the dis­
cretion of the family - the rights of use and control delegated 
to him by the family. This forfeiture can only take place as 
the result of the solemn act of the family, usually as the re­
sult of a family ” arbitration11; and there is no such thing as 
automatic forfeiture.
Apart from this, the successor controls and manages the 
property as though it were his own self-acquired property. His 
rights of control, however, do not extend to cover disposal of 
the property.
Rights of disposal; in general the successor may dispose of 
temporary and partial interests without the prior authorization 
of the family.
If the property is a house, he can - and does - permit his 
wife and children to reside there. He permits the dependants 
of deceased to reside there also. He can permit members of the 
family to reside there freely. He can allow friends to stay 
there; but in some cases he is not permitted to let out rooms, 
lease part or the whole of the house, without the family's 
authority. There is, however, conflicting evidence on this
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point.
If the property is house-land, he may allow a friend to 
build there free* In such cases, it is safer all round for 
the successor to notify the family - if he.is wise; and also 
to charge the house builder something (e*g., sheep or drink) 
annually; otherwise the family may object that the security of 
their title is being impaired.
If the property is farm-land, then the successor will work 
it in company with his wife and children and servants as if it 
were his own property; and he may - as is customary - reward 
their services by giving them temporary use of a portion of the 
land for their own benefit. Unless the family were present 
and consenting at the time of the gift, or have subsequently 
given their approval for the gift to be permanent, such a gift 
does not bind the family after the successor's death; and the 
family may withdraw the gift.
The successor may appoint a caretaker, and often does, to 
look after the property. He may also admit a stranger as 
tenant, either on the abusa system, or for an annual fixed pay­
ment; sometimes he needs the permission of the family before 
doing so; and It is always wise to inform the family to avoid 
trouble•
In some parts of Akan country a successor may pledge
j -  -  - - - -  -  ,  ,  r  ■  -  —  r —  -  ' '  ‘  ‘  J  i r r  ™  " r
i
53. E.g., not without the family's consents Akwapim;
| without the family's knowledge or consent: New
Juaben.
i
i
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inherited property without the previous consent of the family.
54In other parts he may not do so.
If the successor incurs personal debts, the creditor will 
attempt to obtain execution by order of the court against the 
property of the debtor. Family property cannot be attached 
for the private debt of one of its members. Frequently, how­
ever, it happens in practice that inherited farms are so at­
tached under Writ of Fi.Fa. and then sold at public auction. 
Such a sale is in theory invalid and of null effect. In prac­
tice complications arise: families were by ancient custom
liable for the debts and torts of their members. This applies 
only in part today; but if the family have notice of such a 
sale, and do not interplead, or the sale ha3 taken place and 
comes later to their notice, but they allow the purchaser to 
remain in possession undisturbed for a long time, then some 
courts will uphold the purchaser (on the grounds of estoppel
or equity) and the claim of the family for recovery of the
55 56
property will be rejected. *
54. A pledge of inherited property is not enforceable against 
the property unless the family have signed as witnesses:
New Juaben.
"The heir is allowed to pledge Family Property in 
order to raise a loan." - Warrington, 38.
He has no power, but consent of his section may be enough 
if the property is unimportant: Akim Abuakwa.
55. Jackson, J., discussed this question at some length in 
the unreported case of Appreku v. Kwakyi: (1950): Land 
Court, Kumasi, 6/3/50; he rejected the idea that family 
land could be thus attached for the private debt of one 
of its members; the judge went on, however, to put for-
/over
56. (See next page)
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Salea: No successor can sell inherited property without the
authorization of the family. A successor cannot ’’make title”, 
since title is in the family as a whole. Two cases must be 
distinguished:
(1) the successor sells his inherited property, with the 
authorization of the family or members thereof; the proceeds 
are taken by him for his own use, perhaps giving a portion of 
them to the family;
(2) (the older and stricter custom) the successor receives 
authority to sell the property from the family. The successor 
acts as agent of the family. The proceeds belong to the fam­
ily; but the family may allow the successor to keep the whole
57
or part thereof. Aocording to Warrington the successor ‘'is 
allowed to sell inherited property in order to pay the debts of 
the deceased”; but usually either he should work the property 
in order to pay off the debts; receive a loan from the family
55. (corit. "from~ib~uT^page’) ~
ward the theory that the judgement creditor (or the pur­
chaser at the public auction) could take the life interest 
of the judgement debtor in the family property, since ”his 
rights in this case to enjoy the usufruct of the land is 
one which he can convey to another without that family con­
sent and to that extent and to that extent alone his inter­
est in the land may be sold”; and on this ground could 
grant a kind of ’’estate pur autre vie” to the purchaser.
The theory is attractive, but it is submitted with great 
respect that it is untenable.
56. The matter is considered more fully in the Chapter on 
SALE, at pp. 375 et seq.
See also LONG POSSESSION, at pp. 717-722.
57. p. 38.
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(on the security of the property); or failing all else, sell 
with the family's authorization,
6, THE FAMILY AND SUCCESSION,
Various matters will be discussed under this head, prin­
cipally concerning variations in the normal custom of success­
ion, or cases where the successor or deceased person is other 
than an ordinary member or nyoung man" of the family.
(a) The Head of the Family as successor:
When a member of the family dies, it is inaccurate to say 
that the head succeeds to the properties, and then allocates 
them to the successor appointed by the family. It is even in­
accurate to say that the head so succeeds as official head, as 
"trustee" for the family. The head does not succeed in this
case in any sense at all. The property of deceased falls into
or reverts to the pool of family property, whence its use is 
temporarily shared out by the family. It might be truer to 
say that the family succeeds to the deceased man.
It is not customary for the head of the family to succeed
58
to the private properties of deceased "young men" of the family. 
When a new head of the family is appointed, if it is on 
the decease of the previous head then he will usually succeed 
to his private properties also. If on deposition of the pre­
vious head, then the inherited properties of the previous head
58, Sed quaere, whether _the same annlies to a section-elder 
or head or a nouse?
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may be left in his hands and not transferred to the new head 
of the family; (though of course family property in the wide 
sense managed by the head will pass into the control of the 
new head).
(b) The fgmlly*s liability for the debts of deceased:
Formerly the custom was that the family was ultimately 
liable for the private debts of a member; and they are still 
so liable by law if they have guaranteed the debt, or the debt 
was contracted for family purposes with the consent of the fam­
ily. Where the deceased contracts a debt secured on his farm, 
or a successor with the consent of the family raises a loan on 
the security of an inherited farm, the case is somewhat differ­
ent. Here the liability of the family is a liability only 
insofar as it affects the particular portion of family property; 
if an inherited farm is thus given as security, then the cred­
itor will be able to take it in execution; but this does not 
entitle him to proceed against the family as a whole, or against 
the rest of the family property.
The family usually transfer their liability to pay the 
debts of deceased to the successor appointed. But if no suc­
cessor is appointed the family's liability remains primary; 
some informants said that this would equal a repudiation of both
the deceased and his debts. Others said it would not be done
59
because of the great disgrace it Involved.
59. And see ante, pp. 567 et seq.
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(c) Succession to a stool-holder;
If a stool-occupant dies, then one person may be appointed 
to succeed him on the stool; another to succeed to his private 
properties*
(d) Succession to head of family:
The new head of the family usually succeeds, I believe, 
to the deceased head's private property also* 
le) Non-appointment of successor:
Not to appoint a successor more or less declares the dec­
eased as an outcast from the family; and it must be extremely 
rare (but there are instances). One instance is where no-one 
is willing to accept the appointment* It is a question whether
the family would remain liable for the deceased's debts in such 
60
a case* Such action would only be taken where either deceased 
had cut himself, or been cut, off from the family (as by the 
old method of ”cutting ekar”); or else where he left debts and 
no assets* Usually someone would be appointed, at least to 
look after the widow and children*
(f) Succession to slaves, domestics, stool-servants:
Slaves: the master succeeded formerly to all his slave's
60* If there is no successor wthe Head of the Family must take
on the position and any debts of the deceased will be the
debts of the family as a whole11: Warrington, 38*
Deane, C.J., rejected the liability of the family in 
Asledu v. Oforis 97/1932, because, inter alia* he held it 
to be incompatible with Rule 8 Order 44 of old cap. 158*
In this case the deceased left debts and no assets: no
successor was appointed.*
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property. But now "a claim to the administration of a dec-
„61eased native which is based on slavery is unenforceable .
Domestics: in custom, but perhaps not in law recognised by
the Supreme Court, the master succeeds to the property of his
deceased domestics (or descendants of former slaves of the
house). He certainly has the right to take back all property
given by him to the domestic during his lifetime.
Stool-servants: the successor to a stool servant is appointed
by the stool-occupant, with the presence and/or concurrence of
the relatives of deceased. The stool occupant may take back
gifts made to the servant by the present or a previous occupant 
62
of the stool. Other cases in the British courts have recog-
63nised the validity of the custom, even today.
61. In re Damptey, Kodieh v. Affram: (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 12; 
and in Wood v. Thompson: (1909) Earn. 15, succession to 
a slave" by his master*s family was declared repugnant.
62. Warrington agrees that it is the Ashanti custom that the 
property of domestics, if they are ’’fienlpa1', or even if 
they were not slaves, reverts to the Stool on their death 
jp. 42); the rule was considered in Kodieh v. Affram: 
(1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 12, but was rejected as being based on 
slavery. See, however, Ambah v. Libra: (1927) P.Ct. 
,26-,29, 241.
63. E.g., in Nana Juaben Serwah v. Fordjour: (1948) (Unreported 
Civil AppeaT~?57T.9487 iand Court, Accra, 15/7/48; coram 
Jackson, J.). This was an appeal from New Juaben Native 
Court, upholding the right of the Q,ueen-Mother to take 
back a grant of land made by a predecessor to a servant
in exchange for customary services. The learned appeal 
judge described this transaction as:
1 It appears to me to have been rather a grant of land 
as a reward for past services to the stool and in 
anticipation of the continuance of the services in 
the future. The right to occupy the land and enjoy 
its fruits was one limited by the condition that the
fever)
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(g) Succession to church members:
Increasingly today deceased may be a member of one of the 
Christian Churches: these churches have rules governing the
intestate succession to their members, which, although binding 
on the members, cannot legally take effect so as to bar the 
rights of non-members, e.g., the family of deceased.
Such Church rules usually provide that 2/3 of a member's 
self-acquired property should go to his widow and children, 
and the remaining 1/3 to his family (i.e., to be hanied on to 
the successor customarily appointed).
The following points are worthy of notice:
(i) In many cases, especially where most of the family 
are members of the church in question, the family do not ob­
ject to this distribution.
(ii) A successor is still appointed to deceased according 
to custom.
(ill) Elders of the Church, or ministers, may be present 
at the time of the distribution of deceased's estate (i.e.,
63. (cont. from previous page) -
occupier would continue to render those customary 
services.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
nature of the services were so unreasonable as to 
offend against the dictates of natural humanity or 
justice; on the contrary, I am of opinion that it 
would be an Injustice for the appellant to accept and 
enjoy the benefit of the land without at the same 
time shouldering its burdens.1
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after the funeral) In order to safeguard the rights of widow 
and children.
(Iv) The successor will still give customary assistance 
to (and still retains customary powers over) the children of 
deceased.
(v) The 2/3 for the widow and children is theoretically 
divided: 1/3 goes to the widow, 1/3 to the children. But in
practice the mother keep3 the property as a whole, looking 
after the children’s share on behalf of the children.
(vl) If the deceased leaves only one self-acquired house, 
then the widow and children acquire this as of right; but the 
successor also has a right to reside there. The children’s 
children will also have a right to reside in the house. The 
widow and children’s right is therefore larger than that which 
they possess by custom, since, first, It Is not permissive or 
subject to good behaviour, as with customary rights; secondly, 
it is transmissible; thirdly, It is apparently vendible if all, 
Including the successor, agree.
It may appear surprising that a man’s unilateral act - 
joining a church - can affect other persons’ customary rights 
and Interests; and that a pagan family accepts the situation. 
This Is to be explained by the urge towards oompulsory provision 
for widow and children on the death of intestates, an urge 
shared by members and non-members of churches alike. It must
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be stressed that members of the family of deceased who do not 
belong to the church in question are not obliged to allow these 
rules to operate; if they feel so inclined, they may oppose 
the arrangement* Where the majority of the family do not be­
long to the church, I am informed that difficulty arises, and 
they will object to the application of the church rules* 
Nevertheless, the head of the family will still give something 
to the wife and children of deceased, since the fact that by 
the rules the widow and children are entitled to a 1/3 share 
each will have been known by the family for some time* Appar­
ently, until individual persons began to accumulate wealth, 
families of pagans were quite willing to allow the rules to 
operate; and some still do today*
(vii) The Native Courts are sometimes willing to uphold 
the operation of these rules in whole or in part. Often to­
day they reach a compromise solution. I am indebted to
m **64
Matson s invaluable paper on "Custom in the Courts" for ref­
erences to two Ashanti cases, which exemplify the attitude of 
the native courts. In an Agona case of 1942, Darkowa v . Poku, 
the division mentioned above was made by the Native Court in 
accordance with mission rules* In a later case from Juaben 
(mentioned by Matson at p. 7 of his paper) a judgement in 
similar terms was apparently reversed by a magistrate on appeal, 
Native Court members and registrars to whom I have spoken
64. Unpublished
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realize now that these rules are not of legal effect; but 
nevertheless they are willing to operate them where possible* 
Various Native Authorities have drafted rules of their own, or 
influenced the attitude of the Native Courts, to cover intest­
ate succession cases (even where pagans are involved). Akim
Abuakwa's Declaration of Native Customary Law on the subject,
65
issued as a Proclamation in 1943, Is administered in practice 
by the Native Courts, though suspect law. A ruling by the 
Ashanti Confederacy Council In 1948 that 1/3 of a man's prop­
erty, if he dies Intestate, should go to the widow(s) and
children, is being applied by Native Courts under the guise of 
66
equity. In one case, where a successor refused to give the 
widow and children of deceased anything from deceased's estate, 
he was ordered by the native court to make provision for them 
as a matter of "equity”.
A further Interesting feature of modified custom was re­
ported. In several towns where the old Basel Mission was es­
tablished (viz., in Aburl and other Akwapim towns) a special 
quarter for church members was established a little way out of 
the existing town. The land was acquired by the mission from 
the local chief free In return for drink. On the land ac­
quired (often large in area) mission members built their houses.
In several of the towns this area is called "Salem". It was
65. See Gold Coast Gazette, 1943, p. 377.
66. Cf. Matson, Digest, pp. 26-7.
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stated that only Christians may live in Salem; the owner of a
house cannot sell it, his wife and children inheriting it for
a joint estate. The pagan family of the owner have no claim
67
to such a house. As an instance of the extent to which a 
” centre extra-coutumler” was established, it was stated that 
formerly gong-gong could not be beaten in Salem, unless the 
local chief obtained the consent of the pastor. Y/here deceased 
owns a house in Salem, then there is today a tendency for his 
family outside to refuse to satisfy the third shares laid down 
in the Mission Rules for the widow and children. My informant 
said: ”This is the beginning of patrilineal inheritance.”
(h) Succession to Mohammedans:
It must be emphasised that converts to Islam, unlike con­
verts to Christianity, occupy a special position in regard to 
inheritance. It is strange that members of a religion numer­
ically small in the Gold Coast, governed by a Christian state, 
should enjoy privileges not shared by members of Christian 
churches. Whilst the claim of persons not customarily entit­
led on the intestacy of a Christian is based on moral grounds 
and influence and customary law cannot be varied in their fav­
our as of right, succession to a convert to Mohammedanism is
68
governed by the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance, under which
67. Cf. Danquah A.L.C. 184-5, especially at p. 185 for an 
account of similar rules in Akim Abuakwa.
68. S. 10, provided he has made a Mohammedan marriage 
registered under the Ordinance.
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Islamic Law alone is applied. There are not many cases of 
conversion to Islam among the Akans; but In one case encoun­
tered at Obuasi, Ashanti, succession to a convert to Islam was 
ordered by the local native court in accordance with Mohammed­
an Law, and not by Akan custom.
B. TESTATE SUCCESSION: BY CUSTOM: SAMANSEW.
Apart from dying intestate, a man has the power by native
custom to make a customary will, and by English (Gold Coast)
69Law a written will also. He Anaman lays down that ”intest­
acy” means dying without making an English will; so that a 
person who dies after making a customary will still dies in­
testate by Gold Coast law. It is to be hoped that this atti­
tude may be modified by the courts or the law in future years; 
since the time of this decision, customary wills have become 
much more rigid, less a wish than a will in fact; and since 
the intention is to develop customary wills, perhaps in written 
form, it seems obvious that it will not do to call a man who 
makes one an intestate. It is with this hope that I include 
consideration of the customary will under the head of "testate 
succession".
The native customary form of oral will is variously called 
”samansiw", ”samansew", ”samanse", "nsamansie", "sammanslew",
69. (1894) P.C.L. 221.
faccording to district or author. I use here "samansew", which
i
is apparently phonetically preferable to !,samansiwn, the most
usually-found form in the literature. The word means "what
„70 M rt71
the ghost said”; or "what the ghost set aside : it is the
dying remark, wish or provision of deceased. It has long af­
forded in custom a method by which the customary devolution of 
property at the death of the holder might be varied by that 
holder in his lifetime.
The history of samansew has passed through various stages. 
In its earliest, as the name indicates, it was the expression 
of a wish by a person on his deathbed as to the destination to 
which he wished his property to go; and it was left to the 
family, out of a respect and fear for the spirit of the departed 
man, to carry out his wishes to the best of their ability. The 
carrying out of such wishes was not mandatory, there being only 
a moral and religious obligation. The wishes were probably 
expressed only with regard to the destination of his few person­
al belongings, and their bequest could operate only within the
72
family, and perhaps to his wives, children and slaves.
70. Akim and other informants.
71. Ratt. A.L.C. 15.
"That which is left by the spirits" - Samansie: Ratt. Ash. 
238. Matson, in his article Testate Succession in Ashanti. 
Africa, July 1953, 224, spells the word ^saman-nse*' in As ante, and* 
doubts Rattray's etymology.
72. There is a distinct analogy with Charles IIfa famous 
death-bed wish: "Don't let poor Nellie starve!"
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In the second stage the custom developed before English 
law had had the chance to interfere* The Akan people were now 
settled farmers, and the obligation was now gradually shifting 
from morality to law.
In the third stage, that which the custom has reached to­
day, the oral will has become rigid and extended; so that 
property may be left outside the family altogether to strangers 
in blood; and the powers of the family are being correspond­
ingly reduced.
1* THE NATURE OP SAMANSEW;
In its original form samansew was a species of death-bed
wish; from that it developed to become a member of the larger
genus of GIFT (q.v.); and the analogies and confusion with
73gift today are close. Samansew can, however, be distinguished 
from gift just a3 in Homan Law ^donatio inter vivos” was dis­
tinct from wdonatlo mortis causa". Samansew, which now res­
embles donatio mortis causa, was not so originally. Being 
only a wish, there could be no gift.
The original features of samansew thus were that it was 
oral, made in contemplation of death, was a wish, was subject 
to the family's consent, and was in fact made on the death-bed 
of the testator.
There are some who deny even today the enforceable
73. Matson, op. cit.. 224, in fact calls it an "inchoate gift”.
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character of samansew. and who say that where it is legally
enforceable it is a gift inter vivos. One informant said:
11 The family are not bound to carry out the 
wish or will of the deceased relative, for, 
upon his death, the property is no longer 
his, but the family's. The family may 
however respect his will or wish and allow 
the beneficiary to take upon paying an aseda.11
75The Akim Abuakwa Declaration does not seem to imply that
76
samansew takes effect as a wish only.
Where aseda is paid by the beneficiary, is this gift and 
not samansew? Aseda is an almost invariable feature of those 
customary wills that are reported; but there may be a confus­
ion here. One Informant said that if aseda is paid during the
deceased's lifetime to the family, then the transaction is gift
77
and not samansew. The aseda to which we commonly refer in 
this connexion, however, is paid to the testator: it is this
which makes the gift irrevocable by the testator. Aseda is 
also commonly paid to the family by the beneficiary when he 
accepts the thing bequeathed (i.e., at the time of the funeral 
and after).
There are some forms of gift which cannot truly be called
74* Akim Abuakwa.
75. State of Adtyem Abuakwa (Declaration of Native Customary 
Law) Proclamation. 1945: Gazette Notice No. 769. p.577. 1943.
76. And cf. Rattray', A.L.C, 338-9.
77. But Danquah, A.L.C. 198, seems clearly to distinguish 
between samansew and gift inter vivos; the criterion 
is that Hthe donee must be given an opportunity of 
possessing and owning that estate during the donor's 
lifetime11.
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wills. Sometimes a temporary gift of usufruct is made by a 
man during his lifetime to his wife or children. This may 
subsequently be ratified in the presence of members of the 
donor's family as a bequest operative on the death of the test­
ator; the gift is made absolute, the family forfeiting by 
their presence and consent any future claim to take the prop­
erty back on the demise of the donor. This is the type of
perfected gift inter vivos to which the informant probably
o 78 refers.
Time of making: the bequest was usually made when in contemp­
lation of death, and In the grip of mortal sickness. Custom
now allows a bequest of this kind to be made at any time,
79
though this is not yet an Invariable rule. It is true that
78. Cf. GIFT, p. 545.
79. At any time : Akwapim.
Deathbed, preferably; but a gift with family witnesses 
is fully operative if made at any time: New Juaben.
Deathbed : Bekwai.
Deathbed : Ajumako.
In sickness : Akwapim.
Not necessarily on the deathbed, but made in contemplation 
of death : New Juaben.
In expectation of death from illness however caused 
: Akim Abuakwa Declaration. 1943.
Deathbed : Ratt., A.L.C.,15.
Prior to his death: Ratt., Ash. 238.
"It is not only on his death-bed that a man can make testa­
mentary disposition. A person can make his testamentary 
disposition while enjoying perfect health; but at the 
time it is made, the witnesses must be distinctly told by 
him his words are his Samansiw, to take effect after his 
death." : Sar., F.C.L. 99.
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the likeliest time for its making is still on the testator's 
death-bed, when he will hurriedly call (or the donee will do 
so) members of the family to hear his dying wishes* But it is 
not essential that the testator should be on the point of 
death, in grave sickness, or even in fear of death in the near 
future.
Since it is a common thing for a man to work his farms 
with the assistance of his wife and children, and to reward 
them with portions of the land so farmed (an arrangement which 
needs no family ratification), if the family are called to wit­
ness the gift at any time, the only effect is to prolong the 
period of its operation indefinitely. The wife and children 
continue working the farms allocated to them; but retain them 
after the death of their husband/father, without further auth­
orization from the family of deceased. Samansew has the 
effect of prolonging the operation of a gift after the test­
ator's death, or of postponing its operation till then: it is
a point of scientific legal terminology whether one can or 
should apply the term to an absolute gift, not made in contem­
plation of death, which is nevertheless absolute as against 
the donor's family, even after the donor's death,
2. TO WHOM SAMANSEW MAY BE MADE.
One is principally interested in the power (or the 
attempts) of the family to recover property of deceased given
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by him to other persons, once deceased has met his end. If 
no gifts were made by the testator, all his property, inher­
ited and self-acquired, would fall into the hands of the family 
at his death, and would then be available for distribution, 
once his successor has been appointed. The persons most jeal­
ous of such gifts will be the potential successor, the sub­
lineage, and the family generally, in that order. Their jeal­
ousy increases as the degree of relation - by blood or other­
wise - between the testator and donee becomes less close. Hence 
gifts to members of the family will require the least form and 
occasion least scrutiny; thereafter, gifts to deceased’s wives, 
children, servants, and other dependants will not be too jeal­
ously scrutinised, unless excessive, or if the recipients are 
in ill favour; while lastly, gifts to complete strangers will 
be most rigorously attacked. Gifts to take effect after death 
may thus occasion hard feeling and action by the family; the 
procedure of samansew is used to forestall such feeling by in­
forming the family of the gift, and securing their consent to 
it; whereupon they can no longer object to it.
(a) Bequests to members of the family:
Since the ultimate title to the property remains in the 
family, these will require little or no form. The recipient 
should pay aseda. call one or two of the family to witness the 
gift (or inform them of it subsequently).
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(b) Bequests to Dependants: wives« children, servants:
This is the most important class of bequests, since 
samansew or written wills are used at the present day princip­
ally to avoid the harsh consequences of the Akan matrilineal 
custom of succession, by which wives and children of deceased 
would otherwise receive nothing. I think it undoubted that
80
the earliest form of will was in fact to the son of deceased.
The restricted - ” Europe an*1 - family idea is growing; and
pressure for an alteration, whole or partial, from matrilineal
to patrilineal succession is becoming increasingly evident.
Hence the spate of attempts to avoid the normal consequences
81of the customary law of succession.
As already noticed, the family are willing to tolerate 
temporary gifts or alienations of usufruct made to wives or 
children of members; and if a member dies without receiving 
permanent family sanction for the arrangement, the family are 
nevertheless usually prepared to permit it to continue, if they 
have no objection against the character or behaviour of the 
donees.
Nevertheless, if a person leaves a major part of his self- 
acquired property away from the family, it is practically cer­
tain that the family will oppose such a state of affairs; and
80. Cf. Ratt. A.L.C. 15-16, and Ash. 237, et seq.
81 • Vide the resolutions of the J.P.C. and the Ashanti C.C. 
on the subject, the Akim Abuakwa Declaration, mission 
rules for members, the effects of the Marriage Ordin- 
ance t etc.
M ur^
J. for
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it is doubtful whether such a bequest is valid without more.
(c) Bequests to strangers:
These are always more carefully scrutinised and criticised 
by the family, who will probably try to upset them if possible. 
This is in line with the general provision that gifts which 
have the effect of taking property outside the family absolute­
ly and permanently may not as a rule be made unless the family 
express their consent to the gift.
3. PROPERTY WHICH MAY BE GIVEN.
(a) Self-acquired property:
The principal application of samansew is in connexion with 
the testator's self-acquired property. This remains true, 
even though in some areas a person is allowed to specify the 
direction in which he wishes his inherited property to go. All 
types of self-acquired property may be given by will; but it 
is usually only in the case of land, and the things thereon - 
farms, houses, etc. - that it is essential to observe the form­
alities strictly. The family sentiment is strongest in regard
to land, .
/so that chattels and cash may be bequeathed more freely. (Nor­
mally, these last may be given away freely during the donor's 
lifetime without the consent of the family.)
82. According to Rattray, A.L.C. 338, there was moral suasion 
by the family against his making such a bequest. Some 
informants held it would be valid; but those who insisted 
on the family's consent to the gift held that the family 
had thus complete power to prevent it.
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(b) Inherited property:
In the case of self-acquired property, the testator has 
the whole interest and title; devise thereof is therefore not 
illogical* But in the case of inherited property, the family 
have the title, and the testator only a limited interest. If 
inherited property is given away with the consent and author­
ization of the family, they lose their whole interest, and not 
merely testator's interest. Such a devise would therefore not 
be welcome to the family.
Hence it was frequently stated that a man has no power to 
devise inherited property. This is true; but he may be given 
the power by the act of his family. This explains cases met 
with where a man did bequeath inherited farms. Several cases 
are cited by Matson from Ashanti which illustrate this point.
In general, on examination it will be found that the gift was 
to a member of the family, or at least to a son of deceased.
The family are entitled to permit such a bequest if they 
choose; and if the bequest is to another member of the family, 
then the title remains in the family, and there is little ob­
jection to this. The case is slightly different where a man
83nominates his successor, as he is entitled to do.
If the bequest is to wife or child, then they may permit
83. ”A man may nominate his successor, but the decision as
to who is to succeed to any property lies with the Head 
of the Family”. - Warrington, 38.
(See also: Brobbey v. Kyere: (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 106.)
609
this, although the effect of the family’s consent is to take 
the property out of the family for good. Such a gift may 
often only be in confirmation of a de facto gift made inter 
vivos.
If the bequest is to a stranger, then in general the fam­
ily would not authorize it.
The Akim Abuakwa Declaration limits the operation of 
samansew to ”personal property and real property which might 
have been disposed of by will or by gift”; but then the re­
quirements of the Declaration are laser with regard to family
84consent than those normally given;
4. THE FORM OF THE GIFT.
(a) Presence of donor and donee;
The general rule Is that the donee must attend in person, 
If not at the time when the donor makes the declaration, so 
soon thereafter as he can. He must accept the gift in the 
presence of the donor and witnesses, and give the drink as
V  85aseda.
84. Para. 2: wThe disposition of property by Samansew is valid 
if it is made voluntarily and orally in the presence of 
two responsible and disinterested witnesses, by a person 
of sound mind in expectation of death from illness however 
caused.” It will be noted that the necessity for the 
consent of the family is not mentioned.
85. According to oral Information from Akim Abuakwa, the 
testator announces his intention of making a declaration; 
witnesses (baguafo).are summoned; he makes his declara­
tion, and then places religious sanction on It by the
pouring of libation. The named beneficiary is summoned
(over)
610
But the recent war has brought examples of change in the 
custom; in one case a man, dying, bequeathed property to his 
son in the presence of the customary witnesses* The son was
a soldier absent in Burma. Aseda was given on his behalf at
the time; the gift was notified by letter to the son, who, 
when he returned two years later, was handed by the family of
his father the property bequeathed to him.
(b) Witnesses;
There must be witnesses present at the declaration; they 
must also be present when aseda is paid by the donee, and share 
in its division. The witnesses are of two kinds:
(i) family;
(ii) independent.
(i) Family Witnesses: There is no firm rule as to
which members of the family should be present; but the more 
there are, the better. At the least there should be a person 
of responsibility in the family, e.g., the abusuapanln. the 
obaapanln. or an elder of the family. If possible, there 
should be members of the testator's sub-lineage present, in­
cluding preferably the potential successor. The number and
85l (cont. from previous page) - "
if not already present, and gives sheep and a drink. The 
drink is distributed by the testator among those present. 
The gift is to the effect: ttUpon my death my nephew, or
son, or wife, So-and-So must be given the farm or the 
house at Sorand-So.” This account agrees generally with 
those given in other states.
The aseda consists of "a small offering of gold dust 
and rum*', according to Ratt. Ash. 238.
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quality of witnesses desirable vary according to the urgency 
of the case - if the testator is near to death, there may only 
be time to call two or three witnesses. (It may be wondered 
why so frequently the declaration is left to the last possible 
moment; often the family will have been previously aware of at 
least the rough nature of the testator’s intentions. There are 
at least two reasons: first, an African does not like to dis­
close the extent of his property, and only the death-bed may be 
sufficient to over-come his reluctance; secondly, the gifts he 
makes are frequently conditioned by the behaviour of potential 
beneficiaries towards him, and more especially by the care they 
devote to him in his last illness.)
(ii) Independent Witnesses: These are not, as far as
I know, essential by custom; but they are certainly advisable. 
There is a movement now afoot to make only this kind of witness
essential for the validity of a death-bed gift, and that the
86family witnesses should no longer be required. The matter is 
of some importance, since the two types of witness serve diff­
erent functions - the independent witnesses go to prove the
gift, the family witnesses also serve to bind the family by
87their consenting presence. But the evidence conflicts. The
86. Matson, op. cit. , 225, says that "this seems to be con­
fusing the legally necessary with the practically necessary’!
87. Family witnesses are the only essential ones. - New 
Juaben; Family witnesses are not essential. - Akwapim; 
Rattray, A.L.C. 15, only mentions family witnesses;
A will must be witnessed by the family, otherwise it is
/over
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main difficulty with the custom is that if there are only fam­
ily witnesses present, they may later deny the gift's ever 
having been made; the presence of independent witnesses limits 
the possibility of the family witnesses later denying the be­
quests. Very frequently the Odikro or some of his elders or
88
councillors, or other prominent men in the village, will attend. 
Sometimes the leader or minister of the church to which testat­
or belongs will be there. In one case, 2/- out of the aseda 
paid by the donee was sent to the chief of the town, even 
though he was not present as a witness.
In general, there are two courses which are usually 
followed in regard to witnesses: sometimes the intended
87. (cont. from previous page) -
not legally enforceable. - Another informant from New 
Juaben; the presence of elders and church-leaders from 
the town is sufficient evidence of the gift. ~ Akwapim; 
the J.P.C. of the Colony passed in 1940 a resolution that 
"only disinterested witnesses are needed for valid oral 
disposition", and the A.C.C. in 1946 passed a similar 
resolution that the relatives of the donor need not give 
their consent, provided there are accredited witnesses.
(Cf. the Akim Abuakwa Declaration referred to ante. at 
p. 609, note 84.)
Actual cases in the native courts, and especially the 
evidence therein, support overwhelmingly the need for 
family witnesses, and the fact that they were in fact 
present. Independent witnesses are less commonly 
recorded.
And see Danquah, A.L.C, 198: "...the will of a deceased 
member is_subject to the approval of the senior surviving 
members ^of the family^*"
Matson, op.cit.t 224-5: "it is also clear that the 
lineage normallydid consent"; though he doubts whether 
this consent is necessary today.
88. Cf. Ratt. Ash. 239.
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beneficiary is told by the testator of his desire to make a 
bequest, and he then hurries to buy drink and call witnesses; 
conversely, sometimes the testator declare his intention to 
witnesses, who then hurriedly summon the named beneficiary.
It does not matter which procedure is followed.
(c) Aseda:
As with the recipient of any other benefit in Akan custom,
the donee must give aseda or "thanksgiving”. This may be
n tt 89actual drink, or drink expressed as money. There appears to
/ 90
be no fixed amount, but 24/- may be taken as an average.
The original binding force of a samansew rests, as we have
said, on superstitious reverence for the wish of the testator,
and fear of the consequences of disregard. This may be rein-
91
forced by the drinking of fetish; the swearing of an "oath”; 
and the payment of aseda. which act3 as a stamp or seal of the 
arrangement. The giving of aseda is most important:
(i) it signifies the acceptance of the gift by the 
donee; (ii) it makes the gift irrevocable as between donor and 
donee, except for good reason; (iii) it binds the family, 
indicating, first, their consent to and knowledge of the gift,
89. Sheep were mentioned by some informants, it being said 
that the donee gives thanks with a sheep and drink. The
. sheep is the important element, since it "stamps" the 
bequest. - Akwapim.
90. The amount varies, being influenced by the value of the 
property given. If it is insufficient, it might be refused.
91. And by the pouring of libations: Ratt. Ash. 238; and 
Akim Abuakwa.
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and secondly the relinquishment of their right to the property 
(iv) it is evidentiary.
The aseda is paid by the donee to the donor, who distributes 
it, or part of it, among the witnesses, thus binding their 
memories.
Failure to pay aseda MAY make the gift unenforceable as 
between donor and donee, unenforceable as against the family, 
or incapable of proof.
5. EFFECT OF THE GIFT,
(a) When it takes effect:
Samansew is designed to operate on the death of the test­
ator; and, once it has been made, the beneficiary acquires a 
vested interest subject to a condition precedent (namely, the 
death of the testator). It is true that the beneficiary (B) 
acquires no present rights of control or disposal: his inter­
est vests in possession only on testator's death. But, once 
the gift is made, testator's powers over the property are con­
ditioned by B's interest; and it was stated that the testator 
is not allowed to do anything with or to the property which 
would have the effect of injuring or destroying B's interest, 
except with B's permission. Hence the testator cannot sell
92. But it was stated by Akim Abuakwa informants that accept­
ance by the family of aseda before the testator's death 
makes the bequest a gift, and not* samansew: sed dubito;
one must distinguish between the share of the family in 
the aseda paid to testator, and the aseda the donee pays 
whence claims his bequest.
we
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the property, unless B consents thereto; and, if the property
93
is sold, B has a claim to a portion of the proceeds; and he 
can maintain an action against testator in the courts (quaere 
for revocation of the sale, or for damages?}.
Apart from this, the testator during his lifetime may use 
the property as he pleases, and all profits therefrom accrue 
to him. Samansew is thus distinguishable from an ordinary 
gift outright lntepfrlvos, when the donor receives an immediate 
interest in possession.
(b) Revocation by testator:
As between testator and B, testator is bound by B's accept
ance of the gift, and his payment of aseda to wstamp” the gift.
Where the gift was made on testator's death-bed, it is not re-
94
voked by his recovery. It was stated that in no case can
95
testator revoke his gift except for good reason. If he wishes 
to revoke, or to change the beneficiary, then an arbitration 
must be called, composed of representatives of testator's and 
B's families; testator will put before the arbitration the 
reasons for revocation: if these are found to be acceptable,
then the gift is revoked. Acceptable reasons include:
93. This information is from New Juaben, and may not be 
generally applicable.
94. But see the Akim Abuakwa Declaration:
n3. Save where a person disposing of his property 
by Samansew recovers from the illness in the course of 
. which the disposition was made, any disposition of 
property by SamanseW is irrevocable.”
95. Cf. Matson, op.clt. . 226.
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(1) ingratitude; (2) bad behaviour 6f B in other ways.
(c) Reclamation by the family of testator:
Once the family representatives have accepted their share 
of the aseda, they are bound; and cannot subsequently with­
draw their consent, or declare that there was no valid bequest.
If they accept the aseda. change their mind, and endeavour to
' 96
return it, they remain bound by the terms of the bequest.
The family of a testator will frequently contest, however, his
will or alleged will. The chief grounds which they usually
bring forward for objection are:
(1) Denial of the existence of the wills i.e., that it was 
never made. (The absence of independent witnesses facilitates 
this contention.)
(2) Denial of the sufficiency of witnesses: i.e., that the 
presence of certain members of the family was essential to the 
validity of the bequest, and that they were not present.
(3) Denial of their acceptance of the will: i.e., that aseda 
was never offered to them, and accepted by them; sometimes, 
though not frequently as far as one can gather, the family may 
maintain that a samansew has moral, but not legal, sanction.
(4) Uncertainty: as to the property bequeathed.
(5) Denial of the title of testator to the property: i.e.,
that it was really family property, and therefore not testator's
to dispose of.___________________________________________________
96. A samansew was enforced by action in Brobbey v. Kyere:
(1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 106.
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If aseda is not paid, then the bequest is a wish, which 
may be complied with by the family if they choose. There is 
doubt whether the family-witnesses are bound to accept either 
the bequest, or the aseda. There are contrary views:
(1) They need not accept, and have an unqualified right to
97
refuse.
(2) They must accept, except there is a good and sufficient
98
reason for refusal, such as that no or too little property is
99
left for the family; or on account of the character of the
beneficiary, and especially his behaviour towards the rest of
100 
the family.
If no or Insufficient witnesses are present, the bequest 
is inoperative, or perhaps it is better to say that it lies 
dormant; since - until testator's death - this defect (and 
the non-payment of aseda) can be cured by action on the part 
of the beneficiary.
97. According to oral information from Akim Abuakwa: contra 
the Declaration from the same state.
98. Cf. Brobbey v. Kyere, cited above.
99. Above cit. *
100. Normally, the beneficiary enters his succession after 
the death of testator, at the time of the settling of 
accounts of deceased; the claim is acknowledged by the 
family, the beneficiary gives them drink, and receives 
his bequest. It is at such a time that the family 
might raise the question of his behaviour or character.
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6. SOME MODERN DEVELOPMENTS.
One fairly common feature of present Akan customary wills 
is ntrusts” - property is given for different purposes; if the 
purpose is not carried out, the gift lapses, and the property 
given falls into the residue. Examples of such trusts actu­
ally encountered in the reports of cases in the Native Courts 
Include:
(a) Trusts for children:
Formerly, where there were persons entitled to succeed, 
but it was considered that they were too young to succeed im­
mediately, it used to be the custom for a slave or domestic to 
be entrusted with the property, which he was obliged to look 
after until the persons entitled came of age. At the present 
time, one finds that testator gives certain property to, for 
instance, M, the mother of and Cg. M is to hold the prop­
erty in trust for and C2 , devoting the proceeds to their 
maintenance and education. When the children attain full age, 
the property is to be handed over to them by M, and it will 
then become the joint property of and C2 absolutely.
(b) Trust to pay off debts:
This occurs specially in the case of pledged land. Test­
ator gives one or more farms to B, to use the proceeds of the 
farms to pay off certain debts named by the testator; when 
the debts are paid off, the property is to go absolutely to B 
or some other person. Or B may be given a farm which has
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been pledged; when B has paid off the pledge, the farm is to 
become B's absolute property. In some cases gifts over are 
made in case the beneficiary or 11 trustee11 fails in his trust. 
One also sometimes finds that, even where there la no such 
bequest by the deceased, the family, when dividing up his prop­
erty, will indicate to the recipient or recipients that the 
property must be used for some particular purpose,
(c) Writing:
Although it is said that customary wills are now sometimes
recorded in writing, I have not myself met instances of this.
101
In this connexion, the case of Brobbey v. Yaw Kyere is worth 
considering. This was a case from Kumasi, in which the def­
endant, who alleged that he had been given certain property by 
samansew, entered a caveat to the grant of letters of admin­
istration to plaintiff. It wa3 said by Webber, C.J.:
nThe native Court found that the defendant had 
inherited the properties in question in accord­
ance with a death-bed declaration made by Adu 
Yaw in the presence of accredited witnesses, 
including some members of the family, and that 
the declaration so made was confirmed with 
‘great oath' by the deceased before his death,
Ityts the usual native declaration known by 
native law and custom by which the declarer 
names the person or persons to whom the inher­
itance is to be distributed; the declaration 
was put into writing and attested in the usual 
native way prior to the death of the deceased.n
The native tribunal had held that defendant was entitled as
against the plaintiff (who was claiming on behalf of the family
I 101 (1936) 3 W.A.C.A, 106.|
|
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of deceased). The West African Court of Appeal upheld this 
decision, on the ground that plaintiff was barred by estoppel 
per rem judicatam (i.e., by the decision of the native trib­
unal) .
This case also raises the whole question of the admission
102of native wills to probate. Matson, quoting Redwar,
(Comments on 3ome Ordinances of the Gold Coast, p. 19), who
was referring to what is now s, 16 of cap. 4, thinks that the
Supreme Court has power to admit native wills to probate. A
contrary view is given obiter by Francis Smith, J. in Re 
103
Anaman; but this decision is suspect. In this case it was
decided, inter alia, that Mdying intestate” means dying without
having made an English-form will, and that a person who dies
having made a samansew dies intestate. My view is strength-
104
ened by the decision of Michelin, Acting C.J., in Re Otoo. in
which he rejected a samansew because the testator had been
married under the Marriage Ordinance, and therefore could not
make a will except in English form. Had it not been for the
marriage under the Ordinance, then, said the Chief Justice:
nIf these death-bed wishes of the deceased 
could be construed to amount to a ^samansiw” 
or nuncupative will, the court, on. suffic­
ient proof, would no doubt give effect to
such wishes, on an application being made
102. Cf. op. cit., p. 227.
103. (1894) F.C.i. 221.
104. (1927) D.Ct *26-*29, 84.
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for the probate of such will In solemn 
form*” (105, 106)
(d) Enforcement of oral wills:
In Brobbey v* Kyere, already referred to, a caveator pro­
duced a judgement of a native court that he was entitled by 
samansew; the judgement estoppeil (by res judicata) the claim­
ant for letters of administration, the Court was bound to re­
fuse the grant of letters to the olaimant, and the samansew was 
thus enforced by action* There is a tendency observable in 
the superior courts to enforce samansew without reference to 
the wishes of the deceased's family, I.e*, without considering 
whether the family consented to the bequest in the customary 
fashion or not, or whether there were family witnesses to the 
gift. Secrecy, especially as against the parties principally 
interested - the family, is contrary to well-established prin­
ciples of the customary law. Hence arises the great change 
of atmosphere when we consider the enforceability of English 
wills made by Africans*
105• Ibid., at p* 85.
106. But the Courts Ordinance* cap.4, lays down in s.16 that;
”The jurisdiction hereby conferred upon the 
Supreme Court in Probate, Divorce and Matrimonial 
causes and proceedings may, subject to this 
Ordinance and to Rules of Court, he exercised by 
the Supreme Court in conformity with the law and 
practice for the time being in force in England,”
How can the Supreme Court, following “the law and practice* 
of the English courts, grant probate of a nuncupative will, 
since the Wills Act, 1837, debars English courts from do­
ing so (except in the case of servicemen's wills)?
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C. TESTATE SUCCESSION: WRITTEN WILLS: ENGLISH FORM,
It has already been noted that (a) an African will Is 
dependent upon the consent of testator's family; (b) It is 
rarely, if ever, recorded in writing. Hence, where a written 
will is desired, English form is used. It Is reported that 
English wills are frequently employed today, especially to 
avoid some of the consequences which customarily follow from 
an attempt to leave property by customary law. It should be 
emphasised that the use of writing to make a will is different 
from that when customary pledges are recorded in a memorandum. 
The writing in this latter case purports to record only a cus­
tomary transaction, but a written will purports to embody the 
exercise of powers not known to custom. Hence a memorandum 
of pledge is evidentiary, but a will in writing is of a diff­
erent nature and effect from an oral will.
It is therefore necessary to ask what power Africans have 
to make wills in English form. First, however, one must con­
sider the form in which such wills are cast.
1. FORM.
Practically any writing which purports to be the last will 
and testament of the testator, and which is signed by him and 
attested by two witnesses, will be admitted to probate. There 
is no need for legal language, nor for the use of a special 
form or legal advice, though all these are advisable. In the
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Gold Coast, such wills are drawn up impartially by lawyers, 
ministers of a church, letter-writers, etc. The witnesses 
who sign the will in English law testify to its being the test­
ator's will, and they are not interested parties. In the Gold 
Coast, as is familiar to students of the customary law, wit­
nesses are often themselves interested parties, who by their 
attestation may bar their interest in some way.
2. VALIDITY. One must distinguish two stages:
(i) When a will is admitted to probate, nothing more 
is determined than that the will is on its face good in form, 
that it is the testator's last will and not void on account of 
incapacity or undue influence. Proving a will does not estab­
lish the validity of the dispositions which it contains; and 
unless a Court of Probate has incidentally determined a point of 
construction, it is probably open to a Court of construction to 
differ later from its interpretation.
(ii) After probate it is therefore necessary to 
decide in case of dispute whether the dispositions of testator 
are ones which he has power to make, and so on.
Two questions have therefore in fact to be asked:
(a) Have Africans power to make wills in English form, 
and should such wills be admitted to probate?
(b) Are the gifts which such wills contain good in law?
(a) It is submitted that Africans have power to make
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wills in English form* Such wills are in fact constantly ad-
108
mitted to probate in the courts of the Gold Coast. It may be 
objected that the provision in section 74 of the Courts Ordin­
ance that no-one is to be deprived of the benefit of any exist­
ing customary law operates to deprive testators of the power of 
making English-form wills. This view is untenable. So long 
as the will does not make any disposition adverse to others 
(e.g., the family) which the testator could not make by pure
customary law, then the will does not operate to deprive any
109
person of a benefit under native custom. Where it does make 
such a disposition, then proof of the will does not affect the 
rights of third parties; and the difficulty goes to our second 
question, rather than the first. There is an analogy with the 
option allowed to ah African to sell his land either by native 
law and custom, or by a conveyance in English form.
(b) The validity of the dispositions: Unfortunately, the
African mind frequently does not appreciate the distinction we 
have made above, and so it follows that he and his courts some­
times come to the conclusion that admission to probate makes the 
dispositions in the will unchallengeable; and that grant of 
letters of administration to any person establishes the sole and
107. This is, for instance, admitted in Akim Abuakwa.
108. Cf. for example, Acquah v* Acquah & Tsetsewa: (1941) 7 
W.A.C.A. 222, where an English will of a farm was held 
valid; and We ah v. Mens ah: (1876) Ren. 28.
109. According to information from New Juaben, the use of 
writing does not affect the customary law which governs 
wills, and the customary limitations still apply to such 
testaments.
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personal right of that person to deceased's property.
As regards a customary will, it is obligatory that:
(i) some of deceased's self-acquired property should 
be left for the family;
(ii) the family should consent to the bequest of the 
remainder outside the family. The most important requirement 
of custom is that the family should consent; since, by with­
holding their consent, which they have a right to do, they can 
prevent bequests of which they do not approve.
Can a testator by written will leave property without his 
family's consent? As to this, very various answers were given.
In the coastal areas, the answer seemed to be that he has 
the right and power so to do.
In Akwapim, I was told he had no such power.
In New Juaben, I was told that strictly he had no such 
power to leave property by written will without the consent of 
his family; but that the native courts are debarred from try­
ing the case, and in the Supreme Court the will would be upheld; 
thus the Africans have accepted this state of affairs^0
Thanks to the sanctity which Africans attach to written 
documents, the ordinary man accepts the will as valid; this 
attitude is sufficiently demonstrated by the efforts of a
110. It was stated that a written will mu3t be witnessed by 
the family, otherwise it is not enforceable. But 
other informants stated that a written will does not 
need the consent of the family.
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deceased's family to find ard destroy his will, if he is known 
to have made one. There is no reason why inquiry into written 
wills should be confined to the Supreme Court (apart from form­
alities); but the Native Courts, if the point comes before 
them, do not raise the question of the family's consent, be­
cause to them the paper overrides this requirement. And the
1 Supreme Court does not consider the question of family-consent, 
r because this - being foreign to English legal ideas - does not 
occur to them. In theory, then, the testator cannot deprive 
( his family of the major part of his property by making a will; 
and the dispositions should be invalid unless consented to by
his family. In practice, consent is not required, and the
111testator may do as he pleases with his property.
3. EFFECTS OF A WRITTEN WILL.
(a) Between testator and his family:
The will binds, without the family's consent, and even 
without notice to them. The testator, of course, often att­
empts to conceal the existence of a will, otherwise the family 
would make his life unbearable. But the testator cannot be­
queath or devise property which he could not dispose of by cus­
tomary law, i.e., inherited property.
111. But Balogun v» Balogun: (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 290, a Nigerian 
case, prescribed that an intention to make dispositions 
in accordance with customary law will be implied as far 
as possible when an African makes a will.
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(b) Between testator and beneficiary:
Under a customary will the beneficiary acquires a right 
which he may enforce during the lifetime of the testator, poss­
ession alone not coming to him until the letter's death. Under 
an English will the beneficiary acquires no right until the 
death of the testator.
Under customary law testator cannot dispose of property 
already left to B, without B's consent. Under English law (in 
the absence of contract) he may freely do so: the will is
effective only on property In testator's possession at his 
death.
By custom testator can revoke the disposition only for 
good reason; and it may be that subsequent recovery operates 
as an automatic revocation. By English law testator can re­
voke freely.
It is uncertain what Is the effect of customary features 
in a will In English form. Testator may obtain the consent 
of the family before or after the will is made; the beneficiaq 
may give aseda to the testator after testator has told him that 
he has made a will in B's favour - can the testator then still ; 
revoke freely? Testator may give property by native oral will 
to B, B paying aseda and testator's family consenting. Test- j 
ator later, in order to make the will Indisputable, executes 
a will in English form with the same gift in favour of B. Can 
testator then revoke such a gift? This case is somewhat
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different from that where a samansew is later recorded in
112
writing, as in the case of Brobbey v. Kyere; for in this 
case the writing operates only as a memorandum of the bequest, 
and it is not the intention to introduce English law, but 
rather to reinforce customary law.
4* FUTURE POLICY IN REGARD TO WILLS IN THE GOLD COAST.
As will have been gathered from what has gone before, the 
present law in regard both to the enforceability and proof of 
customary wills, and the powers of African testators when Eng­
lish wills are used, is a matter of some uncertainty. Mr. A.J.
Loveridge, former Senior Judicial Adviser, has considered in 
113an article some of the problems which arise, and a possible 
solution for them; the reader is referred to this article for 
a further discussion. It may, however, be said here that this 
should be a field for early legislation. The particular 
points which especially need regulation are:
(1) Letters of Administration: clarifying legislation is 
required to make clear to courts and parties that grant of 
letters to one person does not bar or estop the rights which 
others may have over the property of a deceased.
(2) English wills: it should be made necessary for wills 
in English form to adhere to at least some of the requirements
112. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 106; facts at p. 619 ante.
113. "Wills and the Customary Law in the Cold Coast" - 
Journal of African Administration, October 1950, p. 24.
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of customary wills - e.g*, family consent, the presence of
witnesses, the major portion of the property not to be left
114
away from the family without the latter*s consent, etc.
(3) Samansew: a simple form of recording or proof of cus­
tomary wills is required. Native Courts should be empowered 
to grant “probate" of such wills. It might then be necessary 
to prcvide that there should be a memorandum in writing of such 
wills, unless circumstances prevent (e.g., when it is really 
a "death-bed" declaration), and in such cases adequate proof 
of the will and its terms would be required.
D. SUCCESSION TO STRANGERS,
Although colour is no bar to succession under the custom- 
115
ary law, the Full Court held in Herminah Weytlngh v. Bessa- 
116
buro that the descendants of a non-native could not lay 
claim to land originally acquired by that non-native, if they 
base their claim on the native law and custom of succession. 
(This was a case from Elmina, where succession Is matrilinealj 
hence the unlikelihood of there being relatives - in the matri- 
lineal sense - of a male non-native who would be entitled to 
succeed.)
Apart from this, it is usually stated that the stool has
114. Cf. Matson, Testate Succession in Ashanti. 227.
115. Hutton v. Kuta: (1878) F.C.L.211.
116. (1906) Ren. 427.
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a right of succession to all property; in the case of citizens 
this is exercisable only if no relatives, however remote, of 
deceased remain, and there are no domestics in the family*
This is a state of affairs which does not occur in practice: 
the stool's reversion therefore remains purely theoretical. 
Families are large enough to ensure that there will always be 
someone left to inherit.
In the case of strangers, however, they may quite likely 
have relatives, but not ones capable of succeeding to the parti­
cular property which the strangers enjoyed. In such cases 
native customary law has evolved certain rules, by which a 
stool can succeed to a stranger's property. Such a succession 
Is of a different nature from the types of succession previous­
ly considered: since the succession is based not on some rel­
ationship between the parties; but on the stool's control of 
the area within which the stranger's property is situate: i.e., 
the stool's right is a real and not a personal one.
The rule regarding the stool's succession to strangers 
has steadily become less harsh over the course of years. In an 
area where the stool owned the ultimate title to land - Akim, 
Ashanti - if a stranger built or cultivated on stool land with 
permission, then when he died the stool succeeded and took all 
the property. If a successor from the stranger's family put 
in an appearance he would be forced to obtain fresh permission 
to occupy the stool land; if this were refused, he might
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forfeit the farm or building, or be allowed to take the crops 
or materials away.
Today the stool still succeeds if no successor puts in an 
appearance; but the stool does not succeed in competition with 
the customary successor. Which stool succeeds? In general, 
the stool which owns the land; although it was stated in New 
Juaben that whilst the Paramount Stool succeeded to strangers ' 
farms made out of the forest, the Odikro of the village succeeds 
v to farms made on fallow-land belonging to members of the vill­
age; and also to houses and house-plots in the village. And 
the Odikro would thenceforth hold them for the benefit of the 
whole village.
Where the stool does not own the land, the private or 
family landowner will succeed if the stranger's interest was 
carved out of the landowner's interest. But where the land 
was owned absolutely by the stranger, then it is submitted that 
the stool controlling the area within which the land is situa­
ted holds the land in case a successor puts in an appearance 
(being liable to render up the land to the successor if he 
appears); but I have little evidence regarding this point.
And if no successor appears, the property is taken over as
stool property in the narrow sense (as happened in one case in
117
the Cape Coast district).
117. See also THE INDIVIDUAL AND PROPERTY, pp. 186-7.
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E, THE MARRIAGE ORDINANCE AND SUCCESSION.
118The Marriage Ordinance has the effect of altering the 
normal mode of succession for
(a) spouses married under the Ordinance;
(b) the lawful issue of such a marriage.
The radical changes in status brought about by such a marriage
for an African normally subject to customary law are well
brought out by some judgements and dicta of judges of the Gold
Coast. In regard to the general effect of such a marriage
119
Crampton Smyly, C.J., said in Sackey v. Okantah that:
"The Native Law says that by a Sammansiew or 
statement a Native can deal with his self­
acquired property as he likes during his 
lifetime; the Marriage Ordinance No. 14 
1884 S. 47 provides that in the case of a
Native who contracts a Marriage under the
Ordinance or the issue of such marriage 
in the case of intestacy two thirds follow 
the provisions of the Law of England relating 
to the distribution of the personal estate 
of intestacy on the 13th day of November,
1884 and one third in accordance with the 
provisions of the Native customary law which 
would have obtained if such person had not
118. The Marriage Ordinance started as Ordinance No. 14 of 
1884. It has been principally amended by the Amendment 
Ordinances of 1903, 1909 (revised for the 1936 Revision 
of the Laws, in whicbAt appears as cap. 105), and 1951. 
The amendments as they affect intestate succession are 
considered in the text at pp. 633 et seq. S. 48 of the 
present Ordinance was s. 41 in the original ordinance of 
1884, and s. 39 in the ordinance - of 1903, and 3** 47 in 
the ordinance of 1909.
119. (1916) D & F 'll-'ie, 88, at p. 92.
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married under this Ordinance. Marrying under 
the Ordinance with the knowledge that the doing 
so affects the succession is in my opinion a 
rather pronounced form of Sammansiew.,! (120)
This is certainly an original way of looking at the effect
on a person’s status of marrying under the Ordinance,
Section 48 of the Marriage Ordinance provides that:
" (JLJ_ Subject to__theovisions_ of_the_succeeding 
^ubsectionowhere any person who is stToject 
to native law or custom contracts a marriage, 
whether within or without the Gold Coast, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Ordin­
ance or of any other enactment relating to 
marriage, or has contracted a marriage prior 
to the passing of this Ordinance which marriage 
is validated hereby, and such person dies in­
testate on or after the 15th day of February, 
1909, leaving a widow or husband or any issue 
of such marriage;
And also where any person who is issue of 
any such marriage dies intestate on or after 
the said 15th day of February, 1909, the 
personal property of such intestate, and 
also any real property of which the said 
intestate might have disposed by will, shall 
be distributed or descend in manner following, 
viz: -
Two-thirds in accordance with the pro­
visions of the lav/ of England relating to 
the distribution of the personal estates of 
intestates in force on the 19th day of 
November, 1884, any native law or custom 
to the contrary notwithstanding; and one- 
third in accordance with the provisions of 
the native customary lav/ which would have 
obtained if such person had not been married 
under this Ordinance: Provided:
(1) That where by the law of England, 
any portion of the estate of such intestate 
would become a portion of the casual hereditary
120. This dictum was obiter to the instant case, since it 
was the defendant who had married under the Ordinance, 
and not the deceased person to whom succession was 
claimed.
"Effect of 
marriage in 
case of 
native s.1
"Suecession 
In case""of 
intestacy.1
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revenues of the Crown, such portion shall 
be distributed in accordance with the pro­
visions of the native customary law, and 
shall not become a portion of the said casual 
hereditary revenues;
(2) That real property, the succession 
to which cannot by native customary law be 
affected by testamentary disposition, shall 
descend in accordance with the provisions of 
such native customary law, anything herein 
to the contrary notwithstanding.
( 2 ) _ Where sueh__a__person dies_in the c_ircurnstance£ 
mentioned Tn^thejpreceSing subj3ec_tron on_pr 
after the Tst 5av of DecemFer, _ 19 5 0,jpr oj[erty 
therein mentToned shalT TevoTve upon_the__ 
admini s_trator of_such deceased_j)er£onJ£ " 
estaTe_u£on trust to_selT The siame_and__divi de 
th<9 proceecla o? the saT e__ there of _i n The manner 
£r£vlded~in The RrecedTng ^ uBsection^ "
(3) Before the registrar or a marriage officer
”Provisions issues his certificate in the case of an
to be ' intended marriage, either party to which
explained.1 is a person subject to native law or custom, 
he shall explain to both parties the effect 
of these provisions as to the succession to 
property as affected by marriage,1
Those portions of the section which are underlined by the 
present author were inserted in the Ordinance by section 2 of 
the Marriage (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 13 of 1951, which came 
into force on the 15th September, 1951. This Ordinance also 
repealed (s. 2 (2)) section 7 of the abortive Marriage Amend­
ment Ordinance, No. 34 of 1950, which had also amended section 
48 of the principal Ordinance.
The Marriage Ordinance as it now stands has undergone 
continual change. Except for the amendments to s. 48, it 
represents, as cap. 105, the text of the 1935 revision, which
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itself represents the changes made in 1909. The Ordinance of 
1903, s. 39, provided that succession should be in accordance 
with the rules given when a person
"contracts a marriage in accordance with 
the provisions of this or any other 
Ordinance relating to marriage."
And it also provided that the property of the intestate "shall
be distributed", instead of the present wording "shall be dis-
121
tributed or descend"; whilst the new subsection (2), applying 
to persons dying after 1st December, 1950, makes the intest­
ate's property "devolve" on the administrator, only the pro­
ceeds of the sale thereof being distributed.
The section is still unsatisfactory: one may take the
following points of draftsmanship and interpretation:-
(1) What is the meaning (subsection (1)) of "any other 
enactment relating to marriage"? Does this mean Marriage 
Ordinances of other colonies, laws of England, laws of foreign 
countries? Without more, one would take "enactment" to refer 
only to enactments of the Gold Coast - a submission which the 
pre-1909 wording supports. Should not also the wording "if 
such person had not been married under this Ordinance" in the
121. It was explained In re Gorleku. G. v. G.: (1934) 2 W.A.C.A, 
82, that under s. 47 of the Ordinance "grant of letters 
of administration applies to personalty only;
and also that no real property vests in the person 
to whom letters are granted - Odohkor v. Akoshla? (1929)
P. Ct '26-'29, 322, was distinguished as an obiter 
dictum.
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third paragraph b© altered consequentially?
(2) The wording of the first sidenote - "Effect of marr­
iage in case of natives" - is absurdly loose,
(3) It will be noted that the provisions of the section 
only apply, in the case of persons married under the Ordinance, 
if^they leavi9 a widow orjiusband^or i^sue of_the_marriage 
£uryivin£j but when the do cujus is the issue of such a marr­
iage, then apparently the qualification does not apply. If 
one takes the contractual view of the method by which the 
change in succession is brought about, then succession to a 
person who contracts a marriage under the Ordinance is under 
the qualification, whilst succession to the issue of such a 
marriage (perhaps not married under the Ordinance and with 
only customary wives or children) is not - quod est absurdum.
(4) Paragraph (2) of subsection (1) mentions only real 
property, the succession to which cannot be affected by testa­
mentary disposition in customary law (scs. family property in 
land or the things thereon); it was perhaps not brought to 
the notice of the original legislators that personal property 
(movables) may also become family property, of which the holder 
for the time being cannot dispose outright, whether by will, 
gift, sale, or otherwise. (An example is that where a person 
inherits a house, together with furniture therein, or perhaps 
with cement blocks to be used for its repair.) The family 
interest in such movables is presumably barred by the Ordin­
ance.
(5) Paragraph (2) of subsection (1) speaks of "any real 
property of_whi£h_the_said interstate might havejdisyo sed by 
will" as that which is open to distribution in the manner pro­
vided; but paragraph (2) of the proviso to the subsection res­
erves to the customary successors real property "the succession 
i.°—w3 l ^ b y ^ i m t i v Q  £ustomary law be^affecjted hy_tes.ta- 
mentary disposition; one must 3urely equate "will" and 
"testamentary disposition" in these complementary provisions.
It seems inconsistent to recognise a disability Imposed by cus­
tomary law on the testamentary powers of the intestate, and not 
recognise capacity similarly bestowed by the customary law; for
it has been held that a person married under the Marriage Ord-
122
lnance who endeavours to make a customary will dies intestate.
It will be appreciated that the Ordinance sometimes works 
Injustice, especially in those cases where there are persons 
who would otherwise be entitled by custom to succeed to the 
whole or part of the deceased's estate. In the Gold Coast, 
and especially in Akan districts, this will principally occur 
where deceased is a woman, previously married by native custom, 
and subsequently divorced and married under the Marriage Ord­
inance to a second husband. In that case, she leaves children 
customarily entitled to her estate, but apparently not entitled 
under the Ordinance (except as to 1/3). The position of a man 
previously married by native custom (and later divorced) who
122. He Otoo: (1927) D.Ct '26-'29, 84.
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marries a second wife under the Ordinance is somewhat differ­
ent, since generally his customary children will not be entit­
led to succeed in customary law (although they often have valu­
able rights such as that of residence in their late father's
house)* A different position arose in the Nigerian case of 
124
In re Somefun. where A, the issue of a marriage under the 
Marriage Ordinance of Nigeria, died intestate and was survived 
by (i) a customary widow and children, married by native 
law and custom;
(ii) other issue of hi3 parents' marriage under the 
Marriage Ordinance.
This is a position which may well arise in the Gold Coast too, 
since there is no provision that the issue of a marriage under 
the Marriage Ordinance, although succession to him is governed 
by the terms of the Ordinance, must himself marry in Christian 
or civil form; his marriage by custom is perfectly valid.
It was held by W.A.C.A. that, by the terms of the Marriage 
Ordinance, the customary widow was excluded from the succession, 
since: first, succession to A must go in accordance with Eng­
lish law; and secondly, his widow was a person whose right 
depended on native law and custom, and not on English law;
123. By s. 42 of the Ordinance, a marriage under the Ordin­
ance by a person already married by customary law to 
another is invalid: but the position described in
the text might easily occur if the man had previously 
divorced his customary wife.
124. (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 156.
hence she could not be entitled to succeed. The Court ex­
pressed regret that it could not find otherwise. As far as 
the Gold Coast is concerned, legislation appears to be called 
for, since, when judges express regret at having to make a cer­
tain decision, it is a fair sign that the law, in their opin­
ion, ought to be amended.
How far it is possible to carry this theory of the elect­
ion which an African makes by choosing to marry under the Ord­
inance and not by custom is illustrated by the case of Akwaplm 
125
v. Budu. In this case A was married under the Ordinance. A
person who committed adultery with A's wife was prosecuted
under s. 46 (15) of the old Native Administration Ordinance for
adultery. It was given in evidence that A and his wife had
*
originally married by native custom, and had later married 
under the Ordinance. It was held that in such a case the 
rights of the parties arising out of the marriage were to be 
governed solely by English law; and there could therefore be 
no prosecution for adultery. If the prosecution had instead 
been a civil action, in which the husband sought to enforce his 
rights, there might be strength in this argument. But in a 
criminal case, surely the right defended is the State's notion 
of public policy, and not a private right*
125. (1935) D.Ot '31-'37, 89.
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Not only, apparently, is the husband of a marriage under
the Ordinance deprived of his customary right of suing an
adulterer for an "adultery fee”, hut he is also deprived of
126some of his testamentary powers: in Re Otoo it was held
that a person who marries under the Marriage Ordinance cannot 
make a customary oral will, or samansew.
126. (1927) D.Ct '26-*29, 84; (and see ante, p. 620).
if
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CHAPTER XI.
— mm
WRITING.
"By immemorial custom written documents 
are always used for transfers of land 
in Jamestown.1
- from a newspaper report of an 
Accra land case - judgement of 
the Native Court.
1. PREVALENCE OF THE USE OF WRITING.
No-one can doubt the prevalence of the use of written 
documents and memoranda in modern African customary law. Such 
use has been general for some time in two cases:
(i) in dealings between Africans and non-natives;
(ii) in the more sophisticated areas, the coast 
region and the larger towns - even between Africans;
and (iii) every African party to a dealing relating to 
land will endeavour to secure at least some record of the 
transaction in writing.
•S
The use of writing (foreign originally to the concepts of 
the customary law, and foreign even to the local languages 
until the Europeans came on the scene) poses certain questions:
(i) Does the writing serve as a memorandum only of 
the agreement or transaction; or does it bind - like an Eng­
lish deed, excluding (subject to equity) all other evidence of 
the transaction between the parties?
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(ii) Does the use of writing or of any particular 
form of writing indicate a desire on the part of the parties 
to he bound exclusively, or substantially, by the rules of 
English law?
(iii) Does the use of conveyances mean that thence­
forth land is held not under native tenure, but under English 
real property law?
(iv) Does the use of writing in the transfer of land 
mean that thenceforth subsidiary interests created over the 
land are subject to English law?
(v) Does the use of writing take consideration of any 
matter concerning the transaction out of the jurisdiction of 
the Native Courts, and into the original and exclusive juris­
diction of the Supreme Court?
These questions will be considered and an answer attempted 
below; here it is sufficient to notice that in most fields of 
modern customary law two alternatives present themselves to an 
African dealing with an interest in land: he may use an Afric­
an method of conveyance or an English method. There is also 
a via media of use of customary African form accompanied by a 
memorandum in writing. For example:
(i) If he sells land, he may do so customarily by the
cutting of guaha or the payment of tramma; or he may use an
English conveyance,
(ii) If he wishes to charge his land for a debt or
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loan, he may do so either by customary pledge, or by English 
mortgage.
(iii) If he wishes to grant a tenancy, he may do so 
either by executing an English lease, or by admitting a tenant 
on customary terms (abusa or otherwise)*
(iv) If he wishes to give any property, he can do so 
by English deed of gift, or by using the customary form for 
making a gift, with payment of aseda*
(v) And finally, if he wishes to leave his property 
by will, he can either make an oral declaration in front of 
witnesses (samansew) according to native customary law, or make 
a written will in English form.
2* THE SANCTITY ATTACHING TO WRITTEN DOCUMENTS.
In native custom, practically every agreement, appointment, 
settlement or other transaction has to be customarily "stamped1 
or "sealed". The "stamp" usually takes the form of:
(i) some valuable thing given by the grantee or per­
son benefited to the grantor, which is often sheep, drink, or 
their value in money. Such a stamp is often termed "aseda" 
or "thank-offering". Stamping goes to the enforceability or 
Irrevocability of the act stamped.
(ii) Most transactions in native customary law must 
also be carried out in the presence of the witnesses: and such 
witnesses share in the aseda given* The presence of witnesses
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is a most important element in the subsequent proof of the 
transaction. Witnesses are of two kinds, impartial and part­
ial. Impartial witnesses merely testify to the transaction 
having taken place.
(iii) Partial witnesses are those who are themselves 
interested in the res of the transaction; they are thus sub­
sidiary parties in the transaction, whose interest is bound by 
their presence and acceptance of part of the aseda. which sig­
nify their consent to the transaction, where this is required.
A written document plays a multiple function in native 
customary law. It goes to enforceability, since frequently 
it was stated that native "stamping” is not required if writ­
ing is used.
It goes also to proof, since a document signed by witness­
es is accepted as strong - if not conclusive - evidence by the 
native courts.
It also binds those described above as partial witnesses: 
expressly, where they have subscribed the document as witness­
es; impliedly, where use of documents is held to abrogate the 
necessity for their evidence and at the same time their right 
of consenting or not consenting.
Writing can thus be seen to be a most important element 
in modern customary law; and it is no wonder that great im­
portance is attached by Africans to possessing some writing 
formal or informal, especially in reference to title to prop-
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erty and transactions concerned therewith* In fact, one of 
the first questions frequently put by a native court to a per­
son seeking to establish some transaction in connexion with, 
or his title to, property is: !!Have you some paper to sub­
stantiate your claim?” And claims, apparently and prlma facie 
maintainable, have been rejected solely for want of documentary 
evidence. In one such case, a claim to title by purchase at 
public auction was rejected, even though the fi.fa. of the 
property was proved, the receipt proved as given by the auct­
ioneer, the sale itself proved, because the claimant failed to
1
produce the certificate of purchase.
Whether this attitude of the courts is the cause or the 
effect of the sanctity which the African proprietor attaches 
to writings referring to his interest it is impossible to det­
ermine; and it is perhaps immaterial, since each attitude has 
contributed to the other*
Written proof of title or an act is sought not merely in 
the normal instruments by which interests are transferred or 
created, but also in any memorandum of a transaction, copies 
of letters, copies of court judgements (even irrelevant ones), 
certificates of purchase, letters of administration, wills ad­
mitted to probate, etc. In one instance, the claim of an
1. See: Bruku v. Amoa Panin II: (Unrep: Native Court A, New 
Juaben7 28.9.1950) ; quite contrary to the ruling In 
Bodukuma v* Abaca: (1928) D.Ct ,26-,29, 124, that the 
absence of a certificate of purchase does not affect the 
title of the purchaser.
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Odikro to certain timber trees was supported by a copy of a 
Supreme Court judgement given in the first years of this cent­
ury, and having, alas, no bearing on the question of ownership. 
The Odikro was illiterate. In another case the claim to a 
tract of cocoa-land was substantiated by a faded receipt, given 
over fifty years ago, which was written on a page torn from an 
exercise-book with the exercises still on the other side.
3. THE TWO TYPES OF DOCUMENT: MEMORANDUM AND INSTRUMENT.
Any document made in connexion with a transaction at law 
can belong to either of two types: it may be a memorandum,
which Is made subsequent to the agreement or transaction, and 
whose aim it is to record in permanent and easily visible form 
matters which might otherwise be in dispute: the description
of the land conveyed, whether the transaction is a sale or a 
pledge, the term of a tenancy, the terms on which a pledge or 
mortgage has been made, etc., etc. The purpose of a memoran­
dum is not to supersede the previous oral agreement of the 
parties, but to reinforce and record that agreement.
Or the document may be what is termed an ^instrument**: 
by this is meant that the document is the operative part of 
the agreement; it determines what the parties have agreed to; 
if In competition with the previous alleged terms orally agreed 
by the parties, it prevails (just as in English law a deed pre­
vails over the oral agreement on which the instrument is based,
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so that a party cannot allege that the deed goes contrary to 
his previous oral agreement)*
It Is important to keep the fact that there are two 
classes of document constantly in mind, especially in consider­
ing the effect of any particular document made by Africans, 
since it is submitted that a document, although on the face of 
it an instrument, may be nothing more than a memorandum if made 
by an African. Conversely, something which appears nothing
more than a receipt or memorandum may be held to operate as an 
2
instrument. The Africans use memoranda especially in the case 
of pledges; and practically no pledge is made today unless it 
is recorded in writing. This frequently takes the form of a 
receipt, with certain conditions appended: owing to its ambi­
guous form, cases arise where it is maintained that this rec-
3
eipt records a sale and not a pledge.
The African is also familiar with instruments, especially 
conveyances for sale which purport to transfer the freehold 
estate or fee simple in the land. Such conveyances have been 
in use for a long time, especially in the coastal regions.
2. As in the native court judgement in Donkor v. Ologo: 
(1950) (Hi Ct A, New Juaben, June 1950), where the 
court refused to go behind the terms of a "receipt” 
given in respect of a pledge, although the receipt 
was of the normal kind given for such pledges.
3. See Hamilton v. Mens ah: (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 224, and 
especially the dictum at p. 225 quoted below (at p. 683),
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4. EFFECT OF WRITING ON THE JURISDICTION OP THE
... NATIVE COURTS.
This might not appear to be an Important matter as regards
the substantive law, were it not that:
(i) Some members of the Supreme Court have expressed 
their opinion that where there are documents involved the case 
i3 not suitable for determination by a native court.
(ii) If the case is not determined by a native court, 
custom is liable to be differently interpreted.
(iii) The document will probably be differently
interpreted.
To take the judges' opinions on this matter:
4
In Richardson v. Eshun the Court set aside the Native Court's
judgement because
‘difficult questions arose upon several 
documents in English form, questions 
which were quite unsuitable for decision 
by a Native Tribunal”;
and a rehearing in the Supreme Court wqs recommended.
5
But in Mens ah v. Cobbina the reverse conclusion was 
reached. This case concerned land in Kumasi. It was decided 
that, even though land in Kumasi was at that time held by the 
Crown, and the Government must consent to transfers of lesser 
interests, yet:
4. (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 141.
5. (1939) 5 W.A.C.A. 108, especially at p. 110.
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"This does not mean that the competent Native 
Court should not, therefore, take into considera­
tion any deeds documents or consents which may he 
relevant to the right decision of the case before 
them whether they be in accordance with English 
law or not, provided they are valid in accordance 
with the law regulating Ashanti."
Since this decision, of course, there has been an amendment
0
to the Native Courts (Ashanti) Ordinance, the effect of which 
is to take a case out of the jurisdiction of a native court 
where the parties have agreed that their relations are to be 
regulated substantially by English Law: it will, however, be
appreciated that unless use of writing or English form autom­
atically implies that English Law governs in toto (and in any 
case the parties may agree to the Native Court taking the case), 
the Native Court may still have jurisdiction on a mixed 
question.
7
In an earlier case, Chief John Pobee v, J.B. Doe, it was 
said that:
"it has been decided by this Court and the 
Pull Court on more than one occasion that 
the #ere existence of documents is not 
sufficient for the Courts ^jL.e., the Supreme 
Court7 to retain a case."
In the absence of proof that the parties intended to regulate
their agreement solely by English law, native tribunals were
competent to try such a case*
One cannot, however, do better than cite the excellent
6* Cap. 80; s. 7, by Ordinance No. 15 of 1943*
7. (1914) D. & P. 'll-'ia, 74.
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judgement of Howes, J., in Kweku v. Wood, where he said:
”The question whether the fact that natives 
have elected to make use of an English deed 
of conveyance, affects the jurisdiction 
of a Native Tribunal was considered by the 
Pull Court in the case of Azzu v. Akardiri.
Ren# 677, and Azzu v. Coopert page 679.
In the former case, the Pull Court refused 
to say - 'that from the moment any transfer 
of an interest in land held by native ten­
ure is effected or purported to be effected 
by writing, the Native Tribunals have no 
jurisdiction' and in the latter case - 
'the mere existence of documents in a case 
does not of itself do away with the juris­
diction of the native tribunal'.
A case rather analogous to the above 
cases was also decided by the Pull Court in 
1927, Adjuah v. Wilson, F*Ct '26-'29, p. 260, 
in which it was held that a mortgage exe­
cuted in accordance with English law did 
not cause the land in question to cease to 
be held under native tenure.
What I am asked to find in the present
case is that the bare existence of the con­
veyance to Green by the plaintiff's ancestor 
was evidence that these persons agreed that 
their obligations under this sale of land 
should be regulated substantially according 
to some law other than native customary law 
within the proviso to s. 43 (1) of the Native 
Administration Ordinance, or that some other 
law is properly applicable thereto.”
Howes, J., wished that he could try the case in the Supreme
Court, but stopped the hearing of the case, and referred the
parties to the native tribunal.
9
A further case was that of Amuakwa v. Any an, where the 
existence of a lease of land in English form was proved; it
8. D.Ct '31-'37, 3, at p. 5.
9. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 22.
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was held that since defendant was not a party to the agreement, 
English Law did not apply, hence the Supreme Court had no jur­
isdiction; the trial judge's judgement was therefore set aside
and the parties referred to the competent native court*
10
u.A.C. v* Apaw - again dealing with land in Kumasi - 
raises a rather different point, and is not relevant here.
Reference may also he made to the cases of Kwaku v.Sacker^
12 13
Aylm v* Mena ah, and Dowuonah v. Assabll.
Some of these cases turn on the point that although there
was a deed or other document, yet the rights of the parties were
still governed by native law; and hence native tribunals had
jurisdiction to try these causes. This implies a converse
rule that if the rights of the parties are governed exclusively
14
by English Law then the native courts are not competent.
Whether this assumption is correct in reference to land 
causes or matters must be considered elsewhere; but it is a 
different ground for denying jurisdiction to a native court
10. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 114.
11. (1912) D. & P. '11-*'16, 37.
12. (1912) D. & P. '11-'16, 6. The Pull Court agreed with the
Divisional Court's finding that "there was a verbal contract 
and...that the reduction of the terms of such a contract to 
writing would not ipso facto take it out of native law, 
unless the parties clearly Intended that it should do so, 
and unless the written contract was properly executed 
according to English law."
13. (1914) D. & P. 11-'16, 72.
14. This was the case in Ocquaye v. Sampson: (1927) D. Ct
'26-'29, 81, where there was a conveyance duly executed.
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from the objection that native courts are unsuitable for the 
interpretation of documents.
15
Which ground was the ratio in Gyamfi v. Nyame it is 
difficult to say. The Court said:
"In this case the rights of both sides were 
governed by two mortgages under English law 
which only the Supreme Court could determine."
It is submitted that it is impossible to maintain that the 
mere existence of documents is sufficient to remove the Native 
Court's jurisdiction; and it is necessary to show in addition 
that the parties agreed to regulate their relations by English 
law, either exclusively or substantially.
When are the parties to be taken to have agreed to be 
bound by English Law, so as to oust the jurisdiction of the 
Native Courts? As with the determination of the effect of any 
contract, this requires consideration of the express agreement 
of the parties, and the terms to which they have tacitly or 
impliedly agreed; but there is also a presumption that natives 
in dealings with natives intend to be bound by native customary 
law, whether ancient or modern; and strong positive evidence 
is required to rebut this presumption. This matter is fully 
considered below, at pp. 661 et seq.
Here one must examine the legislation to see when the 
native courts acquire jurisdiction. Native Courts have
15. (1949) (Unrep: Civil Appeal 82/49.)
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exclusive original jurisdiction in land causes or matters; arid 
in other causes or matters involving natives they have juris­
diction, the Supreme Court being bound (s. 17 of cap. 4) to 
refer the parties to a native court if the case is properly 
cognizable by that court, and there is a competent native court.
The jurisdiction of the native courts when English Law
17
obtrudes is governed by the provisos to ss. 15 and 7 of the
16. Probably. Cf. Report of Coimnission on Native Courts. 1951, 
p. 17, para. 937 ”In most /cases/ it has been held that 
cases governed by the customary law of land tenure, or of 
inheritance of property, are properly cognisable by Native 
Courts; one at least has gone further in bringing all 
land cases within this rubric; but no comprehensive ex­
position of the phrase /^jbroperly cognisable11 in s. 17 of 
the Courts Ordinance and elsewhere^ has been made.11
17. *15. Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance a
Native Court shall administer -
(a) the native customary law prevailing 
within the jurisdiction of the Native Court 
(as far as it is not repugnant to natural 
justice, equity, or good conscience, nor incom­
patible either directly or by necessary implica­
tion with any Ordinance for the time being in 
force: "
(Proviso: does not apply here) 
f1 (b) the provisions of any law binding bet­
ween parties subject to the jurisdiction of 
Native Courts.
Provided that In any civil cause or 
matter a Native Court shall not, unless the 
parties agree thereto, have jurisdiction to 
determine any cause wherein it shall appear 
either from express contract or from the nature 
of the transaction out of which such cause or 
matter may have arisen, that the parties agreed 
either expressly or by necessary implication 
that the obligations arising out of such tran­
saction should be regulated exclusively by 
English law."
/over
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Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance» No. 22 of 1944, and the 
Native Courts (Ashanti) Ordinance (cap. 80) respectively. (It 
is slightly startling to find a provision about jurisdiction 
embedded in a section regulating the law which native courts 
are to administer.) The Native Courts are inter alia to ad­
minister any law binding between the parties, but are not to 
have jurisdiction when it appears that the rights of the par­
ties are regulated “exclusively" (Colony) or “substantially1 
(Ashanti) by English Law.
Is there any effect in this difference in wording? It is 
submitted that there is: if the rights of the parties are reg­
ulated “exclusively” by English Law, it follows that native 
customary law must be entirely excluded. "Substantially”, on 
the other hand, means that one must look to the nature of the
agreement. If its substance or essence is English law, it
does not matter if it has customary trimmings or additional 
terms (cf. the English law of sale of goods - the distinction 
between conditions and warranties).
Here one must notice s. 74 of the Courts Ordinance, which 
contains a similar proviso about English Law: s. 74 sides
with the Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance in using the word
17. (cont. from previous page) -
And section 14 (1):
“ All land causes shall be tried and deter­
mined by a Native Court having jurisdiction 
over the area in which the land which is the
subject-matter of the dispute is situated...”
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"exclusively", but a more important point is that this refers 
to a person's claiming the benefit of .“a local law or custom11 
and not to the jurisdiction of the Native Courts. S. 74 re­
lates to the law to be administered: the Native Courts Ordin­
ances to the jurisdiction of certain courts.
There are certain problems of interpretation to overcome. 
The first one is to do with the words "exclusively** and "sub­
stantially". At times it appears as though learned judges 
have overlooked the presence of this or similar terms, and have 
failed to see if the essence or the whole of the contract was 
pure English Law, having instead contented themselves with say­
ing that "English law applies".
Secondly, there might be difficulty in regard to appeals 
from Ashanti, where the rights of the parties are regulated 
substantially, but not exclusively, by English law.
It should be noted that in the cases considered (where 
English law applies) the native courts have no jurisdiction 
"unless the parties agree thereto". In practice, the native 
courts exercise jurisdiction, unless the parties object: I have 
not discovered instances where parties have raised the point 
at this stage. No formal agreement, it is respectfully sub­
mitted, is required between the parties to operate the clause; 
the plaintiff, by making his claim in a native court, must be 
taken to make an offer to the defendant to have the cause tried 
by the native court. If the defendant defends, appears and
656
joins issue with the plaintiff, his act is acceptance of the
plaintiff's offer, and agreement sufficient for the words of
the proviso is present. One must except the case where the
defendant enters a plea to the jurisdiction under the section:
in this case it is obvious that there is no agreement. A view
has been put forward that there must be a formal acceptance by
both parties of the native court's having jurisdiction, and
that, unless there is such acceptance, the subsequent proceed-
18ings are necessarily a nullity. It is respectfully submitted 
that this construction places on the words of the proviso a 
greater strictness than they should bear.
If defendant denies the jurisdiction of the court on other 
grounds, and, his plea not being upheld, the case goes to 
judgement in the Native Court, it is a question whether there 
would be deemed to have been a sufficient agreement - but 
probably not.
Where the defendant does not defend, and a native court
might be entitled to give judgement in default, then it is to
be presumed that it is the court's duty to see first of all -
before giving judgement for plaintiff - whether the claim is
based exclusively or substantially on English law or not.
18. But see: the judgement of Ragnar HyneV J.. in Mensah v . 
Carthy: (Unrep: 1949, Land Appeal No. 15/48, Sekondi); - 
"There is nothing on the record before this Court to show 
that the parties agreed that the Native Court should have 
and exercise jurisdiction in this cause before them - 
such agreement must, in my opinion, be explicitly stated.11
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To summarise, the use of documents, even if in English 
form, does not necessarily imply either that the parties in­
tend to regulate their relations exclusively hy English Law,
19or that the jurisdiction of the Native Courts is ousted. It 
is necessary in mo3t cases to go into the contract and the 
circumstances of the case in order to determine the intention 
of the parties. The Native Court may thus find itself at 
least part-hearing a case over which it has no jurisdiction.
One question mu3t also he asked: what is the effect of the
words "it shall appear0 either from express contract, etc., 
that the parties intended to regulate their obligations by Eng­
lish Law? Do the underlined words equal "it Is certain", or 
"the Court finds good reason for holding", or merely that 
"prima facie the transaction is governed by English law, be­
cause that is the first Impression which would be gained"?
If the words mean "give the impression or raise a pre­
sumption" then such a case would have to be tried by the Sup­
reme Court, whose first duty it would be - before considering 
the merits - to dedide whether appearance was sustained by real* 
Ity, i.e., was consonant with the interpretation of the acts 
and intentions of the parties. If the Court found that the 
appearance was deceptive, it would have to remit the case for 
hearing to the appropriate native court (sed dubium).
19. See Azzu v. Cooper:(1915) F.Ct.Ren. 680
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Another difficulty arises from the proviso: where there
is a bilateral or multilateral transaction, agreement between
the parties, either expressly or by Implication of law, can be
found. But in the case of a unilateral act, no agreement can
possibly be constructed. Certain judgements of W.A.C.A. are
20helpful in this regard: in Mens ah v. Takyi ainpong it was held
that If there Is a dispute about whether property is family or
Individual, the existence of a will affecting the property does
not take the matter out of the cognisance of a native court.
21And in Solomon v. Allotey It was held that the mere fact that
a testator purported to devise by English-form will some of his
property does not prove whether he Intended to regulate his
relations, etc., by English law so as to oust the jurisdiction
22of the Native Court. Again, in Villars v. Baffoe it was
held by the Pull Court that na man cannot by simply taking out
letters of administration oust the native law so far as 'the
family' is concerned. The administrator elects to be bound by
English law, but his election to be so bound does not bind 'the
.family' of /sic:read OR^ the 'family property'.n
The proviso refers to "parties": this cannot refer to
the parties to a transaction; it concerns the parties to the
23
case before the court. Hence, If one of the parties In a
&0. (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 118. :
21. (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 91.
22. (1909) Ren. 549.
23. But Bartholomew, in Private Interpersonal Law. I.C.L.Q., 
(July 1952) I, 325, at pp. 331-2, disagrees with what he
/over
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case is not a party to the transaction, his agreement, express
or implicit, to be bound by English law cannot arise - this
24was the ratio in Amuakwa v. Any an» where the defendant was not 
a party to the lease which was the source of dispute; and the 
native court had jurisdiction.
Again, in the case of a will (and it is now sufficiently
admitted that Africans have power to make wtitten wills) one
must ask: who are the parties who could agree within the terms
of the proviso? There is only one party, the testator; and 
no agreement exists or could possibly be implied between him 
and the beneficiaries. It has been suggested that anyone who 
bases his claim on the will thus elects to be bound by English 
Law: but this is not helpful where one of the parties disput­
ing the succession is a devisee under the will, and the other 
the customary family.
It follows that the proviso would not operate to remove 
English-form wills as such from the jurisdiction of the Native 
Courts; all English-form wills are justiciable by the Native 
Courts provided the testator and the beneficiary or other per­
son suing are "natives11. By what system of law the Native
23. (cont. from previous page) -
calls "one fundamental objection" to such a provision, 
that "it lays down no legal rule which is to be applied 
to a given factual situation”. He thinks that once the 
courts have decided a particular case, "then it is no 
longer true to say that there is no law applicable to 
that particular factual situation”, which will apply, un­
less there is reason to the contrary, in future cases.
24. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 22.
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Court would try such an Issue is another matter. The suggest­
ion that it is inconvenient for matters of interpretation of
25English documents to be considered by native courts is en­
tirely different in kind from the suggestion that the native 
courts have - on the present legislation - no jurisdiction.
This confusion is one which seems to occur. In this connex-
26
ion it is relevant to quote from Azzu v. Akardirl, where the 
appellants claimed that "from the moment any transfer of an 
interest in land held by native tenure is effected or purported 
to be effected by writing the native tribunals have no juris­
diction; and from this contention it logically follows that 
from such date an interest in land previously held by native 
tenure ceases to be held by native tenure”. This contention
was rejected by the Pull Court as a !tconfuslon between inex-
2*7pedlency and illegality11. But in Vanderpuye v. Plange it 
was held: l!A covenant of title has no existence in native
customary law: the rights and liabilities under a covenant of
title can be ascertained only by reference to English law.” 
Hence the Native Tribunal had no jurisdiction as ”the parties 
by Implication agreed that their obligations In connection with 
the transactions should be regulated substantially according to
25. Presumably white man's magic must not be handled by 
native magicians. But surely a native court is more 
likely than any other to know the minds of the parties?
26. (1912; F.Ct. Ren. 675: (the name Is also spelt
"Akadiri” and ”Acardi”).
27. (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 170.
1661
the provisions of English law.1
A deed of gift made for no valuable consideration is also
a unilateral act: and similar considerations may apply as in
28, 29 
wills.
5. THE EFFECT OP WRITING OH THB RIGHTS OP TOE PARTIES.
The forms which may be adopted for the doing of an act or 
the transfer or creation of an interest in property may be 
classified under three heads:
(African form:
(a) (
(African form with a memorandum;
(b) English form;
(c) Mixed form*
(a) African form:
By this is meant a customary mode of conveyance, transfer, 
etc., not involving writing. Such a form may be either
28. See also: Cheshire & Flfoot, Law of Contract, pp. 19-20:
(speaking of contracts under seal) - 
ttThe idea of mutual assent, of bargain, is completely 
lacking. So far, indeed is his liability removed from 
the ordinary conception of agreement that it has even 
been held that a deed may create a legal duty in favour 
of a beneficiary who is unaware of its existence. The 
affinity of the deed is with gift rather than with bi­
lateral obligation...1*
29. For a consideration of the more general questions re­
lating to the jurisdiction of native courts, see my 
The Extent of the Operation of Native Customary Law: 
J7a7a . voITii, (July 1950), 4; and also Marriage laws 
In Africa, by Arthur Phillips, especially at pp7 176 
et seq. “Tin Survey of African Marriage and Family Life. 
1953).
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* ancient or modern; in either case it is good according to 
native law and custom. Examples are:
( D  3alQ of land by guaha or tramma;
(2) gift with aseda;
(3) tenancy, free or on the abusa system;
(4) customary pledge;
(5) samansew or oral will;
(6) caretakership.
The first question which one mu3t ask is whether the 
grantor or grantee has power to create subsequent or dependent 
Interests over the subject-matter in English form. There are 
really two questions: can a grantee subsequently use non-
African form for the conveyance of what is in effect an African 
interest? Can lesser Interests be carved out of the customary 
interest which he possesses, but by the use of non-African 
form? The answer to both questions seems to be a decided 
affirmative. It seems obvious that if land is sold outright 
by customary form, the grantee can mortgage the land by English 
mortgage; and similarly If there is an outright gift. He 
could also re-transfer his Interest by English conveyance If 
he so wished. A tenant may mortgage his cocoa-farm (with the 
permission of the landlord). A person bequeathed property by 
native will may deal with it as his own, Including disposing 
of it by English form.
It is obvious that he cannot create interests which are
incompatible with the rights of others. This will especially
apply where, for instance, a gift is not outright. If the
family of the donor have not given their consent to the gift,
the property will be claimed back by them on the death of the
an
donor; the donee can therefore grant no more than/!festate 
pur autre vie”, and perhaps not even that. He certainly could 
not successfully transfer the property outright by deed of gift 
and evade the customary requirements (or he should not be able 
to do so).
In most cases the granting party retains some right over 
the subject-matter: if there is sale of the land, he may re­
tain right to the minerals; he may revoke a gift or bequ©3t 
for good reason; in other cases he holds the reversion. These 
rights are determined by native law and custom. Now the 
grantor and grantee may - and not Infrequently do - conclude a
subsequent agreement In English form; e.g., after a customary
30
sale, a conveyance may also be executed. A gift may be con­
firmed by deed; an oral will may be strengthened or replaced(?) 
by an English will; a lease may be made between landlord and 
customary tenant. Rights under the English forms are differ­
ent In many cases from rights under native law and custom.
When these rights are in competition, It is necessary to ask 
which set prevails.
30, See: Dowuonah v. Assabll: (1914) D. & P. 'll-'lO, 72; 
coram Smyly, C.J., in the Supreme Court.
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Three results are possible
(1) The subsequent conveyance does not affect the
rights of the parties, but merely records and strengthens the
customary alienation, even though some of the rights and powers
31
expressed In the conveyances are in conflict with custom. In 
such a case, the conveyance serves merely as a memorandum; and 
the transaction becomes an example of ”African form with memo­
randum” •
(2) Alternatively, the conveyance prevails, and its 
terms, and the rights and powers implied thereunder by English 
law, are substituted for powers under native customary law.
The transaction is thus converted into ”(b) English form11.
(5) Finally, conveyance and customary transaction
must be read together as two parts of one transaction: the
case is then one of ”(c) Mixed formn.
To decide which of these results will occur, whether as a
general rule or in particular cases, the vexed question of
’’native tenure11 must be examined.
Land under native tenure: Is there such a thing as 11 land
under native tenure11? This is a phrase commonly encountered
32
in the reports, but one cannot always be certain what is meant
thereby.________________________________________________________
51. Cf. Brobbey v. Kyere: (1956) 5 W.A.Q.A. 106. where a 
samansew was confirmed by a writing. The legatee 
’‘never at any time claimed his right to the Inheritance 
under an English will” - at p. 107.
32. Traceable, of course, to the provisions of s. 11 of the 
old Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, now repealed.
665
The converse of ”land under native tenure” is ”land under 
English tenure”; is then land under native tenure such because 
of the category of land, or of the persons enjoying an interest 
therein, or of the nature of the interest, or of the method by 
which they became seised of that interest?
(i) To consider the first point: this is obviously 
untenable. It is impossible to divide up the Gold Coast phys­
ically, and declare that such-and-such an area is and always 
has been and always will be under English tenure, and the re­
mainder will always be under native tenure. Hence it is not 
the land itself which lends character to the tenure,
(ii) Or is the criterion the type of person enjoying
an interest in the land? That is, if the right-holder is a
native, then must the land be under native tenure? One has 
only to consider the case of Africans enjoying freehold inter­
ests, or interests as mortgagors and mortgagees, to see that it 
would be untrue to hold that a native can only hold property 
by native tenure.
(iii) Does the nature of the interest enjoyed deter­
mine the type of tenure? This is much nearer the truth; but
again from the nature of the interest enjoyed it is impossible 
to label or characterize the land itself as under any parti­
cular form of tenure • There may be more than one party inter- 
ested in the subject-matter: A may hold an interest recognized
at English Law; B an interest recognized in native custom.
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To take a simple example: A may be a lessee under an English-
form lease of a house; he dies, and the benefit of the lease 
is inherited by his successor or family, A*s sons will have a 
customary right of residence free in the house, whilst the fam­
ily enjoy a right under English law.
It is thus incorrect to argue that, because a person en­
joys a particular interest in land, the land is therefore gov­
erned by the appropriate tenure in such a way that all inter­
ests in the land must be ones known to that tenure. Perhaps 
the judges refer only to the dominant interest in the land.
(iv) Does the method by which a person becomes seised 
of an Interest determine the tenure under which he holds? If a 
man acquires land by English form, does he then hold it under 
English tenure; and conversely with African form? The answer 
is ttYes and Now, It Is submitted that the answer is nYestt
when the transfer is not outright or perfected as between the
33
original parties; a lessee under an English lease will be gov­
erned by English Law in his relations with his landlord. Other­
wise the answer is "No”. It is submitted that a man may acquire 
property outright either by an English conveyance or by custom­
33. Thus in Mensah v. Carthy the land in question was assigned 
to C by M under an Indenture; M acquired it in a judicial 
sale. But the Interest assigned here was a leasehold, or­
iginally demised by Government to one K.B. The relevant 
factors in this case were (a) original non-native party;
(b) a continuing Interest (c) known only to English law
(d) created and transferred by English methods. Hence the 
interest of C was not in !lland under native tenure1*.
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ary conveyance. Once he has acquired the property his powers
/ 34
are similar (if the same interest is conveyed). Similarly, a
beneficiary under an English will may be in a similar position 
to a beneficiary under a native will. Because he acquires 
under an English will, the beneficiary does not lose his pow­
ers of alienation under customary. This principle was illus­
trated in Azzu v. Cooper (cited above).
One important result of a decision by a Court that Eng­
lish law is to apply to a transaction between natives is that 
the Statutes of Limitation will therefore operate: a pledge
accompanied by writing might thus be barred by time, if held
35to be governed by English law. Another consequence is that 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds would have to be 
observed.
These questions need never have been asked if there had 
been a clear understanding from the beginning of the relations
34. Cf. Ad.juah v. Wilson: (1927) F.Ct *26-'29, 260.
For a clear guide in. such cases the recent decision of 
Verity, Ag.P«, in Nelson v. Nelson & ogs: Unreported: 
W.A.C.A. Civ.App# ifo.77/49, August 1951 (for which I am 
Indebted to Mr. R.J. PoguckI),i3 of relevance here.
It was held that the mere fact that a form of English 
deed is used does not of itself mean that the incidents 
of English tenure are attached to the property in quest­
ion, to,the exclusion of native tenure, though it may 
regulate the dealing Itself and any dispute which arises 
from It. Because a party agrees to the acquisition of 
title by a conveyance in English form, it does not mean 
that he has agreed that the tenure itself should be 
regulated by English law.
35. Cf. Amarquaye v. Broener: (1898) Ren, 145; and see also
Hughes v. Davies: (1909) F.Ct Ren. 556.
i
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of English, law to customary law in the Gold Coast. Customary
law is not a foreign law in the Gold Coast - the very notion is
patently absurd; and dicta suggesting this are to be under­
stood to refer only to methods of proof of law in the Supreme 
Court. Customary law is not an exception to English common 
or other law. Both are the law of the land, forming two 
branches of Gold Coast Law; but whilst one is appropriate for 
“natives”, the other is appropriate for ”non-natives”. That 
is to say, native customary law is the primary law for Africans
in certain fields, and English law for non-natives. It is
possible for a person to contract out of his primary law, but, 
unless he does so, he remains governed by his own law. These 
concurrent systems of law are administered originally by the 
native courts for native law, and by the Supreme Court for Eng­
lish law. Each type of court is, however, empowered to ad­
minister the other system of law in certain circumstances.
When the Supreme Court hears an appeal from a native court, it 
is itself a native court, and therefore requires no proof of 
native law (as a foreign law). The judges have to refresh 
their memories of native law, it is true; but the submissions 
and evidence they have thereon, and their conclusions which 
they derive from this evidence, are not fact or findings of 
fact. They are findings of law. The distinction is vital: 
the judge's finding on law can be disturbed by a superior 
court. Room is left for the expansion and modification of
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the customary law. Owing to the reluctance of appeal courts 
to disturb findings of fact consistently maintained through 
several courts, a wrong view of native law may thus be con­
firmed, when it is held that findings on customary law are 
findings of fact. Native parties should not need to plead 
rules of native law expressly.
The views above may appear heterodox and contrary in some 
cases to the judgements of the Supreme Court and its predec­
essors, who have held, inter alia: (a) that native law is for-
36 37eign lav;; (b) that it must be specially pleaded; (c) that as
a finding on native law is a finding of fact^^current findings
38
cannot normally be disturbed by an appeal court; (d) that once
36. "As native law is foreign law, it must be proved as any 
other fact" - Francis Smith, J., in Hughes v. Davies:
(1909) Ren. 550 at p. 551.
37. Angu v. Atta: (1916) P.O. 43;
Bonsi v. Adjena II: (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 241 - ”...where a 
party intends to set up and rely upon any Native Law and 
custom it must be specifically pleaded.”
38. Cf. Ameyaw III v. Safo: (1947) Privy Council Appeal No. 66 
of 1945, where Lord clu Parcq mentioned
"a well-established rule of practice of this 
Board, that their Lordships do not advise any 
interference with a decision where there are 
concurrent findings of fact by two Courts in 
the country from which the appeal comes.”
That a finding on customary law is to be treated as a 
finding of fact for this purpose is obvious from a
later dictum in the same case:
”In this case the Courts had to consider native 
customs and to hear evidence as to tradition, 
and so forth, and it was obviously right that 
their Lordships should not be asked to review 
concurrent findings of fact.”
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a native custom is notorious to the courts, as it may become by 
frequent judicial notice, evidence tending to disprove the con­
tinued existence of the custom, or to deny that the custom is
39correctly represented, will not be admitted.
The Supreme Court's administration of native law has been 
bedevilled, as is well known, by mistaken judgements which 
have misinterpreted, or wrongly recorded, rules of native cus­
tomary law; these judgements having been continually followed, 
a false doctrine has been built up in many instances (e*g., on
non-Akan custom of succession); until finally judicial notice
40
is taken of these customs, and it is doubtful if the courts 
would listen to evidence designed to disprove them. Unfort­
unately, the customs of which judicial notice is now taken are 
usually those which either never existed in the form stated, or 
else have been completely modified in customary usage, or even 
abandoned altogether. (Judicial notice is usually taken of 
notorious facts; some of these facts may not be so notorious
that the Judge will not require some refreshment of his judi-
41
cial memory: cf. Me Quaker v. Goddard, where it was judicially
notieed that a camel is a domestic animal.)
39. Cf. the dictum of Sir A. Chahnell in Angu v. Atta (already 
cited); approved in Amiss ah v. Krabah: (1956) fc.C. 2 
W.A.G.A. 30, at p. 31
40. Cf. the case of succession in Accra, as described in my 
article A Note on_the Qa Law of Succession. Bulletin of 
School of Oriental, &c., Studies, XV/1, 164.
41. (1940) 1 K.B. 687.
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Can African form be used where one of the parties is not 
a native; and if so, what is the effect of using it?
The most frequent instance of this has occurred in the 
case of the missions, who acquired land for their churches and 
schools by gift from local chiefs or citizens. In the early 
days these gifts were "stamped” by the payment of rum from 
mission to grantor; and thenceforth both parties acted on the 
assumption that the gift was perfect.
By what law is such a transaction governed? If the gift 
is by native law and custom, the rum operates either as "knock- 
ing-fee” or ”stamping-feen. In either case the donor would 
retain right to the reversion in the land, and especially it 
would revert to him if the donee abandoned the land given.
The donor could also insist that the land should not be used 
commercially, e,g., by sale to a third party, without his per­
mission. The donor would also retain the right to minerals, 
unless otherwise agreed.
Unfortunately, the trouble which brought the Statutes of 
Mortmain into existence in England - that churches do not die - 
arises here; and the donor is likely to lose his land for 
good.
In addition, land so acquired by certain missions has been 
used for the erection of stores, a commercial use of the land 
not contemplated by native custom.
If one says that the transaction is governed by English
672
law, the gift could be construed either as an outright gift, 
or a sale, or a free tenancy at will ripening into ownership*
If it Is the first, the gift should surely have been made 
by deed according to English Law.
If the second, then the consideration Is found in the 
drink given; but this would be to wilfully misinterpret the 
significance of the giving of drink. In such a case again, 
there should be a deed. If the admission into possession and 
the Interpretation of the drink as consideration add up to a 
contract, that contract - to be efficacious - would have to be 
construed as a contract to execute a conveyance when required; 
but such a contract would not - I think - be enforced at Eng­
lish law.
If the third interpretation is correct, and there is a 
permissive tenancy of indefinite duration, then it might be 
contended that by the Statutes of Limitation the tenant's in­
terest could ripen Into ownership by lapse of time. But the
answer to this contention is that the tenant cannot raise a
42
claim adverse to the owner's title.
The truth of the matter is that here English law is quite 
inappropriate, since the donor has followed a form well-known 
to the customary law. This appears to be a case where, even 
if English law were held to be applicable, nsubstantial
42. Miller v. Kwayisi: (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 7, for instance, 
impliedly raises such questions.
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injustice” would be done to the donor by a "strict adherence 
to the rules of English law”; and s. 74 (1) of the Courts 
Ordinance would operate.
(b) English form;
(i) Prom native to native: Is the U3e of English
forms of conveyance and transfer permissible for "natives11?
There seems no doubt that this question must be answered 
in the affirmative; and English form is today frequently used 
in practice by Africans for creating or transferring interest 
in land which they themselves are interested in by native 
custom.
Use of English form appears to be sometimes:
(a) optional or permissible;
(b) compulsory;
Ic) forbidden.
(a) Optional: As a general rule, an African may today use
either an English or an African form of conveyance, etc. Such 
an option is indicated at pp. 642, 643 above. Sometimes his 
choice will make no difference to the subsequent rights of the 
parties; at other times their rights will be affected (see 
pp.661 ff. above).
(t>) Compulsory: The Courts appear to be ready to hold that
use of English form is sometimes compulsory. In particular, 
if Letters of Administration are granted, the administrator may 
be required to deal with the property administered - as regards
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for instance, its vesting in the parties entitled - according 
to the methods of English Law.
Where land is held under an English head-lease, the prop­
erty may have to be dealt with, especially by persons holding
lesser interests dependent on that lease, according to the rules
43of English Law.
When a person holds an interest known only to English Law -
e.g., as tenant for life under a settlement - he must deal with
44his interest by English Law.
Forbidden: It would be truer to say that in certain cases
use of English form is nugatory, in that an African cannot ful­
fil his purpose, and grant the interest intended, by any other 
than the methods of native customary law.
Does the use of English form alter the rights of the 
parties?
45
The answer is MYesn according to Fawcett v. Odamtten,
where it was held that a conveyance written in English in the
usual form must be construed in accordance with English law.
46And again, in Quarshie v. Plange it was held that where
43. E.g., in Mensah v. Carthy: (1949: Land Ct, Sekondi, Land 
Appeal No. 15/48) coram Ragnar Hyne, j.
Compare the obiter dictum about Kumasi lands in U.A.C. v . 
Apaw (referred to above, at p. 65lJj and the restriction of 
tenants in Obuasi in theory to dealings with their inter­
est according to English law.
44. And see: Lutterodt v. Lutterodt: (1915) K-F, 1, where a 
deed of settlement made in English form was interpreted 
in accordance with English law.
45. (1929) F.Ct, '26-’29, 339.
46. (1927) F.Ct, ’26-’29, 246.
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parties adopt the English method of sale they are bound by the
principles of English law* These cases should not be taken
47
at their face-value.
Where the parties have agreed that their obligations 
should be governed exclusively by the rules of English Law, 
obviously their agreement prevails; and English Law alone will 
govern their relations between themselves* Since it will be 
appreciated how rarely Africans will intend to forgo all the 
rights which they possess in customary law, one may understand 
that such a state of affairs Is the exception rather than the 
rule. Nevertheless, when it exists, the grantee will not for­
feit the powers which he possesses by custom to create.rights 
or Interests in favour of others, unless to do so would be ex­
pressly contrary to the rules of English law applying between 
the original parties*
Hence a state of affairs may exist where A transfers an 
Interest by English law to B, who In turn creates an interest 
by customary law in favour of C. The relations of A and B 
are governed by English law; the relations of B and 0 are gov­
erned by customary law; and the relations of A and C presum­
ably by English law*
47* But in Ad.juah v* Wilson: (1927) F.Ct* '26-'29, 260, it 
was held that because a mortgage, executed in accord­
ance with English law, of land under native tenure is 
made, and a sale takes place thereunder, it does not 
necessarily follow that the land ceases to be land 
under native tenure*
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If the form affects some but not all the rights of the
parties, then the form is mixed.
It is submitted as a rule which must be borne in mind in
considering such cases, that the mere fact that African parties
have executed a document in English form does not necessarily
imply that English law is to govern their relations solely,
48
partly, or at all.
A frequent case falling for interpretation is where there 
is a pledge or mortgage of land by a native to a native, acc­
ompanied by writing. This writing usually takes the form of 
a receipt, and/or a so-called "promissory note”. The mere use
of such writing may be held to import English law, and hence
49bar the debt by limitation: see Amarquaye v. Broener, and
50Aradzie v. Yandor; or the contrary may be found: see Parbi
51
and Wusu v. Muffatt.
48. In SampahTv. Yarboyoe: (Unreported): New Juaben A Court,
No. 216 of 1946, defendants' title to a house was based 
on a sale with accompanying document: plaintiffs main­
tained that the conveyance was invalid. The Native 
Court said:
”In regard to the objection by the plaintiffs that 
the Ex. ”A" is not conveyance and therefore not valid 
in law, the onus of proof rests on plaintiffs to state 
that during the transaction both the late Sampah Kojo 
and defendant intended that their obligations should 
be regulated exclusively by English law. Both of 
them were natives and also not legal persons for which 
it would be possible for them to consider about this 
term "Conveyance".’'
49. (1898) Ren. 145; but in this case it was found that 
there was not a mere receipt, but a receipt coupled with 
an agreement.
50. (1922) F.Ct '22, 91.
51. (1923) D.Ct '21-*25, 37.
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Again, such a writing may contain a power of sale without 
an order of the court. If the mortgage is held to be a cus­
tomary African pledge, then no order of the Court is required: 
Norh v. Gbedemahf ^ but it may be held to be an English equit­
able mortgage or charge, under which there can be no sale with-
53
out an order of the Court: Sel v. Ofori.
Certain matters influence the Court in deciding whether 
the parties intend to govern their relations exclusively; by 
English law: the first, whether the transaction of which the
writing is a memorandum is one known to customary law. Hence, 
in the pledge cases, the fact that the pledgee does not go into 
immediate possession is held to indicate that there is no true 
customary pledge, and hence English law applies in toto. Two 
remarks must be made: that the Courts fail to take into acc­
ount modern developments of African pledge, charge, and mort­
gage; and secondly, that even if English law applies, it may 
not apply in toto.
Another test as to the intentions of the parties sometimes
54
used by the Courts is that of literacy. In Koney v. U.T.C. ♦ 
the fact that the African concerned was educated was a point in 
influencing the court to hold that no substantial injustice
52. (1929) F.Ct '26-'29, 395.
53. (1926) F.Ct ,26-*29, 87.
54. (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 188.
r
i
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would result from applying the Statutes of Limitation, Whilst 
one cannot deny that there is some relevancy in whether a party 
is capable of reading, it is submitted that the mere fact that 
he could read (even if not understand) an old English mortgage 
is not sufficient of itself to bind him to its terms.
African form^followed by_Englishjform: when does the
English form prevail?
The English form may operate either as a memorandum or 
an instrument. If it is a memorandum only on the face of it, 
then it is submitted the African form prevails. Or it may be 
an approach to English form, which fails, however, for want of 
some vital particular:
it is not stamped (Parbi & Wusu v. Muffatt); 
it is not under seal (Azzu v. Cooper);
it is not registered ( - do - );
in which case the African law will probably prevail, unless the 
documents purports to be a mortgage, but fails; in which case,
it may.be interpreted as an English equitable mortgage or charge
(Sel v. Ofori). This last interpretation is somewhat dubious, 
in the light of what will be said now on the subject of instru­
ments.
55. and conversely nthere is no presumption that a native of 
Ashanti, who does not understand English, and cannot read* 
or write, has appreciated the meaning and effect of a 
legal instrument because he is alleged to have set his 
mark to it by way of signature.” - Kwamin v. Kufuor;
(1914) Ren. 814; P.O. ,74-,28, 36.
1
i
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The document may he good in form, and would normally
operate as an instrument. It is submitted that it will not
operate as an instrument if:
(1) It is made subsequent to the conveyance or act
which it purports to affect. The greater the interval of time
which elapses between the transaction and the execution of the
instrument, the stronger is the presumption. The document is
in effect a memorandum or record, although in form an instru-
56 57
ment - see Dowuonah v. Assabll. *
Even if the interval of time is small, i,t may still not 
operate: e.g., if A sells land to B, and B pays part of the
purchase-price, guaha is cut, and the parties adjourn and exec­
ute a conveyance, the land has already been validly conveyed by 
native custom when the conveyance is made. It cannot be con­
veyed again; hence on the principle of “nemo bis datTT the sub­
sequent conveyance is meaningless as a conveyance. It will 
need very strong proof to hold that the sale was subject to a 
condition precedent. The distinction is important; if the 
deed operates as an escrow, the condition being the payment of
the rest of the price, then the conveyance is inoperative until
58
the balance of the purchase price is paid: Gbedemah v. Okai.
56. (1914) D. & F# 'll-'IS, 72; in the Supreme Court.
57. Cf, also Brobbey v. Kyere: (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 106, where
a samansew' was confirmed by a writing. The legatee “never 
at any time claimed his right to the inheritance under an 
English will" (at p. 107).
58. (1929) D.Ot. ^ - ’Sl, 17.
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If, however, the conveyance by guaha was valid, then the remedy 
of A Is toaie for the balance as a debt, and ownership Is Im­
mediately vested in B.
(2) The instrument does not represent the intention 
of the parties; e.g., the grantor or grantee is illiterate.
(3) It purports to grant an interest which the grant-
j
or is incapable of transferring by native customary law, or the 
grantee of enjoying.
Even if taking effect a3 a memorandum only, the instrument 
may still serve certain purposes:
- it is evidence of the nature of the transaction:
59
e.g., that a pledge and not a sale was Intended and made;
- it can import subsidiary terms into the transaction 
or agreement: e.g., it can fix the time for repayment in a
pledge, the rate of interest, the boundaries of the land con­
veyed.
- it can operate as against other parties, who sub­
scribe the document as interested witnesses, guarantors, etc;
- it is "registrable" against other claimants: e.g., 
if authenticated by the local chief's signature, it is strong 
evidence against the claim of other parties. It might also be 
registered under the Land Registry Ordinance, cap. 112, and thus
59. In Kwaku v. Sacker: (1912) D. & P. '11-'16, 37, Gough,
Acting C. J., permitted two conveyances to be used in this 
way as evidence "and also because he (plaintiff) is not 
taking proceedings to enforce rights under it.1
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prevent others getting priority by a subsequent registration 
(although once the court examined the facts, the registration
might turn out to be a nullity at law).
- it may also determine the law which is applied to a 
dispute between the parties: e.g., if there is a pledge ac­
companied by a "promissory note", and if the creditor chooses
to sue on the promissory note and not on the pledge, then the
Court will not look behind the note to the customary terms of 
the pledge (such as its indefinite duration), but will apply 
the English law, including the English law of limitation of
*.4 60actions.
One sympathizes with the dictum of Francis Smith, J., in 
61Hughes v. Davies in regard to the similar proviso to s. 19
of the old Supreme Court Ordinance:
"But...the proviso in my opinion implies know­
ledge of the effect of the transaction and an 
agreement to be bound thereby* Can it there­
fore be contended that the plaintiff, in merely 
accepting the I.O.TJ. *s, had such knowledge of 
the difference of the effect of native law or 
custom and English law bearing on the transaction? 
That is, in the one case time can be no bar to 
her remedy, and in the other it would deprive 
her of that remedy...u
(ii) Non-native to native;
The fact that the lease from the Chief Commissioner of 
Ashanti to the Omanhene of Agona was in the English language,
60. Cf. Aradzie v. Yandor: (1922) F.Ct ,22*,91;
Sei v.Ofori: (1926) F.Ct '26-*29, 87.
61. (1909) hen. at p. 555.
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and in English form, was held by the W.A.C.A. in U.A.C. v,
62
Apaw to mean that the agreement must be construed by the law 
of England, and the agreement must be governed by English law. 
This case concerned land in Kumasi, which at the date of the 
lease (1927) was Crown land. Kumasi lands are a special case; 
and perhaps the same rules will not apply now that they have 
been vested in the Asantehene in trust by the Kuma3i Lands Ord­
inance of 1943. It will be appreciated that there is a dist­
inction between holding that an agreement concerning Kumasi 
lands is governed by English law; and holding that Kumasi 
lands in general are not subject to native tenure. The position 
now is that as regards leases to chiefs and individuals, an 
English form of lease is used: but this cannot be held to
mean that all customary rights are to be excluded, and that, 
for instance, it is now impossible for a widow or children to 
claim a right in some particular portion of Kumasi land by 
virtue of customary law.
Where there is a dispute between native and non-native, 
section 74 of the Courts Ordinance lays down in effect that 
English law is to be applied by the Court, unless substantial
injustice would result to either party by a strict adherence
63
to the rules of English law. This gives us a rule, or a 
guide, when an issue comes before the Court; it is, of course,
62. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 114.
63. See: Koney v. U.T.C.• (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 188.
683
of no assistance at all in deciding what law is applicable if
there is no case before any court. The fact that one of the
contracting parties is a non-native puts the native on enquiry,
as it were; the native party is to be taken to comprehend that
English law is the ordinary law in contracts with non-natives;
and the use of writing strengthens this presumption. But the
presumption is not conclusive. In dealings between natives
and non-natives it is possible for them - exceptionally - to
contract according to the provisions of some other law, be it
European - French, etc.; or native. Contracting parties to
64
some extent make their own law; if they choose to adopt native
law as the basis of their contract, they are free to do so.
The onus will, however, be on the party alleging it to show
that native law is to govern such a contract.
The question of the literacy of the native party is also
to be considered; even without there being such a deception
as to amount to fraud, yet there may be such a failure on the
part of the native to understand the legal consequences of his
contracting as to make the parties not ad Idem.
65
In Hamilton v. Mensah one party was from Sierra Leone, 
and not a native. As regards the sale of timber, coupled with 
a receipt which W.A.C.A. accepted as a sufficient memorandum 
of the agreement, but not a concession within section 2 of the
64. This is the view of Kelsen, from the jurisprudential 
angle, following the maxim Modus ac conventio vincunt legem,
65. (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 224.
684
Concessions Ordinance, the Court in ordering a retrial did not 
say whether English law applied or not. But, said the Court, 
at p. 225:
"It is clear that the plaintiff's case is not 
that the receipt purports to grant the timber 
in question, but that there is a verbal agree­
ment as to the sale of the timber and that the 
receipt is merely evidence thereof. If this 
contention is correct then it is quite , clear 
that the right to the timber has been trans­
ferred to the plaintiff by a verbal agreement 
and that the receipt is merely evidence there­
of and not the writing whereby the rights in 
the growing trees were transferred, and there­
fore not a concession."
U.A.C. v. Apaw was adverted to in the unreported case of
66Asamoah v. Mprenguo where Smith, J., putting the view of the
Court, spoke of "the difficulty of trying to superimpose a
form of native tenure of a house where the land on which it is
built is held under a lease according to English law, as the
case of U.A.C.Ltd. v. Kwad.jo Apaw & ors (3 W.A.C.A. 114) has
decided that in Kumasi the ownership of buildings goes with
the land on which they are erected." The case of U.A.C. v.
Apaw was not decided on this point, the dictum of the Court
67
being, it is submitted, obiter. In any case, there is no 
difficulty in superimposing a form of native tenure of a house 
on a form of English tenure of the land on which it stands: in
66. (1949) W.A.C.A. Civil Appeal 72/48; 28.2.49.
67. At p. 117: "By reason of the principle of law shortly
expressed in the legal maxim quicquid 
plantatur solo, solo cedlt. the new build­
ing became annexed to and formed part of 
the freehold."
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other parts of the country it is possible to sell, or to seize 
in execution, a house, without affecting the land on which it 
stands; and this principle has long been recognized by the 
Courts of the Gold Coast.
In any case, despite his assertion above, Smith, J., then 
went onto order that appellant (holding on a sub-lease from the 
Odumhene, himself holding the land on a head-lease from the 
Asantehene) should not have an order for possession or an ac­
count, that the house was appellant's property, but the res­
pondent should be "entitled to occupy it for her life or the 
life of the house, whichever be the shorter, provided that she 
pays her customary due3 to the Odumhene”. This very much res­
embles the superimposition of a bastard form of "native tenure” 
upon an English tenure.
(c) Mixed form:
The type of case included here is similar to that consid-
68
©red by the Pull Court in Boodoo v. Bissa. upon which the
then Chief Justice, Brandford Griffith, remarked:
It was a "difficult matter to apply either 
English law or native custom entirely to 
the facts of this case. The parties concerned 
were mostly illiterate natives who used some 
of the forms of English law, and yet, to some 
extent, guided themselves by native custom".
He considered that it was not necessary to apply either native
i
j -  _ - , ^  _ r ^  r  t j l __j- j. __ ■ i _ i ri r  j.__ r -- - “ r r  n t j n “n
68. (1910) (Pull Court) Ren. 585, of which there is a fuller 
report at first instance in Earn. 35.
[
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or English law exclusively; justice could he done within the
provisions of s. 19 of the Supreme Court Ordinance. This type
of case is more frequent than might he imagined; it is of
particular interest when considering the place of documents in
Gold Coast law, inasmuch as it principally arises when there
has heen some document. Another example was provided hy Ah ah
69
Ahrobah v. Moubarak and Omanhene of Dutch Sekondi. Here there 
were two claimants for the land in question, the plaintiff 
claiming that he acquired the land hy conveyance from one A.L. 
(which conveyance was approved hy the 3tool of Dutch Sekondi), 
the first defendant claiming that he acquired the land hy deed 
of gift from the same stool. For the stool as co-defendant 
the contention was that:
n...the land belongs to the Stool of Dutch 
Sekdndi and that the deed of gift to the 
first defendant was according to native 
custom, the ownership not passing entirely 
to the first defendant, and as regards the 
alleged deed of conveyance to the plaintiff, 
the second defendant alleges that this also 
was only a deed of gift according to native 
custom, and that as the plaintiff failed to 
comply with the conditions upon which the 
gift was made, he, the second defendant, ree 
voked the gift, as he was entitled to under 
native customary law.
This excerpt is sufficient to illustrate the amazing results 
which may follow the mixture of customary law With modern ex­
otic trimmings. Ancient customary law knows nothing of a
i
i "deed of gift according to native custom." The chief was
69. (1935) D.Ct. *31-'37, 103.
I
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maintaining that the customary duties of the donee and custom­
ary rights of the donor remain unaffected by the use of an Eng­
lish deed, in particular that:
nas the land was Stool land its occupancy 
was governed by native customary law; 
the occupier for the time being was under 
an obligation to recognize the suzerainty 
of the Stool, he had no right to build on 
the land without the Stool s permission 
and was obliged to contribute towards the 
payment of the Stool debts when called 
upon to do so.1
Whether this list of customary duties is correct or not is im­
material (it is probably too extensive); but unfortunately the 
intricate question posed - and provisionally answered by the 
stool - was not answered by the court, since Barton, J., found 
that the assignment made by A.L. was valid, and therefore gave 
judgement for plaintiff.
A very frequent example of a mixed form at the present day 
concerns customary tenancies and leases in English form. 
Strangers on abusa tenancy and other forms of tenancy have in 
some states (e.g., in Adansi) been required to accept a written 
lease. The lease provides for the observance of the tenant's 
customary duties, and preserves the rights of the stool; one 
can only conclude that the result is a mixed form. Again, 
strangers wishing to build houses in certain towns take a lease 
j  of a house-plot; this is expressly done not so as to alter the
I
rights of the parties, but so as to preserve the right of the 
stool to the land. Once the stranger has built his house on
the plot, It Is his own absolute property, although standing 
on a leased site. In Bekwai citizens also take leases of 
their plots, mostly post facto (i.e., in respect of plots of 
which they are already in occupation); but since the lease is 
not expressed to be for any rent, and its specific terms are 
neglected except where they coincide with customary duties, 
they do not seem to alter the legal position very much. In 
“Kumasi the position is still more complicated, owing to pre­
vious vesting of title in the Grown; and the past and present 
employment of English-form leases. In Obuasi the townsfolk 
enjoy their houses on tenancies from the Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation Ltd., based on the letter's head-lease from the 
Adansi stool* The advocate of the tenure theory must find 
the legal position here rather complicated, since Adansi grant­
ed a lease, carved out of the customary title of the stool to 
the land; out of this lease, A.G.C. again granted interests at 
English Law to Africans; and the Africans themselves have 
busily carved interests known only to customary law out of 
these sub-leases* There is thus here a dual shift, from Af­
rican to English, from English to African, tenure. Such prob­
lems of mixed form are no juristic stumbling-block to those who
support the idea that there is a Gold Coast law, compounded of
70
both elements: as W.A.C.A. pointed out in Mens ah v. Cobbina,
70. (1939) 5 W.A.C.A. 108, at p. 110.
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a competent native court can "take into consideration any deeds 
documents or consents which may be relevant to the right deci­
sion of the. case before them whether .they be in accordance with 
English law or not, Rrovided_they are valid in_accordance with 
the law ro£^1 ajbing_Ashanti." (The subsequent proviso inserted,
as a result of this case, in the Native Courts (Ashanti) Ord­
inance. cap. 80, does not affect this principle, except where
71
English law substantially governs the relations of the parties.)
71. But an inelegancy must be pointed out. In many cases of 
mixed form the plaintiff appears to have an election: if,
for instance, there is a customary pledge with 11 promissory 
note” attached, his decision to sue on the promissory note 
will apparently estop him from referring to the customary 
or other terms of the pledge outside the promissory note, 
and a decision will be given according to the English law 
alone. The terms, however, of the proviso in all the 
relevant ordinances command the Court to consider the 
agreement of the parties or the nature of the transaction' 
as the determinant of the law to be applied, for which the 
form of action is not the criterion.
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CHAPTER XII.
LONG POSSESSION OP LAND,
In any system of law the fact of possession plays a def­
inite part. By itself, and however short, it is evidence of 
title in the possessor?* The presumption engendered by poss­
ession gathers strength as the duration of the possession in­
creases, and the other means of proving title gradually dis­
appear* Time with his scythe mows down the muniments of 
title; with his hour-glass he establishes presumptions in 
their place.
Besides its function as evidence, possession (more parti­
cularly if long) may have other effects: it may (by provision
of law) serve as a ground for the acquisition of a prescriptive 
title by the occupier; it may bar either the right to sue, or | 
the actual title itself, of another (the true owner) - this is 
limitation or so-called "negative prescription". In the acc­
ount which follows we shall consider each of these functions in 
Gold Coast law. The present situation is somewhat confused; 
this confusion can be traced to various causes:-
1. Indeed in the case of oocupatio rei nullius the mere 
taking of possession may create title: just as the 
abandonment of possession cor pore et animo may destroy 
it. However, in the case of taking up waste land for 
agricultural purposes some systems of law require a 
minimum period of cultivation to establish title; mean­
while the possession is protected. This is not 
a feature of Akan law.
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(1) There has been insufficient recognition of the great 
difference between the concepts of English and African law; in 
particular, there has been a failure to appreciate the exist­
ence of exotic forms of subordinate ownership, and the separa­
tion of title between land and the things on it, which has 
sometimes led to attempts to apply English ideas to African 
facts.
(2) The judges have come up against the fact that pre­
scription in the English sense is not part of customary law, 
and that the Statutes of Limitation do not ordinarily apply to 
land held under native tenure; hence they have fallen back on 
such rules as those of estoppel (en pais or by laches), and 
the bona fide purchaser for value, to fill the gap. The settled 
doctrine that as between the purchaser and parties interested 
other than the vendor the purchaser must prove that he acted 
without notice after making all enquiries open to him (cf. In 
re Nisbet & Potts* Contract; (1905) 1 Ch. 391; (1906) 1 Ch.386) 
appears to have sometimes been overlooked.
(3) Unfortunately, the judges do not always appear to have 
comprehended the nature of these rules in English law; one 
finds that a decision will in one case be given against an 
owner on grounds of estoppel, in another case with similar 
facts on grounds of laches, and in a third under the doctrine 
of innocent purchaser for value#
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(4) Cases involving problems of possession do not usually 
show any clear line of doctrine, wherein earlier decisions are 
referred to and evaluated. There is thus a difficulty in 
relating a collection 6f isolated decisions and assigning 
them to their proper categories.
(5) Modern Gold Coast law is in fact a mixture of English 
and African law today. , , / _
1# LONG POSSESSION AS EVIDENCE OF TITLE.
- - - - -
"K* — -"t h- » •  *-
By itself possession raises a presumption of ownership,
or at least of lawful occupation. Such a presumption can of
course be rebutted by proof of a superior title (as soon as
the courts say that such a presumption is or shall be ”con-
2
elusive” or ’’irrebuttable”, then the presumption ceases to be 
part of the law of evidence or adjectival law, and operates 
as prescription, as part of substantive law).
Two cases arise for consideration:
(i) a party who is in possession relies on that 
fact as evidence of his title;
(ii) a party not in possession sues to eject a party 
in possession, or for a declaration of title.
In the former cas9 , the possessor need only sit back and let 
the other party (seeking to evict him) discharge the burden 
created by the adverse possession; in the latter case the
2. Cf. Elizabeth v. Sam: (1910) Earn. 19:
Tslbu V .1 Kyel; U922) P.Ct ’ 2 & ,  li.
i
f f r
Lt****** ------------------------
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plaintiff will usually have to put his own title in proof, or 
else show how the possessor came into possession.
Possession is only one of the elements which go to make 
up£roof of title; where there is a lack of documentary evid­
ence of the title to the land, then the courts are forced to 
rely on less tangible proof. In practice, other elements be­
sides the mere fact of possession are present: the first of
these is the long duration of the possession.
(a) Long occupation:
The fact that possession has been long strengthens the
presumption of title. By itself, long occupation may serve
as evidence either of ownership or of some lesser interest; it
4
may indeed be evidence only of lawful entry on the land.
(i) As evidence of ownership: the kind of title
claimed varies partly according to the nature of the contest-
5
ants. Although it is possible, as we have seen, for families 
and individuals to hold an absolute interest in the land, it is 
more usual for such an interest to be claimed by stools. In 
Class I Areas, in which ownership of the absolute interest in 
land is with the stools, this is the rule; and individuals 
will be able to claim no more than free tenure subject to the
3. Summary procedure ( to prevent one who has recently obtained 
possession by unlawful means from relying on the possession
so obtained to cast the burden of proof on the dispossessed 
plaintiff) is outside the scope of the present work.
4. Of. Wiapa v. Solomon: (1905) P.Ct. Ren. 405.
5. Vide ante Chapters on THE FAMILY and THE INDIVIDUALS
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interests of the stool. In Class II Areas, where the rights 
of stools are jurisdictional, families and individuals will 
rely on long possession to ground their claims to absolute 
title.
Claims by stools will usually be to the absolute interest; 
but cases frequently arise where two subordinate stools subject 
to on© paramount dispute "ownership”. The paramount stool 
does not interfere, because its rights are safe. Even if one 
subordinate stool is awarded "ownership", this is only owner­
ship as against the other party, and not as against its para­
mount. The position is probably different where the subord­
inate stools of two different paramount stools are in conflict; 
since a decision against the subordinate stool will probably 
affect the rights of the paramount stool as well (which is the 
reason why the paramount stool will usually join in such liti­
gation, or at least support it financially).
A claim by a stool, to land is based as a rule on the pos­
session of its subjects. Such was the case in The Stool of 
Abinabina v. Chief Kofi Enyimadu (on behalf of the Stool of .
c
Nkasawura. which came before the Privy Council very recently, 
Respondents claimed title to certain lands, based on possess­
ion by subjects for many years without paying tribute. Appell­
ants claimed title, and that respondents were only on the land 
by leave and licence. The Board said by way of preface:
6. (1953) Privy Council Appeal No. 5 of 1951.
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nBefore turning to the record of proceedings 
their Lordships think it advisable to observe 
that the expression ‘title* appears to be used 
throughout in the sense of the usufructuary 
right defined by Lord Haldane in Amodu Tijani 
v. The Secretary, Southern Nigeria 11921) 2 A.C.
399 at p. 402".11
The ghost of the Amodu Ti.jani decision (given for Nigeria)
seems to haunt the customary law* The claim that native titles
are all usufructuary and communal should surely be seen not to
be the case, as the preceding exposition of Akan law should
have demonstrated. It is submitted with great respect that in
the Instant case, as two stools were litigating, the claim was
to a stool lor absolute) interest, not to a mere usufructuary
interest. (If the claim had been only a jurisdictional one,
It would not have been cognisable by the courts.)
Since stools must usually rely (if their claim is based on
long possession) on occupation by their subjects, one must bear
in mind the dictum of the Privy Council in Kobina Foil v. Obeng 
7
Akesse:
"In questions of disputed ownership of land, 
occupation and possession of portions of the 
disputed area Is not relevant evidence of 
title to the whole area unless it can be 
reasonably attributed to a right of the whole 
area,"
i
The possession of an individual subject cannot presumably be[ - ■
i
| attributed to a claim to the whole area; but the right under
which they claim to farm there may be so attributable (since it
7. (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 46, at p. 50.
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derives from their membership of the stool laying claim to the 
whole of that area).
(ii) As evidence of the acquisition of a lesser 
interest: Long possession may suffice as evidence of the ac­
quisition of an interest less than full ownership. Such cases 
may arise when a stool endeavours to assert title based on the 
occupation of its subjects; or where an individual ”squatter” 
resists an attempt to evict him, or to make him pay tribute for 
the land which he occupies.
Q
The former case was considered in Akesse v. Ababio; There 
was a dispute between two chiefs; W.A.C.A. (per Kingdom, C.J.)
said at p. 266:
”...if the title to the land was in plaintiff's 
people at the time the Oath was sworn, the sub­
sequent making of cocoa farms by defendant's 
people was a mere trespass and such trespass, 
no matter how persistent, could never give the 
defendant's people title to the land as communal 
/sc. stool/* land, though the trial judge was 
careful, In his judgement, to conserve any in­
dividual rights which might have accrued by 
long possession.”
9
And in Kuma v. Kuma Sir Lancelot Sanderson said (at p. 7) that:
”...even assuming that the defendant and his 
predecessors have been to some extent in oc­
cupation of parts of the land in question 
without paying tribute to the plaintiff or 
his predecessors, such possession...is not 
conclusive evidence of the defendant's title.”
8. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 264.
9. (1938) P.C. 5 W.A.C.A. 4 (reversing the judgement of 
W.A.C.A. reported at (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 178).
All that was found in this case was that “plaintiff had foll­
owed the practice of his ancestors in not extracting tribute 
from the persons occupying the land; and that he only objected 
when the defendant tried to dispose of It“. Only permissive 
tenancies on plaintiff's land seem to have been recognized; 
and plaintiff, was entitled to a declaration of title#
In Adu v# Kurna^0 it was held that the Provincial Comm­
issioner went too far
“to hold that land proved to have been plaintiff's 
has become defendant's because defendant has 
occupied it undisturbed for sixteen years. That 
decision being contrary to well-established 
native custom cannot be upheld,“
Ownership, not possession, was in issue in this case.
Apart from the length of occupation, it is usually neces­
sary for it to have other characteristics: these include the
fact that it was peaceful, that no rent or tribute was paid, 
that there was no acknowledgement of ownership, that the occup­
ier himself performed acts of ownership, that oral tradition 
reinforces the claim for title.
(b) Peaceful possession.
Generally, the possession must have been peaceful and un­
disturbed. If the occupation has been continually challenged
In the past, its value as evidence is very much weakened. In
11Ninson v. Adjuah Aduwah the Privy Council took nine years'
10. (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 240.
11. (1932) P.C. 2 W.A.C.A. 14.
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peaceable possession by A immediately preceding the action as 
strong evidence against B, who sued for a declaration of title.
Peaceful possession here negatived a claim of title. (The Pull
12 % 13
Court decision was reversed.) In Ablnah v. Kennedy, where
there was "long and undisturbed possession" of a house, the
plaintiff's family having lost it by a judicial sale, the Pull
Court took the possession as evidence that defendant's husband
bought the house from some-one with a right to sell it. In 
14
Tslbu v. Kyel possession for a "long period" was taken as
conclusive evidence of title. Peaceful possession for.a long
period, coupled with non-payment of tribute, was proved.
Peaceful possession where the original entry was lawful
or by leave does not count, since such possession will not of
itself be adverse to the owner's title. Examples are Nkoom 
15
v. Etsiaku. where plaintiff entered on a mortgage from def­
endant's predecessor. He had been in occupation for thirty- 
four years, and the money had been repaid. It was held that
there was no acquisition by prescription. In Accuful v .
16
Martey it was held that there was no adverse possession, 
since defendant was aware of his tenure, which was a mere per­
missive one, though no rent had been paid for thirty years.
12. (1929) P.Ct. '26-'29, 465.
13. (1921) P.Ct. '20-'21, 21.
14. (1922) P.Ct, '22, 13.
15. (1922) P.Ct. '22, 1.
16. (1882) P.C.L. 156.
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17In Ackon v. Kotoh plaintiffs allowed defendants to farm on 
their land and use the land for many years. All that was ac­
quired here was the right to farm indefinitely on payment of
18tribute. In Bissoe v. Aithie, the lawful entry was under a
19
lease. And in Kofi v. Kofi, there was a pledge from A to B's 
ancestors In 1869, but It was ruled that It could be redeemed, 
despite the lapse of time.
Must the possession be bona fide? Since the courts will 
examine facts rather than motives, the good or bad faith of the 
occupier will not usually be examined,. Where a claim is based 
on laches, of course (see below), this will be a most important 
consideration. But recognition of long possession as a root 
of title is a practical rule, which prefers to leave a situa­
tion as it has existed for some time undisturbed, except for 
very good reason.
(c) Non-payment of rent or tribute; no acknowledgement
of ownership:
The value of long possession as proof of title, or to 
resist a claim for title, Is completely altered if the occupier 
has paid rent or tribute to another, or otherwise acknowledged 
ownership In some other person. Since a stranger on another's 
land should normally be paying rent or tribute - or even a 
nominal amount, such as an annual bottle of gin or a sheep - if 
he makes no such payment then there Is a presumption that he is
17. (1922) P.Ct. *22, 9.
18. (1926) P.Ct. *26-*29, 113.
19. (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 284.
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entitled to be on the land In his own right. But in the facts 
of African custom this is not necessarily so. There may have 
been a free permissive tenancy of land for fanning or house­
building, not connoting any claim to the title in the land it­
self; in such cases there is no acknowledgement of ownership 
made by the tenant annually (except in a tenancy for a nominal 
rental). Since the landlord does not forfeit his claim to the 
land however long the tenant occupies it, and since the tenant 
may hold the land indefinitely unless he denies his landlord's 
title, mere length of occupation is not conclusive on this 
point. The landlord need do nothing until his tenant claims
title (i.e., to the land) by virtue of his long occupation.
(
In custom he need still do nothing. Today, if the landlord 
acquiesces in the tenant's putting himself forward as an owner, 
then the Superior Courts tend to invoke the relevant doctrines 
of English law and equity.
Hence> the next requirement is important as evidence of 
ownership, to wit -
(d) Acts of ownership:
If it can be shown that the occupier has behaved as an 
owner in regard to the property, then it is strong evidence 
of title if there has been no objection raised to his behaviour 
by any interested party. It should be noted that in the case 
of the tenant (just given) the tenant is owner of his house or 
farm, and acts of ownership with regard to these are inconclus-
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ive, unless his behaviour expressly, or impliedly, covers 
ownership of the land as well. But if the occupier's acts 
are referable to some interest other than ownership, he may
not succeed in his claim to title. The case of Ablnabina v .
20
Enylmadu. establishes a most important principle in this con­
nexion. The trial judge, Jackson, J., had said:
f,In claims for declaration of title the onus 
is upon the Plaintiff to establish his cause 
upon the strength of his own case and not upon 
the weakness of his opponents. In. such action 
he must evidence such positive and numerous 
acts within living memory sufficiently fre­
quent and positive to justify the inference 
that he is the exclusive owner.
This test the Plaintiff has failed sig­
nally to satisfy and I do dismiss the claim 
of the Plaintiff both in respect of the dec­
laration sought for and in respect of that 
for damages and trespass.1
W.A.C.A., when the matter came to them upon appeal, contented
themselves with affirming the trial judge's findings. Before
the Privy Council it was claimed that
(1) the trial judge was wrong in holding that sufficient
and frequent positive and numerous acts within living memory
were necessary to establish title and, inferentially, that such 
title could not be supported by traditional evidence alone;
(2) the trial judge was not justified in his conclusion
that plaintiff was lying. The Board found substance in both 
these contentions: specifically, that it is not well founded
to maintain that frequent, etc., acts of ownership are
20. (1953) Unreported: P.C. Appeal No. 5 of 1951.
7oa
essential to justify the inference of exclusive ownership.
Tradition alone might be sufficient. In Nana 03ei Assibey III,
21
Kokofuhene, v. Nana Kwesi Agyeman, Boagyaahene, another very 
recent case before the Privy Council, plaintiff (respondent) 
claimed undisturbed possession since 1700, and that he had 
collected cocoa and gome tribute from defendant's subjects, and 
from other persons, on the land. The trial court (the Asante- 
hene's A Court) found the plaintiff's case proved beyond all 
reasonable doubt. On Appeal to the Chief Commissioner's Court, 
to the West African Court of Appeal, and to the Privy Council, 
this judgement was sustained.
(e) Tradition:
Some courts have in the past been very chary about accept­
ing tradition as evidence of title, if otherwise unsupported.
22
For example, Watson, C.J., in Agyeman v. Yarmoah, said:
”...1 do not propose to base my judgment on 
a claim of this nature /by tradition/1, as I 
cannot admit the principle that land in this 
Colony can be said to vest by use and occupa­
tion of an indefinite tract, supported only 
by tradition handed down from one generation 
to another by word of mouth only. I think 
something more definite must be shewn to enable 
one stool to establish a title to land as ag­
ainst another stool, and I therefore ignore 
entirely the long historical traditions which 
have been adduced by both sides.”
23
The dictum of the trial judge in Ablnabina v. Enyimadu
21. (1952) TJnreported: Privy Council Appeal No. 41 of 1950.
22. (1913) D. & F. '11-'16, 56.
23. (1953) Unreported: Privy Council Appeal No. 5 of 1951.
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requiring acts of ownership was stated to be not well-founded 
by the Privy Council, who laid down that ”traditional evidence
may be very relevant...”* In the native courts today tradi­
tion is frequently quoted as evidence, there often being little 
other.
Tradition may relate either to the elements stated above,
or may itself state that title is with the party alleging it.
That is, a party may produce tradition as evidence that:
he has been in long occupation (or that his ancestors
have been);
the possession was peaceful; 
he has never paid rent or tribute;
he has exercised the powers of an owner in the past; 
or the tradition may simply state that:
he and his ancestors have always owned the land.
In Ablnabina v. Enylmadu (already cited) the Judicial Committee 
distinguished traditional and factual evidence:
”.../The evidence/ was partly traditional,- 
that* is to say evidence as to rights alleged 
to have existed beyond time of living memory 
and proved by linguists or other members of 
the various tribes concerned - and partly 
factual as to actual events occurring within 
living memory.”
In giving evidence of tradition a party will often step into 
she shoes of his ancestor, or predecessor in a position, and 
say ”1 did so-and-so”.
Tradition, then, may be a method of proof of facts which
704
are evidence of title; or may itself be one of the facts which 
prove title. It may well be inevitable that such evidence 
should be accepted; but it is obviously advisable to treat It 
with circumspection.
2. PRESCRIPTION.
Prescription is acquisitive possession; the enjoyment of
a right adversely to its owner for a period of time creates
title for the occupier and destroys the title of the previous
owner - but only if such owner was lawfully entitled to poss-
24
ess. Watson, J., In Agyeman v. Yarmoah declared positively 
that ”there Is no such thing in native customary law as a pre­
scriptive title”; and that t!mere use and occupation for some
time cannot of itself oust an original title”. And again the
25Privy Council approved the dictum of W.A.C.A. in Kojo v. Dadzie 
that ”it was well established Native Law and Custom that rights 
of ownership are not extinguished by lapse of time”. Prescrip­
tion is theoretically contrary to Akan customary law (but it 
applies where there has been undetected encroachment or forcible 
dispossession, as by conquest). This rule of customary law 
appears to conflict with a later dictum by Watson, J., in the 
same case, where he said:
”,..it is absurd to suggest that if an indi­
vidual scratches a farm on a piece of waste 
land and then abandons it, he or his des-
24. (1913) D. & P. *11-'16, 56.
25. (1951) P.O. Appeal No. 61 of 1941.
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Cendants can return years afterwards, and 
oust anyone who happens to have followed him#”
This is in fact what the ancient custom did suggest#
Apart from adverse prescriptions, Akan law recognizes a
title by occupation, such as was considered in Oman of Yamuransa 
26
v, Kessi II by Jackson, J#, who said:
flThe Aburadzi family claimed they were the 
owners by virtue of being the first persons 
to clear the virgin bush after the land had 
been conquered by their clan#”
Such clearing (by a citizen) in an area where a stool already
holds the absolute title in the land engenders in him, not
27
ownership, but a dependent interest*
5, LIMITATION*
The limitations of actions (sometimes called ”negative 
prescription”) is a rule of public policy - interest reipublicae 
ut sit finis litium - which holds it impolitic that persons 
should be vexed by stale claims; hence, after a statutory 
period, a person's right of action, or sometimes his title, is 
barred#
Failure by an owner to sue in defence of his land within 
the statutory period may bar either his right of action, or his 
right or title# In English law up till 1833 only the remedy 
of the owner was barred; since that date his title also is
26* Unreported: Land Court, Cape Coast, 31#10.1946#
27# In mo3t systems, even an instant's possession animo domini 
of a res nullius creates ownership; it does not merely 
evidence it#
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extinguished. Limitation does not transfer the former owner's 
title to the adverse possessor: the term sometimes used-‘a
Parliamentary conveyance" - is thus a misnomer. In essence 
limitation is a procedural rule and negative in its effect; 
but indirectly it may affect substantive rights.
It has been frequently ruled in the Gold Coast that the 
Statutes of Limitation do not apply to:
28"a native tenancy of land" : Bodoa v. Ofoil;
"land held by natives under native tenure": Abinah v . gg
"land held under native law" t> Incroma v. Marmoon 
But they do apply when the parties' relations - whether by 
agreement or otherwise - are regulated by English law, which 
may be shown by:
31
using an English method of loan : Aradzie v. landor;
32
or a power of attorney : Tandoh v. Williams;
33
or a lease : Dainsuah v. Cole;
or where the transaction Is one between native and non- 
native; the fact that the native was educated was a point in 
influencing the court to hold that no substantial injustice 
would result from applying the Statutes of Limitation: Koney v .
28. (1910) Earn. 51.
29. (1921) P.Ct. '20-'21, 21.
30. (1882) P.C.L. 157, (note).
31. (1922) P.Ct. '22, 91.
32. (1923) P.Ct. '23-'25, 18.
33. (1924) P.Ct. '23-'25, 135.
34. (1898) Ren. 145.
Kf-----
34
or a doc time nt Amarquaye v. Broener
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U.T.C.; or, in the case of a gift to a concubine, if a party 
fails to plead a native custom, English Law applies and the 
Statutes of Limitation operate: Hughes v, Davies: (1909),
F.Ct. Ren.556, reversing the trial judge, Hen* 550.
Native law and the native courts do not recognise limita­
tion of actions; and did not recognise res judicata. There 
was no such thing as a stale claim; and any claim might be 
re-opened.
Since prescription and limitation of actions as known to 
English law do not usually govern dealings with land held under 
native tenure in the Gold Coast, the courts have called in aid 
other doctrines and devices to deal with cases where the poss­
ession of an occupier, and perhaps the negligence of the true
? owner, might otherwise bring about an unjust result. These
! •-
devices are: estoppel; laches; innocent purchaser for value.
4. ESTOPPEL.
Estoppel is a rule of evidence, or a rule of procedure, 
under which in certain circumstances a party is estopped from 
denying a fact which by his conduct or words he has represented 
to be true; and the other party must have spent money or done 
an act on his wrong faith in the truth of this representation. 
For our purposes here estoppel by word or conduct - estoppel 
in pais - is our principal concern; estoppel per rem judicatam
35.(1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 188.
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is really a fundamental principle of the validity of judgements
and not a rule of evidence#
Estoppel is only a defence» and not a cause of action.
The estoppel present in cases involving long possession
is usually by conduct, in that the true owner, by failure to
assert his rights over a long period, or by acquiescence in an
occupier's holding himself out as owner, is to be taken to imply
that he consents to such possession or conduct, or at least
that he is debarred from asserting the contrary. An example
might be where a member of a family holds himself out to the
world as owner; his family permit him to do so; a purchaser
from the member in good faith is evicted by the family. The
family are estopped by their conduct from denying the member's
37
right to convey - Russell v. Martin; Basel Mission Factory 
38
v. Suapim. Brandforth Griffith, C.J#, said in Russell's Case 
that:
MIn every case in which a member of a family 
holds himself out as owner and is allowed to 
so hold himself out, very satisfactory evid­
ence is required to prove that the land or 
house is not his sole property#1
And Orampton Smyly, C,J., said in Basel Mission Factory v .
Suapim:
36. But see Kofi v. Twum: (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 165, for some 
of the limitations on the use of estoppel as a defence#
37. (1900) Ren. 193 ^
38. (1911) D. & P# 'H- '16, 13.
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"In my opinion where one member of a family 
holds himself out to the public as the owner 
of real property, it is essential that the 
family should have some Independent corrobora­
tion, if they wish to set up some private 
arrangement between themselves, for the pur­
pose of defeating his creditors,"
39
Another case was Miller v. Kwayisl. where the occupier 
had paid no rent or tribute to the stool of Akwapim - the true 
owners - for eighty years; it was held that "the stool by their 
own conduct and acquiescence are now estopped, therefore, from 
disputing the plaintiff's title".
These decisions are perhaps in line with the law in Eng­
land, where it has been held that one who culpably stands by 
and allows another to hold himself out to the world a3 the owner
of property, and thereby to sell it to a bona fide purchaser,
40 ,
cannot afterwards assert his title against the latter. (This
indicates a link with the doctrine of innocent purchaser for
41
value, which is considered below). It is uncertain what line 
is to be drawn between estoppel and equitable estoppel, which 
is also a defence In equity.
Equitable estoppel rests mainly on the acquiescence of the 
owner, operating by way of estoppel. Lapse of time as such is 
irrelevant if all the five ingredients mentioned below occur.
In general, if A stands by while B infringes A's right, A will 
be unable to assert his title if:
39. (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 7.
40. Cf. Gregg v. Wells: (1830) 10 Ad. & El. 90.
41. See p.716.
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(i) B was mistaken as to his rights, and was unaware 
of A's rights.
(ii) B spends money, or does an act (to his detriment) 
on the faith of his own misbelief.
(iii) A is aware of his legal rights.
(iv) A knows of B*s mistaken belief.
(v) A either directly encourages B, or else abstains
42
from asserting his legal rights.
5. LACHES.
It will be observed that equitable estoppel bears some
relation to the doctrine of laches, which is also an equitable 
43
defence. The main elements in this defence are:
(i) Infringement by B of A's rights.
(ii) Acquiescence by A in the infringement*
(iii) Change of B*s position brought about through 
this acquiescence.
(iv) A must have a legal right to take action, and 
fail to do so.
Lapse of time is generally evidence of acquiescence by A. 
If the lapse of time is gross, e.g., for 20 years, a claim may 
be rendered stale even without acquiescence in the change of 
B*s circumstances. Generally, laches operates only where
42. Cf. Savage v. Foster: (1723) 9 Mod. Rep. 35.
43. In fact, one might say that laches is merely a special 
case of equitable estoppel.
L
It
[
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44
there is no statutory bar.
The defence of laches is a dangerous and uncertain weapon
unless carefully handled by the courts; in this connexion it
is important to bear in mind the opinion of Lord Blackburn in
45
Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. on the subject:
"In Lindgay Petroleum Company v. Hurd (L.H.
§  P.(S. 239) it is said: The doctrine of laches
in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a 
technical doctrine. Where it would be practic­
ally unjust to give a remedy, either because the 
party has, by his donduct done that which might 
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of 
it, or where, by his conduct and neglect he has, 
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put 
the other party in a situation in which it would 
not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were 
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these 
cases lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case if an argument against relief, 
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon 
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to 
a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity 
of that defence must be tried upon principles sub­
stantially equitable. Two circumstances always 
important in such cases are the length of the de­
lay and the nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking 
the one course or the other, so far as relates to
the remedy. 9 I have looked in vain for any auth­
ority which gives a more distinct and definite rule 
than this; and I think, from the nature of the 
inquiry, it must always be a question of more or 
less, depending on the degree of diligence which 
might reasonably be required, and the degree of 
change which has occurred, whether the balance of
44. But where there is no period of limitation the maxim, 
"Equity follows the law", may operate, i.e., a Court of 
Equity will commonly withhold relief if the statutory per­
iod of limitation which would govern a common-law action 
has been allowed to pass without good reason.
45. (1878) L.R. 3 A.C. 1218, at p. 1279.
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Justice or injustice is in favour of granting
the remedy or with-holding it. The determination
of such a question must largely depend on the 
turn of mind of those who have to decide, and must 
therefore be subject to uncertainty; but that,
I think, is inherent in the nature of the inquiry.”
The essence of the doctrine of laches is thu3 the neglig­
ence by the owner in asserting his rights by action when he is 
in a position to do so, thus causing detriment to a person who 
innocently infringes those rights. As the maxim has it: 
vigil antibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt. Adverse poss­
ession, where it is innocent, and has caused possible detriment 
to the occupier through the negligence or acquiescence of the
owner, may raise the defence. Such negligence was present in
46
the case of Amoa v. Obll, where the owner was present and
raised no objection at a sale of his property which was without
his authority. The purchaser remained undisturbed in possess-
47ion for six years thereafter. And in the Bokitsl Case it 
was said that:
"/it is/ contrary to the principles of equity 
to allow the native law to apply in its entirety, 
such law being that the original owner can after 
any length of time and under any circumstances, 
obtain recovery whatever may be the detriment 
caused by the fact that original owner chose to 
sleep on his rights."
48The Bokitsi case was followed in Weytingh v. Bessaburo, where 
there was fifteen years* undisturbed possession by the domestics
46. (1885) P.L.R. 39.
47. (1902) P.L.R. 159, at, 160.
48. (1906) Ren. 427.
i
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of the true owner* In Kwad.joe v. Cud joe, where plaintiff 
(the true owner) sued the purchaser at an irregular judicial 
sale, the mere fact that defendant was innocent did not protect 
him* It was held that the balance of equities favoured the 
plaintiff.
The fact that the defendant occupier has made improvements
to the property is obviously of great relevance; and may debar
an owner from later asserting his claim to evict a trespasser.
50
This was the case in Stephens v. Blay. where Blay improved by 4 
putting up buildings, and plaintiff family's claim was held to 
fail on the ground that equity forbade their claiip, and that
thoy were estopped by conduct.
51
In a case before a native court, Danso v* Mans a, where
it . was, found that B had been in possession of A's cocoa-farm
under an invalid sale, the court held that the claim of the 
owner was barred by:
the fourteen years' possession of B; 
material Improvements made to the farm by B; 
the fact that A was present during the whole period 
in the village, and yet did nothing to rectify the situation.
The defence of laches is raised by the acquiescence of 
the true owner in the occupation of the trespasser. In the 
facts of Akan law one has to consider the type of possession
49. (1930) D.Ct. '29-'31, 25.
50. (1910) Ren. 578.
51. Kokofu Native Court.
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by the occupier, and in what the owner acquiesced. In this
connexion the decision of W.A.C.A. in the Nigerian case of
52
Oshodi v. Imoru is of great assistance. Kingdon, C.J., 
said (at p. 95):
f,It seems to me that in these cases there are 
two things which must be distinguished.
The first is acquiescence in occupation ,
over a period which would bar the original 7
overlord from bringing an action for ejectment 
as In the case of Akpan Awo v. Cookey Sam 
(2 N.L.R. 67).
And the second is such acquiescence as would 
servo to pass the original rights of the over­
lord to the occupier. Very much more is re­
quired to establish the second than the first."
It was found that the plaintiff family acquiesced in the
occupation but
"how can it be argued that the plaintiff or 
his family acquiesced in the alienation from 
them of their reversionary rights when they /• 
had no knowledge that such rights were being 
challenged or interfered with? There is no 
suggestion that the family gave prior acquies­
cence to the conveyance or sale...the evidence 
Is quite insufficient to justify a finding 
that the family acquiesced after the event in 
the conveyance In question, which would have 
the effect of abrogating the family's rever­
sionary interest."
The learned Chief Justice thus drew a valuable distinction bet­
ween acquiescence In occupation, and acquiescence In convey­
ance, stressing that though an owner's right to evict might be 
barred through his failure to take action, this did not imply
52. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 93.
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that his title to the property was also lost. Possession by 
the occupier might not be inconsistent with the title of the 
true owner.
Laches, as a defence, is thus not a method of acquiring
53
title by prescription. It was emphasized in Ado v. Wusu
that "the native custom is clear. ..that the ultimate ownership
remains in the original owner for all time". So many years'
undisturbed use may only entitle the occupier to continue farm-
54
ing indefinitely on payment of tribute - Ackon v. Kotoh; and
55it was held in Kuma v. Kuma that defendant could remain in 
possession undisturbed if he set up no adverse title. Plain­
tiff 's title was held proved, despite occupation by defendant's
people for six generations. In the Nigerian case of Ita v .
56
Asido a declaration of title to occupy in accordance with
native law and custom, and not of a title in fee simple, was
57
given; whilst in Dadzie v. Ko.lo plaintiff sued for a declar­
ation of title. The delay in bringing a claim was considered, 
but was held not to affect his claim:
!,If this were an action to recover possession, 
this matter of 'sleeping on his rights' might 
have to be carefully considered, but it is 
well-established Native Law and Custom that
rights of ownership are not extinguished by
lapse of time, and consequently the Plaintiff 
has not lost his right to the declaration he 
__________ seeks.”__(58)________________________________________
53. (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 24.
54. (1922) F.Ct. '22, 9.
55. (1938) P.O. 5 W.A.C.A. 4.
56. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 339.
57. (1940^ 6 W.A.C.A. 139.
58. At p. 140.
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When the occupation is by an individual claiming against
a stool, then it is likely that the occupier acquires only a
59
lesser interest. The occupier s interest may be less than 
full title when he has entered under a mortgage, lease, etc.; 
or where he is aware of the customary rule with regard to 
prescription?0
6, BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE,
There are really two distinct doctrines of ”bona fide 
purchaser for value”. The former is available only against 
the actual vendor and those claiming title under him, namely, 
that in consideration of the value which the vendor has rec­
eived he shall do everything in his power to implement his 
grant, and in particular shall allow the purchaser to stand in 
the vendor5s shoes and work out any remedy which might have 
been available to the latter. The second plea of ”bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice” applies where a purchaser 
from a legal owner endeavours to set up a title adverse to the 
beneficial estate. It is a single plea to be pleaded and 
proved as such. It is not a plea of bona fide purchaser for 
value to be met by a plea of notice. The type of case where 
the plea operates is that where the purchaser of the legal es­
tate alleges that he has no notice of equitable interests
59, Cf. Akesse v. Ababio: (1935) 2 W.A.C.A, 264;
Owusu v,.Manche of Labadi: (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 278.
60. Cf. Ado v. Wusu.
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governing that estate; the lack of notice is vital to the 
plea. This element requires that the purchaser must show 
that he has taken all possible precautions to Investigate any 
interests affecting the estate; i.e., he is bound not only by 
those interests of which he has actual notice, but by those of 
which he had constructive notice as well. A purchaser who 
has not been diligent in investigating the title of his vendor 
will be affected by notice of those interests which he would 
have discovered by reasonable enquiry.
In the facts of Gold Coast, more especially by reason of 
the multiplicity of interests which families, stools or indi­
viduals may have in any given parcel, and of the customary 
modes of conveyance, which are designed to ensure that those 
holding concurrent interests in the subject-matter shall either
actively consent in dealings with it, or at least be aware of■*
such dealings, such a rule is required, and a purchaser should 
be put on enquiry.
It does not appear from the decided cases that the limita­
tions of the doctrine have always been borne in mind in the 
Gold Coast; sometimes the reports are too sparse to follow its 
application to the facts of a particular case. The doctrine 
has, however, been invoked in some cases, especially involving 
the sale of family land.
The general rule of law is that nemo dat quod non habet: 
if A sell&- B's property without authority to C, an innocent
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purchaser for value, it is obvious that when the fraud (or 
honest mistake) is discovered one of two innocent parties, B 
or C, must suffer. Normally C will get nothing; but if B is 
not entirely innocent, but has acquiesced or been guilty of 
negligence, then laches or estoppel may operate to the benefit 
of C. Or B may be taken to have impliedly adopted the sale to 
C. The case is similar where A, a member of a family F, and 
holding an inherited interest, purports to sell to B (passing 
the entire estate) title to the property, including F*s inter­
est. If A does so without the authority of P, nothing passes. 
Had P ,s interest been merely equitable, then the doctrine of 
innocent purchaser might have operated. The doctrine says in 
general terms that a bona fide purchaser for value of land ac­
quires it free of equitable interests of which he is innocent 
(lie., innocent sifter making all enquiries which he ought to 
have made), but not free of legal interests, whether he had 
notice of them or not. Juristically, a family's interest in 
inherited property held by one of its members is not equitable 
but legal; the member does not hold the legal interest on 
trust for the family, nor are the family trustees of the legal 
estate, holding it in trust for the individual member. It is 
therefore difficult to follow how the doctrine can be applied
61
to such a case as we have given. The ratio of Boodoo v. Bissa
61. (1910) P.Ct. Ren. 585; the details of the case emerge more 
clearly from the report at first instance in Earn. 35 
(esp. p. 37).
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Is thus difficult to discover.
The fact of the innocence of the purchaser may be relevant 
if he wishes to raise a defence of laches or estoppel.
Many cases where family land has been sold irregularly 
reach the courts; some of them have already been considered 
elsewhere; but it might be worthwhile to examine same of the 
implications raised by decided cases. We consider the case 
where members of a family P have irregularly sold family land 
to A, without the knowledge or approval of B, a member of the 
family, whose consent is essential to the sale.
(i) As regards A*s position, the sale is void accord-
63
ing to G-alslwa v. Akraba; and voidable (i.e., valid until re­
pudiated) according to Boodoo v. Bissa (already cited) and
64
Bayaidee v. Mensah.
(ii) As regards P, a family can apparently be bound
by the act of some of its members, according to Insilhea v.
65
Simons and Boodoo v. Bissa. Where a third party is involved, 
the knowledge of one member will be attributed as knowledge of
the family; but apparently this constructive knowledge will
become effective only after some lapse of time*
(iii) Consequently, it appears that the Courts will
hold that the family is guilty of laches, if some members of it
62. See under SALE, at pp. 374c et seq.
63. (1896) P.L.R. 94.
64. (1878) Ren. 45.
65. (1899) P.L.R. 104.
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are so guilty* This is a very hard doctrine, even if the Eng­
lish rule ahout constructive notice to fellow-trustees is 
quoted in support (though this is not really comparable)* Why 
should not such a rule apply also in the case of a member's 
private debt, and constructive notice to and the acquiescence 
of the family in the debt not be similarly presumed? And 
again (if we adopt this reasoning), why should execution ag­
ainst a joint-tenant affect only his interest in the property 
subject to the joint-tenancy?
(iv) As for B's rights, B's Interest in P's property 
is not legal, since the members of a family do not have a joint 
tenancy in the family property (there being no partition): fam­
ily property is owned by the family, a single legal person.
Nor would it be correct to term B's interest equitable, since, 
inter alia* native custom has never heard of equity. It is 
doubtful whether B has any remedy against the land* Nor app­
arently has B any right of action against the family, the
courts having held that a member of a family cannot sue other
66
members for an account, or for apportionment* It appears that 
B is without a remedy; in any case, mere monetary compensation 
would be of little value.
But apart from B's interest or right as member of the 
family in the property, he may also have a personal right in 
that property. If the property is a family house, B may have
66. See FAMILY, pp. 220-1, ante.
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a right of occupation in it. Then the sale is surely voidable 
if it takes place without B*s knowledge or consent. It is pos­
sible that B's right of residence might be overreached by an
otherwise valid conveyance to an innocent purchaser for value.
67
The Nigerian case of Lawani v. Tadeyo provides a pointer to 
the solution of this problem. It laid down that if A is owner 
of a house In which lives B, who has a right to reside there 
during good behaviour, and if A's right, title and interest 
are sold by a judicial sale to C, then:
(I) not only does B have a continued right to reside 
in the house;
but (ii) C cannot exercise A's power to evict B for mis­
behaviour. As regards laches, the laches of the rest of the 
family may serve to bind B also (for example, if the sale takes 
place whilst B is absent) as regards title to the property it­
self; but it surely cannot also serve to bar B's personal 
right, viz., of residence.
68
The line of cases following Manko v. Bonso. requiring a
family to act l!timeouslytt to set aside a sale of family land 
made
/without the necessary concurrence of Its members, has been
69
criticised by Jackson, J., recently. He referred to
67. (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 57.
68. For which see ante, at p. 375.
69. In an unnamed appeal to the Supreme Court, Eastern Divi­
sion, Land Court, Accra, on 31 May 1951, of which I rec­
eived a note from Mr. H.E. Devaux, then Acting Senior 
Judicial Adviser.
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"the decisions of these Courts which have held 
repeatedly that sales of family land, made 
without the concurrence of the members of the 
family are not void but voidable11;
and went on to declare:
"In my judgment, with great respect, these 
decisions go perilously hear to the wind to 
destroy one of the factors which goes to the 
very root of the validity of a sale by cus­
tomary law and which Sarbah has described as 
being necessary for the constitution of a 
valid sale." (70)
7. SQUATTERS AND CUSTOMARY LAW.
As v/e are aware from the previous discussion, the custom­
ary law did not recognize prescription. If a man unwittingly 
cultivated another's land, then he could be ejected after any 
period of time. He acquired no right in the land, and he had
no right to remove crops he might have planted there. (This
71
last point is confirmed by Acquainoo v. Abiram, where it was 
held that a trespasser has no right to the crops which he has 
planted on the land on which he trespassed, once judgement for 
trespass has been given against him. The trespasser cannot 
cannot enter to remove the crops.) Two different cases really 
arise: (a) a stranger cultivates virgin stool land, and makes
farms thereon;
(b) a trespasser cultivates land which belongs to
70. At p. 27 of the judgment. The learned judge was 
referring to the requirement that the family must 
consent to dealings with the property of the family.
71. (1910) Earn. 43.
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another individual, even if the letter's interest is only a 
citizen's interest, dependent on the title of his stool.
(a) Against a stool: Squatters may by lapse of time and 
the acquiescence of the stool acquire the right to continue 
cultivation indefinitely, provided they pay tribute, or some­
times (e.g., where a stool has deliberately failed to exact 
tribute from them, or evict them) to continue cultivation free 
provided they assert no claim to absolute title for themselves 
or for the stool they serve.
(b) Against an Individual: A certain amelioration is det­
ectable in the decisions of native courts in such cases. Al-
72
though, said an informant, the customary rule that it is not 
possible to acquire title by lapse of time is still recognised, 
if A makes a cocoa farm on apparently forest-land which he 
does not know belongs to anyone, and, after being in occupation 
for some time, is attacked by B, who proves that he has an 
ancestral right to the land, then, although the Native Court 
will recognise B's title, it will make an equitable order. It 
will declare that the farm shall be physically divided, two 
parts going to the farmer, and one part to the land-owner. 
Thenceforward, each party will be the true owner of the res­
pective portions. The average length of occupation for the 
practice to operate was given as ten .to fifteen years. If the
72. Prom New Juaben.
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period is less, then the court will merely order the return 
of the land and farm to B, the owner. For the rule to apply, 
the possession must be bona fide. Occupation mala fide des­
troys this wequitable" claim. The order of the court rec­
ognizes the title of the true owner, but through its division 
of the property effects a judicial transfer of title. The 
rule thus compensates those who innocently make improvements 
on another's land. It was specifically stated that the 
practice doe3 not apply to cases where stools find strangers 
farming on stool land. In such a case (given at (a) above), 
the stool will either evict the stranger, or allow him to farm 
on payment of abusa. However long a stranger squatted, he
could acquire only farming rights, since his possession is
73, 74
different in nature from that of the stool.
73. The Nigerian case of Oloto v. John: (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 127, 
discusses when, if ever, a court will protect “squatting 
possession11.
74. Long occupation of land has been the subject of Judicial 
Adviser's Circular to Native Courts. No. 13.
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CHAPTER XIII,
REGISTRATION OP LAUD,
A> INTRODUCTORY.
It is not proposed to consider in detail here the argu­
ments for or against registration of land^ It Is, however, 
necessary to say something in a general way about the methods 
and meaning of registration, and to mention previous history 
in the Cold Coast and elsewhere of attempts at registration*
1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN REGISTRATION OP DEEDS, AND 
“ “  ~ ~  ' ! REGISTRATION OP TlTLS.
It is necessary to make this distinction patent, because 
some persons have been led astray into thinking that any system 
of registration of deeds can ever serve the purposes envisaged 
for a proper system of registration of title*
There is already in existence in the Gold Coast (as in 
England also), a Registry of Deeds: the salient fact about such 
registration is that it Is the parties to the deed who are sig­
nificant, and not the parcel of land conveyed* It is imposs­
ible, by consulting a Registry of Deeds, to see clearly, If at 
all, the history and present state of any parcel of land at
1. The reader is referred to Land Registration, by Sir Ernest 
Dowson and V#L#0. Sheppard, for an analysis of the prin­
ciples and practice of registration. What is put forward 
below should be read with this authoritative work in mind.
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law. A system of registration which records the changes in 
Interest relating to parcels of land by reference to those 
parcels is essential. Such a system registers interests and 
not deeds, and is commonly referred to as "registration of 
title". The kind of title registered is insignificant here, 
except that one mu3t point out that the titles registered may 
be either possessory, with reference to the actual occupation 
of the land; or proprietary, with reference to the ownership 
of Interests in the land.
2. THE HEED FOR A SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION IN THE
GOLD COAST.
That the only solution to the problem of land tenure in 
the Gold Coast is a system of land-registration has long been 
evident; but Governments have hesitated to attempt such an 
enterprise for various reasons, whioh are considered in full 
at C. (below).
It appears that only by registration will the present con­
fusion as to the scope and nature of Interests in land there be
2
resolved, and the consequent litigation greatly diminished.
2. Cf. the dictum by the President of W.A.C.A. in Amule v . 
Sablh: (1949) (unrep: Civil Appeal No. 33/48), when he 
said: "I would add that the uncertainty that prevails 
about the tenure of the Brazilian Community>s land is yet 
another illustration of the urgent need for a system of 
land registration in urban areas in this Colony. It is 
to be hoped that the recommendations of the Havers report 
in that respect will be implemented in the near future."
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Gold Coast Is unlike 3ome other British African territories 
in that no claim by right of conquest or statute is at present 
made by the Crown to the ultimate title in the land (except in 
the case of the Northern Territories, by the Land and Native 
Rights Ordinance, cap. 121); and the forms of tenure of land 
existing when the British came continue with modifications to 
the present day. Hence it is impossible to give a snap answer 
- such as may be possible in other territories - to the quest­
ion: "who owns the ultimate title to the land?”
At various times in the past it has been suggested that 
the Crown, to protect the interests of the inhabitants, should 
assume the ultimate title to land in the Gold Coast, holding 
the land in trusteeship for the indigenes; but such suggest­
ions have been strongly resisted by African public opinion 
(under the misconception that this would weaken or destroy 
their rights), and such a solution is not now feasible.
Litigation over land has had an undue share in the activ­
ities of the people, it being a road to financial exhaustion 
for individuals, families, and stools. Whether or not it is 
a substitute for tribal warfare (as has been jocularly suggest­
ed), there is no doubt that it should be severely curtailed in 
the best economic Interests of the people*
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B* MAIN REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OP TITLE TO LAND,
These are indicated here so that the reader may easily 
see what has to be done, and how, before registration Is feas­
ible or accomplished in the Gold Coast; and in particular, 
the obstacles presented by difficulties peculiar to the Gold 
Coast, or of particular importance therein*
1. SUBJECT-MATTER*
The first requirement is that the subject-matter should 
be accurately surveyed, having regard to the user to which the 
land is actually put, and the special needs of registration* 
This implies a process of cadastral survey* and adequate mark­
ing by pillars or otherwise*
2* INTERESTS*
Next, it is essential to decide:
(i) the kinds of interests which may exist in land, 
examining their nature, effects, etc.;
(ii) which interests should be registered, and which 
(if any) not registered;
(ill) whether the lesser interests, and if so, which 
ones, should be registered as charges or conditions on major 
or absolute interests;
(iv) whether registration should be possessory* or 
proprietary*
729
As to (i), it cannot be said that there is yet sufficient 
evidence as to conditions of tenure - distinguished area by 
area - to permit an immediate registration. Some of this in­
formation must be gathered at or about the time of registration 
(as is done in the case of Forest Reserves); but the rest must 
be already available before registration is initiated. Most 
important is it that juristic evaluation of such interests and 
their place in the combined British-African legal framework of 
the Gold Coast should be undertaken without delay; if the knot 
is too tangled to unravel by reason alone, it must be severed 
by the Alexandrine method - in this case legislation.
As to (ii) and (iii), these decisions must be taken to­
gether, having regard to the professed aims of registration - 
certainty, protection of legitimate interests, reduction of 
litigation; and more especially whilst keeping in mind the 
fact that registration, however worked, will produce some alter­
ation in the substantive law or custom. This last is so be­
cause the jump is here not from a system of conveyance by deed
to one by registration (as in England), but from unwritten
3
transfer to transfer by means of a register.
As to (iv), the answer to this question can no doubt best 
be given by the experts on registration; but it does appear 
that registration of possessory title would do little to achieve 
the objects of registration mentioned above; though it might
3, I.e., involving two jumps Instead of one.
be better than no registration at all.
3. SETTLEMENT AND PROCEDURE.
The subject-matter, the land, having been adequately sur­
veyed, and the interests which may exist therein ascertained, 
the next step is the matching of the one to the other by a pro­
cess of settlement. Settlement is a dual process: settlement
of title, and settlement of boundaries.
la) Settlement of Title:
By this is meant that the settlement officer must decide 
what interests subsist in the subject-matter, and in favour of 
which parties.
(b ) Settlement of boundaries:
This must be done concurrently with settlement of title, 
so as to indicate not only the legal extent of interests found 
to exist in the land, but their spatial extent also.
Once these interests and boundaries have been settled, then 
they must be recorded permanently by means of registers and 
plans. Little need be said about this side of registration, 
since the general principles behind the organisation and com­
pilation of registers are sufficiently well knov/n.
4. EFFECTS OF REGISTRATION.
The general desired effect of registration in other 
countries has been to substitute conveyance by register for 
conveyance by deeds. Hence it is most important that:-
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(a) The title given by an entry in a Register should not 
be generally open to challenge.
(b) Instruments affecting the land should have no force 
unless registered.
(a) Is the aim to give an indefeasible title by registra­
tion attainable, or only a pious wish? It is obvious that 
registration of possessory title cannot from its very nature 
bring indefeasibility. Such registration is evidentiary 
rather than conclusive. Registration of possessory title can, 
however, be converted by lapse of time into registration of 
proprietary title, if it is provided that a possessory title 
unchallenged for a certain number of years shall ipso facto 
become an indefeasible proprietary title.
Sufficient allowance must be made for mistakes or fraud; 
but apart from this it should be made plain that titles will 
not be contestable after a certain fixed time.
It is not essential to a system of registration that all 
interests affecting a parcel should be registered; in fact, a 
multiplicity of equitable interests, easements and common 
rights on the register would defeat the purpose of registration 
by clogging the machine. I consider that indefeasibility is 
possible; but, to achieve it, it is necessary that the req­
uirements detailed above be met, and that the machinery should 
not break down or become congested once the initial settlement 
and registration have taken place.
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(b) To this end, it is necessary to make registration 
complete and compulsory. A piecemeal registration is worse 
than none at all. This must not be taken to imply that the 
whole country should be registered simultaneously; all it means 
is that within a specified block no parcels of land not regis­
tered should be allowed to exist. Any system which leaves it 
to the choice of the individual whether he registers or not 
will not secure uniformity of registration. Hence it will be 
essential that, within the block, registration should be com­
pulsory for all holders of registrable interests in land. As 
will be seen when we consider registration in the context of 
Gold Coast land tenure below, certain existing blocks and def­
ined areas are already available,;of which use should be made.
C. PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES IN THE GOLD COAST.
Although the champions of registration maintain that sys­
tems of registration can be devised for any type of tenure, it 
is hardly surprising that special circumstances are encountered 
in different areas which call for appropriate solutions. Such 
is the case with the Gold Coast.
1. SUBJECT-MATTER.
The Gold Coast has in general been very adequately sur­
veyed, considering the natural obstacles and the paucity of
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resources In men and materials for such a survey. This survey 
is not, however, generally cadastral, nor is it on a large 
enough scale to satisfy the requirements of registration. 
Registration will call for an abnormal effort from the survey­
ors, so that one naturally looks for methods which will be com­
prehensive yet economical in effort and time. Survey by air 
photographs may be of some help in this regard; but the fact 
that a large part of the lower Gold Coast is forested and lacks 
clearly defined natural features is a drawback.
To descend to detail, boundaries are rarely if ever In-
5
dlcated - at least not in a manner visible from the air; and 
the land Is put to many uses which may call for distinct meth­
ods of mapping.
It is presumed that if survey is decided upon, defic­
iencies of personnel will be met, and adequate systems of 
marking points or boundaries devised or adopted.
2. INTERESTS.
It is when we turn to the Interests capable of subsisting 
In land that one of our main difficulties is met. These
4. And It appears that even at the present time the shortage 
of trained surveyors is much felt. The problem of train­
ing sufficient surveyors for the work of registration 
appears almost unsurmountable; It might be partially 
evaded by confining registration to smaller blocks to 
begin with.
5. Ways in which boundaries may be marked are indicated at 
pp. 147, and 365 et seq.
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difficulties arise from
(a) the multiplicity of interests;
(b) lack of knowledge of them,
(a) Multiplicity of interests:
The severance of ownership of land from ownership of the 
things in or on land leads to confusion for a person trained 
in European systems of law. This implies a stratification of 
Interests, and that registration will have to be vertical as 
well as horizontal in extent. The descending chain of inter­
ests from absolute ownership through individual usufructuary 
interest to lesser interests (of, for example,a caretaker or 
pledgee) should have been sufficiently revealed by previous 
chapters not to need further exposition. Theoretically, there 
is no limit, either upward or downward, to this chain of inter­
ests, There is here a complete contrast with the English law, 
which recognizes a title (that of a person seised of a fee 
simple absolute In possession) beyond which it is impossible 
to go. But in the Gold Coast one cannot say that the absolute
interest of today might not become a dependent interest to- 
6
morrow.
(b) Lack of knowledge:
It is impossible to say today what interests in fact exist 
in any one area out of the possible choices. It Is possible 
to formulate general principles, but their application in
6. Cf, the effect of the restoration of the Ashanti Confederacy.
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detail may vary from area to area. It will be recommended 
that settlement officers should - at the same time as they 
record the interests of individuals for a particular area from 
their knowledge of the principles - also record the detailed 
application of those principles.
The fact, then, that we do not as yet know in complete 
detail the land tenure of all areas should not deter us from 
beginning registration (although this has operated as a det­
errent in the past).
3. SETTLEMENT.
The practical difficulties of registration in the Gold
Coast are more formidable than the theoretical. The settlement
of boundaries (always a vexed question) already occupies a con-
7
siderable amount of the courts' time. The Boundaries Ascert­
ainment Ordinance, cap. 118, which might appear to facilitate 
the settlement of disputed boundaries, is of little real assist 
ance, since it does not permit a judge to lay down a fair 
boundary, but only to declare where the boundary is as a fact. 
Settlement of boundaries is thus at present a question of fact; 
and much fact has to be gone into in order to ascertain a 
particular boundary. In addition, settlement of a boundary
7. Mr. T. Button-Mills, giving evidence before the Be If ie Id
Commission, was unduly optimistic when he said (p.46,para.5);
Rl" am inclined to think that the owners of land
are able to define their boundaries. Intertribal
boundaries are easily ascertained.11
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for one set of parties may operate in customary law to settle 
it for another set of parties. The legal position to he ad­
opted by the court's is not, however, clear. An instance may 
be given:
Stool A, which serves Paramount Stool X, 
has a boundary dispute with Stool B, which 
serves Paramount Stool Y; judgement is 
given fixing the boundary between A and B,
Does this judgement operate as an estoppel 
by record against X and Y?
A point such as this will have to be settled in the legis­
lation authorizing registration, in order to avoid multiplicity 
of disputes on similar facts.
The registration of boundaries with reference to a 
cadastral plan will also occasion difficulties. It is said 
that the accuracy of such a plan may be varied according to 
the user to which land is subject in a given area - the accur­
acy may be to so many feet if the land is planted with trees 
in rows, to inches if planted with annual crops (e.g., ground­
nuts) in rows; and to use a higher standard of accuracy than 
this is obviously a waste of effort.
But in the Gold Coast the user of land varies from place 
to place, and from year to year. The land may be occupied by 
virgin-forest, cultivated land reverted to secondary forest, 
cocoa, rubber, palm-trees, and smaller crops (e.g., yams, 
cassava, plantain, pepper, groundnuts). Nor is it usual to 
find cultivation in rows. An errof of six inches might change
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the ownership of a cocoa tree. The difficulties experienced 
by the Cocoa Rehabilitation Survey in this matter are illumin­
ating*
It is in the matter of the settlement of titles or inter­
ests that one must expect the major stumbling-block to speedy 
registration to appear. The settlement officer, faced almost 
inevitably with a mass of conflicting claims, will have little 
to guide him but a patient examination of the evidence, and a 
shrewd ability to spot the lie or liar. Physical examination 
of the land by himself will be of a little help, but may be 
deceptive. If two men, A and B, are fanning adjacent plots, 
the first, A, may have acquired his farm himself (it is ‘self- 
acquired property*); the second, B, may have inherited his 
farm (it is then 'family property*). Hence A will have an 
absolute interest (or an interest qualified by the superior 
right of a stool), while B will have a limited interest dep­
endent on a family interest* Yet to the casual eye of the ob­
server both A and B will farm their lands in the same way, and 
there will be no external evidence of the difference in inter­
est between them.
One of the major aims of the introduction of registration 
is to cut down litigation; the effect of the inquiry by the 
settlement officer will be to raise all disputes affecting the 
land at the same time, and indeed to revive disputes that are 
dormant. Necessarily, especially if registration is to give
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an Indefeasible title, the settlement officer mast determine 
such disputes in a judicial frame of mind, and with a judicial 
procedure; hence the immediate result of the introduction of 
registration will be to encourage that which it is desired to 
reduce, and more litigation and not less will be the first con­
sequence* This is a matter which must be faced and overcome, 
and should not mean that registration is to be abandoned as un­
workable, It serves to indicate the onerous nature of a 
settlement officer’s duties, and the time which must elapse 
before registration is a fact,
4, EFFECTS,
Will registration in the Gold Coast in fact achieve its 
aims? One of those alms is almost certain to be that a reg­
istered title should be in theory indefeasible; and it should 
in practice be easily ascertainable by reference to the reg­
ister.
No-one who has seen either the attitude of mind of the 
Gold Coast public to their land, or land in general, on the one 
hand; and the methods by which a claim (sometimes baseless) is 
pursued through the courts on the other; can doubt that the 
sleeping dogs of dispute will not be finally caunltted to eter­
nal rest in the all-embracing arms of a register, but will 
rather be re-awoken at every opportunity and by every means.
The African litigant will admit defeat only temporarily, when
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his funds are exhausted; the practitioner will use every pro­
cedural device to prevent a final decision being given*
It is necessary in the legislation to make provision for 
the honest case of mistake or fraud (if the paradox will be 
permitted); this implies equal investigation of cases where 
fraud is dishonestly alleged. Even if it produces injustice, 
it would be better to provide that fraud could be alleged with­
in, say, six years of the date of registration as a matter of 
course, exceptionally thereafter within, say, fourteen years; 
and that at the end of that period the title would become in­
defeasible even if fraudulent in the first place.
A further difficulty may arise in regard to the Registries; 
such registries, to be of use, must be sited locally. It will 
be essential to make provision for their ready accessibility, 
sound and honest custody, and for the prevention of deletions, 
substitutions, and the like. Microfilm copies kept centrally 
may be the answer to this difficulty. Another solution sug­
gested is that records should be maintained centrally for ease 
of working and supervision. In any case there should be two 
sets of registers to minimise the danger of fraud.
5. PUBLIC OPINION.
Last, but by no means least, comes the question of the 
public's attitude to the introduction of registration and to 
its continued working thereafter. Any matter touching the
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land affects the African deeply, and he has always shown him­
self suspicious of any legislation or control - even where 
evidently intended for his own good and protection - over his 
ownership or use of land. One need only refer to such dis­
parate events as the protest against the proposed Lands legis- 
lation at the turn of the century, and the later protest against 
”cutting-out” of diseased cocoa-trees, to confirm this state­
ment.
The African's main suspicion will he that registration 
will alter his rights in land, rather than protect them; that, 
in effect, a new system of land-tenure will come into being. 
Such fears - although strenuously contradicted by the expert 
proponents of registration - are not idle ones: the appearance
of ”mailon lands in Uganda is a sufficient example. The change 
will be overnight from a loose unformalized system of tenure | 
and methods of creation and transfer of rights, to a higjily- 
foranallzed and sophisticated mode of transfer, meat too strong 
for many English tastes. One must therefore allay such fears 
by a publicity campaign, but more especially by affording to 
the suspicious visible examples of the superior economic bene­
fits which registration will bring. The argument of increase 
financial gain is one which cannot long be resisted by homo 
oeconomicu3t and especially by the species Africanus; but such
8. Against the Land Bill. 1894; and the Public Lands 
Bill. 1897.
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motivation - despite the opinion of some socialists - is not 
an unworthy one* The first field chosen for registration 
must therefore he one where the chances of failure are neglig­
ible, and where the population are already partly accustomed 
to registers. That is why the unofficial experiments exposed 
at D.^ t* below are of such value.
D* PRESENT PROGRESS IN THE GOLD COAST.
It is proposed in this section to examine official and 
non-official action in certain limited spheres by which certain 
of the aims and objects of registration have already been 
achieved, or which could form part of the foundations of a sys­
tem of land-registration. Some of these actions have been of 
temporary importance, some have been of little effect, but all 
are instructive*
1. OFFICIAL*
DEEDSi
(a) Registration of Deeds.
By the Land Registry Ordinance. (1895), cap. 112, which, 
despite its title, does not concern Itself with the registra­
tion of land, registration of deeds is permitted, and machin­
ery therefor is provided.
(i) The authority of the ordinance: the Ordinance 
is permissive and not mandatory* It does not (s» 5} command
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registration, but rather seeks to recommend itself to a party
by the advantages which registration of his instrument can
bring. It achieves this object by conferring priority (s. 20
9
(1)) on registered as against unregistered instruments, and
also by ensuring a permanent record of a transaction, which
cannot be tampered with.
(11) Kinds of deeds registered; Any * instrument *
can be registered (s. 5). ‘Instrument* is defined as:
wany writing affecting land situate in the Gold
Coast, including a Judge*s certificate.(s. 2)
Such instrument must contain (s. 6)
na description which shall include a statement 
of the boundaries, extent, and situation of 
the land affected by it, or a sufficient ref­
erence to the date and particulars of regis­
tration of an instrument affecting the same 
land and already registered.1
Wills may be registered.
Certified (validated) concessions must be registered by 
virtue of the Concessions Ordinance. 1939.
(iii) Effects of registration: registered instru­
ments take priority as against other instruments affecting the 
same land from the date of registration (s. 20(1) and s. 22).
Wills which are registered take effect from the date of 
registration (s. 21); but exceptionally from the date of the
I
i
i
! 9. But, according to Dofah v. Williams: (1922) P.Ct. *22, 99,
the Ordinance gives no priority to a later registered con­
veyance over a previous oral sale by native custom of the 
same land.
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death of the testator.
The Ordinance requires that deeds submitted for registra­
tion and transferring or charging an interest in land should, 
as a rule, contain a plan of the land affected sufficient for 
its identification (s, 6): this requirement is sometimes
dispensed with,
BOUNDARIES:
(b) The Boundary, Land, Tribute, and Fishery Disputes
(Executive Decisions" Validation) Ordinance, (1929) 
cap, 120: *
provided for the validation of certain executive decisions 
with regard to disputed boundaries, etc,, in Ashanti, these 
validated decisions thenceforth having the force of a Judgement 
with regard to such boundaries. The boundaries so decided 
were marked - usually by pillars - and recorded in official 
Boundary Books, so that future disputes regarding such bound­
aries should not have arisen?*0 This has not entirely been 
the case: validated boundaries have been challenged, it being
for instance alleged that
(1) there is a discrepancy between the boundary book 
and the boundary marked on the ground;
(2) the pillars have been moved;
10, Of, Ohene of Assachere v, Ohene of Dadlasl: (1941) 7 
W.A.C.A. 86:-
n.,.these two exhibits were Validated Executive 
Decisions which in my opinion are under section 
3 (1) of Chapter 120 given the effect of judg­
ments in rem except only as against the Crown,"
744
(3) the pillars have been destroyed or disappeared;
(4) there was an error in description or survey 
irreconcilable with later and more accurate survey;
(5) the interests between which the boundary was 
drawn were not the correct ones, or were misunderstood;
(6) the original decision was made as a result of 
the fraud of one party;
(7) the boundary is inoperative as regards other 
parties and other interests*
It will thus be seen that registration of boundaries has 
not put an entire end to disputes.
(c) The Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Ordinance.
(fro. 49 of 1950):
The object of this Ordinance is to determine the boundar­
ies between the lands of stools. In the past these have been 
a fruitful source of litigation, litigation aggravated by un­
certainty as to past history, as to the legal effect of past
events, as to the distinction between jurisdiction and owner-
M  11 ship.
The present ordinance does not attempt to distinguish 
in terms between jurisdiction and ownership: it merely com­
mands the Settlement Commissioner to settle the boundaries, 
whether jurisdictional or proprietary (and these may well be 
different)._____________________. __________
11. Compare the dictum of Mr. T. Hutton-Mills, at p. 46 of 
the Belfield Report:
1 inter tribal boundarie s are easily ascertained.”
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The Jurisdiction of Native Authorities is at present as­
certained for the purposes of the different Native Authority 
12
Ordinances (and other ordinances such as that creating elect-
respect of
oral districts and sub-districts) by reference to the area in/ 
which a Paramount Chief is customarily elected. This is of 
course a definition which does not define, since the matter 
frequently in dispute is exactly that: in respect of what area
is a Paramount Chief elected? Ignorance of the spatial limits 
of a Native Authority's Jurisdiction means, in particular, dis­
putes over the competing Jurisdictions of two native courts, 
over questions of liability to annual rate or tax, and over 
liability to pay the rent, tribute or tax demanded of a 
stranger-farmer.
The Ordinance is thus a first and courageous step in the 
direction of registration of land, but leaves unanswered as 
many questions as it answers. Its particular usefulness will 
be in facilitating the formation of the new local councils; 
and - in the sphere of registration - of delimiting a block 
within which complete registration may later take place.
12. Cap. 79 (Ashanti) s. 2, under the definition of "Division1*; 
Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance, s. 2, sub nom. "state 
(The Local Government OrdinanceT 1951, ha3 of course 
altered the system of local government; but it appears 
likely that the Councils which the Minister may, by s. 3, 
establish will be set up with reference to the existing 
states and divisions - so that the difficulty mentioned 
in the text will still exist.)
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RIGHTS AND BOUNDARIES:
(d) The Forests Ordinance; (1927) Cap. 122:
By this Ordinance provision was made (s. 5) for the de­
limitation of forest reserves so proclaimed by Government, and 
for dealing with questions of ownership and interest therein.
In particular, the Stool's ultimate titles to the forest land 
were under consideration, and also the interests of farmers in 
the land, and communal rights over the land and forest-produce. 
The Reserve Settlement Commissioners who were appointed 
under the Ordinance -proceed by way of enquiry held locally (s, 
9): the results, and the rights recorded, are a little uneven
in quality.
Since the Ordinance was designed to protect existing 
rights and prevent the creation of new ones within the reserve 
(except under control), the boundaries of the individual hold­
ers were delimited and recorded; a copy of this record is kept 
and used by the Forestry Department for the administration of 
the reserve.
The aim of the Ordinance is thus closest to registration 
of land, and the experience of the Reserve Settlement Commiss­
ioners is of importance. It is worth noting some of the pro­
visions of the Ordinance:
The Reserve Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdiction 
(s. 10(1)) of a Court for the purposes of his enquiry; when 
ownership of land is disputed before him, he is directed ( ^
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by the Ordinance to refer such questions to a native court for 
13determination. He adopts their decision as his own.
Whilst the Ordinance says in clear terms that (s. 1? (1))
"the ownership of land within a Forest 
Reserve shall not be altered by its 
constitution as a Forest Reserve”,
yet claims to rights in the land affected by the Forest Reserve
not submitted to the Reserve Settlement Commissioner are in
general extinguished (s. 13).
Transfers of interests in land within a Forest Reserve 
are controlled by the Forestry Department, it being provided 
that (s. 18)
"rights in a Forest Reserve may not be 
alienated by sale, lease, mortgage, 
charge or transfer, unless and until 
the right-holder shall have given a 
written notification of his intention 
to the Conservator of Forests."
Despite this, conveyance is not by register, and prospective 
transferees do not investigate the transferor's title in a 
Register; nor does an entry in the record confer an indef­
easible title.
(e) The Kumasl Dands Ordinance. (No. 17 of 1945):
The history of the lanis situate within the boundaries of 
of the town of Kumasi has been peculiar. The Crown was orig­
inally seised of the lands therein absolutely by right of con­
quest; but in 1943 the Government made over its rights to the
13. He may also refer questions to the Land Court.
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Asantehene (s, 3), to hold them as trustee for the Golden 
Stool and the Kttmasi Division.
The ordinance prevents (ss. 10-11) the conveyance of ab­
solute interests, and permits only leasehold tenure by citi­
zens, strangers, and non-native s.
It prescribes (s. 21) the terms of such leases; and a 
central register is kept (under s. 16) in the Asantehene's 
Lands Office of demises, sub-leases, mortgages and assignments 
by lessees.
The extent of the plots leased is recorded on a cadastral 
plan contained in the lease (s# 23).
All leases zmist be registered (s. 22; and see s. 23).
Despite this, the validity of transfers depends on the 
assent of the Asantehene, and not on entries in the Register.
The boundaries of Kumasi are laid down by the Kumasi Town 
Boundaries Ordinance, cap. 119.
(f) Cocoa Rehabilitation Survey:
The Cocoa Rehabilitation Department (whose future is in 
14
doubt) has had to survey cocoa farms devastated by swollen- 
shoot, pay compensation to farmers for trees cut-out, and make 
replanting payments. The basis of the C.R.S.’s authority Is 
executive, and Its manner of working empirical. Plans were 
made on the spot within each block of the farms, and within
14. It is no longer In doubt, it having disappeared, and some 
of its personnel absorbed in the Department of Agricul­
ture. The above gives the position in 1951.
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that block on the basis of information supplied by the farmers; 
and title thereto was similarly ascertained. This information 
regarding the boundaries of and title to farms was used for the 
payment of compensation. The C.R.S. has not acted judicially; 
in case of a dispute as to boundaries or title, the parties 
have been referred to a competent native court and the judge­
ment of the Court used as a basis for payment* It has fre­
quently happened that a person has been recorded as owner of a 
farm, when in fact he is not so, but has, either of his own 
motion or after being authorized by the true owner, put himself 
forward as owner* Such might well be the case where an indi­
vidual holding inherited family property has registered in his 
own name*- Although in paying the compensation to the individ­
ual the C*R. Department does not look behind the transaction, 
the rights of the parties are not thereby affected. The indi­
vidual is then merely a trustee of the monies he so receives, 
and must pay them over if so required to the true owner. The 
Native Courts do admit evidence of the receipt of C.R* money 
from the Department as evidence of ownership, but attach to it 
no conclusive weight.
The C.R.S* has met with some difficulty in the demarcation 
of plots; totalling the acreages indicates that some over­
lapping has taken place. Their experience in the difficulties 
of rural survey is valuable if we are considering the problems
i
j  of registration of rural areas. Now that the Department is
ii
[f -
r
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apparently to be wound up, It seems that officers experienced 
In such survey might be useful for registration purposes.
(g) The Concessions Ordinance. (No. 19 of 1959):
This Ordinance repealed and replaced the Concessions Ord­
inance. 1900, and the Concessions Ordinance (Ashanti). 1905,
(by s* 66).
The Concessions Ordinance may not seem to have much con­
nexion with registration of land: nevertheless, there is a
strand connecting them, and that is that the Ordinance regul­
ates the transfer of certain types of interests in land, pro­
viding that such transfers are not to have effect unless in the 
prescribed form, validated by the Court, registered and so on. 
It is therefore worth while considering the provisions of the 
Ordinance more closely, since it bears not only on the present 
permitted modes of transfer of property, but also on the app­
lication of a system of registration In the Gold Coa3t.
The Ordinance regulates the grant and enforcement of "con­
cessions". It is therefore necessary to ask what a concession 
is.
w 'Concession* means any instrument whereby 
any right title or Interest IhT’Or to land, 
or in or to minerals, timber, rubber, or 
other products of the soil In or growing on 
any land of the option of acquiring any 
such right, title or Interest, purports to 
be granted or demised by_asy^nativej but 
does not Include an assignment or sub-demise 
of the whole or any part of the rights 
granted by any concession, or a sale, mort­
gage, lease, or agreement to lease land within
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a town or village, from which sale, 
mortgage, lease or agreement all right 
title, and interest in or to minerals 
is excepted." (s. 2).
'Instrument*: The Ordinance catches only the written contract
or conveyance, and does not operate over an oral agreement, or
presumably over customary transfers(?).
(The Land Registry Ordinance (cap. 112), s. 2, defines 'instru­
ment* as meaning: "any writing affecting land situate in the
Gold Coast".)
Evasion of the Ordinance by a non-native grantee by use 
of an oral agreement only is prevented by the terms of sect­
ion 5:
"Any agreement whereby any right, interest, 
or property in, to or over land, in or to 
minerals, metals, precious stones, timber, 
rubber or other products of the soil in 
or growing oh any land, or the option of 
acquiring any such right, Interest or prop­
erty, purports to be granted.by a native 
to ajperson who is not_a_na11 ve, shall be 
voTd unless’ rt~isT Tn writing7"~*
'By any native*: It will be noticed that whilst s. 2 operates
only with regard to the grantor, s, 5 takes note also of the 
personality of the grantee. It is thus to be concluded that 
a native grantee is not caught by the statute unless his agree­
ment is in writing, nor apparently will the non-native grantor 
be caught in any circumstances, even if the grantee is a native. 
Wills: It is tentatively suggested that the terms of s. 2
might be held to be wide enough to Include wills made by natives
i
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in writing, and containing a devise of real property* If this 
is so, it is certainly not observed in practice.
Towns: Instruments affecting land situate in towns and vill­
ages are excepted from the provisions of the Ordinance, pro­
vided right to minerals, etc., is not conveyed. Such a grant 
excluding right to minerals may be made either by specific res­
ervation of mineral rights to the grantor, or by grant of a 
lesser interest which does not include right to minerals*
Whilst it is in general true that in the interior, when land 
is conveyed within towns and villages, minerals are specific­
ally reserved to the stool, or else only a right of occupation 
granted, yet this does not necessarily apply either to convey­
ances made in former years, when grantors were not as careful 
of their rights, or to the present day on the coast* (It is 
true that this is in an area where no minerals have been found, 
but this is irrelevant.) Is a conveyance ” absolute ly", or 
”in fee simple”, or ”outright” in Cape Coast then invalidated 
by the Ordinance?
By section 4, the Governor may exclude any portion of the 
Gold Coast, or any class of concession, from the operation of 
the Ordinance.
Apart from this, the Ordinance encourages the parties to 
use the machinery provided in the terms of section 7:
”No proceedings shall, without the leave of the 
Court, be taken to give effect to any concession 
unless such concession has been certified as 
valid by the Court.”
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The subsequent sections indicate the prescribed method: 
the term of any concession is limited by section 20 to a max­
imum of 99 years; whilst the area over which a concession may
extend is limited by section 21 (as amended by the Concessions
v 15
(Amendment) Ordinance of 1941 according to the nature of the
rights granted (e.g., mining, timber, rubber, etc.).
By section 30 it is provided that instruments of transfer 
must be registered under cap. 112, and that they are liable to 
stamp duty.
Now for the obtaining of a certificate of validity, which 
must be obtained from the court, as it is provided (s. 9) that 
if all steps which must be taken for a concession enquiry are 
not completed within two years from the date of the co&sssion, 
the concession becomes null and void.
Notice of the concession must be filed with the Court 
within two months of its date of making (s. 8). The Court 
conducts a concession enquiry, and, if the concession is found 
valid by the Court, a certificate of validity is given, which 
must be registered at the Land Registry Office.(s. 16). The 
concession must not be certified as valid unless:
”all the terms and conditions upon which such 
concession was made, which ought to have been 
performed, have been reasonably and substan­
tially performed.” (s. 12 (5);
The certificate of validity must (s# 17) contain a
15. No. 9 of 1941
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description of the exact boundaries, extent and situation, of 
the land the subject of the concession; and a cadastral plan
will be ordered (s. 19) unless the Director of Survey certifies
that it is unnecessary*
The effect of a certificate of validity is given by s. 31:
(1) ”A certificate of validity shall be good and
valid from the date of such certificate as 
against any person claiming adversely thereto..”
(2) ”A certificate of validity shall not be liable
to be impeached by any person by reason of 
any lack of notice of the boundaries or ex­
tent of the land in respect of which it is
given, or for any other reason or on any
other ground save that of fraud...
£\.to which the holder of the concession 
is proved to be a party/V1 (16)
The presumable effect of the Concessions Ordinance is then 
that, until the grant of the Certificate of Validity, a con­
cession is operative but not enforceable by action by virtue of 
the validity of the conveyance or agreement made by the parties; 
once the certificate has been given, the validity and enforce­
ability stem from the certificate.
It will be observed that, as with other regulating stat­
utes, and as will presumably happen in the case of the insti­
tution of registration in the Gold Coast, rights of parties are 
in fact affected. The Ordinance in fact affects the rights 
of persons not parties to the concession, their chance to ass­
ert their rights coming at the time of the concession enquiry.
16. The words given here in brackets were added by Ordinance 
No. 35 of 1942.
A
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The effect of validating a concession is thus more or less to 
crystallize rights affecting the land subject to the concession 
and also the boundaries of the interests in such land. Since 
in addition the land is accurately surveyed, it is obvious how 
close is the resemblance to a process of registration. The 
grant of a certificate of validity will not presumably affect 
at all the interests or rights which are not in competition 
with those which are the subject of the certificate.
2. NON-OFFICIAL.
(a) Certain Towns;
(i) Mining: Towns which have come into being largely
or solely as a result of mining operations in the vicinity by
a mining company are a special case. The land on which the 
town is situated may be held on a long lease by the company 
from the local stool, as at Obuasi. This is the he ad-lease, 
under which the company has created sub-leases in favour of 
tenants holding houses built by the company. The grant and 
record of such sub-leases is centralized, so that there is the
germ of a register of interests. To take Obuasi as an example:
The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation holds the site of the 
town on lease from the Adansihene (as representing the Param­
ount Stool of Adansi Division). It has been laid out In 
plots, and houses built thereon. The management of the prop­
erty is de facto entrusted to the Obuasi Sanitary Board, which
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is a statutory body. The O.S.B. numbers the individual 
houses and plots, grants sub-leases over them, and maintains 
control and record of sub-leases, assignments, and mortgages 
by the tenants. There is thus in theory (as in Kumasi) an 
English system of tenure; but in practice the attitude of the 
African tenants (mostly non-Ashantis) and the Native Courts 
does not agree with the theory. Their individual tenancies 
they treat as comparable to the tenancies enjoyed by strangers 
in farms and houses elsewhere in Ashanti, and they transfer 
such interests in a customary manner. Such transfers are 
theoretically of no legal effect unless consented to and re­
corded by the Board, Native Courts sometimes take evidence 
of such record as estoppel in favour of the party whose name 
appears in the record; and sometimes go behind the record to 
find (as with the cocoa-farms surveyed by the C.R.S,: see
D.l.(f) above) that the person is nominal owner only, and in 
fact holds in trust for another.
The boundaries of the plots are physically delimited, a 
register of tenants, mortgagees, etc., kept, and conveyance of 
the plots is in effect by register. Here, then, is found an 
approximation to registration. Such a resemblance traces* of 
course, to unity of ownership underlying all the lesser inter­
ests.
17. This gives the position as at the time of my 
investigation.
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(ii) Towns where alienation la controlled by Native 
Authorities: In theory alienation is controlled by the Stool,
since it alone is seised of the absolute Interest in the land* 
In practice the control is exercised by the Native Authority, 
since it has not been previously usual for the African to take 
the theoretical distinction between the Paramount Chief and 
his Council, and the Native Authority constituted by them*
Kumasi: is a special case, since although alienation is
controlled by the Native Authority, it does so by virtue of 
Ordinance; and the system of tenure permitted is expressly 
stated to be English. Its case resembles that of Obuasi 
therefore, more than it does, say, Koforidua or Bekwai.
Koforidua: The capital town of New Juaben is unique in
being situate in the only Ashanti state in the Colony* Its 
history Is a chequered one, and the uncertainty as to the res­
pective rights of Crown, New Juabens (and formerly Kukurantumi) 
has been rife. The land on which the state and town are sit­
uated was originally purchased by Government from an Akim 
18
Abuakwa Stool for the. settlement of refugees from Ashanti In 
1882, and again in 1895* It seems to follow that the claim 
of the transferor-stool Is gone forever. For a long time, 
however, there was uncertainty whether Government bought the 
land for itself - thus making it Crown land - whilst permitting 
free occupation by the New Juabens; or whether Government
18* Kukurantumi
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bought It as agent for the New Juabens, so that New Juaben be­
came owner of the land, but subject to certain privileges re­
tained by Government, A third suggestion of the position was 
that the amount paid to Kukurantumi by Government in regard to 
the land was a solatium to Kukurantumi for having given the 
land to the Juabens to settle on.
The uncertainty was resolved when Government vested the 
lands In the Paramount Stool of New Juaben. New Juaben thus 
became owner of the land, but Government retains the right to 
acquire land for the Crown without the payment of rent or com­
pensation. It is doubtful how far this right would be exer­
cised today.
The grant of interests in land In the town Is now reserved 
to the Paramount Stool of New Juaben, which acts through a Nat­
ive Authority Lands Office. Neither citizen nor stranger can 
originally acquire a plot for building without the consent of 
the Lands Office representing the Stool. The position of the 
citizen and the stranger are however distinguished.
The citizen applies for a plot through the ’’caretaker” to 
the Omarihene; he does not need a lease, although he will re­
quire approval by the Public Works Department of his proposed 
building, for which he must submit a plan. The Lands Office 
will give him a certificate of title to the plot for the pur­
poses of the P.W.D. Thenceforth the citizen remains in in­
definite, free, occupation. He will not require the knowledge
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or consent of the Lands Office before transferring the whole or 
part of his interest, unless the transferee is a stranger,
A citizen may, however, apply for a lease from the Stool, 
whereupon he must pay rent, and his position approximates to 
that of a stranger (than whom he is, however, in a more secure
position as being a citizen with an innate right to take up
land in the town), A citizen will apply for a lease espec­
ially when he wishes to charge his interest as security for his 
employment with a commercial firm, or to a stranger.
The stranger can hold only under a lease - of the plot - 
from the Stool, The stranger agrees on the terms and condi­
tions of the lease with the Omanhene, the area of the plot, the 
term of the demise, and the rent payable, varying in different 
cases, although there is a theoretical uniform scale of charges. 
Transfer of such interests tinder a lease is notified to and 
controlled by the Lands Office, and is invalid without the con­
sent of the Stool,
A citizen conveying to a stranger can apply to the Lands 
Office for a certificate of title to support his claim to enjoy 
the interest conveyed.
The following registers are maintained by the Lands Office:
(1) A Register of new leases.
(2) A Register of ground-rents.
. 19
(3) A Register of sites, showing:
lr9, £iots are physically identified fey description, and 
by reference to' a master-plan.
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(I) Date of the lease.
(il) Number of the lease.
(ill) Site of the plot.
(lv) Name of the lessee.
(v) The annual rent charged.
(4) A Register of Classified Leases, showing:
(1) Term of the lease.
(ii) Other details.
(5) Copies of leases, kept by years.
The plots are identified only by the numbers of the leases 
demising them, and in no other way.
It will thus be seen that interests affecting plots may 
be registered, if they are leased to strangers, or to citizens 
in certain cases: by reference to Register No. (3) above, it
is possible to ascertain what interests affect the plots. In 
the case of plots occupied by citizens, this does not follow.
Interests affecting, the houses built on the plots may or 
may not be ascertainable.
Transfer or creation of interests affecting houses or 
plots may be: (i) valid without reference to the Lands Office 
(citizen to citizen);
(11) valid without reference to the Lands Office, 
but they must be notified to the Lands Office (citizens to 
strangers);
(iii) invalid without reference to the Lands
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Office (by a stranger)*
The boundaries of the plots may be ascertainable by
reference to the Registers and the plans deposited; or they
may be unascertainable.
The existing system is thus incomplete; but could easily
be adapted for the purposes of registration.
This system applies also to other towns in the state of
New Juaben, e.g.:
Asokore; Effidua3e; Oyoko;
Jumapo; Suhien;
but its application there appears to be less rigid,
Bekwai: In the town of Bekwai the acquisition of plots
by both citizens and strangers is controlled. The system has
20been described above,
Kibi: Transfers and leases of land to strangers are con­
trolled by the Paramount Chief - acting through the Native 
Authority, There is a Native Authority Lands Office in the 
town.
It must be noted that there is a confusion between regis­
tration as such and the control of land by a central land­
owning authority. This control, at first Intended for strang­
ers only, has now extercled to citizens, who have been drawn 
into the system. (This applies especially to the larger 
towns,)
20. See INDIVIDUAL, pp. 152-3.
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Even the most rudimentary of these systems affords some 
basis for the introduction of registration, even if it does no 
more than facilitate investigation of title# The investiga­
tion may deceive where a successor-in-title by succession has 
been registered in place of the original individual acquirer; 
but the difficulty can be met in practice by careful examina­
tion.
The basic ownership by Stools of the title to land is * 
therefore a help, since there is a firm ground-title, even if 
the interests created subsidiarily thereto vary enormously#
(b) Rural:
Control of rural alienation and land-holding is in a much 
more rudimentary condition. The control by the New Juaben 
State of alienations to strangers in the smaller towns and 
villages of that state is semi-rural in nature; but it does 
not now apply to agricultural land as such#
In Adansi, alienations of rural agricultural land are 
controlled centrally if to strangers#
In Akim Abuakwa there is a similar control# In both 
states - which are wealthy and suitable for development by 
commercial interests - rights more extensive than those of an 
individual farmer are frequently granted: concessions for
timber, minerals, or rubber are frequent.
Both states have properly-organized offices for dealing
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with land-matters; but these are more registers of conveyances 
and rent-payments than registries of title with reference to 
the land*
In general, alienations to strangers in many states, (more 
particularly in Ashanti, Akim and Assin) are controlled by the 
native authorities.
(c) Present Effects of ^Registration”:
The centralized approval and granting of interests in land 
to strangers is aimed at control of alienation, rather than at 
facilitating transfers of interests.
Cadastral plans may be required (as Kumasi), or the extent 
of the land subject to the transfer Indicated in other ways 
(rough sketches, verbal description, fencing of boundaries).
Visualization of the land subject to Interests may be 
assisted by block-maps (in Koforidua a scale map of the town 
carries indications of plots subject to Interests, the plots 
being identified by the lease numbers, to which leases the in­
vestigator is thus referred).
Subsidiary Interests may or may not be indicated in the 
Registers; there may be theoretical provision for this (Obuasi, 
Kumasi) not always observed in practice; or there may be no 
provision.
Devolution of title: the contemporaneity of the registers
varies.
Transfers, etc., may be invalid until registered or
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centrally approved (Kumasi, Obuasi, Koforidua); valid, but to 
be notified post factum to the central office (Koforidua, and 
Bekwai, in certain cases); or valid without notice (especially 
when the parties are citizens, but not in Kumasi).
It is uncertain how far transfers not meeting the require­
ments are absolutely void, voidable, or curable (by the inter­
vention of equitable remedies).
E. PLANS AND POLICY IN THE GOLD COAST,
Now we shall discuss where registration should begin; the 
method by which it should be carried out; the types of inter­
ests to be registered, and how; and the effects of registra­
tion. ^  q
1. WHERE SHOULD REGISTRATION BEGIN? -----------------------------------------
• /
There are three categories which must be considered, the
areas governed by particular stools; the towns; and the rural
areas.
(a) Stool boundaries:
Our question has already been answered by the action of
the Gold Coast Government, in that it is now open to them to
begin registration of these boundaries under the Stool Lands
21
Boundaries Settlement Ordinance; although when they will do 
so is another question. _______________________________
21. No. 49 of 1950. See p. 744 ante.
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By this Ordinance the boundaries, jurisdictional and 
proprietary, of the Stool lands may be settled by Commissioners 
specially appointed. There is no limitation as to the kind of 
Stool the boundaries of whose lands may be determined, but the 
most feasible method, no doubt, is to begin with the boundaries 
of the Paramount Stools and work downwards.
The resultant settled blocks will be valuable, Indeed 
essential,
(1) insofar as they are jur1adlc11onal, to fix the limits 
of the authority of native authorities, and new local Councils, 
and to serve as registration-blocks for lesser interests;
(2) insofar as they are proprietary, that they may be incor­
porated in the general settlement of proprietary rights con­
sequent on the initiation of registration of title.
(b) Towns;
Actual registration of the mass of lesser interests will 
take place either within blocks as settled above; or within 
areas already defined (e.g., under the Towns Ordinance); or 
within areas artificially and arbitrarily chosen and defined 
for the purpose.
The boundaries of the major towns (it must be stressed 
that these boundaries are administrative only) are already 
fixed by legislation. The first requirement, that registra­
tion should take place within a defined block, is thus already 
satisfied.
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In point of need, the towns are obviously a more pressing 
problem than the rural areas, since there has been a much
22greater amount of changes of ownership, etc*, within them*
It is also easier to begin registration in the towns,
since adventitious aids to registration are already available
In the form of evidence both as to boundaries and title. The
aids available have been exposed at D. above.
It is therefore recommended that registration should be
commenced In the following towns:
Accra Cape Coast
Sekondi-Takoradi 
Tarkwa Nsawam
Swedru
and that the existing systems should be converted to full reg­
istration of title in the following towns:
Kumasi Kibi
Koforidua Obuasi
Bibiani Bekwai
Tafo
These lists are not exhaustive, but will do as a suggestion 
of the size of the problem.
It may be necessary to register some rural areas immed­
iately adjacent to the towns named above; but the problems 
of rural registration are considered below.
Registration in towns will also be easier in that rights 
to houses are less complicated and more permanent than rights
22. Cf. the observations of W.A.C.A. In Amuie v. Sablh: (1949) 
(unrep: Civ. Appeal 23/48), quoted at p. 726.
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in agricultural land.
(c) Rural Areaa:
These present a more difficult problem, and the immediate
23
need is less pressing; need for registration of title is still 
present, however.
Again, registration should take place within defined 
blocks: if these are consonant with existing well-recognized
political or tribal boundaries the difficulties of registration! 
and acceptance by the public, will be so much the easier.
It is suggested that the easiest block in which to com­
mence would be that of the state of New Juaben, for the follow­
ing reasons:
(i) Tenure is of the Ashanti type, the root-title 
being vested in the Paramount Stool.
(11) The area is small.
(iii) Town and countryside are mixed.
(iv) The area has been surveyed by the C.R.S.
(v) There is an existing scheme of ^ semi-
registration?
Further candidates for early registration are those areas 
where there has been long-standing disorganization of land 
tenure, e.g.:
- the Coastal belt of the Colony; 
or rapid growth of agriculture (especially cocoa) requires
23. This point is arguable, however.
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immediate action:
- Akim Abuakwa;
- parts of Ashanti,
2, METHOD OF REGISTRATION,
Yfhat interests might be registered; which interests 
should be registered - why and how; and which not registered?
(a) Interests which might be registered:
Interests in land, farms, houses can be classified accord­
ing to their nature - that they are absolute, dependent, or 
contingent; according to the right-holder, that they are 
stool-interests, family-interests, or individual interests; 
or according to their subject-matter - that they are interests 
in land, in farms, in houses, etc.
The first and elementary step is to separate interests in 
land from other Interests, It will be recalled from a pre­
vious analysis that such a separation of interests is possible. 
It will also be recalled that a citizen, for Instance, holding 
a farm in his own state in Ashanti, has a limited Interest in 
the land, and an absolute Interest in the farm. Since to 
register both interests would be a matter of great complexity, 
and one which would not be appreciated by the African, it is 
proposed to register such an Interest in land and farm combined 
as an Interest dependent upon the absolute interest of the cit­
izen's political superior (his Stool), even though this tends 
to obscure the nice theoretical distinction between these in­
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terests. It is also proposed not to combine the absolute 
interests of a citiaen in his house, with his limited interest 
in the land on which it stands. Each would be registered 
separately#
Since such dependent interests combine a measure of per­
manence and security of tenure, which depends on the fact of 
citizenship, it is proposed to separate those interests which 
do not partake of the same quality, and to call these last 
contingent interests, since their term and conditions of tenure 
are contingent on certain factors, e.g., the existence of a 
lease or mortgage, the continued existence of a relationship, 
or the fact that the right-holder is a stranger.
Next, it must be emphasized that interests equal in rank 
may be held by different classes of persons - stools, families, 
individuals. Qua the Stool, a family's interest is equivalent 
to an individual's self-acquired interest; the distinction 
only becomes relevant when the famlly-interest is examined a 
propos of the rights of an individual member of the family.
(b) liie following schedule attempts to set out in a 
concise form the Interests which might be registered inland 
and houses, whether these interests are to be classed as ab­
solute, dependent or contingent (in accordance with our class­
ification above), the right-holders, and whether their inter­
ests are stool (S.I.), family (P.I.), or individual (I.I.), 
interests. Under the head Conditions the limitations on a
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particular interest, or the circumstances attaching to its 
existence, are briefly indicated. It must be emphasized that 
some of these interests are alternative or mutually exclusive 
(©•g., either a tar amount Stool, or a subordinate stool, or a 
family, or an individual, may hold the absolute interest in 
land), and that not all these Interests are necessarily to be 
found in every locality (see below for some examples). Section
(c) below considers which of the interests detailed in the 
Schedule should, in the author's opinion, be registered.
SCHEDULE.
Right-holder
LARD.
Absolute Interest;
Paramount Stool
Stool
Sub-stool
Family
Individual
Stool, Family, 
or Individual 
Interest Conditions
(24)
5.1.
5.1.
5.1.
F.I.
1.1.
Subordinate Stools 
are caretakers only.
Paramount Stool has 
right of jurisdiction
Paramount Stool has 
rights of juris­
diction only.
- do —
- do -
24. Abbreviations: P. S. - Paramount Stool. S. - Stool (subord­
inate)
F. - Family. A.I. - Absolute Interest.
D.I. e Dependent Interest.
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Right-holder 
LARD (cont.7
Dependent Interest:
Stool
Family
-section
Individual
(member)
Stool, Family, 
or Individual 
Interest Conditions
Individual
(non-member)
Contingent Interest:
Paramount Stool 
Lessee 
Tenant 
Mortgagee
Pledgee
Child
Wife
Donee
Estate Contract 
Other interests:
5.1. 
F.I.
F.I.
1.1.
1.1.
5.1.
F.I.
1.1.
1.1. 
F.I.
5.1. 
F.I.
1.1. 
1*1.
1.1. 
I.I.
Tenant-at-will
Squatter
Caretaker
Family's reversion 
(Equitable interests?)
Paramount Stool owns 
Absolute Interest.
(P.S, owns A.I.,
(S. owns D.I.; 
or S. owns A.I.
— do —
(P.S. owns A.I.,
( S. owns D.I.,
( F. owns D.I.; 
or (S. owns A.I.,
( F. owns D.I.; 
or (S. owns A.I.; 
or (F. owns A.I.
as above, plus 
Individual owns 
(A.I. or 
(D.I.
Subordinate Stool 
owns A.I.
by intestate succession 
(RARE)
direct, or by
succession
as above -
of deceased father, in 
certain instances 
of deceased husband, 
in certain Instances 
in certain Instances
no interest in property 
in member's self­
acquired property - Not 
an interest
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Right-holder
HOUSES.
Absolute interest;
Paramount Stool
Stool
Family
Individual
Dependent Interest:
Section
Individual
Contingent Interest: 
Land-owner
Lessee
Tenant
Mortgagee
Pledgee
Child
Wife
Estate Contract
Stool, Family,
Individual,
Interest
5.1.
5.1. 
F.I.
1.1.
F.I.
I.I.
5.1, 
F.I.
1.1.
Conditions
cf. Ahenfie, etc. 
- do -
Family owns A.I.
-do-, and section 
may own intermediate 
D.I.
where ownership of 
the land and house 
are separated
(see LAND)
Other Interests: (-ditto-) (25)
25. Comments: The main problem Is the placing of the indi­
vidual person holding inherited property. It is true 
that his holding is limited, and contingent upon the 
family, both as to Its beginning (by appointment), and 
as to its end. Its quality resembles other categories 
of dependent interest rather than contingent interests; 
it Is recommended that it find its place with the former.
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(c) Which Interests should be registered, and In 
whose name?
It is recommended that absolute and dependent interests 
as detailed above should be registered; and contingent inter­
ests registered as charges on the absolute and dependent in­
terests. Interests collected at (b) above under "Other" 
should not be registered. It is true that by this method not 
every visible occupier of land will be registered; but the 
other interests are too transitory or theoretical to be worth 
registering.
Interests specified as "Stool Interests” should be regis­
tered in the name of the stool, with the occupant for the time 
being noted as the MPerson Registering”.
"Family-interests" should be registered in the name of 
the family, with the head thereof noted as the "person regis­
tering” .
"Individual Interests", if Independent of family Interest, 
should be registered in the name of the individual. If depend­
ent on family interests, they should be registered In the indi­
vidual^ name, but with the Individual and the head of his fam­
ily as the "persons registering” jointly*
It appeats that registration will have to be extended to 
wills. English and customary, if a logical system of convey­
ancing by register is desired: and further, that some means
will have to be found of compelling registration of all changes 
of title subsequent to Initial registration.
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(d) Interests which should not be registered;
These include equitable interests, and rights of a tran­
sitory nature. It is for consideration whether equitable 
mortgages should be registered, since to do so, if practicable, 
would obviate some abuses; (and they should certainly be reg­
istered if the Supreme Court persists in its attitude that many 
of what one should classify as native mortgages are to take 
effect as English equitable mortgages).
The above statement conforms to English ideas and prac­
tice; but in the context of the Gold Coast (an undeveloped 
comprehension of the nature of Equity and equitable interests) 
it is uncertain how far they apply or should be applied. To 
take an instance: a family one of whose members is entered
as nominal owner of family property on an appropriate register 
or record have a clear interest in the property; in England 
this might be described as equitable; in the Gold Coast it is 
clearly legal. The family remain owners of the property; the 
member has an equitable duty to maintain their title (by 
neither disposing of it or denying it). If existing records 
are taken as the basis of the new registration, there is a 
danger that this point will become obscured.
3. SETTLEMENT.
The interests which are to be registered have already 
been discussed. It is now necessary to consider the problems
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of settlement, both of title and boundaries, and to endeavour
to visualize if possible both the process by which settlement
might be effected, and the rough shape of the final registers, j 
26
At E.l. a suggested order of priority for registration- I! 
areas has been put forward: from that summary three main points
in regard to settlement of title may be abstracted:
(i) that it should be within a defined block;
(ii) that it should be compulsory;
(iii) that it should be exhaustive or complete,
(a) Settlement of Boundaries:
The boundaries of the chosen block are those which must be
settled first* Whilst it is not essential, that such boundar­
ies be delimited where the block chosen is an arbitrary one 
adopted for purposes of administrative convenience, yet it is 
simpler to choose a defined block; the Stool Lands Boundaries 
Settlement Ordinance* 1950, provides a procedure for settling 
such boundaries in rural areas. The Towns Ordinance fixes 
administrative boundaries for the larger towns; but these 
boundaries may not be wide enough, or cover the whole of the 
urban agglomerations (for instance,* in Accra).
Within the block settlement of boundaries and titles can 
proceed hand-in-hand. Time will necessarily have to be 
allotted before the beginning of the judicial enquiry for:
(1) notice to right-holders of the forthcoming
registration (say two months);_________________________________
26. At p. 764 above*
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(ii) preparatory work (assembly of auxiliary mater- 
ial), preliminary surveys, enquiry into the special rights or 
problems of the particular block).
Regard must be had before fixing the date of enquiry to season­
al movements or occupations (the cocoa-harVest, the absence of 
many farmers on their distant farms - cf. especially Akwapim); 
lack of this regard impaired the work of the Census and the 
registration of voters.
It is suggested that advance-parties should be formed, who 
would precede the Settlement Commissioner, and clear the ground 
for him. This party might include an Assistant Settlement 
Commissioner, a surveyor, and an archivist-registrar-secretary.
(b ) Settlement of Title;
This head includes settlement and registration of all 
lesser interests, and is the major work. It is already the 
practice in certain areas for a transferee to require or be 
required to consult the local chief or headman, and the family 
of the transferor (even where the property transferred is self- 
acquired). This valuable procedure ensures that family- 
interests are safeguarded, fraud Is avoided, the title of the 
transferee is secure from objections of the transferor's family 
in the future, publicity is given to the transaction, and a 
record of the transaction kept in a secure place. A similar 
procedure is recommended for the Settlement Commissioner: 
families of claimants and the local chief, etc., should in
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rural areas especially be made parties to the settlement.
This would also facilitate the form of registration proposed 
above.
As to the method of recording Interests proved, a certain 
amount of difficulty arises, since in order to simplify regis­
tration it has already been proposed that interests in land 
and farms should be registered together under "land"; whilst 
interests in land and houses are to be separated under “land11 
and”houses”•
Let us take some instances:
FANTI: Land:
Absolute Interest: in general with a family or individual.
To be registered as stool-interest in the case of “stool 
lands1 (unoccupied tribal lands, and tribal lands occupied 
by the stool). Stool family lands must be registered 
as a family-interest, preferably in the name of the family 
with the head of the family and the stool-holder (if 
different) as persons registering.
Dependent interests: will include the interest of the
individual member of a family with a farm on family land,
27and an inherited farm.
Contingent interests: - of a stool in occupied tribal lands - 
it is questionable whether jurlddlction should be allowed
27, Room must be found for the dependent interest of a
section ("House”, branch, sub-lineage) where the inter­
est is found.
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to obtrude on a proprietary register; if the answer is 
MYesw, then this may be so registered. The interest may 
be the basis for the acquisition of a proprietary inter­
est, by succession to abandoned land, and perhaps by 
alluvion.
Houses;
Absolute interest: may be held by a Stool, family or
individual.
The holder of the absolute interest in the house may 
be different from the land-owner.
Dependent interests: see above.
Contingent interests: see above; the question arises
whether to record the land-owner as holder of a contingent 
interest extending over the house. He has no present 
interest, but:
(i) he may have the right to control alienation 
or user of the house;
(ii) he may succeed to the house if left derelict.
The land-owner*s interest is already recorded in the 
nLand Register11; to record it again here would tie in the 
two registers, even if only by a cross-reference.
ASHANTI: Land:
Absolute interest: is in general with the Paramount Stool,
but is in some cases with the Wing and other Stools.
i
Dependent interests: may include those of a Paramount Stool,
other stool, family, individual.
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Contingent Interests: must include a Paramount Stool's
jurisdictional interest, in that it may be customary or 
necessary for the signature of the Paramount Chief to 
authenticate a transfer by the land-owning stool.
Houses:
Absolute Interest: may be with a stool, family or individ­
ual.
Dependent Interests: in favour of a section or individual.
Contingent Interests: may also include the 3p©^3uccess-
ionls, of the land-owner.(?)
MIXED COLONY STATES:
Land:
Absolute Interest: in general is or was with Stools, whether
Paramount, Wing, or other. The implication of the sale 
of land to individuals arises; such sale may be:-
(1) outright (inclusive of minerals, etc.);
(2) outright (with reservation of mineral i
rights to the grantor);
(3) of farming rights (the grantor retaining
ownership of the soil and things therein).
Such sales by stools have gradually changed their charac­
ter, the general movement being from (1) to (2) to (3).
This will confuse the problem of registration greatly, 
since in (1) the grantee is owner of the absolute interest 
in the land, and things therein ani thereon; in (2) he is
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owner of the absolute interest in the land, the grantor 
owning the interest in minerals and timber; in (3) the 
grantee is absolute owner of his farm, the grantor of 
the land.
(1) presents no difficulties in registration;
(2) might be registered with grantee as absolute 
owner; grantor as owner of a contingent interest;
(3) grantor as absolute owner; grantee as owner of
a dependent interest. Theoretically, this is unsound,
practically it seems the best solution, since an alien
purchaser of farming rights (unlike a stranger tenant-
farmer) acquires a right at least as wide as a citizen's
interest?**
Dependent Interests: )
) follow from the above.
Contingent Interests; )
(a) Objections and Rectifications:
The boundaries and interests having been settled (a pro­
cess no doubt occurring contemporaneously), they will be rec­
orded in the appropriate registers. Time will have to be left 
for the hearing of objections in the immediate post-settlement
28. It should be observed in general that a stranger-purchaser 
of a house from a citizen may be:
(1) forced to take a lease of house and plot from
the land-owning stool;
(2) forced to take a lease of the plot only;
(3) not forced to execute any agreement in writing.
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period, and also at a later period.
A suggested timetable is as follows:-
Settlement: 0 months (Provisional Register published)
Ob .lections: within Sf- 6 months)
) (Provisional Register 
Rectification: to S +  9 months )
) in force)
Confirmation: S 1 year )
From the timetable, it will be seen.that 6 months, whilst 
the provisional register is open to inspection, are allowed 
for lodging objections; 3 months for the hearing of the ob­
jections, and rectification of the register; and 3 further 
months whilst the. objections and rectifications are themselves 
open to objection. At the end of one year from publication 
of the provisional register, it is confirmed. From this time 
until 6 years after publication of the provisional register, 
applications to rectify the confirmed register might be brought 
by leave of the court. From the end of this period until the 
lapse of 12 years from the original settlement, applications to, 
rectify on the ground of fraud alone might be brought by spec­
ial leave of the court. At the end of the 12 years the reg- . 
ister becomes absolute and unchallengeable on any ground what­
soever.
The periods suggested fit in as far as possible with the 
present practice of the courts in cases of prolonged adverse 
possession (the Statutes of Llmltion not applying to land held 
under native tenure).
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The overall timetable then becomes: - 
Settlement: Publication of Provisional Register.
Objections and rectification: Confirmed Register.
Up to 1 year (any ground; without leave). 
Rectification: For cause shown; by leave of the court
up to 6 years.
Rectification: For fraud alone; special leave; up
to 12 years.
Register becomes absolute.
It may be held:
(1) that the periods chosen are inadequate or too 
lengthy; - since the selection of these periods is necessarily 
arbitrary, any suitable periods may do;
(2) that it is outside the scope of this treatment to
consider such matters of detail - unfortunately, such details
will have a preponderant effect on a matter adverted to pre- 
29
viously, namely, on African public opinion and its reception 
of the ideas and practice of registration. It is especially 
in the matter of detail that there will have to be the closest 
consideration, otherwise inevitable the cry will go up that 
Government is stealing the lands of the Gold Coast people.
* j er 0
29. At p. 739 ante.
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CHAPTER XIV.
Conclusions,
It may be helpful to the reader to attempt here to pick 
up some of the diverse threads which run through the whole of 
this work, to formulate some conclusions, and to indicate what 
scope there is for development, or field for reform. First, 
one must answer the question: how far is It possible to enun­
ciate any clear rules for Akan land-tenure at the present time?
1. THE ELUCIDATION OF TEE CUSTOMARY LAW.
The rules already given for the different aspects of Akan 
law represent a formative stage in the evolution of a legal 
system. The law described is a law in transition, the result 
of an incomplete adaptation of age-old customary concepts to a 
modern society. Quite apart from the fluidity of the rules 
themselves, there is the difficulty of evaluating the evidence
i
from which they may be derived. Each source of information 
open to us is subject to qualification: the decisions of the
superior courts sometimes, it is submitted with great respect, 
show an incomplete acquaintance with the customary law, or en­
shrine false doctrines through the working of the rules under 
which proof of customary law is admitted; the decisions of 
native courts, though often sounder guides, are sometimes in­
fluenced by partiality or by individual or local idiosyncrasies;
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the works of text-book writers are frequently sparse, out-of- 
date, or - most important of all - not written primarily with 
strictly legal ends in view; and, finally, oral information 
(on which a great part of the foregoing material is based) ref­
lects the prevailing mood of indecision. One would expect 
that it would be from this last source that the most accurate 
material would be derived; this expectation is lessened by 
partiality and the decline in knowledge of the customary law 
on the part of informants, and by the obsolescence of parts of 
the ancient law. In short, one is presented with a mass of 
often conflicting evidence.
On what principles is one to choose between the sources 
when they themselves vary? In general, oral information^ and 
the decisions of native courts have been preferred to cases 
from the Supreme Court and the textbooks, since the former 
class is more likely to represent the law as it is now prac­
tised. But conflicts between different oral Informants are j
by no means rare; and here the resolution becomes more diffi­
cult. One has to eliminate any warping due to bias; one has
to endeavour to segregate variations which are due to local 
2
differences. Even after this, however, conflicts may remain. 
Some of these conflicts can be traced to a desire to modify the
1. Prom at least 500 persons drawn from different states 
in the Colony and Ashanti.
2. Sometimes this is relatively easy, as with the variation 
between the rights of stools in, say, Pante and Ashanti 
custom respectively.
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customary law; Taut the majority are due to the fact that the 
customary law is being modified. During the period of change 
one can often do no more than indicate the conflict, the reso­
lution of which must be left to the processes of time. This
is inevitable when one remembers that the validity of customary
4
law derives from its observance by those subject to it; one 
can confidently say that an acceptable change in custom has 
taken place only when usage speaks preponderantly for the aban­
donment of the former customs. This is a matter of fact, per­
haps to be investigated by quasi-statistical methods (along the 
lines sometimes pursued by sociologists in their enquiries); 
it may be that the preliminary enquiries which will be needed 
before registration is introduced will provide the opportunity 
for such an investigation. Until such a change in custom is 
satisfactorily established, the courts (and the writers of 
text-books) must continue to rely on the older rule.
There is one further matter which must be considered be- .j
- ■ - - -   ■ ■ ■ - - .j
fore we can turn to an examination of some of these changes:
this is the propriety of calling custom a system of law. Is 
one perhaps attempting the impossible, trying to clothe some­
thing essentially non-legal in legal dress? There is at times
3. E.g., in the law of succession, when it is stated that
, family-witnesses are no longer required for the validity 
of a samansew.
4. Cf. the definition of,lnative customary law11 in the Native 
Courts (Colony) Ordinance. 1944, which provides that the j
rules must be fortified by established usage”. -
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a powerful temptation for one nurtured in the literalism of
English law to reject the notion that customary law is a true
law, and to think of it merely as a guide to conduct or an ab-
5
straction from observed practice. The temptation lies in the 
fact that there is some truth in this notion: the guiding aim
of adjudication in customary law was to bring peace between 
the parties rather than to impose an inflexible rule on a given 
set of facts. This is clearly shown in the customary institu­
tion of "arbitration”, which has been subject to some misunder-
g
standing in the higher courts. When so many petty quarrels 
were settled within the house, and the chief’s powers - except 
in the case of crimes against the community - were really only 
an extension of such a settlement, it was to be expected that 
the rules on which these decisions were given should have a 
flexible content. Hence, even today, it is almost impossible 
to say that there is a customary law regarding many internal 
family matters. Often the question is not "has A a right to 
do such-and-such?" but "who will object if A does it?" The 
power of the family to control the dealings of its individual 
members, to contest new ideas of succession, and so on, often
5. Gf. my article Customary Law of the Akan Peoples. African 
Studies, March T9537~^2/T7~26l and Dr. M.D.W. Jeffreys’ 
rejoinder printed therewith.
6. Cf. articles by: Matson. The Supreme Court and the Customary 
Judicial Process in the Cold Coast: I.C.L.Q., (Jan. 1953), 
p. 47; and Allott. Kwasi v. Larbi (1955) A.C. 164. Akan 
Customary Law of "arbitration” in the Cold Coast. I.C.L.ft., 
July 1953, 2, 3, 466.
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rests on personal factors - the strength of the head's charac­
ter, the propinquity of the parties, etc. A customary law of 
such a flexible nature is now administered subject to an alien 
and organized system of law; the conflict between the two no­
tions lies at the root of many discrepancies.
2. SOCIAL CHANGES AKP THEIR EFFECT IN CUSTOMARY LAW.
Whilst the Akan remained a people devoted mainly to the 
raising of subsistence crops, hunting, and the arts of war, 
there was little field for the assertion of concrete rights in 
land. The pacification of the country, and the subsequent 
development of its resources, mainly through its natural wealth 
and the labours of it3 peasant-farmors, have rapidly led to the 
growth of claims of a legal nature over the land and the things 
in and on it. Legal persons have developed side-by-side as 
bearers of these rights. Such developments often render the 
appeal to ancient custom nugatory.
As regards the Stool, the main change has been from a 
relationship resting on a purely personal basis (that of alle­
giance) to one based on territorial claims and control over 
land. Formerly, the wealth of a stool was its people, and 
its main aim was to secure them and their possessions in peace 
and war. Today, we have destroyed this purpose, which acted 
as a social cement. What are we to put in its place? We 
offer the wealth derived from land, in which a stool, as rep-
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resenting its people, now has many valuable claims: an absol­
ute title, which may be vendible; royalties from timber and 
mineral-deposits; revenues from stool-farms and enterprises, 
and from stranger-farmers. The two-fold movement of wealth, 
which we observe in the old days, effectively bound stool and 
subjects together. But today there is an increasing tendency 
to strip the stool of all those rights and privileges (which 
went together) which tied it to its subjects. This tendency 
is accentuated, though it was not initiated, by the Local 
Government Ordinance, 1951. The government of the people by 
the stool is now placed in the hands of Local Councils, two- 
thirds of whose members are democratically elected; the right 
to try the disputes of its subjects is given to native (or 
local) courts increasingly staffed by non-traditional members; 
the right to receive the revenues from its land has been lost 
by the stool; even its control of stool-lands, and its right 
to dispose of them, have been taken out of its hands or sub­
jected to the concurrence of new bodies. These changes are 
irreversible, and were perhaps unavoidable; but they may leave 
the chiefs (or their stools) an empty symbol without a content.
The new ordinance did not initiate these changes; but it 
marks a turning-point. The old Native Authority Ordinances, 
although constituting new statutory bodies, in effect gave 
extra functions to the existing traditional rules, or regulated 
old ones. There were no signs of the mental or legal tensions
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which one might expect to he induced by the chiefs, their 
elders and councillors, enjoying twin personalities, customary 
and statutory. This was perhaps due to the fact that the 
legal dyarchy was ignored, and the two bodies worked harmon­
iously together without any great concern over which personal­
ity was acting at any given time. Today the gulf is too wide 
to be camouflaged in this fashion.
The diminishing sphere of responsibility of the stools 
has other repercussions. The relationship between the stool 
and the chief who holds it has altered: with chiefs being
remunerated by allowances or salaries instead of in the ancient 
manner (wherein the stool and the chief were one), the claim 
that chiefs should be allowed to enjoy separate property, in­
stead of all their possessions and subsequent acquisitions 
being merged in the general stool property, has become insis­
tent, and is now recognized by the customary law.
But the point of greatest concern is the relationship 
between the stool (or the chief) and its subjects, especially 
in the context of rights over land. There is a discernible 
tendency for the previous customary nexus to be replaced by 
relationships adapted from English law - the use of leases or 
written forms of agreement in Kumasi and other large towns, 
even between citizens and their stools, is an example. The 
influx of strangers, now possible through the cessation of j
i
tribal warfare, and spurred on by the search for new land
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suitable for cocoa-cultivation, tends to place relationships 
on a territorial or residential, rather than a personal, basis. 
In fact, the concept of citizenship, resting on allegiance, is 
changing; and with this change come new problems, such as the 
question of security of tenure. Strangers today have increas­
ed security; It Is now the exception for their holding to be 
terminated at their death. This alone represents a consider­
able change of custom.
New tensions have been set up between the Ideas of juris­
diction and ovmership, which have been considered in Chapter II. 
The assumption that outright transfer of an absolute title by 
sale served to pass all rights, including those of jurisdict­
ion, to the purchaser or his stool has been challenged in at 
least two ways: by maintaining that jurisdiction does not pass
under a sale of land, but only agricultural rights; by out­
lawing outright sales of land. The problems raised by juris­
diction are new ones, which may be alleviated, or - if the 
worst comes to the worst - aggravated, by the proposed delim­
itation of stool boundaries.
The powers of the individual over land which he holds have 
increased in many ways: whereas formerly the cultivator could
probably claim no personal right in the land which he occupied, 
he has now a defined interest, capable of being pledged, 
leased, or sold, or of being the subject of gift or will. The 
exact limits which are to be placed on such dealings by the i
i
stool holding superior rights in the same land cannot as yet 
be said to have been fully worked out. The institutions them­
selves are changing: the ancient pledge given for no fixed
period, incapable of foreclosure, in which the pledgee came 
into possession and took the fruits as his interest, has 
yielded to new forms, wherein a definite term is set, at the 
expiry of which the creditor may be able to foreclose or make 
the land the subject of judicial sale. In this connexion the 
self-liquidating pledge is of special interest, as alleviating 
some of the grosser injustices due to the high reward the 
pledgee may take (from the sale of cocoa) in comparison with 
the principal secured.
The trend is everywhere to commercialization: this is
most clearly evident in the dwindling use made of "gifts" of 
land, that is, grants of a holding free or for a nominal sum. 
Commercial tenancies are substituted, in consonance with the 
high annual value and comparative permanence of the crops now 
planted, especially cocoa. The accumulation of wealth is 
assisted by the employment of "caretakers", who can develop or 
look after farms for distant owners.
If, then, the individual has developed rights partially 
at the expense of the stool he serves, no less important is his 
changing relationship with the family of which he is a member. 
Until fairly recently it could have been maintained that an 
individual could hold no property in his own right, save for
792
]
some paltry personal belongings. We witness today a stage in 
the struggle towards emancipation from this older idea of the 
family. The powers of a family over the property of its mem­
bers grow steadily weaker; already one can maintain that it 
has no right to interfere with the use by its members of their 
own self-acquired property, even though the former custom was 
undoubted, that any disposition by a person of his property 
required the consent of the family (evidenced by their presence 
as consenting witnesses), if he wishes to divest himself of all 
rights in that subject-matter. Where the transaction is a 
sale, the new attitude is not yet firmly established; whilst 
in the case of gifts the old rule (that the family should con­
sent) is still supported by the majority of informants; in 
both cases the trend away from family control is unmistakable.
The weakening ties of family are equally shown in the case 
of liability for debt: it is today recognized that family 
property is not liable for the debt of a member, nor a member's 
property for the debt of his family. Results similar to the 
old rules (under which a family was liable for a member's debts 
and torts) are in some cases achieved by the courts' using the 
weapons of estoppel and laches. It is, however, the attacks, 
on the customary law of succession which are most significant. 
These attacks take two nlain forms: strengthening of the
samansew or oral will, and compulsory provision of an aliquot 
portion of an intestate's estate for his widow and children.
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The essence of the Akan family Is Its matrilineal character, 
maintained and emphasized by the mode of intestate succession* 
This character runs counter to many modern features of life in 
the Gold Coast - these include the spread of Christianity with 
its stress (perhaps misplaced) on the small patrilineal family, 
and the increased reward now open to individual effort, whether 
through speculation, agriculture, or work at a wage or salary. 
Social habits of residence are changing in conformity, and it 
is perhaps natural that a progressive African today should wish 
to pass on his wealth to the children whom he has educated 
and nurtured, and to his wife, chosen by himself and perhaps 
of equal education with him, rather than to benefit a distant 
family. A will is the answer for such an individual; but 
not a will which depends for its validity on the consent of 
the matrilineal family who would otherwise benefit* This ex­
plains the modern tendency to decry the need for any other than 
independent witnesses to an oral will; but this tendency is 
not yet the law. The other way of attack, through compulsory 
provision for widow and children, rests partially and by anal­
ogy on the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance and the Mmiss- 
ion-rules” of the Christian churches. The former are law for 
the minority married under that ordinance; the latter are not 
(though at times applied through misguided decisions of native 
courts, or by the co-operation of the deceased's family). The 
States are interesting themselves in making similar provision;
their resolutions are, however, not yet in binding form.
Besides such attacks as these, which prevent a family's 
succeeding to the whole property of a deceased member, the 
rights of families are subject to encroachment at a later 
stage, when a successor has been customarily appointed, and
!
holds property thereunder. Such "inherited property”, as it j 
has been called here, is not owned by the holder for the time 
being; the ultimate title to it is with the family. The title 
of the family in such property is menaced by voluntary dealings 
with.it without consultation with the family, and by the action 
of law, as where it is seized in execution for the private debt 
of its holder. Control over inherited property still remains 
strong, but one can foresee that the family's rights will in 
time probably dwindle.
One cannot emphasize too strongly that tinkering with the 
customary law of succession, and with the rights of a family 
over the persons and property of its members, strikes a root- 
blow at the whole family-system, and thereby at the typical 
Akan form of land-tenure. It would be improper here to judge 
this system; but it is important for those who make what 
appear trifling changes to realize what they are doing. The 
Akan system has many merits which it would be foolish to jeo­
pardize unless something better could be put in its place.
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3. KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL OP CUSTOMARY LAW.
We are thus naturally led to a consideration of our know­
ledge of customary law, and the control which, should be exer­
cised over its administration and development. Sufficient has 
already been said passim to show that Akan law is complex, and 
that its comprehension is made more difficult by its fluid 
nature at the present time. In fact, the hierarchy of con­
current interests which exists in Akan land-tenure has no real 
parallels elsewhere; it is most likely to be misunderstood by 
those who come from an entirely different legal system, with 
its feudal hangovers, in which estates are measured by their 
duration rather than by their extent. Some of the problems 
which now exist -.such as those of indebtedness, rights of 
jurisdiction, etc. - are due to previous lack of knowledge and 
control of the customary law, to a fear or inability to step 
in, to absence of a high policy for the future development of 
customary law. There are few now who would deny that every 
effort should be made to investigate, record, and evaluate the 
rules of customary law; though fear is sometimes expressed 
that the recording of customary law in accessible form will 
have unfortunate consequences (e.g., by stereotyping or per­
verting the law which native courts would apply). Some persons 
see salvation in codification, others in registration of title. 
Admirable though these may be, they all depend on previous 
acquaintance with the customary law as it is; a somewhat
j
i
i
contemptuous attitude to custom (auch as treating it as ”for-
eign law” in the courts of its native country) must be aban- 
7
doned.
With fuller knowledge must come control. This implies 
not merely a day-to-day scrutiny of the workings of the law, 
but decision on long-term objectives. Is it the aim that the 
future law of the Gold Coast should be basically English, 
basically African, or a mixture of the two?
4. GOLD COAST LAW.
The truth of the matter is that even today the two sys­
tems, English and African, are irretrievably mixed. This is 
sufficiently exemplified by the prevalent use of writing to 
record customary transactions, or to effect transfers of in­
terests, and by the constant moulding to which custom is sub­
jected through the decisions of superior courts, applying 
English concepts to test customary rules or remedy deficien­
cies. The fact that the Gold Coast has a single legal system 
is obscured by the legislation governing the courts, and by
the dicta of judges on the status and proof of custom. These
8
matters have already been considered; one sees some of the 
difficulties involved when the Supreme Court has to consider 
a customary transaction in which writing ha3 been used, or to
7.See below, pp. 797-8*
8.Cf. WRITING, at pp. 667 et seq.: and LONG
POSSESSION, at pp. 704 et seq.
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decide a case of long possession when bound by the rule that 
prescription and limitation do not operate in customary law.
In particular, there is a tendency to find on very weak evid­
ence that "natives” have impliedly agreed to be bound by Eng­
lish law, thus taking the dispute into the far happier ground 
of English law, and avoiding the problems of the proof of cus­
tom and its application to the circumstances*
Part of the trouble is due to the dual system of courts, 
neither exclusively bound to a single system of law, but 
nevertheless each having a proper law which is prlma facie 
applicable. There were probably good arguments In favour of 
having courts whose personal jurisdiction was restricted to 
Africans, and which could administer only native law in the 
heyday of Indirect Rule, and before the local inhabitants had 
emerged into a modern society. Today, when Africans have a 
law which is neither pure African nor pure English, and may 
choose to regulate their affairs with any mixture of the two, 
there are very strong arguments for omnicompetent courts, 
empowered to deal with parties of all races, to administer any 
law applicable to the matter in controversy, no matter whether 
this shows affinities with the English or African system; and 
it is gratifying to know that the new Local Courts, when they 
are introduced, will partake of this character. It is to be 
hoped that at the same time the superior courts will adopt an 
attitude to customary law which accords more with realities:
that is, that the suggestion that Akan law is a foreign law 
in the Supreme Court will be abandoned, even if this is no 
more than a convenient way of saying that the proof of custom­
ary law is of its nature more stringent than that of English 
law. Neither the House of Lords in its appellate capacity, 
when faced with English or Scottish appeals, or the Judicial 
Committee, ranging the legal systems of the world, has main­
tained that any law which it is empowered to administer is 
9
foreign to it.
5. THE FUTURE OF AKAN LAND-TENURE.
With the extension of education and the growth of commerce, 
it is to be expected that not only will writing be used for 
legal dealings (as it is in any civilized country), thus ex­
tending the present trend, but that at the same time many of 
the forms of English law will be borrowed for general use.
This will emphasize the unitary nature of Gold Coast law; it
9. A searching criticism of the suggestion that a law can be 
foreign in its own country, and an indication of the lines 
on which the administration of customary law might use­
fully develop, is given in the authoritative judgement of 
the Privy Council (per Sir George Rankin) in the Indian 
case of The Mosque known as Masjid Shahid Ganj & or3 v. 
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak "Committee, Amritzar, & anor: 
L.R. (1940) 67 I.A. 251. lFwas"said at p. 259:
u A third feature of the suit has reference to the 
method of trial, the learned District Judge having 
been persuaded that the mode by which a British 
Indian Court ascertains the Mahomedan law is by 
taking evidence. The opinion of Sulaiman J.
/in an Indian case/ to the contrary ... was cited
/over
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9. (cont. from previous page) -
to him, but he wrongly considered that s. 49 of 
the Evidence Act was applicable to the ascertain­
ment of the law. He seems also to have relied on 
the old practice of obtaining the opinions of pandits 
on questions of Hindu law... No great harm, as it 
happened, was done by the admission of this class of 
evidence, as the witnesses made reference to author­
itative texts in a short and sensible manner. But it 
would not be tolerable that a Hindu or a Muslim in a 
British Indian Court should be put to the expense of 
proving by expert witnesses the legal principles 
applicable to his case, and it would introduce great 
confusion into the practice of the Courts if decisions 
upon Hindu or Muslim law were to depend on the evid­
ence given in a particular case, the credibility of 
the expert witnesses, and so forth. The Muslim Law 
is not the common law of India: British India has
no common law in the sense of law applicable prima 
facie to everyone, unless it be the statutory Codes, 
e.g., Contract Act, Transfer of Property Act. But 
the Muslim law is under legislative enactments applied 
by British Indian Courts to certain classes of matters 
and to certain classes of people as part of the law 
of the land which the Courts administer as being with­
in their own knowledge and competence. The system 
of Mexpert advisers” (muftist maulavis or, in the case 
of Hindu law, pandits) had its day, but has long been 
abandoned, though the opinions given by such advisers 
may still be cited from the reports. Custom, in 
variance of the general law, is matter of evidence, 
but not the law itself. Their Lordships desire to 
adopt the observations of Sulaiman J. in the case 
referred to:-
*It is the duty of the Courts themselves 
to interpret the law of the land and to apply 
it and not to depend on the opinion of wit­
nesses however learned they may be. It would 
be dangerous to delegate their duty to wit­
nesses produced by either party. Foreign 
law, on the other hand, is a question of fact 
with which courts in British India are not 
supposed to be conversant. Opinions of experts 
on foreign law are, therefore, allowed to be 
admitted. ,f1
(It should be noted that there is only one system of 
courts in India; but the argument remains valid for 
the Gold Coast.)
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will also prepare the ground for a form of codification.
Perhaps the most successful example of the type of codification 
which I favour is the English Sale of Goods Act. 1893: this,
it must be remembered, was possible only as the result of the 
patient working-out over a long period by the courts of rules 
for the regulation of commercial dealings. Codification, to 
be of any use, must be comprehensive; it must cover not merely 
customary rules governing land-tenure, but the English or Gold 
Coast law (e.g., in regard to execution) as well.
As well as codification, there is much to be said for 
, registration of title to land. Many look on this as a panacea 
for all ills; but indeed it can assist only a healthy patient. 
Rights must be ascertained before they are recorded; a begin­
ning has been made in Chapter XIII of this work, but this is 
no more than tentative.
Some of the more flagrant omissions and confusions in Akan 
land-tenure must be supplied or rectified by legislation: it
is for consideration whether rules of prescription and limita­
tion might not now be introduced into the customary law; pro­
vision might be made for the recording of native wills in 
writing, and their registration with a local court; the terms 
of pledges and mortgages, and their enforcement by fi.fa. and 
otherwise, might come under scrutiny; the conditions of 
tenancies granted to strangers might be regulated; and so on.
In short, Immediate (though belated) control should be exer­
cised over the details of Akan law, with this end in view - 
to produce, by a marriage of customary rules, refined and 
extended where necessary, and English legal method, a law at 
once in harmony with the traditions and Institutions of the 
people, and adapted to the demands of a modern, democratic 
society.
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APPENDIX,
SOME RECENT LEGISLATION}
1. The State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance. No. 4 of 1952:
This Ordinance applies only to Ashanti. The protection
of stool property was formerly brought about by the Stool Prop-
2
erty Protection Ordinance, No, 22 of 1940, This Ordinance is 
intended to replace that of 1940; and in addition, whilst the 
Second Schedule of the Local Government Ordinance. 1951, rep­
ealed the Native Authority (Ashanti) Ordinance, cap. 79, the
Third Schedule to the same ordinance saved certain sections
subject to amendment (consisting principally of the deletion 
of the words 1fNative Authorities” where these occurred). The 
new Ordinance repeals those sections of cap, 79 preserved by 
the Local Government Ordinance,
The ordinance makes fresh provision for the protection of 
Stool property. The definition of "Stool Property” is given 
by s. 2 , which says:
” ‘Stool Property* includes the Stool itself and
all the Insignia, and such other properties in­
cluding land as were handed over or declared as 
Stool Property to a Chief on his installation, 
and property (other than private property)
1. The legislation which follows is either of such recent 
date, or so recently available in this country, that it 
has been Impossible to notice it in the text. It is 
appended here to enable the reader to keep abreast of the 
current legal position in the Gold Coast*
2. For which see above at pp. 57, 299-300, 446 et seq.
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acquired, or made and enjoyed, by such Chief 
or his Stool during his occupancy of the Stool."
Failure to declare property as stool property at the time of a
chief’s enstoolment would thus lead, it seems, to property not
so declared falling outside the provisions of this Ordinance.
Part V. Protection of Stool Property of the ordinance 
covers (by s. 23) the recovery of stool property; whilst s.
24 (1) provides:
"Alienation of Stool Property. It shall not 
be lawful, without the consent of the State 
Council concerned, to alienate or pledge any 
Stool Property, and any instrument, and any 
transaction or agreement (whether in writing 
or not), which purports to effect any such 
alienation or pledge shall, in the absence of 
such consent, for all purposes be null and 
void."
S. 24 (3) provides that the ordinance is to be read in
addition to the provisions of the Local Government Ordinance,
3
in so far as it relates to land.
This Ordinance did not repeal the Stool Property Protection 
Ordinance; this omission was rectified by the State Councils 
(Ashanti) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1952 (No. 41 of 1952).
2. The State Councils (Colony and Southern Togoland) 
Ordinance, No. 8 of 1952:
This Ordinance is in similar terms to the foregoing.
S. 15 provides for the recovery, and s. 16 for the alienation,
of stool property in the same words as the Ashanti ordinance.
3. I.e., such consent is in addition to the concurrence which
must be obtained from the Local Council under s. 75 of 
the L.G.O. (See pp. 62 et 3eq. ante.)
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S. 40 (1) repeals the outstanding sections of the Native
2
Authority (Colony) Ordinance, 1944, as preserved by the Local 
Government Ordinance.
3* The Chattels Transfer Ordinance, No. 51 of 1952:
This Ordinance appears to be designed to remedy some of
the worst consequences of the present confusion relating to the
enforcement of security over property, and the use of ill-drawn
4
documents of uncertain effect.
It is limited in its effect to "chattels", which are
defined in s, 2 as follows:
"‘Chattels* means any movable property that can 
be completely transferred by delivery, and in­
cludes machinery, stock and the natural increase 
of stock, crops, growing trees and timber..."
Land is outside the scope of the Ordinance; presumably crops 
whether severed or attached to the realty are included, as s.27 
permits the giving of security over crops. S. 28 provides 
that the rights of the landlord of the land (or its mortgagee) 
are not affected by securities over the crops, unless he con­
sents in writing.
The Ordinance provides for the registration of "instru­
ments" affecting chattels. There is no provision that deal­
ings with chattels must be in writing, and thus amenable to 
registration. One must therefore conclude that evasion of the 
Ordinance through the use of oral agreements is possible; and
4. Cf. Chapters VI (PLEDGE AND MORTGAGE) and XI (WRITING) ante,
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that the intention of the legislator was only to ensure that
if writing is used, it shall be in a certain form and of no
effect unless registered,
“Instrument” is defined by s. 2 to mean:
“...any instrument given to secure the payment 
of money or the performance of some obligation 
and includes any bill of sale, mortgage, lien 
or any other document that transfers or pur­
ports to transfer the property in or right to 
possession of chattels, whether permanently or 
temporarily, whether absolutely or condition­
ally, and whether by way of sale, security, 
pledge, gift, settlement, or lease, and also 
the following:-
(a) inventories of chattels with receipt 
thereto attached;
(b) receipts for purchase-money of chattels;
(c) other assurances of chattels;
• • • • •
(f) any agreement, whether intended to be 
followed by the execution of any other instru­
ment or not, by which a right in equity to any 
chattels, or to any charge or security thereon 
or thereover, is conferred..."
But “Instrument" does not Include:
"securities over, or leases of, fixtures .... 
when mortgaged, charged or leased in any mort­
gage, charge or lease of any freehold or lease­
hold Interest in any land or building to which 
they are affixed.., or 
"any instrument which is a concession under the 
Concessions Ordinance, 1939, and relates solely 
to chattels..."
The choice of the word "instrument", and the phrase
"document that transfers*..", in the definition would seem to
c
exclude writings which are merely memoranda, and receipts,
5. Cf. Chapter XI, at pp. 646 et seq.
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except in the specific.cases of inventories with receipt 
attached, and receipts on the sale of chattels. The phrase­
ology throughout the Ordinance is "English" - it is doubtful 
whether there is such a thing as "freehold" in the Gold Coast, 
or whether the concept "chattel" is applicable in Akan Law.
Once a document is an "instrument” in the terms of the 
Ordinance, it must be drawn up in accordance with the forms 
appended to the Ordinance (with a full series of implied coven­
ants)^ and - to be of effect - it must be registered. The 
effect of non-registration is given by ss. 13 and 14 of the 
Ordinance. A new s. 13 was substituted by the Chattels Trans­
fer (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 13 of 1953, which now provides:
"Every instrument, unless registered in the 
manner hereinbefore provided, shall, upon the 
expiration of the time for registration, or if 
the time for registration is extended by the 
Supreme Court, then upon the expiration of 
such extended time, be deemed fraudulent and 
void as against -
(a) the assignee or trustee acting under 
any assignment for the benefit of the credit­
ors of the person whose chattels or any of 
them are comprised in any such instrument;
(b) any person seizing the chattels or any 
part thereof comprised in any such instrument, 
in execution of the process of any court auth­
orizing the seizure of the chattels of any 
person by whom or concerning whose chattels such 
instrument was made, and against every person 
on whose behalf such process was issued, 30 far 
as regards the property in or right to the 
possession of any chattels comprised in or 
affected by the instrument..."
And s. 14 provides:
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“No unregistered instrument comprising any 
chattels whatsoever shall, without express 
notice, be valid and effectual as against 
any bona fide purchaser or mortgagee for 
valuable consideration, or as against any 
person bona fide selling or dealing with such 
chattels as auctioneer or dealer or agent in 
the ordinary course of business.”
The effect of registering an instrument is given by s. 4:
nAll persons shall be deemed to have notice of 
an instrument and of the contents thereof so 
soon as such instrument has been registered 
as provided by the Ordinance.”
The wide-reaching terms of the Ordinance will undoubtedly
have an effect, not only on such questions as the form in which
6 7pledges are recorded and security enforced, but on the right
of the family to interplead when a member allows family prop­
erty to be seized in execution after pledging it without auth-
q
ority, and on the doctrine of the bona fide purchaser for value
9
without notice. It also makes compulsory the registration of
10deeds or instruments in certain connexions. Nevertheless, it 
leaves untouched most dealings with land, so that confusion and 
injustice will continue in regard to pledges of land, and the 
seizure of land in execution.
6. Cf. ante at pp. 425 et seq.
7. Cf. ante at pp. 443 et seq.
8. Cf. ante at pp. 415 et seq.
9. Cf. ante at pp. 716 et seq.
10. Cf. ante at pp. 741 et seq.where the existing optional 
procedure for registering deeds is described.
